Saturday, October 17, 2026

Putin’s Ideology

Vladimir Moss | November 23 / December 6, 2022

 

 

Putin has no ideology. He is a thief, a bandit, a warlord, a murderer, a billionaire Mafioso “boss of bosses”, and such people do not have ideologies in the normal sense. If they have one, it is: “Might is right”, or “Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die”. However, Putin is also the head of a very important and powerful state (and not only because of its nuclear weapons); and almost all heads of state have ideologies, if only as ways of uniting and motivating their peoples behind them. So Putin pretends to have an ideology. If someone will object that Putin truly has an ideology and is sincere in holding it, I shall not dispute that here. My main purpose in this article is not to delve into the sincerity or otherwise of his professed beliefs, but to inquire what those beliefs would appear to be, whether sincerely held or not.

Putin was originally a communist, and unlike, for example, Boris Yeltsin, he never formally renounced communism. He says he threw his party card into the top drawer of his desk, and left it there, implying a kind of indifference to, but not outright rejection of, the party. As we shall see, he still holds to certain communist beliefs, but claims they are compatible with Christianity (which they are not). He is loyal to historic Communist Russia, especially the period of Stalin’s wartime rule, and considers that in spite of certain “mistakes” in its governance the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the twentieth century.

In the 1990s Putin had the opportunity to take part in certain shady capitalist deals, and acquired a taste for a kind of capitalism, “anarcho-capitalism”, as it has been called. Indeed, surprising as it may seem, capitalism is probably the most sincerely held part of his belief structure. The reason is simple: it pays. And for Putin and his band of thieves, that is absolutely the first priority. That is why among Putin’s highest priorities is Russia’s unfettered access to world markets and all the mechanisms of the global capitalist system.

However, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and the West’s exceptionally strong sanctions in reply, has probably destroyed his chances of being a “normal” capitalist country – at least, in the foreseeable future. Fortunately for him (but not for anybody else), he still has vast mineral resources. So as long as he controls those gas and oil reserves, he is unlikely to become a complete pauper.

Is Putin a democrat? He certainly pretends to be; and he holds elections that have deceived enough people into thinking that he really cares that the will of the people should prevail. But he claims that his system is not democracy tout court, but “sovereign democracy” – a significant difference which means he is in favour of democracy so long as it produces only one consistent winner – himself. He, rather than the people, is the sovereign. He manipulates elections and electoral processes so as to stack the odds against all but one candidate. Dangerously popular candidates such as Nemtsov or Navalny he either kills or poisons or imprisons. As for the constitution, he feels free to manipulate it so as to keep him or his stooge, Medvedev, in the presidency. In 2020 he claimed a democratic mandate for changing the constitution to enable his to remain president indefinitely; but he achieved that by mixing up the issue of the presidency with other issues, such as gay marriage, where he could be more sure that the people would agree with him.

“Sovereign democracy” also means that he claims to be the real sovereign of the whole territory of the former Soviet Union, of the “Russian world”, including its non-Russian parts. Hence his persistent attempts to distort the Ukrainian elections, resorting to force in the early 2000s when they came up with the wrong winner. In the case of Crimea, he invaded first, and then staged an election. In the case of Georgia, he simply invaded. In 2020 he put forward a new constitution for voting in a referendum. It more or less guaranteed that he could remain President for life in Russia as his “eternal friend” President Xi of China is.

With regard to liberalism, the issue is clearer: Putin openly despises liberalism and human rights. He is profoundly opposed to free speech. And although he has not destroyed it altogether, his control of the media (apart from the internet) is more or less complete.

Is he a nationalist? He certainly claims to be, although in a multi-national country like Russia he has to be careful with his language about other nationalities. He certainly delights in Russian successes, whether in sport or culture or science or on the battlefield. He is not a racist in the manner of Hitler, and displays no obvious anti-semitism; but the similarities between his and Hitler’s regime are numerous; hence his nickname “Putler”.

Probably the most difficult – but potentially most rewarding – juggling-act that Putin is trying to pull off is to be the successor not only of the Russian democrats of the 1990s, and of the Soviet communists of the period 1917-91, but also of the pre-revolutionary Orthodox Russian tsars. Of course, this is an impossible feat; the ideological contradictions between the three are too great. But this does not stop Putin from trying in this way to be the heir of “all the Russias”, understood temporally as well as spatially.

