Summary and Analysis of the Collective Resignation of the GOC Hierarchy, November 3, 1952

Outline, summary, and ecclesiological analysis of the original Greek Πρακτικὸν Συνεδριάσεως τῶν Παλαιοημερολογιτῶν Ἀρχιερέων (Minutes of the Meeting of the Old Calendarist Hierarchs)

 

 

I. General assessment

The collective resignation of Metropolitans Chrysostomos of Florina and Bishops Christophoros of Christianoupolis and Polykarpos of Diavleia must be understood against a longer history of unsuccessful attempts to preserve Orthodox tradition, correct rigorist tendencies within the Old Calendarist movement, and restore ecclesiastical unity.

The document was adopted unanimously on November 3, 1952, at Chrysostomos's residence in Athens.

Its importance is considerably greater than a simple announcement of episcopal retirement.

The three hierarchs expressly explain that they had undertaken leadership of the Old Calendarists in 1935 for two interconnected reasons: to defend the traditional ecclesiastical calendar and to correct the ecclesiastical excesses developing within the movement.

They further declare that their objective was never to perpetuate a separate ecclesiastical organization indefinitely, but to overcome the division through canonical order and the eventual correction of the calendar innovation.

By November 1952, however, those objectives appeared increasingly unattainable. The movement had suffered internal fragmentation, the Keratea controversies had severely damaged its public standing, and the official Church and State had pursued coercive measures against Old Calendarist clergy and faithful.

The collective resignation therefore marks the culmination of a prolonged crisis in the original restorative ecclesiology of the Old Calendarist movement.

It is not merely evidence of discouragement. It is a remarkable declaration by the entire remaining Florinite episcopate that the independent episcopal administration they had established was no longer serving the original objectives of their struggle.

Nevertheless, a crucial distinction must be maintained: the document itself identifies continuing persecution as the immediate reason for resignation. Its criticism of internal radicalism explains the broader ecclesiastical problem, but the two should not be conflated.

II. The seven principal declarations

 

Section	Argument of the bishops	Ecclesiological significance
First	The ecclesiastical division originated in the unilateral calendar innovation, not in the bishops' resistance	Responsibility for the original rupture remains with the innovators
Second	They entered the movement in 1935 both to defend tradition and to restrain its ecclesiastical excesses	Opposition to rigorism was part of their original mission
Third	Their aim was to bridge the division, not deepen it	The Old Calendarist hierarchy was conceived as corrective rather than permanently separatist
Fourth	The official hierarchy responded to conscientious separation with persecution instead of persuasion	Legitimate resistance cannot be suppressed through ecclesiastical coercion
Fifth	The official Church exploited the Keratea scandals to persecute people who had no communion with that establishment	The Florinite movement must not be identified with the Matthewite organization
Sixth	Successive governments improperly enforced the Church's allegedly unconstitutional and uncanonical measures	Civil authority had become an instrument of ecclesiastical coercion
Seventh	Their continued episcopal leadership was being used as a pretext for prolonging persecution	Withdrawal from administration was intended to remove an obstacle to peace

 

These seven explanations culminate in the bishops' decision to relinquish active pastoral administration without renouncing either their episcopal dignity or their adherence to the traditional calendar.

(https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eNcBBZXhKdEq88S0v5-FWf2zUcxsi-sY/view?usp=sharing)

III. The most significant passages

1. Their original objective included the correction of internal extremism

In the second declaration, the bishops explain that they entered the calendar struggle eleven years after the introduction of the reform partly:

ἵνα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τῆς Ἐκκλησίας θέσωμεν ἓν τέρμα εἰς τὰς ἐκτροπὰς

That is, “in order, for the benefit of the Church, to put an end to the excesses.”

They attribute those excesses to the absence of leaders possessing adequate theological education and canonical formation.

This is a particularly important statement because it directly confirms what Chrysostomos had repeatedly maintained in his correspondence with Germanos of the Cyclades in 1937.

The bishops did not enter the Old Calendarist movement merely to provide episcopal leadership to an already established and fully satisfactory ecclesiastical organization.

They considered part of its existing religious practice and ecclesiastical understanding to require correction.

This helps explain Chrysostomos's sustained opposition to indiscriminate re-Chrismation, automatic declarations of sacramental gracelessness, and the assumption that Old Calendarist clergy could definitively judge the ecclesiastical status of all other Orthodox hierarchs.

The resignation presents that corrective responsibility as an original and fundamental component of episcopal leadership.

2. Their mission was to bridge the division

The third declaration states:

οὐχὶ ἵνα εὐρύνωμεν τὸ χάσμα τῆς Ἐκκλησιαστικῆς διαιρέσεως ἀλλ᾿ ἵνα γεφυρώσωμεν αὐτό

“Not in order to widen the breach of ecclesiastical division, but to bridge it.”

The bishops explain how this was to be accomplished.

On one hand, they would restrain the Old Calendarists within the bounds of canonical order, ecclesiastical propriety, and legality.

On the other, they would provide the hierarchy of the Church of Greece with an opportunity to reconsider the calendar innovation.

The passage is significant because it identifies two simultaneous objects of correction: the innovating official hierarchy and the excesses of those resisting it.

For Chrysostomos and his colleagues, neither side could be treated as beyond criticism simply because it was associated with the formal ecclesiastical administration or with the defense of tradition.

This also clarifies their understanding of the independent Old Calendarist hierarchy.

They did not originally regard its permanent institutional separation as an objective in itself. It was an ecclesiastical response intended to preserve tradition and eventually facilitate reconciliation.

3. The Keratea controversy was not an internal Florinite scandal

The fifth declaration is especially important in light of the subsequent history.

The bishops accuse the official hierarchy of employing the controversies surrounding the Keratea monastery as a pretext for persecuting the Florinite Old Calendarists.

They emphasize that they and their followers had maintained no ecclesiastical relationship or communion with that establishment since, according to the document, 1936.

