From the Moscow Patriarchate: "A Brief Overview of the Largest Modern Church Divisions Operating on the Canonical Territory of the Russian Church" (2024)

Dr. Pavel Vladimirovich Bochkov

Associate Professor of the Department of Church History and Church-Practical Disciplines, Kostroma Theological Seminary [1]

 

 

Abstract. The article presents a very brief overview of the largest non-canonical Orthodox jurisdictions currently operating within the canonical territory of the Local Russian Church. Six major structures are examined based on the number of communities of believers within them: the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine,” the “Russian Orthodox Church Abroad” under the jurisdiction of “Metropolitan” Agafangel (Pashkovsky), the “True Orthodox Church of Russia” under the jurisdiction of “Schema-Metropolitan” Seraphim (Motovilov), the “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church” under the jurisdiction of “Metropolitan” Feodor (Gineevsky), the “Apostolic Orthodox Church,” and the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” under “Patriarch” Filaret (Denysenko). The article provides the most concise information about the time and history of the formation of these groups, as well as the number of communities, clergy, and “episcopate.” The overview makes it clear that non-canonical groups, having separated from the Russian Church for various reasons, are often in a state of conflict among their religious leaders in the course of their jurisdictional development and internal organization, which in turn leads to further divisions and fragmentations of these structures. Nevertheless, due to the increase in their “episcopate,” these groups pose a significant threat to ecclesiastical unity. The collection and analysis of materials on the history and current state of non-canonical groups can not only reflect the real situation in the world of schismatic communities, but also serve as a basis for a pan-Church response to this phenomenon—a comprehensive anti-schismatic strategy and the development of further measures for the protection of Church unity and the canonical order of the Church.

 

The issue of church divisions has always been particularly painful for the canonical Church, as it directly concerns the subject of ecclesiastical unity. Schism as a phenomenon always poses a great danger, arouses anxiety not only among the church hierarchy, but also brings discord and misunderstanding into the relationships between clergy and laity, divides society on religious grounds, and can lead to acute conflict situations with a wide range of negative consequences.

By 2024, several dozen schismatic communities of various ideological foundations and different origins were active on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. All these groups, despite the fact that they are mostly in sharp denial of one another, nevertheless act together against the Russian Orthodox Church.

There are a number of classifications and typologies by which church divisions can be examined. However, so as not to overload the audience with this introductory information, we will simply state that in our brief overview we have listed the non-canonical jurisdictions based on the principle of assessing their size from larger to less significant. At the same time, we will consider only the six largest non-canonical communities. We emphasize that the proposed list is intended only to highlight the most prominent groups and does not aim to provide a deep and detailed description of specific jurisdictions, which have been described in sufficient detail by the author in other works. [2] In our report, there is no room for a detailed retelling of the history of the emergence of a particular schism, the personal composition of the episcopate, or the origin of its “apostolic succession.”

Of course, the largest body that has set itself in opposition to the canonical Russian Church is the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), unlawfully created by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2018. In 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate unilaterally “restored to rank” the defrocked and deposed former Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret (Denysenko), who was also under anathema from the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, and at that time headed the non-canonical “Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate” (UOC-KP), as well as the leader of the non-canonical “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” (UAOC), the former priest of the ROC Makariy (Maletych). In 2018, at the initiative of state authorities and personally of the President of Ukraine P. A. Poroshenko, a so-called “Unification Council” of these non-canonical structures was held, which resulted in the creation of a new structure — the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine.” In January 2019, the Patriarchate of Constantinople issued a Tomos granting this jurisdiction autocephalous status. By doing so unilaterally, the Ecumenical Patriarchate delivered a most serious blow to inter-Orthodox relations, the consequences of which pose unprecedented threats to the unity of the Local Churches, not seen since the Great Schism of 1054. As of 2024, the OCU is recognized by the Orthodox Churches of the Greek world: the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Alexandria, as well as the Churches of Greece and Cyprus (while a number of hierarchs of the latter two Churches have made strong statements refusing recognition of the OCU). [3] In the other Local Churches, there is no unity on the issue of canonical recognition of the OCU.