What attracts Putin to Orthodox tsarism is its authoritarianism, its rejection of the concept of human rights (as opposed to the values of the Gospel) and its appeal to the growing number of Russian Orthodox patriots. There are other, less obvious, but not inconsiderable benefits. Thus Putin, who loves nothing better than to squeeze his oldest and poorest subjects ever more tightly while indulging in a billionaire’s lifestyle, can claim to be following the teaching and example of his fellow-KGB Agent, the Moscow Patriarch Cyril Gundiaev, who urges his mainly poor Orthodox parishioners not to aim for riches and be content with their lot, in accordance with the Gospel, while indulging in very conspicuous consumption himself.

Putin has played the part of an Orthodox Christian in general well. He claims to have been baptized in his childhood, and dutifully goes to church on major feasts, putting out candles and crossing himself. He even claims to have an Orthodox spiritual father – the ambitious and talented Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkhunov) of Pskov. 

But there are flaws in Putin’s performance in relation to Orthodoxy and the Orthodox autocracy, some of them important. The rest of this article is devoted to an analysis of them…

First of all, there is Putin’s religious ecumenism. The Russian Federation has four official religions. Among them, Orthodoxy is clearly the most favoured, but not in the sense confessed by the tsars, that is, as the one true faith. Indeed, Putin goes out of his way, both at home and abroad, to show his great respect for other religions, especially Islam and Judaism. While hotly defending Russia and Russia’s political system against all rivals, he does not do the same in regard to Russia’s traditional religion, Orthodox Christianity.

Of course, in this respect he is following the consistent practice of all the political and ecclesiastical leaders of Russia since the 1960s, including that of Patriarch Cyril. However, ecumenism is a pre-eminently western doctrine, which since the early twentieth century has been promoted especially by the Anglo-Saxon nations as part of their liberal programme of human rights. It was therefore rejected as a form of western capitalist propaganda by Stalin, who in 1948 organized a Pan-Orthodox Conference in Moscow to counter and condemn the first General Assembly of the World Council of Churches that was taking place at the same time in Amsterdam. In 1961 the KGB changed course, and sent KGB Major-General Nikodem Rotov, Metropolitan of Leningrad (Agent “Sviatoslav”), who also happened to be a secret Catholic bishop, to the General Assembly of the WCC in New Delhi to spy on western churchmen, and to propagate the Soviet view of the world. (Nikodem was accompanied by Metropolitan Anthony [Bloom] of Sourozh, based in London, who was suspected by many of working simultaneously for the KGB and MI5.) Both patriarchs of the post-Soviet period, Alexis II (Agent “Drozdov”) and the present Cyril (Agent “Mikhailov), were disciples of Nikodem, and continued his ecumenist policies. In 2016 Cyril even had a “summit” with Castro and Pope Francis I in Havana…

But Putin is, of course, anti-western

Putin’s regime claims to be the successor not only of the RSFSR and the USSR but also of the pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodox Empire. It may be described as neo-Soviet and neo-Fascist, without the apparatus of conventional Marxism but with “Communist Christianity”, drawing support from a heady mixture of conflicting constituencies: nationalists and democrats and monarchists, Orthodox Christians and pagan mystics and dyed-in-the-wool atheists, westerners and capitalists, mafiosi bandits and Slavophile patriots. Putin aims to find a place in his all-embracing heart for all the Russias of the last century – and all its faiths going back to the tenth century.

One of those faiths is communism, and Putin has clearly not renounced that. As he said in 2016 to the Pan-Russian People’s Front: “You know that like millions of Soviet citizens – over 20 million – I used to be a member of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), and not just a regular member: for almost 20 years I worked for the organization called the Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union [KGB]. This organization derives from the Cheka [Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage], which was then called the armed unit of the Party. If for some reason a person left the Communist Party, they were immediately fired from the KGB. I did not join the party simply because I had to, though I cannot say I was such a dedicated communist, but I treated this with great care. As opposed to numerous party functionaries, I was not one of them; I was a rank-and-file member. As opposed to many functionaries, I did not trash my membership card, I did not burn it. I would not want to criticize anyone now – people had different motives and this is their own business. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union fell apart; my membership card is still out there somewhere.