The reference to 1936 needs qualification, since the definitive division involving Matthew is ordinarily dated to 1937. It may reflect an earlier deterioration in relations or an imprecise retrospective date. [It reflects the year the lay “Greek Religious Community of Genuine Orthodox Christians” withdrew support for the original synod under Metropolitan Germanos, and was replaced by the “Pan-Hellenic Religious National Orthodox Society.” The Religious Community ended up in the Matthewite camp. – Blog Admin. note]

Nevertheless, the intended distinction is unmistakable.

The bishops repudiated responsibility for the conduct of the separate Matthewite establishment.

This is consistent with Chrysostomos's final Encyclical of July 1954, which again distinguished his movement from the Keratea establishment and refused to recognize the episcopal standing claimed by Matthew's successors without competent Pan-Orthodox adjudication.

(https://orthodoxmiscellany.blogspot.com/2025/01/final-encyclical-of-st-chrysostomos-new.html)

The important historical point is that Chrysostomos remained opposed to the Matthewite establishment even after the severe Encyclical of 1950.

Thus, the 1950 declaration cannot reasonably be treated as proof that the earlier ecclesiological dispute had been settled in Matthew's favor.

4. The resignation was an attempt to end persecution, not an acknowledgment of ecclesiastical defeat

The seventh declaration deserves especially careful attention.

The bishops state that the persecution of Old Calendarists had become a source of scandal, discrediting both the Church and the State.

They did not wish their continued presence as episcopal leaders to give the authorities another pretext for perpetuating these measures.

They therefore resolved:

παραιτούμεθα τοῦ λοιποῦ τῆς ἐνεργοῦ ὑπηρεσίας καὶ τῆς Ποιμαντορικῆς κηδεμονίας ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιμνίου ἡμῶν

“We henceforth resign from active service and from the pastoral care of our flock.”

They immediately qualify this:

οὐχὶ ὅμως καὶ τῆς Ἀρχιερωσύνης καὶ τῆς πίστεως πρὸς τὴν παράδοσιν τοῦ Πατρίου Ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ ἡμερολογίου

“But not from the episcopate or from fidelity to the tradition of the Patristic Ecclesiastical Calendar.”

They also direct their clergy to cease commemorating them during Divine Services, since they have relinquished pastoral authority over those following the traditional calendar.

The distinction is deliberate.

They relinquish episcopal administration, not episcopal dignity. They withdraw from leadership, not from their confession of faith.

Nor do they declare their previous walling-off unlawful or offer to restore communion unconditionally with the official hierarchy.

(https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eNcBBZXhKdEq88S0v5-FWf2zUcxsi-sY/view?usp=sharing)

IV. The resignation viewed against the entire history of Chrysostomos's leadership

The document becomes considerably more revealing when situated within the sequence of events between 1935 and 1955.

1. 1935 — Assumption of episcopal leadership

Chrysostomos and his fellow bishops undertake the defense of the traditional calendar while seeking to restore canonical discipline within the movement.

2. 1937 — Rupture with Matthew and Germanos of the Cyclades

The conflict over potential versus actual schism, the validity of Mysteries, and the repetition of Chrismation develops into an organizational separation.

3. 1938 — Proposed reconciliation with the official Church

The remaining senior hierarchs attempt to secure restoration of the traditional calendar through negotiations and a future council. The proposal fails.

4. 1948–1950 — Consolidation of the rival Matthewite hierarchy and renewed attempts at reunion

Matthew undertakes episcopal consecrations in 1948. After his death in May 1950, Chrysostomos issues the severe Encyclical No. 13 while attempting to reunite the movement.

5. 1951 — Further unsuccessful reconciliation negotiations

Chrysostomos negotiates with Archbishop Spyridon Vlachos amid severe persecution. Agreement is not achieved.

6. November 1952 — Collective resignation

All three Florinite bishops announce their withdrawal from pastoral administration, declaring that their continued leadership has become a pretext for persecution.

7. 1953 — Divergent paths of the bishops

Chrysostomos has withdrawn his resignation and continues leading his flock. Christophoros and Polykarpos seek restoration to the official Church and are received without repetition of their episcopal consecrations.

8. 1954 — Chrysostomos's final Encyclical

Chrysostomos again repudiates the canonical claims of Matthew's successors, refuses to accept their episcopal authority without conciliar judgment, and continues to distinguish his movement from the Keratea establishment.

This chronology establishes a pattern that cannot be reduced to a single disagreement about the validity of New Calendarist Mysteries.

For almost twenty years, Chrysostomos attempted to preserve the resistance movement while preventing its transformation into a self-perpetuating ecclesiastical organization founded upon exclusivist claims.

The 1952 resignation marks a particularly severe crisis in that effort.

V. The influence of rigorist ecclesiology within the Florinite movement

Before 1955: Chrysostomos's struggle against rigorist tendencies

During Chrysostomos's lifetime, the relevant problem was not simply the existence of the separate Matthewite Synod.

He had already encountered rigorist tendencies among monastics and clergy within the broader Old Calendarist movement before the division of 1937.

His correspondence indicates that he regarded these tendencies as canonically unsound and damaging to the credibility of the struggle.

The 1952 resignation confirms that the bishops understood their original mission as including the correction of such excesses.

Their decision also reflects the consequences of prolonged hostility between the Matthewite establishment and the Florinite movement, especially after the Keratea scandals.

Nevertheless, the resignation does not specifically identify former Matthewite clergy within the Florinite ranks as responsible for the immediate crisis of 1952.

The strongest documentary conclusion is that the bishops had become disillusioned with a movement repeatedly unable to escape internal extremism, jurisdictional conflict, and persecution.

After 1960: Transformation of the restored Florinite hierarchy

A related but distinct process occurred after Chrysostomos's death.

The restored Florinite hierarchy included men who had previously belonged to, or been spiritually and institutionally formed within, the Matthewite milieu.

Akakios Pappas, Auxentios Pastras, Chrysostomos Kiousis, and Kallinikos Sarantopoulos all had significant connections with that earlier ecclesiastical environment, although the nature of those connections differed.

This does not establish that every one of them consistently maintained Matthew's exact ecclesiology throughout his episcopal ministry.

Nevertheless, it raises an important question concerning the transformation of the movement's ecclesiastical identity.

By the 1970s, the Florinite Synod was formally reiterating the severe sacramental declarations of 1935 and 1950.

