A. A. Kostryukov
Russian source: St.
Tikhon’s University Review, Series II: History. History of the Russian
Orthodox Church, 2026, Issue 131, pp. 101-118.
Abstract: With the coming to power of M. S. Gorbachev in the USSR in 1985, the
state’s attitude toward the Church gradually began to change for the better.
After some time, churches and monasteries began to reopen, and those who had
been imprisoned for their faith were released. Changes also took place in the
Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) in the mid-1980s.
Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky) was succeeded as its head by Metropolitan
Vitaly (Ustinov). According to a number of testimonies, this hierarch viewed
the changes taking place in the homeland positively. There is also evidence
that, among the clergy and parishioners, there were many supporters of
reunification with the Moscow Patriarchate. Nevertheless, no dialogue took
place during those years. On the basis of the periodical press of the Russian
diaspora and archival documents, the article addresses the question of why,
instead of rapprochement, relations deteriorated. The reason for ROCOR’s
cooling toward the Moscow Patriarchate was that the Soviet leadership did not
immediately ease the persecution of believers, while the leadership of the
Moscow Patriarchate continued to praise the existing regime. This led to
distrust on the part of the Russian Church Abroad, especially since the
majority of its episcopate likewise did not welcome rapprochement with the
Moscow Patriarchate. Metropolitan Vitaly was also opposed to dialogue. The
Russian Church Abroad began to present the Moscow Patriarchate with ultimatums,
and in 1990 it decided to establish its own dioceses on the canonical territory
of the Moscow Patriarchate. This led to a deterioration in relations and
postponed the beginning of dialogue for more than ten years.
The history of relations between
the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) and the Moscow
Patriarchate in the late 1980s and early 1990s has not yet received adequate
treatment in the scholarly literature, even though this period could have proved
decisive for the possible reunification of the two parts of Russian Orthodoxy.
Dialogue might have been facilitated by the political changes that began after
M. S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 and that entered history under the
name “Perestroika.” The official exposure of Stalinist repressions and the
rehabilitation of innocent victims opened the way for the Moscow Patriarchate
to bear witness to the New Martyrs. In 1987, Optina Hermitage and the Tolga
Monastery were returned to the Church, and churches began to reopen. The state
also took part in the celebration of the millennium of the Baptism of Rus’;
television broadcast excerpts from divine services, while for the first time in
decades the mass media spoke of the Church not with hostility, but even with
sympathy. On April 29, 1988, in the run-up to the Local Council, M. Gorbachev
met with Patriarch Pimen (Izvekov) and the members of the Holy Synod. [1]
The Local Council, held on June
6–9, 1988, adopted the “Statute on the Governance of the Russian Orthodox
Church,” abolished the Khrushchev-era parish reform, and canonized nine
ascetics. A year later, the Moscow Patriarchate also glorified the first saint
from among the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia—His Holiness Patriarch
Tikhon. In 1990, the canonization of Righteous John of Kronstadt followed,
something that only a year or two earlier would have been absolutely
unthinkable because of this saint’s monarchist and anti-revolutionary views.
However, relations between the
Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Church Abroad during those years not only
failed to improve, but actually deteriorated. It would therefore be worthwhile
to understand why the situation developed in precisely this way rather than
another, and why, instead of reconciliation, a new phase of conflict began.
As is well known, amid the wave
of democratization, the Moscow Patriarchate attempted to establish relations
with the Russian Church Abroad. On June 21, 1987, Patriarch Pimen and the Holy
Synod addressed an epistle to the Russian Church Abroad and the Ukrainian
Autocephalists: “We address you… with a brotherly appeal to overcome the spirit
of bitterness and division and, with one mouth and one heart, to glorify the
all-holy and magnificent name of our Lord and Savior. We fervently pray that
the Great Chief Shepherd may soften our hearts and unite us in His love, so
that together, in humility and repentance, we may with one accord meet the
approaching days of the celebration of the millennium of the Baptism of Rus’.”
[2]
The Local Council of 1988 issued
another document as well—an appeal “To the Children of the Russian Orthodox
Church Who Are Not in Canonical Communion with the Mother Church.” The appeal
spoke of the canonization of saints, of monastic communities that had been
returned by the state, and also of the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church
was recognized by all the Local Churches. The cause of the division was
identified as “not questions of faith, but external historical circumstances,
in the setting of which a wall of estrangement arose between us.” The epistle
was composed in a peaceable and calm tone and called not for repentance, but
for dialogue and reconciliation. [3] It is noteworthy that, according to the
published materials of the Local Council, representatives of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia were also included among the honored
guests—Priest V. Potapov and six laymen. [4]
Sympathy toward the Russian
Church Abroad, amid the wave of democratic change, was expressed in other ways
as well. The Russian anti-communist writer Vladimir Soloukhin wrote in the
newspaper Moscow News that the division had never been profound. The
writer proposed transferring to the Church Abroad one of the desecrated
monasteries—for example, the Nilov-Stolobensky or Kursk-Root Hermitage—so that
one of these monasteries might become a dependency of ROCOR and engage in
publishing activity. Soloukhin considered this the best step toward
rapprochement between the Churches. [5]
During those same years, changes
were also taking place in the Russian Church Abroad. At the end of 1985, its
First Hierarch, Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky), died—a hierarch of
conservative views who, in private conversations, at times expressed extremely
harsh opinions of the Moscow Patriarchate, even to the point of questioning
whether it possessed grace. [6] In 1986, Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov) became
Chairman of the Synod of Bishops. At first, it might have seemed that he was
not as radical as his predecessor. This impression was supported, for example,
by the removal from power of ROCOR’s “gray cardinal,” Bishop Gregory (Grabbe),
[7] as well as by canonical measures taken against the “zealot” leadership of
Holy Transfiguration Monastery in Boston. [8]
The few private testimonies that
reached the Moscow Patriarchate were also encouraging. Archpriest Andrei
Semyanko (ROCOR), who visited Russia in July 1989, told the DECR official
accompanying him that approximately 25% of the clergy and laity of the Church
Abroad were ready for reunification, 25% were categorically opposed, while the
remaining 50% were indifferent to the issue and would follow their leadership.