“I have always liked communist and socialist ideas. If we consider the Code of the Builder of Communism that was widely published in the Soviet Union, it strongly resembles the Bible. This is not a joke; it was actually an excerpt from the Bible. It spoke of good things: equality, fraternity, happiness. However, the practical implementation of these ideals in this country had little in common with what the utopian socialists Saint-Simon or Owen spoke about. This country had little resemblance to their City of the Sun.”

Andrei Melnikov writes: “Vladimir Putin’s words to the effect that the communist ideology is ‘very close’ to Christianity, were uttered in a documentary film ‘Valaam’ that was shown on January 14 of this year [2018] on the television channel ‘Russia 1’. They elicited a strong reaction even in spite of the fact that the Russian president had expounded similar views earlier. The head of the government’s thought has probably sounded particularly clear now in view of the beginning of the presidential campaign. Let us not note that the maker of the film was the journalist Andrei Kondrashov, who was recently appointed head of Putin’s pre-election campaign headquarters. The president visited Valaam monastery in June, 2017, and he has been there before. 

“‘Faith,’ said Putin on the television screen, ‘has always accompanied us. It has become stronger when our country was suffering particularly intensely during the most God-fighting years, when priests were killed and churches destroyed. But at the same time, you know, they created a new religion’ – the communist ideology, - which ‘is very akin to Christianity’. ‘Freedom, brotherhood, equality, justice – all these are invoked in the Holy Scriptures, it’s all there. And what of the ‘Law Code of the Builder of Communism’? This was a sublimation, a primitive excerpt from the Bible, they didn’t think up anything new there’.

“Let us recall that the president said similar things earlier. For example, during his speech in 2016 before the activists of the Pan-Russian People’s Front – a structure that had played the role of locomotive in the preceding electoral campaign of the acting president. ‘I very much like and to this day I still like communist and socialist ideas,’ said Putin then. ‘If we look at the ‘Law Code of the Builder of Communism’, which was published in large quantities in the Soviet Union, we see that it is very reminiscent of the Bible. This is no joke, this is in fact an extract from the Bible.’ ‘But the practical incarnations of these remarkable ideas in our country were far from what the socialist utopians expounded. Our country was not like the City of the Sun’, explained the head of the Russian state to the PPF activists.

“However, this time Putin added one more ‘burning’ topic – the fate of Lenin’s body in the Mausoleum. The past year was marked, in connection with the 100th anniversary of the revolution, by a sharpening of the discussion over the burial of the leader of the world revolution. One of those who expressed himself in favour of a ‘normal’ burial of Lenin was the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov, after which he had a bit of a quarrel with the president of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Ziuganov.

“‘Look,’ said Putin, ‘they put Lenin in the Mausoleum. In what does this differ from the relics of the saint? For the Orthodox, or simply for Christians? When they tell me: there is no such tradition in the Christian world, how come? Go to Athos and look. There they have holy relics. Yes, and her (on Valaam) there are also holy relics, those of Sergius and Herman.’ ‘In essence, the authorities at that time thought up nothing new. They simply adapted what humanity had already long ago invented to their own ideology,’ explained the head of the state.

“These words on ‘relics’ received a stormy reaction from the State Duma Deputy Natalya Poklonskaya, who in the course of the past year, in unison with Kadyrov, spoke out for the burial of Lenin. ‘In my view, it would be incorrect and a consciously self-interested distortion, for political or other motives, to use and interpret ‘in one’s own way’ the words of the president on a certain parallel between the dead body of Ulyanov in the Mausoleum, on whose conscience are millions of murdered people, and the holy relics in the monasteries and churches. The opinion he voiced is not about that, but about government regimes and the attempt to create a false religion at a definite stage of history,’ wrote Poklonskaya in her account on Facebook.

“However, the words on the Mausoleum were received with rapture by the communists headed by Gennady Ziuganov. On the one hand, this is understandable: Ziuganov has himself expressed analogous ideas about the similarity between the moral imperatives of communism and those of Christianity. ‘If you take the Moral ‘Code of Law of the Builder of Communism’ and the Sermon on the Mount of Jesus Christ and put them side to side, you will be surprised: the texts coincide completely,’ declared the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 2012 in an interview on the same ‘Russia 1’ channel. On the other hand, the rhetoric of compromise addressed to the older generation, who are not indifferent to their memories of the Soviet past, contributes to the rising popularity of Pavel Grudinin, a candidate for the presidency from the CPRF.