The 1974 Encyclical is particularly significant in this respect.

The movement established under Chrysostomos to resist innovation while restraining rigorist tendencies subsequently came to adopt, at least in some of its authoritative declarations, an ecclesiology closer to positions he had opposed.

This makes it essential to distinguish institutional succession from doctrinal continuity.

The 1952 resignation did not result from changes that occurred after 1960. But it helps explain the ecclesiastical environment inherited by the later leadership and the significance of the subsequent transformation.

VI. The 1954 final Encyclical strengthens the interpretation of the resignation

The final Encyclical is important because it prevents us from interpreting the resignation as Chrysostomos's final abandonment of his earlier principles.

In 1952, the three bishops collectively declared that they had sought to restrain excesses and bridge the ecclesiastical division.

In 1954, after Chrysostomos had resumed leadership, he continued to maintain that the Matthewite hierarchy lacked proper canonical authorization.

He explicitly refused the proposed union involving the recognition of Matthew's successors and the formation of a larger twelve-member Synod.

His refusal rested partly upon the irregularity of Matthew's unilateral episcopal consecrations and partly upon the conduct and qualifications of those claiming episcopal authority.

He maintained that competent Pan-Orthodox judgment was necessary for their recognition.

[See: https://orthodoxmiscellany.blogspot.com/2025/01/final-encyclical-of-st-chrysostomos-new.html]

This is especially relevant to the 1950 Encyclical.

If Chrysostomos had genuinely adopted the full Matthewite conception of ecclesiastical authority in 1950, his continued insistence in 1954 upon the illegitimacy of the Matthewite episcopal succession would require further explanation.

Of course, two questions must remain distinct: whether Matthew's episcopal consecrations were canonical and whether the New Calendarist Mysteries were graceless.

Opposition to Matthew's consecrations does not logically prove that Chrysostomos rejected every element of Matthew's sacramental ecclesiology.

Nevertheless, the 1954 Encyclical establishes that the 1950 declaration had not produced a general ecclesiological convergence between Chrysostomos and the Matthewite leadership.

His opposition to their ecclesiastical claims continued to the end of his public ministry.

VII. The ecclesiological implications of the collective resignation

1. The bishops did not identify their particular jurisdiction with the whole Church

This is a major difference between the ecclesiological assumptions reflected in the resignation and the more exclusivist formulations characteristic of Matthewite polemics.

The bishops speak of the Church of Greece as a continuing ecclesiastical institution whose hierarchy had unlawfully innovated and persecuted the faithful.

They do not describe their separate administration as having definitively supplanted the Autocephalous Church of Greece.

Their objective remains correction and reunion.

This does not establish that they approved the official Church's ecclesiastical conduct or were already in communion with its hierarchy.

Rather, it shows that they distinguished the existence of the Church from the errors of its current administration.

2. Episcopal authority was understood as a responsibility, not an instrument for perpetuating separation

The bishops' willingness to resign is especially noteworthy.

They apparently did not consider their continued exercise of jurisdiction over a separate Old Calendarist body to be an absolute ecclesiological necessity.

They could contemplate relinquishing that responsibility while remaining Orthodox bishops faithful to the traditional calendar.

But this also exposed a serious practical contradiction.

If they relinquished pastoral care and instructed their clergy to cease commemorating them, who would exercise the necessary episcopal oversight of those clergy?

The resignation provides no adequate solution.

This is arguably its greatest canonical weakness.

The bishops' desire to remove a pretext for persecution was understandable, but that did not automatically release them from their pastoral obligations toward the faithful who depended upon them.

3. The faithful exercised decisive influence

Chrysostomos subsequently withdrew his resignation.

Archbishop Christodoulos's historical study records that on November 27, 1952, Chrysostomos reversed his decision after pressure from lay representatives and the refusal of the presbyterate and leadership of Π.Θ.Ε.Ο.Κ. to accept the resignation.

The need for a bishop who could represent the Old Calendarists in negotiations with the incoming Papagos government was also cited.

(https://myriobiblos.gr/books/book1/kef5_per3_fas2_meros4.htm)

The possibility that the faithful might otherwise turn to the Matthewite episcopate provides additional context, although it is not expressly identified as the reason in the resignation itself.

Chrysostomos's reversal illustrates the continued influence of the faithful in the movement's ecclesiastical affairs.

His resignation was not simply an individual decision that could be implemented without regard for those entrusted to his care.

At the same time, the episode reveals how dependent the movement had become upon its single remaining senior hierarch.

4. The official Church's reception of the other two bishops is revealing

Christophoros and Polykarpos maintained their resignations and sought reconciliation with the official Church.

On March 9 and 12, 1953, an ecclesiastical tribunal restored them to episcopal standing without new episcopal consecrations.

Archbishop Christodoulos records that the official Church recognized their 1935 consecrations by economy, notwithstanding its earlier declarations against Old Calendarist ordinations.

(https://myriobiblos.gr/books/book1/kef5_per3_fas2_meros4.htm)

This development is especially interesting because both sides had previously issued very severe judgments concerning the other's Mysteries.

Yet the official Church ultimately received the two bishops without repeating their consecrations.

It illustrates the difficulty of applying categorical assertions of gracelessness consistently to the practical reconciliation of separated clergy.

It also reinforces the importance of distinguishing sacramental questions from canonical recognition, deposition, restoration, and ecclesiastical economy.

VIII. Critical evaluation: what should be concluded?

The resignation supports several propositions, but they require careful formulation.

 

Proposition	Assessment
The bishops considered the calendar innovation unlawful	Explicitly established
They originally entered the movement partly to correct internal excesses	Explicitly established
They sought restoration of ecclesiastical unity rather than permanent division	Explicitly established
They rejected responsibility for the Keratea establishment	Explicitly established
They wished to remove a pretext for continued persecution	Explicitly established
They no longer believed the traditional calendar worth defending	Explicitly contradicted
They had accepted the Matthewite ecclesiology of automatic gracelessness	Not established
Their resignation was caused exclusively by former Matthewite clergy within the Florinite movement	Not established
They considered their separate administrative structure indispensable to the continued existence of the Church	Difficult to reconcile with the document
The resignation definitively resolved the question of sacramental grace in the official Church	Not established

 

The most important distinction is between the bishops' stated original purpose, their immediate reason for resigning, and the subsequent ecclesiological implications.