The negotiation process, therefore, could have been fruitful. It is noteworthy
that, according to the archpriest’s testimony, he had received Metropolitan
Vitaly’s blessing for this trip. [9]
Much the same was said by another
ROCOR cleric, Hieromonk John (Magramm), who visited Russia in September 1988.
According to him, at that time there was a group of influential figures within
the Church Abroad who were strongly opposed to rapprochement with the Moscow
Patriarchate. Father John maintained, however, that the number of such
“ill-wishers” had declined because of the departure from ROCOR of the Greek Old
Calendarists—that is, Archimandrite Panteleimon (Metropoulos) and certain other
members of Holy Transfiguration Monastery in Boston. In the visitor’s opinion,
frequent visits to Russia by clergy from abroad would help promote
rapprochement. [10] Such a course did not seem unrealistic to Fr. John: he
believed that ROCOR had much in common with the Moscow Patriarchate, unlike,
for example, the Orthodox Church in America, which the hieromonk described as
“commercial.” [11]
It is also not difficult to
discern the outwardly favorable attitude of the Moscow church leadership toward
clergy from abroad, as well as its interest in maintaining contacts with them.
Thus, for example, Hieromonk John (Magramm) had already been invited to Russia
in 1985 by the Chairman of the DECR, Metropolitan Philaret (Vakhromeyev) of
Minsk and Slutsk.
During his visit, the hieromonk
met with Metropolitan Philaret himself, Bishop Theophan (Galinsky) of Kashira,
and Protopresbyter Matthew Stadnyuk. The meetings left a favorable impression
on the visitor, who admitted that he had previously held an incorrect view of
the situation of the Church in Russia and expressed the hope that the Tikhvin
Icon of the Mother of God, which had been taken to the United States during the
war, would be returned to its homeland. Archpriest Leonid Abashev, the Moscow
Patriarchate cleric who accompanied the hieromonk, noted that during the trip
the visitor received the blessing of Patriarch Pimen and the bishops, conversed
amicably with the clergy, prayed at divine services, and, at the Holy
Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra, spoke with the monastery’s dean, Abbot Daniel
(Dorovskikh), and the choir director, Archimandrite Matthew (Mormyl), who sent
audio recordings of church chants to America. Another gift from the Lavra
consisted of seals for prosphora. Hieromonk John also traveled to Kiev and
visited the abbess of the Florovsky Monastery, “Abbess Natalia” (most likely
the author of the report meant Abbess Antonia [Filkina], who was abbess of the
monastery during those years). The report noted that Fr. John was invited to
take part in divine services—apparently molebens—but that he “tactfully
declined.” [12]
The inexperienced “ROCOR people”
were won over by the hospitality, as well as by the fact that the Patriarchate
covered all expenses connected with visits to tourist sites. Its comfortable
financial position could hardly go unnoticed, and the luxury of the church
furnishings produced at Sofrino was particularly dazzling. Hieromonk John was
shown around an exhibition of the Patriarchate’s Economic Administration, after
which he even expressed a desire to visit the factory at Sofrino and purchase a
large candle stand. [13]
Sofrino products captivated more
than Hieromonk John alone. Thus, Archpriest Andrei Semyanko conveyed a request
from Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov) for permission to open a book depot in
Moscow for the sale and distribution of Holy Scripture and theological
literature. Under this plan, the proceeds could be transferred to the Moscow
Patriarchate, which in turn would settle accounts with ROCOR by supplying
products from the Patriarchate’s workshops. [14]
The Chairman of the Publishing
Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Pitirim (Nechaev), also had
information indicating that Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov) was not opposed to
unity. On May 12, 1987, he received the émigrés M. Belyaeva and N. Trubetskoy,
who had arrived in the Soviet Union for business negotiations. Both belonged to
the Russian Church Abroad and described themselves as representatives of an
initiative group of Russian youth seeking to establish contacts with the USSR
on a patriotic basis. “According to them,” Metropolitan Pitirim reported,
“Metropolitan Vitaly encourages the development of friendly tendencies, but
because of the continuing hostility of the older generation he is unable to do
so openly. His personal attitude toward the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Patriarchate is developing in a positive direction, and he has already had
unofficial meetings with several priests of the Moscow Patriarchate.” [15]
According to Belyaeva, the
atmosphere of hostility toward the Moscow Patriarchate was diminishing,
especially after the Grabbe faction had lost its influence. At the same time,
Belyaeva noted that Bishop Gregory (Grabbe), who had not lost his personal authority,
continued to pursue his hostile course. [16]
Apparently, the older émigrés—and
especially the generations that had grown up abroad—were already forgetting the
bloody times and were becoming fairly friendly in their attitude toward both
the USSR and the Moscow Patriarchate. This was even more true of the laity.