As of mid-February 2024, this jurisdiction had within its episcopate 63 “hierarchs,” of whom 22 were “metropolitans,” 19 “archbishops,” and 22 “bishops.” Of these, 46 are ruling, 10 are vicars, 3 hold titular sees, and 4 are retired (including the former “Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine of the UOC-KP,” Filaret (Denysenko)). [4] As of January 1, 2022, the OCU comprised 6,187 parishes, 71 monasteries, and 3,842 “clergy.” [5] In the past two years, it can be said that the number of communities has increased due to the violent seizure and forced incorporation of communities belonging to the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. By mid-2024, the total number of OCU clergy fluctuates around 5,000 people. However, among the faithful and church-attending populace, the OCU holds no authority; their churches are almost always empty, and strong communities continue to exist only in the territory of Western Ukraine.

The OCU is rather politicized and aggressive. In its rhetoric, it speaks sharply against the Russian Orthodox Church, seeks to absorb, and actively persecutes the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. At the same time, the canonical "Ukrainian Church comprises up to a third of the parishes and faithful of the entire Russian Church (Moscow Patriarchate), and therefore the outcome of the current confrontation determines the fate not only of the Russian, but of all world Orthodoxy." [6] A number of hierarchs and clergy of this jurisdiction declare the idea of the Russian World to be heretical, demand that the leadership of the Russian Church be put on trial, and the like. The head of the OCU is “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine” Epiphanius (Dumenko), formerly the “Patriarchal Vicar” of Filaret (Denysenko) and, in effect, the second-in-command in the UOC-KP. His canonical legitimacy personally is questioned not only by the majority of the faithful but also by a number of Primates of Local Orthodox Churches. [7]

The next largest non-canonical jurisdiction is the non-canonical "Russian Orthodox Church Abroad" under the jurisdiction of "Metropolitan" Agafangel (Pashkovsky) (ROCA[A]).

It is worth mentioning here that after 1990, a long series of schisms occurred in ROCA, which led to endless fragmentations and the creation of various synods retaining the unchanged abbreviation ROCA. At present, around thirty small non-canonical jurisdictions consider themselves heirs of the historical ROCA, and through it, of the Orthodox Russian Church.

ROCA(A) arose as a result of the refusal by part of the parishes and communities of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad to recognize the Act of Canonical Communion between ROCA and the ROC in 2007. [8] The most uncompromising clergy, critical of the Moscow Patriarchate, led by Bishop Agafangel (Pashkovsky), fell into schism, declaring that their part of ROCA is the true successor of the historical Russian Church Abroad. As a result, Bishop Agafangel was suspended from ministry and later defrocked. Entering into union with a conglomerate of Greek Old Calendarist jurisdictions, Agafangel (Pashkovsky) carried out a series of ordinations, creating his own hierarchy, which was soon joined by two "bishops" of the non-canonical “Seraphimo-Gennadiev branch of the True Orthodox Catacomb Church,” also known as the “Sekachev” branch (named after the co-founder of this structure, “Schema-Metropolitan” Gennady (Sekach)). It is noteworthy that this branch of the Catacomb Church is completely devoid of apostolic succession, as it originates from the impostor layman Mikhail (Pozdeyev) (1886–1971), who passed himself off as the allegedly surviving Archbishop Seraphim (Ostroumov) (1880–1937) [9] during the years of repression. According to some reports, these “bishops” were received through cheirothesia, according to others—through re-ordination. Moreover, the Synod of Bishops of the historical ROCA was well informed about the lack of apostolic succession among the “Sekachevites,” as the Catacomb Archbishop of ROCA, Lazar (Zhurbenko), who possessed complete information on the state of the Catacomb Church in the USSR, repeatedly informed the ROCA Synod of the origin of the “Sekachevites.”

Nevertheless, the group of Agafangel (Pashkovsky) very soon came to represent a large structure, extended its influence to almost all continents, and engaged in polemics with other groups derived from ROCA.