“If all this is understandable for the communist electorate, there remains the question: to what extent do the thoughts of the president chime in with the point of view of the church? If we are to take the opinion of Patriarch Cyril of Moscow and All Russia as the official position of the ROC, then it is impossible for us not to register the striking consonance between his sermons and the speeches of Putin on the issue in question, with the exception, perhaps, of his words on Lenin. On April 6, 2011 in Kiev the head of the ROC said: ‘Even the years of life in the conditions of unbelief did not root out in us that very programme which was laid as a certain Code of development of our Orthodox peoples. And in this sense the unbelievers of the Soviet period were in a rudimentary way Orthodox Christians – they remained in the same system of values… At that time atheist ideology wanted to reform the system of values, but did not encroach on morality. Take the very ‘Code of Law of the Builder of Communism’ – it was dictated from the Bible. Without God, but the same morality.’ However, with regard to the burial of Lenin, the representatives of the Church in 2017 more than once said that it was necessary to wait with that.

“‘Putin’s real ideas about Christian values are hidden from us,’ thinks the leader of the Centre for the Study of Problems of Religion and Society at the Institute of Europe RAN, Roman Lunkin. ‘The president has not spoken about fulfilling the Gospel commandments or about his parish life.’ ‘For Putin the important things in public are formalities – his baptism in childhood, Orthodoxy as an element consolidating society, his principled visits to a simple church service at Christmas and more officially – at Pascha,’ said the religious expert of ‘NGR’. 

“A leading expert of the Centre for Political Technologies, Alexei Makarkin, pointed to the fact that ‘in his interview Putin did not say that this was Christian tradition in its pure form, that would have been strange: he spoke about copying tradition, and the striving of the essentially antichristian party to borrow something.’ ‘In this way each auditorium can read what it wants,’ explained the political expert. ‘The main auditorium – nostalgic Russians – can read in it the main thing that Putin is against – that Lenin should be taken out of the Mausoleum, at any rate now. At the same time there is another variant for people holding other views, in the first place believers: who, from the point of view of the believers, will copy Jesus Christ? He will be copied by the Antichrist, who will try to make out that he is Jesus, being in actual fact his most terrible enemy. For the Christians there could be the following interpretation: since the president recognizes that the communists can copy certain Christian traditions, that means that everything is in fact like that – the enemies of Christ are trying to copy, while at the same time distorting, ‘said Markarkin of the ‘NGR’.”

*

This article goes a long way to answering the question that has exercised and divided Russian True Orthodox Christians: is Putin’s regime a reincarnation of the antichristian Soviet regime (in a fascist, nationalist mode) or something new? If the former, then it lies under the same anathema of the Moscow Council of 1918 that fell on the obviously antichristian Soviet regime and all those who cooperated with it. If the latter, then we must consider the possibility that Putin’s regime is actually worse than the Soviet regime, being antichristian in a different, more subtle and more profound manner.

The word “Antichrist” has a dual meaning. The preposition “anti” in Greek can mean either “against” or “in the place of”. The Soviet regime was clearly “against” Christ – it murdered millions of Christians, and persecuted the faith in word and deed. However, it did not pretend to “take the place of” Christ or God. For how could it take the place of a being that, according to communists, does not exist?

But the Soviet regime came to an end in 1991, and with it so did the open persecution of Christians. There was nobody left in Russia who was openly “anti” – in the sense of “against” – Christ. There were still very many atheists and heretics, but no more “God-fighters”; all the surviving former God-fighters were living on their pensions; “God-fighting” was no longer legal or in any way approved.