Thus, in September 1988, Archpriest Anatoly Kaznovetsky, a cleric of the Moscow
Patriarchate, arrived in Australia to work at EXPO 88. In a private capacity,
ROCOR clergymen Archpriest Michael Klebansky and Priest Ruf Tobolev agreed to
meet with him. The clergy were mainly interested in the Moscow Patriarchate’s
ecumenical contacts and its cooperation with the atheist authorities, although
both priests acknowledged that M. Gorbachev’s policies should resolve the
latter problem. According to the representative of the Moscow Patriarchate, the
participants parted on cordial terms. However, as Archpriest A. Kaznovetsky
reported, not all the clergy were so favorably disposed. The rector of one of
the churches in Brisbane sent word to Fr. Anatoly through visitors to the
exhibition that he should not come to their church. Unlike the priests, the
laity received the Moscow representative with considerable enthusiasm: they
“wept and asked him to kiss their native soil.” Moreover, according to
Archpriest Anatoly, the ROCOR Annunciation parish in Brisbane was prepared to
enter the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The priest’s general
conclusion was that the Russian émigrés in the country were drawn toward the
Moscow Patriarchate, the clergy were wavering, and only the hierarchs remained
firm in their position, although they were gradually losing ground. [17]
No less interesting were the
reports coming from the Holy Land. In 1990, the Russian Church Abroad’s mission
in Jerusalem was visited by Archbishop Anthony (Sinkevich) and Bishop Mark
(Arndt), both of whom were distinguished by their uncompromising stance toward
the Moscow Patriarchate. [18] One of the hierarchs’ aims was to investigate
reports concerning contacts between the local clergy and the Moscow
Patriarchate’s mission in the Holy Land. It emerged that the head of the ROCOR
mission, Archimandrite Alexy (Rosentul), maintained close relations with the
Moscow mission and had received its head, Archimandrite Nikita (Latushko), with
honor and entertained him as his guest. [19]
In response to the hierarchs’
indignation, Archimandrite Alexy stated that he had acted with the blessing of
Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov), and also referred to the favorable attitude
toward such contacts on the part of Archbishops Anthony (Bartoshevich) and
Laurus (Škurla), and Bishop Hilarion (Kapral). The archimandrite added that if
one regarded the Moscow Patriarchate as strictly as his interlocutors did, “the
Greeks will laugh and consider us insane.” Archbishop Anthony and Bishop Mark
were indignant: “By these words he gave us to understand that he agrees with
them and not with us, that is, that we deserve to be laughed at by him and are
insane.” [20]
Contacts between the two missions
were also confirmed by other facts. The writer Lyudmila Köhler, who lived at
the Mount of Olives Convent (ROCOR), reported that the convent maintained
regular contact with the Moscow Patriarchate. [21] On the Feast of the
Ascension in 1990, sisters from the Gorny Convent (Moscow Patriarchate) visited
the Mount of Olives Convent and were invited to a meal. [22]
Reports that ROCOR was prepared
for rapprochement with the Moscow Patriarchate also came from the Exarch of
Western Europe, Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan). According to his report, many
within ROCOR were interested in the Moscow Church Herald, which had
begun appearing in a small print run in 1987. According to the metropolitan, at
the beginning of 1989 ROCOR considered the question of inviting a
representative from Moscow to a conference at Holy Trinity Monastery in
Jordanville. The organizers of the conference were not prepared to receive a
cleric, and therefore planned instead to invite Professor A. I. Osipov of the
Moscow Theological Academy to present a paper. [23] The very fact that such an
invitation was contemplated is perplexing and merely indicates the organizers’
lack of familiarity with their own history. In Jordanville they ought to have
remembered what the émigré press had reported only nine years earlier—namely,
A. Osipov’s participation as a prosecution witness at the trial of Priest Gleb
Yakunin and the “Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights.”
[24] It was also known in émigré circles that Osipov had described the Russian
Church Abroad as a schism and had criticized its head, Metropolitan Philaret
(Voznesensky). [25] Apparently, in this instance, as in a number of others, the
advocates of rapprochement with Moscow displayed a peculiar naïveté and
simplicity. In the end, however, Osipov was not invited to the conference.
Thus, it would seem that there
was a sizable group within ROCOR that was prepared for dialogue. What, then,
prevented rapprochement?
First of all, it must be said
that the 25% opposed to unity, of whom Archpriest Andrei Semyanko spoke, quite
successfully resisted the advocates of reconciliation. Metropolitan Vitaly
(Ustinov), despite the testimonies cited above, also joined the camp of those
opposed to Moscow. To understand his attitude toward the Moscow Patriarchate,
we must turn to London in the early 1950s. There the future First Hierarch,
then an archimandrite, shared a church with a community of the Moscow
Patriarchate headed by Hieromonk Anthony (Bloom), the future metropolitan.
According to Metropolitan Anthony’s testimony, Archimandrite Vitaly already
displayed particular hostility toward the Moscow Patriarchate at that time and
even said: “To put it politely, you are not a priest; to put it plainly, you are
a servant of Satan.” [26] Archbishop Michael (Donskov) of Meudon (ROCOR)
related that Metropolitan Vitaly later did not repudiate the words he had
spoken on that occasion, but explained that he had meant them not in the sense
that Hieromonk Anthony (Bloom) was an adherent of some dark cult, but in the
sense that he was serving the atheistic regime. [27]
Apparently, at some point
Metropolitan Vitaly came to adopt a more moderate attitude toward the Moscow
Patriarchate. According to Archbishop Michael, the positive changes taking
place in Russia at the end of the 1980s encouraged the metropolitan, and he sincerely
wished to help the Russian clergy. [28] This is also indicated by the
testimonies cited above and by the frequent publications in the ROCOR press
concerning assistance to believers in the homeland, above all through the
provision of literature. Metropolitan Vitaly’s enthusiasm, however, faded very
quickly.
An important qualification should
be made here: the hierarch’s position in the early 1990s had nothing to do with
the memory problems that became one of the reasons for his retirement in 2001.
The existence of such problems is now well known. [29] However, as Archbishop
Michael (Donskov), for example, emphasizes, Metropolitan Vitaly had no problems
with his mental health until the end of the 1990s. [30]
Thus, after a certain euphoria in
the mid- to late 1980s, Metropolitan Vitaly returned to his former anti-Moscow
views. In 1988, for example, the metropolitan said that “between the Moscow
Patriarchate and the Church Abroad lies a deep chasm filled with the blood of
the New Martyrs.” [31]
“We believe,” Metropolitan Vitaly
said in an interview in March 1990, “that when the Russian people—the ordinary
people, who understand neither ‘Sergianism’ nor any of these matters—approach
the Chalice in a church of the Moscow Patriarchate <…> they partake of
the Holy Mysteries of Christ.” According to the head of ROCOR, however, in such
a case “some extraordinary Divine economy” is at work. [32]
In the same interview, the
hierarch said that the Moscow Patriarchate must renounce Sergianism and
recognize the New Martyrs—specifically, it must recognize the canonization
already carried out by ROCOR rather than perform a canonization of its own.
Responding to the question of when the Iveron (Montreal) Icon of the Mother of
God would appear in Russia, the metropolitan said that Russia must first assume
“the form of a normal state” and that the “sword of Damocles”—the KGB—must
cease to hang over the heads of its people. [33]
At the same time, the First
Hierarch began to incline toward conspiracy theories, focusing not on Russia’s
liberation from the Communists or on the revival of the Orthodox Church, but on
the country’s “enslavement” by “dark forces.” “Every resource will be brought
to bear,” the metropolitan said, “billions in gold, in order to extinguish the
flame of the Russian Revival. This is what Russia now faces. It is worse than
Napoleon and Hitler.” [34] Metropolitan Vitaly also regarded the leadership of
the Moscow Patriarchate as implicated in the activity of these new “Napoleons”
and “Hitlers.” In 1991, the head of ROCOR stated explicitly that “the
administration of the Patriarchate goes hand in hand with the Party.” [35]
Metropolitan Vitaly’s position is
clear. But how broad was the circle of bishops who shared his views? To answer
this question, we must once again go back in time, this time to 1986, when the
ROCOR Council of Bishops was choosing a new First Hierarch.