Their original purpose was to defend tradition and correct excesses.

Their immediate reason for resigning was to remove an alleged pretext for persecution.

The broader implication is that their understanding of ecclesiastical resistance did not depend upon the permanent perpetuation of an exclusive Old Calendarist hierarchy.

IX. Final synthesis

The collective resignation of November 3, 1952, should be understood as one of the clearest collective testimonies to the original ecclesiological outlook of the Florinite Old Calendarist leadership.

The three bishops reaffirmed that they entered the struggle to defend the traditional calendar, correct ecclesiastical excesses, and restore unity.

They continued to blame the official hierarchy for the innovation and the subsequent persecution.

They also explicitly repudiated responsibility for the excesses associated with Keratea.

Their willingness to relinquish active pastoral administration demonstrates how profoundly they had become discouraged by the failure to achieve a satisfactory ecclesiastical resolution.

Yet the resignation also exposes the practical difficulty of their position: they could abandon their jurisdictional responsibilities, but they could not thereby resolve the canonical questions confronting the faithful.

Chrysostomos's subsequent withdrawal of his resignation, together with his final Encyclical of 1954, shows that he continued to regard himself as responsible for the pastoral protection of those who had resisted the calendar innovation.

Most significantly, he did not abandon his opposition to the ecclesiastical claims of Matthew's successors.

This provides an important corrective to any historical account that treats the 1950 Encyclical as the definitive expression of his entire ecclesiology.

His earlier correspondence, the failed reconciliation attempts, the 1952 resignation, and the 1954 Encyclical reveal a much more complicated but also more coherent underlying objective.

Chrysostomos sought to defend the Orthodox Church against innovation without replacing its catholic and conciliar understanding of ecclesiastical authority with the claims of an exclusive Old Calendarist jurisdiction.

The later reception into the Florinite hierarchy of clergy formed in the Matthewite movement, and the subsequent emergence of stricter ecclesiological declarations, must therefore be investigated as a distinct historical development rather than assumed to represent an uncomplicated continuation of Chrysostomos's convictions.

The central historical irony is that the episcopate established in 1935 partly to restrain rigorist tendencies came, after Chrysostomos's death, to be led by hierarchs with significant roots in the very movement whose ecclesiological claims he had opposed.

The 1952 resignation is particularly important because it records the original bishops' objectives in their own collective words, shortly before that entire generation of leadership disappeared.

It should therefore occupy a central place in any serious historical evaluation of the ecclesiology of Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Florina and its relationship to the subsequent ecclesiology of the GOC.

 

Generated by ChatGPT-6.0 on November 2, 2026.

Analysis of the 1938 Compromise Proposal of Metropolitans Germanos of Demetrias and Chrysostomos of Florina

Outline, summary, and historical–ecclesiological analysis of the Greek memorandum transmitted to the Holy Synod of the official Church of Greece on January 15, 1938.

 

 

I. General summary

The memorandum is an exceptionally important document for understanding the original ecclesiology and objectives of the Greek Old Calendarist movement, particularly after its internal division in 1937.

Metropolitans Germanos of Demetrias, President of the Old Calendarist Synod, and Chrysostomos of Florina propose a negotiated settlement with the official Church of Greece that would restore the traditional calendar, recognize the Old Calendarist clergy, end persecution, and reintegrate the divided faithful into a unified ecclesiastical administration.

Their proposal was not an unconditional submission to the official hierarchy. It demanded substantial concessions from the State Church, especially concerning the traditional calendar and the canonical standing of the Old Calendarist clergy.

Nevertheless, the document reveals that both hierarchs continued to recognize the possibility of legitimate ecclesiastical authority within the official Church of Greece. They were prepared to cooperate with its Holy Synod, accept its participation in the adjudication of the calendar controversy, and eventually resolve the division through a common ecclesiastical structure.

Most significantly, they proposed that Bishops Matthew of Bresthena and Germanos of the Cyclades—the leaders of the 1937 separation—be brought before the official Holy Synod for disciplinary proceedings.

This last provision illustrates how severely the internal Old Calendarist division had affected the outlook of the two senior hierarchs.

The proposal demonstrates that, even after the 1935 declaration concerning the gracelessness of the New Calendarists, Germanos and Chrysostomos did not consider the ecclesiastical separation irreversible or necessarily dependent upon the creation of a permanently independent Old Calendarist Church.

The memorandum was ultimately rejected, and the anticipated reconciliation never occurred.

II. Historical background

The document was forwarded by Constantine Georgakopoulos, Minister of Religious Affairs and National Education, under Protocol No. 1615, dated January 15, 1938.

The memorandum itself had apparently been submitted during December 1937, when efforts were underway to resolve the calendar controversy through negotiations involving the government and representatives of both ecclesiastical parties.

The introductory proposal envisaged a mixed committee comprising two bishops appointed by the official Holy Synod, Germanos and Chrysostomos, and two government representatives.

This is significant: the Old Calendarist bishops were proposing a negotiated settlement within the broader framework of the Church of Greece, with the government acting as a facilitator.

The proposed conditions follow.