But in 2000 Putin came to power. Now Putin had just recently been director of the FSB (KGB), the executive branch, as it were, of the Soviet government’s war against God. For such a man to become president was therefore a profound shock and a stern warning for those with eyes to see and ears to hear. It was as if the head of the Inquisition had become head of the World Council of Churches, or Himmler – the president of Germany after the war. It was tolerated in Russia, first, because, as surveys showed, most Russians still considered the Soviet Union to be their native country, and Lenin and Stalin to be heroes; and secondly, because the West clung on to the stupid belief that over seventy years of the most terrible blood-letting in history – far longer and far more radical than Hitler’s twelve years in power – could be wiped out and reversed without any kind of decommunization, without even a single person being put on trial for the murdering of innocent people in the name of the “collective Antichrist” of Soviet power. The tragic farce has reached such a stage that the KGB has become a hero of Russian literature and cinematography, with its own church in the middle of its chief prison, the Lubyanka in Moscow – not, as it might be thought to commemorate the martyrs who suffered so terribly within its walls, but for the executioners! The West concurred with this filthy whitewash; the official Orthodox Church (itself ruled by KGB agents) concurred; the masses of the Russian people concurred by voting Putin into power repeatedly. 

And then the “rebirth” took place: without repenting in the slightest of his communist past, and while gradually reintroducing more and more Soviet traditions and symbols, Putin underwent a conversion to Christ! Or rather, from being part of the body of the Soviet Antichrist, which was “anti”, that is, “against” Christ, he is now preaching a form of Communist Christianity that, as Makarkin puts it, “copies” Jesus Christ, placing its own ideas “in the place” of Christ’s and passing them off as His. And if the “copy” is a poor one – just as Lenin’s stinking body is a very poor imitation of the fragrant relics of the saints, and the murderous “Code of Law of the Builder of Communism” is a very poor imitation of the Sermon on the Mount - this does not matter, so long as the masses are taken in by it, or, if not taken in by it, at least convinced that Christ and the antichristian state are now on the same side...

So the Russian revolution has mutated from one kind of Antichristianity to another, from Lenin’s Antichristianity that was openly against Christ, to Putin’s Antichristianity which pretends not to be against Christ but to copy Him and take His place… There can be no doubt that this new, more sophisticated kind is more dangerous than the former – and closer to the kind that will be practised by “the personal Antichrist” himself at the end of time. For of that Antichrist, the Lord said: “I have come in My Father’s name and you do not believe Me: if another shall come in his own name, him you will believe” (John 5.43). In other words, you have rejected the real Christ, and as a direct result you will accept an imposter, a man-god, for the real thing, the God-Man.

But we must not be deceived, remembering Putin’s words: “Once a chekist, always a chekist…”

On the Question of the "Revised Julian Calendar"

By Father George Lardas

Source: Indiana University’s Orthodox LISTSERV discussion list, September 1996.

 

The matter of the "Revised Julian Calendar" has recently been raised on this list and has generated some discussion. Since some were wondering about its relation to the traditional calendar of the Church, the Julian Calendar, on the one hand, and the Gregorian Calendar on the other, as well as the question of their astronomical accuracy, I thought the following might be helpful:

As everyone knows, the year is about 365 and a quarter-days long. This is, however, only an approximation. We are concerned here with the seasonal, or tropical year, the average time from vernal equinox (the beginning of spring) to vernal equinox. The more accurate figure is 365.2422 days, a figure close to that known to the ancient Greek astronomers (Callippus, Ptolemy, et al). The Julian Calendar, the Church's traditional calendar, has 365 days in a year and an extra day added once every fourth year to February, making an average year length of 365.25 days. When the Church chose this as her own calendar at the Council of Nicaea (AD 325), the vernal equinox fell on 21 March. But since the Julian year is 0.0078 days longer than the true year, over a span of time 21 March will occur later than the astronomical equinox at the rate of about one day in 128 years.

By 1582, when Pope Gregory XIII changed the calendar, 21 March fell 10 days after the astronomical event. He adjusted the calendar by omitting 10 days from that year, so that the following year the astronomical equinox would fall on 21 March again, and he also adjusted the rule for leap years to keep the calendar date from drifting away from the astronomical event. This is accomplished by dropping a leap day every centennial year (those divisible by 100), but retaining the leap day every year divisible by 400. In other words, the years 1700, 1800, and 1900 are not leap years in the Gregorian calendar, but the years 1600 and 2000 are leap years. To obtain the average length of the Gregorian year, we must subtract from the Julian year three days in four hundred years,