In the first round of voting, the
ballots were distributed as follows: 4 votes were cast for Archbishop Vitaly
(Ustinov), 4 for Archbishop Anthony (Bartoshevich), 3 for Archbishop Anthony
(Sinkevich), 1 for Archbishop Anthony (Medvedev), 2 for Archbishop Paul
(Pavlov), 1 for Archbishop Laurus (Škurla), and 1 for Bishop Gregory (Grabbe).
Thus, eight votes were cast for
hierarchs opposed to the Moscow Patriarchate—Archbishops Vitaly and Anthony
(Sinkevich), and Bishop Gregory (Grabbe)—while the other eight votes went to
supporters of dialogue with the Moscow Patriarchate or to those who were
wavering: Archbishops Anthony (Bartoshevich) and Anthony (Medvedev), and
Bishops Paul (Pavlov) and Laurus (Škurla).
Since no one received a majority
of the votes, a second ballot was held. This time, one of the three hierarchs
who had received the highest number of votes was to be chosen. The votes were
now distributed as follows: 6 votes for Archbishop Vitaly, 6 for Archbishop
Anthony (Bartoshevich), and 4 for Archbishop Anthony (Sinkevich). Thus, the
second round of voting showed that 10 votes were cast for opponents of unity
and 6 for a supporter of unity.
Since Archbishop Vitaly and
Archbishop Anthony (Bartoshevich) received an equal number of votes, the fate
of the Church was decided by lot. Slips bearing the names of the two hierarchs
were placed in a small reliquary before the Kursk-Root Icon of the Mother of
God. After the singing of the kontakion “We Have No Other Help,”
Archimandrite Gelasius (Maiboroda) drew the slip bearing the name of Archbishop
Vitaly. [36]
As we can see, the voting showed
that among the ROCOR bishops there were more opponents of unity with the Moscow
Patriarchate than supporters—ten to six.
Relations between the Moscow
Patriarchate and ROCOR at the local level, among clergy and parishes, were also
far from ideal. According to the testimony of the previously mentioned
Archpriest Leonid Abashev, there were cases in Western Europe in which ROCOR
clergy asked pilgrims where they had come from and, upon learning that they
were from Russia, did not permit them to kiss the cross or the icons. [37]
Another example may be cited. On
November 2, 1989, a group of influential ROCOR clergy, invoking the blessing of
Metropolitan Vitaly, appealed to the flock in South America with the request
“not to have any dealings whatsoever, even out of simple curiosity, with
representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate and under no circumstances to
support their initiatives.” The epistle was signed by Archimandrite Benjamin
(Voznyuk), Mitred Archpriest Vladimir Skalon, Archpriests Vladimir Shlenov,
Sergius Ivanov, Valentin Ivashevich, and George Petrenko, and Priest Igor
Bulatov. The authors of the appeal stated that the bishops and clergy of the
Moscow Patriarchate abroad were, for the most part, in close cooperation with
and subordination to the atheistic authorities and were doing nothing concrete
to secure the liberation of the “Mother Church in the homeland.” According to
the authors of the letter, the activities of the Moscow Patriarchate clergy
“constitute subtle Soviet propaganda, not the preaching of the Gospel for the
salvation of believers.” [38]
Can such statements be regarded
as justified? Unfortunately, there are also examples showing that
representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate did not always conduct themselves as
they should have.
There are also examples of
representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate failing to rise to the occasion.
Bishops and priests formed under the Soviet system, as in earlier times,
attempted either to conceal or to minimize the scale of the Communist persecutions
and even sought to justify the atheistic leaders. None of this went unnoticed.
An account has been preserved of
the visit to the Holy Land of two Moscow hierarchs—Archbishop Agafangel
(Savvin) and Bishop Victor (Pyankov). On June 27, 1989, the hierarchs visited
the Mount of Olives Convent (ROCOR). L. Köhler, who was in Jerusalem at the
time, recorded part of the conversation: “The group headed by Vladyka Victor
asked why we were so opposed to Lenin (who, according to them, was a holy man),
and Vladyka Victor said: ‘Why anathematize him? He excommunicated himself from
the Church.’ To this Mother Veronica replied: ‘Arius also excommunicated
himself from the Church, yet the Council nevertheless anathematized him.’ At
this, this theologian and learned man could find no answer.” [39] And when
Archbishop Agathangel exclaimed, “What divides us?! Why can we not unite?”, L.
Köhler answered him loudly: “The blood of the New Martyrs divides us!” [40]
Statements in defense of Leninist
church policy were, however, also heard from higher ecclesiastical platforms.
In a letter from Patriarch Pimen to M. Gorbachev on behalf of the 1988 Local
Council, for example, reference was made to the need to implement “the ideas
proclaimed by the Great October Socialist Revolution.” [41] Commenting on these
words, Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) concluded that “the official ideologists of the
Moscow Patriarchate have a distorted understanding of the Christian religion,”
since the Communist regime “is legalized violence on the basis of class.” [42] The
ROCOR press likewise wrote that the Moscow church leadership was continuing its
attempts to reconcile atheistic Communism with Christianity. [43]
In 1989, Patriarch Pimen gave
further grounds for criticism by sending Gorbachev a telegram thanking him for
his policy of “restoring Leninist norms in relations between Church and state.”
[44] In ROCOR, the patriarchal rhetoric provoked ridicule, since for a
Christian the praise of Leninist norms was just as absurd “as if someone were
to take it upon himself to praise the norms of Nero or Diocletian with regard
to the Christians of ancient Rome.” [45]
The Patriarch’s words about
“Leninist norms” were not accidental. Soviet ideology in the late 1980s
explained the country’s problems solely in terms of Stalin’s crimes and spoke
of Stalin’s departure from Lenin’s supposedly “just” policy. M. Gorbachev’s speech
at the above-mentioned meeting with the Synod on April 29, 1988, was framed in
the same spirit. On that occasion, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central
Committee explicitly referred to persecuted Orthodox Christians as victims of
Stalin’s “cult of personality” and declared a return to “Leninist principles.”