III. Outline of the ten proposed conditions

 

No.	Proposal	Principal significance
1	Annul every deposition imposed because of the calendar controversy, restore clergy to their ranks immediately, and eventually restore their ecclesiastical positions	Complete canonical rehabilitation of the Old Calendarist clergy
2	Recognize the episcopal consecrations and certain priestly ordinations performed by the Old Calendarist bishops; submit Matthew and Germanos of the Cyclades to the official Synod for disciplinary examination	Recognition of Old Calendarist Holy Orders, combined with action against the separatist bishops
3	Recognize that the adoption of the new calendar was provisional rather than final, pending Pan-Orthodox consideration	The reform remained open to ecclesiastical review
4	Guarantee freedom from persecution for clergy and faithful following the traditional calendar	Protection of Old Calendarist worship during negotiations
5	Convene a Pre-Synodal Conference during Great Lent 1938, preferably by the Sunday of Orthodoxy, with the aim of unity by Pascha	Establishment of an urgent timetable for reconciliation
6	Include one of the two Old Calendarist metropolitan bishops in the Church's delegation to the Conference	Recognition of their right to participate in resolving the controversy
7	Make a unanimous decision of the Pre-Synodal Conference binding upon both parties	Acceptance of a common, authoritative ecclesiastical judgment
8	Dissolve the independent Greek Religious Community of Genuine Orthodox Christians and place its churches under Germanos and Chrysostomos	Removal of a rival institutional structure associated with the internal division
9	Take appropriate ecclesiastical measures against clergy and laity exploiting the calendar struggle and perpetuating division	Suppression of factionalism and alleged abuses
10	If the Conference did not meet by Pascha, require the official Holy Synod to restore the traditional calendar for all feasts	A concrete fallback mechanism favoring restoration of the Julian calendar

 

Two features deserve particular attention.

First, the proposal expressly states that a Pre-Synodal Conference could issue immediately binding decisions only through unanimous agreement among its representatives.

Second, in the final paragraph, Germanos and Chrysostomos promise that, once the official Synod accepts the conditions, they will maintain the existing ecclesiastical arrangement until Pascha and refrain from further episcopal or priestly ordinations and other actions that might prejudice the negotiations.

This is a substantial concession in ecclesiastical administration.

IV. Analysis of the most important provisions

1. The bishops recognized a continuing ecclesiastical reality within the official Church

This is perhaps the most important ecclesiological implication of the document.

Germanos and Chrysostomos did not approach the State Church as an entirely graceless and ecclesiastically nonexistent institution.

They asked its Synod to rescind depositions, recognize ordinations, appoint a representative to the Pan-Orthodox gathering, and eventually restore the traditional calendar.

They were even willing to accept its disciplinary authority over members of the Old Calendarist hierarchy.

These actions presuppose that the official Synod retained a recognizable institutional and canonical capacity to act.

This does not necessarily mean that Germanos and Chrysostomos regarded all its actions as legitimate. They clearly repudiated the calendar innovation and the penalties imposed upon the Old Calendarists.

However, they did not treat the State Church as incapable of participating in a valid ecclesiastical reconciliation.

That is extremely difficult to harmonize with an uncompromising interpretation of the June 1935 Encyclical according to which the entire New Calendarist hierarchy had definitively ceased to possess ecclesiastical authority and sacramental grace in 1924.

The memorandum is therefore strong evidence of the distinction between their earlier polemical declarations and their operative ecclesiology.

2. The restoration of the traditional calendar remained their principal objective

The proposed agreement did not require the Old Calendarists to accept the new calendar.

On the contrary, its provisions were carefully designed to secure the eventual restoration of the Julian calendar throughout the Church of Greece.

The bishops proposed a two-stage process.

First, the disputed reform would be submitted to a Pan-Orthodox Pre-Synodal Conference, with both sides bound by a unanimous decision.

Second, if the Conference failed to convene before Pascha, the official Holy Synod would be required to restore the traditional calendar.

This demonstrates that Germanos and Chrysostomos still regarded the original objective of the struggle as attainable through the existing ecclesiastical institutions.

Nevertheless, Condition 7 is particularly revealing. It provides for acceptance of the Pre-Synodal Conference's decision concerning the calendar, whatever that decision might be.

That language strongly suggests that the bishops did not consider the precise juridical consequences of the 1924 reform to have been definitively settled.

They maintained that the reform was unlawful, but they were prepared to accept an authoritative Pan-Orthodox adjudication.

This is much closer to Chrysostomos's understanding of potential schism than to the Matthewite theory of an already completed and irreversible ecclesiastical separation.

3. Condition 2 reveals the profound hostility produced by the Matthewite division

Condition 2 contains one of the most striking provisions.

The two senior bishops proposed that Germanos Varykopoulos of the Cyclades and Matthew the Athonite be brought before the official Holy Synod for their allegedly uncanonical and unlawful actions and publications.

They also sought recognition of the episcopal consecrations performed in 1935 and of priestly ordinations undertaken for the pastoral needs of the Old Calendarists.

The significance is twofold.

First, Germanos and Chrysostomos evidently did not accept that the two separatist bishops had legitimately displaced them as representatives of the Orthodox Old Calendarist movement.

Second, they were prepared to involve the official hierarchy in resolving what had become an internal Old Calendarist conflict.

This is both historically revealing and canonically troubling.

If the official hierarchy had persecuted and unjustly deposed the Old Calendarist bishops in 1935, inviting that same hierarchy to judge their former colleagues could expose those colleagues to further disciplinary abuse.

Their anger and frustration may explain this provision, but they do not necessarily justify it.

Indeed, this is the strongest element of the memorandum for a critic wishing to argue that Germanos and Chrysostomos had allowed their conflict with Matthew to influence their ecclesiastical judgment.

The document does not merely propose reconciliation with the official Church. It also seeks to eliminate the competing institutional authority of the Matthewite faction.

That introduces an undeniable jurisdictional and disciplinary dimension into what is presented as a settlement of the calendar controversy.

4. The proposed dissolution of the independent religious community is especially important

Condition 8 demands the abolition of the independent Religious Community of Genuine Orthodox Christians and the transfer of certain churches, including St. Marina of Piraeus, into the jurisdiction of Germanos and Chrysostomos.

This is not simply a technical proposal concerning church property.

It implies that the two hierarchs considered the independent administrative organization of the Old Calendarist movement unnecessary if a satisfactory ecclesiastical settlement could be reached.

Their preferred arrangement would preserve the traditional calendar within a restored ecclesiastical unity.

This directly contradicts the later assumption that the Old Calendarist movement was necessarily intended to establish and perpetuate an autonomous ecclesiastical body separate from the Church of Greece.

It also illustrates how the 1937 division had altered the immediate priorities of the leadership.

The struggle was no longer directed exclusively against the calendar innovation. It had also become a contest concerning who legitimately represented the Old Calendarist faithful.