At present, the jurisdiction numbers about 170 parishes, located both in the post-Soviet space and in countries of the far abroad. In addition to this, the jurisdiction includes 11 “bishops” and 125 “clergy.” [10] The data provided also includes the parishes and communities of the “Free Serbian Orthodox Church,” which are under the jurisdiction of ROCA(A), located in Australia. [11]

The third largest group in terms of numbers is the “True Orthodox Church of Russia” (TOCR) under the leadership of “Schema-Metropolitan” Seraphim (Motovilov), formerly better known as “Metropolitan” Raphael (Prokopyev). This jurisdiction traces its succession to the “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” and is essentially a conglomerate of “hierarchs” of various origins. Its history begins in the early 2000s, when, based on one of the groups that emerged from the disintegration of the “Russian True Orthodox Church,” under the leadership of retired military specialist L. Prokopyev, a structure began to be built that aimed to incorporate the entire so-called “non-canonical ‘alternative’” operating in Russia and neighboring countries. In 2003, a “Unification Council” was held, which absorbed a multitude of non-canonical clergy and “hierarchs.” [12] Thanks to a constant process of migration of “hierarchs,” the group is continuously replenished by various kinds of “bishops,” most of whom later leave the TOCR. Over the years of its existence, several dozen non-canonical hierarchs have passed through its ranks.

As of January 1, 2015, the jurisdiction included 33 religious organizations registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Of these, 3 were centralized organizations, 27 were local, and 3 were monasteries. [13] In addition to this, there exists a certain number of small communities without the status of a religious organization.

As of August 1, 2023, the jurisdiction consisted of 11 “bishops” who operated not only within the territory of Russia but also in countries of Latin America. [14] In addition, a number of this structure’s “hierarchs” are retired or inactive. The jurisdiction includes several dozen communities and several monasteries, with at least two large monasteries located in the Moscow region. Some communities are registered with the justice authorities. The TOCR itself holds the status of a centralized religious organization. Conferences and various theological discussions are held periodically. In particular, a process of rapprochement is observed with the “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church,” another offshoot of the Russian part of ROCA.

At the initiative of the TOCR, the so-called “Synaxis of True Orthodox Churches” was established, which became yet another form of unity for a number of non-canonical communities from various countries. [15]

Speaking of the already mentioned “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church” (ROAC), currently headed by “Metropolitan” Feodor (Gineevsky), it should be noted that, like ROCA(A), it is a derivative of ROCA.

The Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church traces its history to an intra-jurisdictional crisis that arose within the Russian part of ROCA in the mid-1990s, when the ROCA Bishop of Suzdal and Vladimir, Valentin (Rusantsov) (1939–2012), made the decision to break canonical communion with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and began organizing an independent jurisdiction in Russia, which was initially called the “Higher Church Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church,” later transformed into the ROAC.

For a time, the ROAC was a fairly substantial jurisdiction and, compared to other non-canonical entities, exhibited all the signs of an independent structure: a number of dioceses, a functioning synod, and a regularly convened “Council of Bishops.” After the death of the head of this jurisdiction, “Metropolitan” Valentin (Rusantsov), which occurred in 2012, and following the confiscation of all historical churches from the ROAC by court orders initiated by state authorities, the influence of the ROAC was significantly weakened, and a substantial portion of its clergy transferred to other so-called “ROCA splinters”—formations that broke away from ROCA from 1995 to the present.

As of the second half of 2016, the ROAC had about 90 parish communities and about 60 “priests,” as well as the Suzdal Theological School. [16]

By 2024, the ROAC includes no fewer than 8 “hierarchs” and several dozen small communities throughout the country, including some that are historical catacomb communities.

The next notable non-canonical organization is the “Apostolic Orthodox Church” (AOC). It emerged as a movement for the “renewal and revival of Orthodoxy” and was originally named the “Orthodox Church of the ‘Revival’,” later renamed to the AOC. From 2000 to 2018, the AOC went through a long journey, actively disseminated its ideas, organized a multitude of “dioceses,” for which a considerable number of “bishops” were ordained, most of whom later left the AOC. [17]