[46] It is therefore hardly surprising that, eight months later, Patriarch
Pimen cited “Leninist norms” as a model for Church-state relations. One may
suppose that, had Gorbachev declared a return to the norms of the
pre-revolutionary or Stalinist period, the patriarchal message would have been
couched in corresponding terms.
However, adherence to Soviet
ideology, which was acceptable to the majority of the bishops of the Moscow
Patriarchate, was unthinkable for the Russian Church Abroad, where Lenin and
Stalin were regarded as equally criminal, both against Russia and against the
Church.
Distrust of the new church policy
was compounded by the conviction that the Soviet administration was insincere.
Gorbachev himself, both before and after his appointment as General Secretary,
showed no particular sympathy toward the Church and acted within the framework
of Soviet atheistic ideology. The Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU, held in
1986, emphasized the importance of atheist work. [47] As in previous years, an
open display of church affiliation could cost a person his career, while active
involvement could cost him his freedom. Virtually no changes in church policy
were planned even on the eve of the celebration of the millennium of the
Baptism of Rus’. The festivities were supposed to remain an internal church
affair, largely unnoticed by society. Only against the background of
confrontation with the West and the country’s difficult economic situation did
Gorbachev enter into negotiations with U.S. President R. Reagan, who pressed
for greater freedoms and the amnesty of political prisoners. Moreover, Reagan,
as a religious man, was particularly sensitive to violations of religious
rights and freedoms. The Soviet leadership could not simply renounce atheism,
which had formed the foundation of the Communist regime for seventy years, and
the process of abandoning its former anti-religious policy proceeded with great
difficulty. [48]
Initially, the steps taken toward
the Church—both in the transfer of Optina Hermitage and the Tolga Monastery and
in the celebration of the millennium of the Baptism of Rus’—were conceived
purely for propaganda purposes, in order to demonstrate to the West that there
were no problems with freedom of conscience in the country. The Communist state
had no intention of granting the Church greater freedom, and bishops were even
given hints that they should not indulge in hopes and, in general, should “not
be in a hurry.” For this reason, the episcopate did not believe that the Church
would actually be liberated. Nevertheless, R. Reagan continued to insist that
believers be granted full freedom. [49]
The Russian Church Abroad was
well aware that the liberation of the Church was taking place not because of
some miraculous awakening on the part of the Communist leaders, but because of
persistent demands from the United States. [50] It was also known that in 1988
around 200 people were being held in Soviet prisons after being convicted on
account of their faith. [51] The hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate did
themselves no favors, either, by speaking of those who suffered for the faith
as persons convicted of crimes against the state. During a visit to the United
States in December 1987, for example, Metropolitan Philaret (Vakhromeyev) spoke
in this way concerning the imprisoned Deacon Vladimir Rusak. In 1988, when
asked why the New Martyrs had not been canonized, Metropolitan Juvenaly
(Poyarkov) replied that such a canonization would be an expression of “political
emotions.” [52]
Representatives of ROCOR
insisted—including at the highest levels of government—that the Soviet state
could not be trusted until it granted believers full freedom. “The free and
democratic world of the West,” Archpriest Vladimir Shibaev said at a seminar
held at the residence of the President of the United States (the White House)
on May 3, 1988, “must not allow itself to be deceived; it must not become
involved in this game of lies and deception by means of which Gorbachev hopes
to repair the utterly ruined economy of the USSR at the expense of Western
assistance. The Gorbachev era is a tactical pause during which the KGB is
increasing its personnel and expanding the files on those with whom it will
later have to settle accounts.” [53] It should be noted that Fr. Vladimir
Shibaev himself had only recently succeeded in leaving the USSR and was hardly
mistaken in his assessment of the actual state of affairs both in the country
and in the Church. At the 1988 ROCOR Council of Bishops, the priest confirmed
that the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate continued to remain silent
concerning the ongoing persecution of believers. [54]
All of the reasons listed above
help explain ROCOR’s responses to the conciliatory messages of the Moscow
Patriarchate in 1987 and 1988.
In 1987, the ROCOR Synod of
Bishops, responding to the Pre-Jubilee Epistle, stated that it welcomed and
thanked its authors for the invitation to dialogue, but pointed out that ROCOR
and the Moscow Patriarchate had different understandings of the causes of the
division. The causes themselves were also set forth—causes without whose
removal unity would be impossible.
The first cause identified was
the Moscow Patriarchate’s refusal to venerate the New Martyrs and Confessors of
Russia. The epistle stated that the Moscow Patriarchate continued to repudiate
the New Martyrs and to bear false witness by denying the existence of
persecution against the Church. [55]
As the second obstacle to
reunification, the ROCOR Council of Bishops cited the fact that Metropolitan
Sergius’s “Declaration,” which identified the interests of the atheistic state
with those of the Church, still formed the basis of the Moscow Patriarchate’s
policy. This, it stated, led to arbitrary interference by the Soviet
administration in the affairs of the Church.
The third cause cited was the
fact that the Moscow Patriarchate continued to speak of the Russian Church
Abroad as a body existing “outside the saving enclosure of the Mother Church,”
that is, as a schism. The Church Abroad insisted that it had never departed
from the Russian Church and had never sought “foreign omophoria.” The
Council referred to the Epistle of the Solovki Confessors, which stated that
the Church is united not by external forms, but by one faith. [56]
Finally, the fourth cause cited
was the Moscow Patriarchate’s ecumenical contacts, which went beyond the limits
of the canons. “With sorrow we observe,” the epistle of the Council of Bishops
stated, “the ever-greater involvement of the Moscow Patriarchate in ecumenism,
including participation in prayers even with pagans and idolaters (let us
recall, if only, the ecumenical gathering in Assisi).” [57] It is true that
only a short paragraph was devoted to the ecumenical issue. In general, it
should be noted that in ROCOR periodicals of the second half of the 1980s, this
subject remained on the periphery of anti-Moscow criticism and was developed
more fully only in the 1990s.
The decisions of the 1988 Local
Council likewise met with a restrained response from the Church Abroad. The
epistle of the ROCOR Council of Bishops (August 1988) reflected an expectation
that the persecutions might be coming to an end. At the same time, however, the
Council stated that there would be no reunification with the ecclesiastical
authorities in Moscow so long as people remained imprisoned for their faith and
the Patriarchate remained silent.