5. Condition 9 exposes the internal divisions within the movement

The bishops propose disciplinary measures against individuals who had transformed the struggle for the traditional calendar into a means of exploitation and who had undertaken actions perpetuating ecclesiastical division.

The wording is severe.

Although it does not name Matthew and his supporters in this particular condition, its placement immediately after the proposal to abolish the independent religious community strongly suggests that the bishops had the separatist faction principally in mind.

The memorandum therefore provides evidence that the schism was understood by Germanos and Chrysostomos as involving not merely theological disagreement, but also personal ambition, institutional rivalry, and the exploitation of religious loyalties.

This is consistent with Chrysostomos's correspondence of 1937, in which he expressed deep concern that radical ecclesiological claims and factional conduct were compromising the entire Old Calendarist cause.

However, the memorandum alone does not establish that all the individuals criticized were actually motivated by personal gain. It establishes what the two metropolitan bishops alleged and sought to remedy.

V. The proposal in relation to the ecclesiology of 1935 and 1937

The document creates a significant interpretive difficulty for those who insist that the June 1935 declaration expressed the definitive and unchanging ecclesiology of the three hierarchs.

Consider the historical sequence.

Date	Position or action
May 1935	The innovating hierarchy is described as potentially schismatic in relation to the wider Orthodox Church
June 1935	Following their condemnation and deposition, the bishops issue a declaration concerning the absence of grace among the New Calendarists
1937	Germanos and Chrysostomos explicitly reject automatic deprivation of sacramental grace before competent conciliar judgment
January 1938	They propose recognition, reconciliation, joint ecclesiastical adjudication, and possible restoration of unity with the official Church

This chronology suggests a substantial continuity between the initial May 1935 position, the clarification of 1937, and the practical proposals of January 1938.

The June 1935 statement, although unquestionably part of the historical record, appears less representative of their sustained ecclesiastical practice.

The 1938 memorandum is particularly valuable because it is not a theoretical theological treatise.

It is a practical proposal describing the arrangement under which the bishops believed legitimate ecclesiastical unity could actually be restored.

Their actions and intended arrangements therefore illuminate the ecclesiological assumptions underlying their conduct.

VI. The proposal's weaknesses and contradictions

Despite its considerable historical significance, the memorandum is not without difficulties.

A. It risks relying upon the very hierarchy whose canonical actions it condemns

The proposal seeks rehabilitation from an ecclesiastical authority that had previously deposed the Old Calendarist bishops.

There is no necessary contradiction in seeking the reversal of an unjust decision by the authority responsible for issuing it.

But the request for disciplinary proceedings against Matthew and Germanos introduces a more serious problem.

The two metropolitan bishops were prepared to recognize a degree of judicial competence in a hierarchy whose previous judgment against them they regarded as invalid.

This required careful canonical justification, which the memorandum does not provide.

B. It allows considerable governmental participation

The proposed mixed commission would include two representatives of the Greek government.

Governmental mediation might have helped resolve a dispute intertwined with Greek ecclesiastical law and public administration.

Nevertheless, reliance upon state authority carries obvious risks, particularly given the persecution that Old Calendarist clergy had already experienced.

The proposal reflects the Greek Church's historical entanglement with the State and the bishops' expectation that governmental intervention could facilitate ecclesiastical reconciliation.

It also demonstrates that their preferred solution was not a purely internal arrangement between two independent ecclesiastical bodies.

C. The terms combine genuine reconciliation with factional suppression

The bishops seek peace, rehabilitation, recognition, and reunion.

Yet they simultaneously demand the abolition of a competing religious association and disciplinary proceedings against opponents.

These objectives are not necessarily incompatible, but their combination is revealing.

It suggests that the bishops considered the removal of the Matthewite opposition an important condition for the restoration of unity.

The proposal therefore cannot be interpreted simply as a disinterested expression of ecclesiastical reconciliation.

It was also an attempt to restore the authority of the senior Old Calendarist leadership after the division of 1937.

D. The proposed timetable was extraordinarily ambitious

The memorandum envisaged a Pan-Orthodox gathering during Great Lent 1938 and the possibility of achieving unity by Pascha.

Given the disputes among the Local Orthodox Churches and the unresolved divisions within the Old Calendarist movement itself, this was highly ambitious.

The fallback provision requiring the official Synod to restore the old calendar if the Conference failed to meet also imposed a significant obligation upon the State Church.

Consequently, the compromise may have been considerably less attractive to the official hierarchy than its conciliatory language initially suggested.

VII. What the memorandum establishes—and what it does not

It provides strong evidence for three conclusions.

First, Germanos and Chrysostomos did not regard permanent institutional separation as the necessary or desirable culmination of the Old Calendarist struggle. Their objective remained the restoration of the traditional calendar and ecclesiastical unity.

Second, they recognized a continuing capacity for legitimate ecclesiastical action within the official Church of Greece. Their willingness to submit the controversy to the official Synod and a future Pan-Orthodox gathering is difficult to reconcile with the assertion that the State Church had entirely ceased to exist ecclesiastically.

Third, the 1937 division had profoundly affected their practical priorities. They were willing to pursue reconciliation with the State Church while simultaneously seeking disciplinary action against the bishops who had separated from them.

The document does not, however, prove that Germanos and Chrysostomos were prepared to restore communion unconditionally, that they accepted the calendar innovation as legitimate, or that all their actions were canonically beyond criticism.

Nor does it prove that the official Church rejected the proposal specifically because it expected the Old Calendarist movement to collapse. That explanation is plausible but would require evidence from the official Synod's deliberations.

VIII. Overall assessment

I consider the 1938 memorandum one of the more revealing primary documents concerning the original ecclesiology of the Greek Old Calendarist movement.

It demonstrates that the two senior hierarchs understood their separation from the official Church as a corrective and potentially temporary ecclesiastical action, not necessarily as the establishment of an exclusively authentic Church replacing the existing Autocephalous Church of Greece.

Their ultimate objective remained the restoration of the traditional calendar, the recognition of their clergy, and the reunification of the divided faithful.