It should be noted that at present this religious organization is undergoing a phase of rapid structural expansion. Numerous vagantes (independent “hierarchs,” usually with virtually no flock) from Africa and Asia are joining it; new “episcopal consecrations” are regularly carried out, and statements are made about the accession of entire dioceses, allegedly encompassing the territories of entire countries. However, unlike all the previously mentioned communities, this jurisdiction is neo-renovationist, treats tradition and heritage rather loosely, espouses broad liberalism both in relation to the liturgical tradition and in the area of parish and general ecclesial life, and recognizes a married episcopate. While at its founding in 2000 it bore the features of a typical non-canonical jurisdiction, in light of various reforms, leadership changes, and the mass ordinations of the past three years, one can say that the AOC has transformed into a kind of confederation of religious communities of widely varying traditions and levels of canonical awareness. As a rule, the main flock of the AOC consists of unchurched individuals detached from tradition: members of the intelligentsia, youth involved in various subcultures, representatives of socio-political opposition, liberal thinkers, and the like. The AOC, as a central religious organization, is headed by the illegitimate son of the poet A. A. Galich (real name: Aleksandr Aronovich Ginzburg, 1918–1977), former priest of the Novgorod diocese, Grigory (Mikhnov-Vaytenko). At different times, the AOC has included the anathematized former priest Gleb Yakunin (1934–2014), “Metropolitan” Vitaly (Kuzhevatov), the well-known neo-Pentecostal “Archbishop” Sergey Zhuravlyov, “priest” Lev Regelson, and others. Due to the organization of communities based on the personal contacts of parish leaders, there are currently several dozen small AOC groups and communities active in Russia. A similar situation is observed in Ukraine, where the AOC has its own structures in the form of several non-canonical groups united by a common origin of their “hierarchy” and, in some cases, being in canonical communion with one another. Despite the small size of these groups and the amorphousness of their structure, the AOC poses a serious threat to ecclesiastical unity, as it exploits a number of fashionable liberal slogans and seeks to preach among the socially vulnerable segments of the population, especially the youth.

Regarding the size of the jurisdiction, one can quite confidently speak of several dozen groups in Russia and no fewer than a hundred communities in various countries around the world. At the same time, it is often the case that each individual small community is headed by a “bishop.” The total number of the “episcopate,” by the most conservative estimates, ranges from 20 to 40 persons, including African “hierarchs.” The “Orthodoxy” of the AOC’s representatives is highly conditional; among its “episcopate” one can often encounter rather exotic figures. For example, at one point the AOC included a “bishop” who was simultaneously a Hindu guru, professing a belief system far removed from Christianity and actively practicing syncretic rituals. The presence of such a figure in the “episcopate” led to a schism within the AOC. [18]

Another notable structure within the canonical territory of the Local Russian Church is the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” headed by the long-standing “Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine” Filaret (Denysenko). Despite the fact that after his separation from the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” very few clergy followed him, he nevertheless managed to effectively revive his structure, contrary to the decisions of his own “Local Council” of 2018 regarding its dissolution and unification with the UAOC. [19]

According to various estimates, in 2023–2024 the UOC-KP consisted of approximately 25 parish communities in Ukraine, none of which had legal registration. Some reports indicate that the largest number of these are located in the Odesa region (about 10 parishes), in the Kryvyi Rih region (7 parishes), and in the Kyiv region (up to 5 parishes). There is also an active European deanery (protopresbyterate), headed by “Protopriest” Volodymyr Chaika, [20] which includes up to 15 communities of Ukrainian believers living in Germany and Denmark. [21] In the United States, there is also the “Vicariate of the UOC-KP in America and Canada,” headed by “Bishop” Luka (Zgoba), rector of the “Patriarchal St. Nicholas Stavropegial Parish” in Philadelphia, USA (the vicariate also includes a St. Nicholas parish in Chicago). Two “bishops” of the UOC-KP reside in Greece; however, the likelihood that a significant number of communities and clergy operate under their jurisdiction is extremely low. In addition, in the spring of 2022, it was announced that several parishes from Australia and New Zealand, led by Archimandrite Nektarios (Alexandratos), were received into the UOC-KP. [22] The synod of the UOC-KP consists of 13 “hierarchs.” [23] The extensive life experience and long service in administrative church positions have enabled Filaret (Denysenko) to keep the UOC-KP afloat. As before, he demands special treatment from the governmental authorities and society of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that Filaret (Denysenko) is the longest-serving hierarch in terms of consecration (1962) and one of the oldest by age (born in 1929) among the heads of non-canonical jurisdictions, surpassed only by the head of the non-canonical “Romanian Old Calendar Orthodox Church,” “Metropolitan” Demosfen (Ioniță).