The epistle stated that the ROCOR
bishops were the only Russian bishops who had preserved the Church’s internal
freedom and the “canonical purity of ordination,” since they had performed
episcopal consecrations without the permission of the atheistic authorities.
According to the epistle, it was ROCOR that had canonized the New Martyrs and
that bore witness both to the former and to the contemporary sufferers for the
faith. The voice of ROCOR, therefore, “is the free voice of the much-suffering
Mother Church, in contrast to the false propaganda of those who have enslaved
the homeland and of the ecclesiastical leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate.”
[58]
In the years that followed, the
position of the ROCOR leadership toward the Moscow Patriarchate remained
unchanged. The periodical press of the Russian Church Abroad pointed to the
KGB’s complete control over the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate and to the
infiltration of Soviet security-service personnel into the Russian Church. [59]
References to the New Martyrs, which began to appear gradually on the part of
the Moscow Patriarchate after 1988, were regarded condescendingly in ROCOR. The
leadership of the Church Abroad attributed such publications not to the
persistence of the Moscow hierarchy, but to the process of rehabilitating
victims of repression that Gorbachev himself had initiated. [60] Indeed, the
first article in the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate about a
repressed clergyman, Metropolitan Seraphim (Chichagov), appeared in February
1989—that is, after his rehabilitation on November 10, 1988. [61]
Even the glorification of saints
at the 1988 Local Council of the Moscow Patriarchate elicited no positive
response from the Church Abroad. On August 10, 1988, the ROCOR Synod of Bishops
declared that the process of canonization should have begun with the
glorification of the New Martyrs, and that only in that case could one speak of
the beginning of conciliarity in the Russian Church. [62] In 1989, Church
Life, for example, quoted Zoya Krakhmalnikova, who accused the Moscow
Patriarchate of passivity and of a “politically motivated refusal” to canonize
the New Martyrs. [63] In commenting on such accusations, it must be
acknowledged that the ROCOR leadership viewed the matter too simplistically. It
was naïve to suppose that the canonization of the New Martyrs could be carried
out so quickly, especially when the liberation of the Church had only just
begun to dawn. It should be recalled that ROCOR itself did not glorify those
who had suffered for the faith for sixty years, until 1981, and even then,
prepared only a modest list of twenty names for the canonization. [64]
In 1989—that is, only eight years
after ROCOR’s canonization—the Moscow Patriarchate had already glorified the
first of the New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia, Patriarch Tikhon. Yet even
this did not alter the situation. The Church Abroad now began to level the
accusation that the Patriarch had been glorified as a holy hierarch rather than
as a hieromartyr or confessor. Church Life explained this by claiming
that “the Patriarchate and the KGB” were deliberately avoiding any mention of
his confession of the faith. [65]
Further attempts to establish
relations were likewise rejected by the leadership of the Church Abroad. Thus,
in 1989, ROCOR declined an invitation from the Moscow Patriarchate to
participate in a conference devoted to the 400th anniversary of the establishment
of the Patriarchate in Russia. [66] Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) pointed out that
“dialogue now implies the equal admissibility of differing points of view on
one and the same question.” In the bishop’s view, a simple agreement between
ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate was entirely unacceptable, since the Moscow
Patriarchate had not changed in essence and remained “Sergianist.” [67] As we
can see, for a certain segment of ROCOR, overcoming the division through
dialogue was wholly unacceptable under those circumstances. In September 1989,
the latest issue of the journal Orthodox Rus’ appeared in an unusual
format. Whereas previously the journal’s title had been placed at the very top
of the first page, it was now moved to the middle, while the upper portion was
given over to lines from the testament of Metropolitan Anastasy (Gribanovsky)
concerning the inadmissibility of having with the Moscow Patriarchate not only
prayerful communion, but even ordinary social intercourse. [68] By the
beginning of 1990, some representatives of ROCOR were no longer concealing
plans to open parishes on the territory of the Soviet Union. [69]
On May 15, 1990, the ROCOR
Council of Bishops set forth the causes of the division:
1. The Moscow
Patriarchate’s rejection of clergy and laity who had not accepted the
“Declaration” of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky).
2. The
“trampling upon the memory of the Holy New Martyrs and Confessors.”
3. Cooperation
with the atheistic authorities “even in the matter of closing churches, servile
submission to them, and public prayer for the strengthening of the regime that
was waging war against the faith and the Church.”
4. Distortion of
the Mysteries and of preaching, and abandonment of Orthodox religious
education.
5. Participation
in the ecumenical movement.
6. Subordination
to the atheistic authorities and allowing them to intrude into church life “to
the point of direct governance for the purpose of undermining the faith.”
7. The
alienation of the hierarchy from the flock and an arrogant attitude toward the
laity.
8. Moral laxity
and love of money among the clergy.
9. Uncanonical
transfers of bishops and priests. [70]
According to the document, clergy
of the Moscow Patriarchate “should be regarded as brethren who have fallen away
and gone astray <…> as though they were under suspension ‘until
repentance.’” [71]
In principle, only points 1, 2,
3, 5, and 6 could realistically have been discussed, whereas discussion of the
remaining points would have postponed reunification for a very long time, quite
apart from the fact that similar accusations could also have been directed at
the other side. For the most part, the serious grievances continued to revolve
around the same issues—“Sergianism,” ecumenism, and the canonization of the New
Martyrs.
The document also specified what
the ROCOR leadership understood by ecumenism: the creation of a “worldwide
‘church’ uniting all heresies and religions, and membership in the World
Council of Churches.” [72] It should be noted here that ROCOR’s anti-ecumenical
rhetoric at that time was clearly deficient, since even the most active
Orthodox ecumenists were hardly planning to create some sort of “worldwide
church” into which other religions, along with Orthodox Christians, would be
incorporated [sic]. As for the canonization of the New Martyrs, ROCOR’s
ultimatum was unprecedented: history perhaps knows of no other instance in
which, as a condition for reunification, one side demanded that the other
canonize certain persons. The Moscow Patriarchate, however, had already begun
glorifying those who had suffered for the faith. More serious and more
troubling for the Moscow church leadership was the accusation of subordination
to the atheistic authorities; but soon afterward, with the fall of Communist rule,
this argument largely lost its relevance.