The memorandum consequently reinforces the argument that Chrysostomos's potential–actual distinction was not merely a convenient theoretical device. It had concrete implications for his understanding of ecclesiastical authority, sacramental recognition, and the possibility of reconciliation.

At the same time, its proposed treatment of Matthew and Germanos of the Cyclades reveals how factional bitterness could compromise the canonical restraint the two senior hierarchs otherwise defended.

In that respect, the document is not an uncomplicated vindication of Germanos and Chrysostomos. It simultaneously illuminates their ecclesiological moderation and their willingness to employ the official ecclesiastical machinery against their internal opponents.

My principal conclusion is that the memorandum provides powerful evidence against the retrospective portrayal of Chrysostomos of Florina as an unwavering advocate of the automatic extinction of sacramental grace in 1924. His practical ecclesiastical policy in January 1938 is much more intelligible within his understanding of the potential–actual distinction and his conviction that the calendar dispute required an authoritative, conciliar resolution.

One further observation is particularly important: the bishops' proposal did not fail because they were unwilling to contemplate reconciliation. They were demonstrably prepared to negotiate an extensive settlement, including their own future ecclesiastical status.

The failure of that settlement helped leave the Old Calendarist movement in the condition of prolonged separation that Chrysostomos had originally hoped to prevent.

This also supplies an important historical context for understanding his subsequent statements in 1948 and 1950. By then, the prospects for a comprehensive settlement had deteriorated considerably, and the movement had become deeply fragmented by competing ecclesiologies and jurisdictions.

Thus, when evaluating the successive declarations of 1935, 1950, and 1974, the operative ecclesiology revealed in the 1938 memorandum deserves at least as much attention as their more severe theological formulations.

 

Generated by ChatGPT-6.0 on November 2, 2026.

Advice Is One Thing, a Command Is Another: Elderism and the Limits of Spiritual Authority

By Protopresbyter Christophoros Chronis

Assistant Professor, School of Theology,

Department of Theology, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

 

 

Eleni, a teacher of about thirty-five, asked to speak with her parish priest after spending eight years under the guidance of a very well-known spiritual father. Throughout those years, he decided whether she should accept an appointment in another city, instructed her to distance herself from her sister because, as he put it, “she did not understand the spiritual life,” and expected her to seek his blessing before making any significant purchase (a house, a car, etc.). When she once hesitated, he told her that whoever doubts his spiritual father doubts God. Today, prayer frightens her, and she feels guilty whenever she makes a decision on her own. She does not use the word abuse. She simply says, “I was not obedient enough.”

The figure of Eleni has been drawn from numerous pastoral encounters, so that no actual person can be identified. Those who minister the Holy Mystery of Repentance and Confession know that they frequently encounter people like her, and that her words, “I was not obedient enough,” are heard in the confessional far more often than one might expect. By the term “elderism” (γεροντισμός), we do not mean genuine spiritual fatherhood as exercised by the Elders, which has given the Church her saints, but rather its distortion, which leads to its degeneration. The spiritual father, whether a clergyman or a monk, ceases to guide the individual toward Christ and instead binds him to himself, while the faithful person transfers to him decisions that properly belong to his own responsibility. Obedience, which the ascetical tradition places near the summit of the spiritual life, then becomes a mechanism of control. Contemporary research, having listened attentively to the testimonies of those who have been wounded, describes spiritual abuse as the coercion and control of one person by another within a spiritual context. Among its manifestations are the demand for obedience to the spiritual guide and the isolation of the faithful person from those outside that relationship. [1]

Orthodox pastoral theology, on the one hand, cannot deny that such harm also occurs within its own communities. And when it does occur, it constitutes a grave pastoral failing that cannot be justified by any appeal to obedience. The spiritual father who binds a person's soul to himself, rather than guiding it toward Christ, must give an account for the souls whom God entrusted to his care in order that he might set them free, many of whom have been spiritually crushed. On the other hand, however, Orthodox pastoral theology cannot address this problem by abandoning obedience, for in doing so it would abandon a central element of its spiritual heritage. The Fathers knew how easily spiritual authority could be misused, and for this reason they bequeathed to us criteria that distinguish obedience which heals from control which wounds.

1. First Test the Helmsman

St. John Climacus instructs anyone intending to enter the arena of obedience first to examine and, as he writes, to test the helmsman, lest he find himself with a sailor instead of a helmsman, a sick man instead of a physician, a man subject to the passions instead of one free from them, and thus bring about his own shipwreck. [2] The exhortation that the disciple should not judge his Elder for minor human weaknesses comes afterward. Discernment, therefore, is exercised at the beginning of the relationship and is the responsibility of the disciple, who remains free to choose a guide and, consequently, free not to choose one.

The same author calls the spiritual father “a mediator unto God, and after God.” [3] The spiritual father who teaches that doubting him is equivalent to doubting God has silently erased the words “after God.” He now occupies a position that belongs to Christ alone, the “one mediator between God and men,” [4] and this is exceedingly dangerous.

2. Advice Is One Thing, a Command Is Another

The most precise criterion is found in the Questions and Answers of Venerable Barsanuphius and John, where the art of spiritual guidance unfolds through hundreds of written responses to monks and laypeople in Gaza. A brother asks whether he is obliged to carry out without exception every answer he receives from the Fathers. Abba John, the disciple and fellow ascetic of the Great Elder, replies with discernment: “Not all of them. Only those that are given to him as commands. For simple counsel according to God is one thing, and a command is another. Counsel is an admonition, not a binding obligation, and shows a person the straight path of life. A command, on the other hand, has the character of a binding obligation.” [5]

Admonition reveals the path and leaves the person free to walk it. In the following question and answer, the Elder explains what happens when a disciple, who has sought an answer according to God rather than a command, does not follow what he has heard: “Now, if you do not wish to do what your spiritual father has told you, this does not mean that you are a transgressor of a commandment, for you have not received a command. Rather, it shows that you are neglecting your own spiritual benefit, and for this reason you ought to blame yourself.” [6] The disciple does not transgress a commandment. He neglects his own spiritual benefit, and it is for this reason alone that he reproaches himself. An even more crucial clarification follows, since the character of what is said is determined by the intention of the one speaking: “If you ask the Elder to give you a command, but he has no such intention, his answer will not be regarded as a command, even if you have requested one.” [7]

This distinction places a grave responsibility upon anyone who offers spiritual guidance. The spiritual father who wishes to remain faithful to the tradition must know, and must make clear, when he is offering admonition or counsel and when he is giving a command. When this distinction is forgotten, whether inadvertently or deliberately, every piece of advice comes to be heard as a command, and every hesitation as disobedience to God Himself. This is the voice that Eleni still hears.