Structures of the Kyiv Patriarchate also exist in Russia, specifically in the Belgorod region, both in the city of Belgorod itself and in regional towns. Two “hierarchs” of the UOC-KP reside permanently in Russia: “Metropolitan of Belgorod and Oboyan” Ioasaph (Shibayev), who was defrocked by the Bishops’ Council of the ROC in February 1997, and his vicar “Bishop of Valuyki” Peter (Moskalev). [24] Both “hierarchs” became practically the only “bishops” who supported Filaret (Denysenko) in his efforts to “revive” the Kyiv Patriarchate, for which they were defrocked by the “Holy Synod” of the OCU in May 2022. [25]

Of course, there are also other non-canonical groups that declare to all interested parties that they consist of hundreds of parishes and thousands of faithful, but such claims are far from reality. Perhaps the only structure that maintains a stable number of strong church communities located directly on the territory of Russia is the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church. However, Old Believer jurisdictions lie outside the scope of our review.

At present, the schismatics continue to engage in their non-canonical religious activity. When examining the offshoots of ROCA, it becomes clear that the vast majority of their communities located in the post-Soviet space have entered a state of regression and chaotic “ordinations” to “episcopal” rank of completely random individuals. These trends will only further accelerate the disintegration of the already few communities and will lead to the phenomenon of “vagantes” becoming widespread throughout the entire canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is dangerous that such individuals are, as a rule, simultaneously religious fraudsters, and their rhetoric and methods of preaching in some cases fully fall under the definition of religious extremism.

Active opposition to the schismatics, the creation of one’s own scholarly school, the strengthening of conciliarity and canonical consciousness may be effective means of combating these phenomena. But for this, the participation of the fullness of the entire Church is necessary.

 

NOTES

1. The article is based on the theses of a report delivered at the 3rd All-Russian Scientific and Theological Conference “The Renovationist Schism in Siberia: Canonical, Theological, and Historical Assessments” (Tomsk, Tomsk Theological Seminary, June 17, 2024).

2. See: Bochkov Pavel, Priest. Overview of Non-Canonical Orthodox Jurisdictions of the 20th–21st Centuries. 2nd ed., revised and expanded. St. Petersburg: Svoe Publishing, 2018–2020. Vols. 1–5.

3. See: Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus. The Ukrainian Church Question. Moscow: Publishing House “Poznanie,” 2021; Nikifor, Metropolitan of Kissamos and Tylliria. The Contemporary Ukrainian Question and Its Resolution According to the Divine and Sacred Canons. Moscow: Publishing House “Poznanie,” 2021.

4. Episcopate [Electronic resource] // Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 2024. URL: https://www.pomisna.info/uk/tserkva/yepiskopat/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

5. Report on the Network of Religious Organizations in Vinnytsia Region as of January 1, 2022 [Electronic resource] // State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience. 2024. URL: https://dess.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Zvit-pro-merezhu-relihiynykh-orhanizatsiy-Form1-2022.xlsx (accessed: 20.06.2024).

6. Shchipkov V. A. The USA Against Orthodoxy: Systemic Pressure of the USA on the Russian Orthodox Church as a Means of Geopolitical Struggle Against Russia Amid the Ukrainian Crisis: Monograph / Scientific editors: O. I. Bykova, E. E. Mamaeva. Moscow: Russian Expert School, 2023. p. 35.

7. For example, see: Primate of the Polish Church Refused to Recognize the Head of the OCU as a Clergyman [Electronic resource] // News in Russia and the World. TASS. 2024. URL: https://tass.ru/obschestvo/5980184 (accessed: 20.06.2024).

8. Act of Canonical Communion (signed on May 17, 2007) // Collection of Documents of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vol. 1. Normative Documents. Moscow: Publishing House of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2013. pp. 337–340.