The document of the ROCOR Council
of Bishops dated May 15, 1990, in itself pushed back the possibility of
dialogue. The problem, however, was compounded by the fact that the same
Council, without waiting for the final collapse of the Soviet regime and having
lost faith in the positive changes taking place in the homeland, decided to
establish its own dioceses on the canonical territory of the Moscow
Patriarchate and to receive parishes that had separated from it. [72] From that
point onward, the polemic between the two sides assumed an aggressive and
insulting character.
The 1990 ROCOR Council of Bishops
brought another stage in the history of the division between the Moscow
Patriarchate and ROCOR to a close. And whereas in the late 1980s rapprochement
had seemed possible, after the 1990 Council it appeared almost unattainable.
It may be concluded that in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, the two sides were not yet ready for unity. And
although there was a desire for peace at the local level, no dialogue could be
initiated at the highest level during those years.
There were, however, objective
reasons that hindered reconciliation. Despite the new freedoms and changing
political currents, the government in Russia remained Communist, and it did not
immediately bring the persecution of believers to an end. The Moscow
Patriarchate, notwithstanding this, continued to deny the persecutions and
spoke only sparingly, and even cautiously, about the New Martyrs. These facts
aroused wariness within the Russian Church Abroad and prevented it from placing
serious confidence in the changes taking place in Russia.
As for the Church Abroad itself,
over the seven decades of its de facto independence, generations of
hierarchs and clergy had arisen within it who held a negative attitude toward
the Moscow Patriarchate. While such clergy did not constitute a majority, the
bishops who did not desire unity were in the majority, and the ROCOR First
Hierarch himself may also be counted among them.
The two sides still had to pass
through the difficulties of the 1990s: the Moscow Patriarchate had to speak
more clearly about the atheistic regime and glorify the New Martyrs, while the
Church Abroad had to recognize the danger of withdrawing into complete
isolation and understand the futility of attempts to establish its own
structures in Russia.
FOOTNOTES
1. See: “Meeting of M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee, with Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’, and
Members of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church” // Journal of the
Moscow Patriarchate (hereafter — JMP). 1988. No. 7. Pp. 2–6.
2. “Pre-Jubilee Epistle of His Holiness Pimen, Patriarch of
Moscow and All Rus’, and the Holy Synod to the Archpastors, Pastors, Honorable
Monastics, and All the Children of the Russian Orthodox Church in Our Homeland
and Beyond Its Borders, on the Occasion of the 1000th Anniversary of the
Baptism of Rus’” // JMP. 1987. No. 8. P. 4.
3. See: Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. Holy
Trinity–St. Sergius Lavra, June 6–9, 1988: Materials. Moscow, 1990. Pp.
61–63.
4. See: Ibid. P. 472.
5. See: Soloukhin, V. “Toward Unity” // Moscow News.
1989. No. 50. December 10.
6. See, for example: Kostryukov, A. The Russian Church
Abroad under Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky). Moscow, 2021. Pp.
216–217.
7. See: “Decisions of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia” // Church Life (hereafter — CL).
1986. Nos. 1–4. P. 27.
8. See: “Decisions of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia” // CL. 1987. Nos. 1–2. Pp. 3–9; Nos.
5–6. Pp. 139–140, 145–146.
9. “Report on the Stay of Archpriest A. Semyanko in Vladimir,
July 1–3, 1989” (Archive of the DECR. File 43: Reports. P.: 1989. Fol. 1–2).
10. Abashev, L., Archpriest. “Report on the Stay in the USSR
of Guests of the Moscow Patriarchate, September 7–18, 1988” (Archive of the
DECR. File: Russian Church Abroad. P.: 1989. Fol. 4).
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. Fol. 1, 2, 6.
13. Ibid. Fol. 3.
14. “Report on the Stay of Archpriest A. Semyanko in
Vladimir, July 1–3, 1989” (Archive of the DECR. File 43. P.: 1989. Fol. 1).
15. Pitirim (Nechaev), Metropolitan. “Report to Metropolitan
Philaret (Vakhromeyev), May 13, 1987” (Archive of the DECR. File: Russian
Church Abroad. P.: 1987).
16. Ibid.
17. Kaznovetsky, A., Archpriest. “Report to the Chairman of
the DECR, Metropolitan Philaret (Vakhromeyev), September 13, 1988” (Archive of
the DECR. File: Russian Church Abroad. P.: 1988. Fol. 1–8).
18. Unlike Archbishop Anthony (Sinkevich) († 1996), His Grace
Mark (Arndt) later changed his views, headed the commission for negotiations
with the Moscow Patriarchate in 2004–2007, and in 2007, together with the
majority of ROCOR, reunited with the Church in the homeland.
19. Anthony (Sinkevich), Archbishop; Mark (Arndt), Bishop.
“Report to the Synod of Bishops, July 26, 1990” (Archive of the DECR. File:
Russian Church Abroad. P.: 1990. Fol. 3).
20. Ibid. Fol. 2, 3, 4.
21. Köhler, L. “Communication to Archbishop Anthony
(Sinkevich)” (Ibid.).
22. Ibid.; Anthony (Sinkevich), Archbishop; Mark (Arndt),
Bishop. “Report to the Synod of Bishops, July 26, 1990.”
23. Vladimir, Metropolitan. “Report to the Chairman of the
DECR, Metropolitan Philaret” (Archive of the DECR. File: Russian Church Abroad.
P.: 1989. Fol. 1).
24. Potapov, V., Priest. “Asceticism in Our Days” // Orthodox
Rus’ (hereafter — OR). 1980. No. 22. P. 4.
25. See: Osipov, A. “On the Appointment of the New Head of
the Karlovci Schism” // JMP. 1964. No. 11. P. 76.
26. Pokrovsky, V. “Relations with the Church Abroad Have
Become Less Strained” // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. No. 113 (284). June 17,
1992. P. 6.
27. Private communication from Archbishop Michael (Donskov),
February 3, 2024.
28. Ibid.
29. See, for example: Bochkov, P., Priest. A Survey of
Non-Canonical Orthodox Jurisdictions of the 20th–21st Centuries: in 5 vols.