For laypeople who live in the world and have not made a monastic vow of obedience, what their spiritual father tells them generally falls within the category of counsel. Decisions concerning marriage, profession, place of residence, medical treatment, and so forth belong to the person who will live with their consequences. The spiritual father prays with him, offers counsel, and opens his eyes to the light of the Gospel. He does not make decisions on his behalf. Never, and for no reason whatsoever.

3. Pastoral Observations

The spiritual father-confessor must explicitly state whether he is offering counsel or giving a command, and in dealing with laypeople, he will almost always offer counsel. It is advisable for him to ask permission before addressing matters that the penitent has not himself raised. When someone suffers from depression or another mental illness, the spiritual father encourages him to continue his treatment and, where necessary, cooperates with his attending physician, rather than interpreting the illness as a lack of humility. He may counsel discretion, as the ascetical tradition does, in order to protect the individual from vainglory. He must never, however, forbid him to speak about their relationship with his parents, his wife, or another spiritual father, nor may he present such a prohibition as an act of obedience. The seal of confession binds the spiritual father and protects the penitent, who remains free to speak about his own life to whomever he wishes. When the spiritual father forbids him to do so, he turns a protection established by the Church for the sake of the vulnerable on its head and transforms it into a shield for the powerful.

Church communities also bear responsibility. The freedom to choose a spiritual father and, when necessary, to change him belongs to the tradition, and parishes and monasteries ought to proclaim this openly rather than regard a change of spiritual father as an act of betrayal. The Metropolises need clearly established channels through which the faithful can express their concerns about a particular confessor, together with procedures for examining such concerns seriously. The training of clergy needs to include ongoing pastoral education, so that future spiritual fathers may recognize dependency both in those whom they guide and in their own need to be needed by them.

Those who have been wounded need patience above all. Many, like Eleni, have learned to hear the voice of God in the voice of the person who harmed them. The priest who receives them can offer them the Psalms of repentance that fill our divine services, together with the assurance that every human being bears the image of God, without pressuring them to return hastily to the Mystery of Confession. Some will need to distance themselves from confession for a time, and the Church can respect this distance as part of their spiritual consolation and healing.

Eleni continues to attend church services. For months, she was unable to go to confession, and her new spiritual father did not insist. When she finally knelt beneath his epitrachelion, she did so because she herself wished to. Now she often asks him, half in jest, whether something he has said is “advice or a command.” He always answers her, and she has begun once again to make the decisions concerning her life for herself, while she now listens to her spiritual father’s admonitions without fear.

 

NOTES

1. L. Oakley and K. Kinmond, Breaking the Silence on Spiritual Abuse, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013, pp. 21–22.

2. St. John of Sinai, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, Step IV, “On Blessed and Ever-Memorable Obedience,” §7, in Philokalia of the Watchful and Ascetical Fathers, vol. 16, text, translation, and commentary by Eleftherios G. Meretakis, Patristic Publications “Gregory Palamas” (EPE), Thessaloniki, 1996, pp. 80–82. Immediately afterward, the author instructs those who have already entered into obedience no longer to scrutinize their good spiritual guide.

3. St. John of Sinai, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, Step I, “On Renunciation of the World,” §14, ibid., p. 42.

4. 1 Timothy 2:5.

5. Venerable Barsanuphius and John, Discourses on Discernment and Hesychasm (Questions and Answers), vol. II, “Preparation” Publications, Holy Monastery of the Honorable Forerunner, Kareas, 1996, Question and Answer 368, pp. 252–254. In the edition of St. Nicodemus the Hagiorite (Venice, 1816), the same question and answer is numbered 365: “Not all, but only those given to him as commands. For simple counsel according to God is one thing, and a command is another. Counsel is an admonition without compulsion, showing a person the straight path of life; but a command bears an inviolable yoke.”

6. Ibid., Question and Answer 369, p. 254: “You are not considered to have transgressed a command, for you did not receive it as a command; rather, you have shown yourself to have disregarded what is beneficial to you.”

7. Ibid., Question and Answer 370, p. 256: “If, when questioned, he had no intention of giving a command, it is not reckoned to you as a command, even if you yourself requested it.”

 

Greek source: https://anastasiosk.blogspot.com/2026/11/blog-post_924.html

Solidarity and Volunteerism: A Conscious Way of Life in Christ

Metropolitan Cyprian [II] of Oropos and Phyle | October 18, 2026 (O.S.)

 

 

For some years now, societies, particularly those of developed and prosperous countries, have begun to recognize the practical as well as the psychological necessity and usefulness of solidarity and volunteerism.

Consequently, they encouraged volunteerism and gave recognition and legitimacy—and often financial subsidies as well—to the corresponding organizations, which fall under the category of so-called “Non-Governmental Organizations” (NGOs). The majority of these are women’s organizations, engaging in numerous and often recreational activities. Thus, in our days, we are witnessing a marked surge in this phenomenon.

Volunteerism is not merely an act of giving, but a conscious way of life in Christ that transforms societies. In a world often dominated by isolation and personal gain, selfless giving constitutes the most powerful antidote. Every hour of volunteer work, every small or great gesture of solidarity, builds bridges of trust and gives rise to hope for a better tomorrow.

Moreover, by giving to others, we discover the best in ourselves.

Volunteerism requires no special skills, but only the willingness to become the change we wish to see in the world. Let us not, therefore, wait for the right conditions before taking action. The right moment is now, and the power lies in the hands of us all, through the Grace of our Christ and the help of our Most Holy Theotokos...

 

Greek source: https://www.imoph.org/pdfs/2026/10/31/20261031aAllileg-Ethelont.pdf