9. See: Alekseev V. V., Nechaeva M. Yu. The Resurrected Romanovs?.. On the History of Imposture in 20th Century Russia. Part I. Yekaterinburg, 2001; Alekseev V. V., Nechaeva M. Yu. The Resurrected Romanovs?. On the History of Imposture in 20th Century Russia. Part II. Chelyabinsk; Yekaterinburg, 2002.

10. List of Clergy and Parishes of the Russian Church Abroad with Their Addresses [Electronic resource] // Synod of ROCA. 2024. URL: https://sinod.ruschurchabroad.org/address.htm (accessed: 20.06.2024).

11. Bochkov P. V., Priest. “The Serbian Free Orthodox Church in Australia: The Emergence of the Jurisdiction and Its Current State” // The Lord’s Field. Bulletin of the Penza Theological Seminary. 2023. No. 3(29). pp. 108–116.

12. “Unification Council of Bishops of the True Orthodox Church in Russia” // Church Gazette. Independent Organ of Orthodox Church Thought. Oradell: NJ, 2003. No. 8–9 (121). pp. 6–7.

13. Statistics of Registered Religious Organizations as of 01.01.2015 (according to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation) // Religion and Law. 2015. No. 1 (72). p. 59.

14. Episcopate [Electronic resource] // True Orthodox Church. Official Website. 2024. URL: https://ipckatakomb.ru/епископат/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

15. See: Bochkov P. V., Priest. Non-Canonical International: “Synaxis of the True Orthodox Churches” – A Challenge to the Canonical Unity of the Orthodox Church // The Lord’s Field. Bulletin of the Penza Theological Seminary. 2022. Issue No. 1 (23). pp. 101–114.

16. Representatives of the Vladimir branch of the FSB explained that the ROAC hierarchs they interviewed “have no connection to extremist activity.” They were interested in another individual [Electronic resource] // Portal-Credo.Ru. 2016. URL: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=122032 (accessed: 18.09.2016).

17. Bochkov P., Priest. Renovationism in Our Days. The History of the Emergence and Current State of the Non-Canonical Jurisdiction ‘Apostolic Orthodox Church’ // Ryazan Theological Bulletin. 2016. No. 1 (13). pp. 54–73.

18. For more details, see: Bochkov P. V., Priest. The Emergence of New Non-Canonical Jurisdictions as a Result of Divisions in the Neo-Renovationist “Apostolic Orthodox Church” in 2018–2023 // Ryazan Theological Bulletin. 2015. No. 2 (28). pp. 114–125.

19. The Kyiv Patriarchate and UAOC Self-Dissolved Before the Council [Electronic resource] // Information Portal “RBK-Ukraine.” 2023. URL: https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/kievskiy-patriarhat-uapts-samoraspustilis-1544894232.html (accessed: 15.09.2023).

20. Chaika Volodymyr, Protopriest. Open Appeal of the European Deanery to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2020. No. 11. pp. 11–13.

21. Dean of the European Deanery Congratulated Ukrainians on Easter in Many Cities of Germany and Denmark // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2022. No. 4. p. 24.

22. Parishes from Australia and New Zealand Were Received into the Kyiv Patriarchate // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2022. No. 3. p. 20.

23. Episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate // Orthodox Church Calendar. Year 2023. Kyiv: From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 2022. pp. 2–5.

24. Resolution of the Bishops’ Council on the Deposition from Holy Orders of the Suspended Clergy Archimandrites Valentin (Rusantsov), Adrian (Starina), and Igumen Ioasaph (Shibayev) [Electronic resource] // Russian Orthodox Church. Official Website. 2024. URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/417799.html (accessed: 20.06.2024).

25. Documents of the Holy Synod Meeting of May 23, 2022 [Electronic resource] // Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 2024. URL: https://www.pomisna.info/uk/document-post/dokumenty-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-synodu-23-travnya-2022-r/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

 

Source: Хризостом: научно-просветительский журнал Екатеринодарской духовной семинарии [Chrysostom: The Scientific and Educational Journal of the Ekaterinodar Theological Seminary], 2024. No. 3 (11), pp. 17-28.