Vol. 1: Political Schisms. St. Petersburg, 2018. P. 26.
30. Private communication from Archbishop Michael (Donskov),
February 3, 2024.
31. “Provocation, Naïveté, or a Crossroads?” // Church
News. 1990. No. 1. P. 1.
32. Potapov, V., Archpriest. “For Us, What Matters Is Not
That We Have Our Own Parishes in Russia, but That the Moscow Patriarchate
Renounce ‘Sergianism’” (Interview with the First Hierarch of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, Metropolitan Vitaly, for the Voice of
America radio station) // OR. 1990. No. 7. P. 6.
33. Ibid. Pp. 5, 6.
34. “I Have Two Values in Life—Orthodoxy and
Russianness…”: The Last First Hierarch of ROCOR, His Beatitude Metropolitan
Vitaly (Ustinov). 2nd ed. Compiled by E. Semenova. Moscow, 2020. P. 110.
35. “I Have Two Values in Life—Orthodoxy and Russianness…”
P. 111.
36. “Act on the Election of the New Metropolitan” // CL.
1986. Nos. 1–4. P. 9.
37. Abashev, L., Archpriest. “Report on the Stay in the USSR
of Guests of the Moscow Patriarchate, September 7–18, 1988.” Fol. 3.
38. “To the God-Loving South American Flock of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia” // Our Country. 1990. No. 2060.
January 27. P. 1.
39. Köhler, L. “Communication to Archbishop Anthony
(Sinkevich), July 5, 1990” (Archive of the DECR. File: Russian Church Abroad.
P.: 1990. Fol. 1).
40. Ibid.
41. Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church. P.
54.
42. Gregory, Bishop. “The October Revolution and the
Christian Religion as Perceived by the 1988 Local Council” // OR. 1988.
No. 14. P. 11.
43. See, for example: Butakov, A. “We and the Russian Church
Abroad” // OR. 1988. No. 16. P. 5.
44. “New Year’s Greeting Telegrams of His Holiness Patriarch
Pimen” // JMP. 1989. No. 3. P. 2.
45. Gregory, Bishop. “The Patriarch and Leninism” // OR.
1989. No. 18. P. 5.
46. “Meeting of M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee, with Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’, and
Members of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church” // JMP. 1988. No.
7. P. 4.
47. See: Materials of the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1986. P. 165.
48. See: Filippov, B. A. “The Influence of Soviet-American
Negotiations of 1985–1989 on Changes in Soviet Religious Policy: Historical and
Political Contexts of Gorbachev’s Visit to the Vatican” // St. Tikhon’s
University Review. Series II: History. History of the Russian Orthodox Church.
2022. Issue 105. Pp. 129, 132–134.
49. See: Filippov, B. A. “The Influence of Soviet-American
Negotiations…” Pp. 135–136.
50. See, for example: S. P. “Christianity, Perestroika, and
the Soviet Regime” // OR. 1988. No. 1. P. 9.
51. See: “Addresses by Priests of the Church Abroad at the
White House Seminar on Religion in the USSR” // OR. 1988. No. 10. P. 8.
52. Gregory, Bishop. “The October Revolution and the
Christian Religion as Perceived by the 1988 Local Council” // OR. 1988.
No. 14. P. 11.
53. “Addresses by Priests of the Church Abroad at the White
House Seminar on Religion in the USSR.” P. 8.
54. See: “Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church”
// CL. 1988. Nos. 3–4. Pp. 73–74.
55. “Epistle of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox
Church Outside of Russia to the Pastors and Flock of the Russian Orthodox
Church” // CL. 1987. Nos. 5–6. P. 130.
56. See: Acts of His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow
and All Russia, Later Documents and Correspondence Concerning the Canonical
Succession of the Supreme Ecclesiastical Authority. 1917–1943 / Compiled by
M. Gubonin. Moscow, 1994. P. 507.
57. See: “Epistle of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia to the Pastors and Flock of the Russian
Orthodox Church” // CL. 1987. Nos. 5–6. Pp. 130–132.
58. “Jubilee Epistle of the Council of Bishops to the Flock
of the Russian Orthodox Church” // CL. 1988. Nos. 3–4. Pp. 66–67.
59. See, for example: Orlov, V. “How the KGB Controls the
Russian Church” // CL. 1988. Nos. 5–6. Pp. 172–176.
60. See: “Collection of Materials on the New Martyrs” // CL.
1989. Nos. 1–2. P. 60.
61. See: Chernaya, V. “Metropolitan Seraphim (Chichagov)” // JMP.
1989. No. 2. Pp. 13–18.
62. See: “Decisions of the Synod of Bishops” // CL.
1988. Nos. 5–6. P. 130.
63. See: “Discussion of Problems of Orthodoxy in Moscow” // CL.
1989. Nos. 1–2. Pp. 60–61.
64. For further details, see: Kostryukov, A. The Russian
Church Abroad under Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky): 1964–1985. Moscow,
2021. Pp. 156–158.
65. See: Köhler, L. “The Glorification of Patriarch Tikhon by
the Moscow Patriarchate” // CL. 1989. Nos. 5–6. P. 184.
66. See: “Decisions of the Synod of Bishops of the Russian
Orthodox Church Outside of Russia” // CL. 1989. Nos. 3–4. P. 72.
67. Gregory, Bishop. “Contemporary Sergianism” // OR.
1989. No. 9. Pp. 8–9.
68. See: “From the Testament of His Beatitude Metropolitan
Anastasy, First Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (†
1965)” // OR. 1989. No. 17. P. 1.
69. See, for example: Averyanov, A., Priest. “Open Parishes
of the Russian Church Abroad in Russia” // OR. 1990. No. 1. Pp. 10–11.
70. See: “Regulations for the Parishes of the Free Russian
Orthodox Church, Adopted by the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox
Church Outside of Russia on May 2/15, 1990” // OR. 1990. No. 12. P. 1.
71. Ibid. P. 2.
72. “Regulations for the Parishes of the Free Russian
Orthodox Church…” P. 1.
73. See: Kostryukov, A. A. “The Russian Church Abroad and the
Beginning of the ‘Free Church’ (1990–1995)” // St. Tikhon’s University
Review. Series II: History. History of the Russian Orthodox Church. 2024.
Issue 120. Pp. 57–78.
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