365.25 - 3/400 = 365.25 - 0.0075 = 365.2425

The Gregorian year is therefore 365.2425 days, or 0.0003 day longer than the true tropical year. This error will accumulate to about one day every 3200 years. At a council held in Constantinople, attended mainly by representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople under Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis, some astronomers proposed the "Revised Julian Calendar". Under this proposal, the Julian calendar would be corrected by dropping 13 days from the current year to bring the calendar 21 March in line with the astronomical equinox, and to keep it from drifting away from that date by omitting seven leap days every 900 years. That is to say, every centennial year would be a regular year without a leap day, except if when divided by 900 it leaves a remainder of 200 or 600. In other words, the years 1800, 1900, 2100, 2200, and 2300 would not be leap years but regular years because when divided by 900 they leave a remainder of 0, 100, 300, 400, and 500 respectively. But the years 2000 and 2400 would be leap years since these leave a remainder of 200 and 600 respectively when divided by 900. The average length of the calendar year is then, 365.25 days less 7 days in 900 years or

365.25 - 7/900 = 365.25 - 0.0077777... = 365.242222...

Which is almost exactly the length of the tropical year. This revision would make the calendar accurate to a day in about 40,000 years. This is the 900-year cycle that was mentioned by some on this list.

The differences between the three calendars can be summarized in the following table. The first column shows century years. The next heading under Leap Years shows which of the three calendars has that year as a leap year. J stands for the traditional Julian calendar, in which every year divisible by four is a leap year (including all century years), G stands for the Gregorian calendar, in which only the century years divisible by 400 are leap years, and R stands for the "Revised Julian Calendar" in which only those century years that leave a remainder of 200 or 600 when divided by 900 are leap years. The next column gives the difference between the Julian and Gregorian calendars in days. This difference holds for that century year, and the 99 years that follow. The next column shows the difference between the traditional Julian Calendar and the "Revised Julian Calendar". The asterisks in the Gregorian and Revised columns are those century years that are leap years and the difference from the Julian calendar remains the same as the previous century.

 



It is interesting that from the year 1600 to the year 2799, a span of 1200 years, the Gregorian and "Revised Julian" calendars agree exactly. From 2800 to 2899 they differ by one day, after which they again agree for another three hundred years. One may wonder whether for ecclesiastical purposes the adherents of the "Revised" calendar will celebrate their Holy Days one day earlier than the rest of the world for one century, or whether after so many centuries of agreement, they might not tacitly leave the matter as it had been.

Some adherents of the New Calendar claim that they have adopted a "Revised Julian Calendar", rather than the Papal Gregorian Calendar, and therefore they do not come under any penalty of the bans on that calendar adopted by the Pan Orthodox Councils of 1582 and 1583. However, for centuries to come, there is no practical difference between the Gregorian and "Revised Julian" calendars. They amount to the same thing. The payoff in astronomical accuracy will not be realized for several thousand years, far beyond any practical human purpose. One may wonder why one should devise a revision that is practically the same as that used by most of the world, and yet diverges in the distant future. For the next 800 years, we would follow identical calendars, then by the time they diverged, the matter would have been settled one way or the other, and everyone would then remain on the same calendar. It is not too hard to guess which way will win.

It is also misleading to call this calendar the "Revised Julian", since the Gregorian Calendar itself is a revised Julian calendar.

I would like to touch on another subject mentioned on this list: the "leap second", a feature of scientific chronometry. Until recently the second was defined as 1/864,000 of a mean solar day (24 hours x 60 minutes per hour x 60 seconds per minute yield 864,000 seconds in a day). The earth, however, has slight seasonal variations in the rate of rotation (imperceptible except by the most sensitive instruments), and because a time standard was needed, accurate to a fraction of an atomic vibration for global positional calculations, the national and international scientific chronometric standard has come to be the atomic clock. The second is now defined as a certain number of vibrations of a certain kind of atom, a rate determined by the laws of physics and presumably invariable. The earth, on the other hand is slowly running down, and the mean day is getting longer at the rate of about a millisecond per century. The difference between the actual length of the day and the nominal length defined as 864,000 seconds accumulates. After a number of years the mean astronomical midnight and midnight by the atomic clocks can diverge by as much as a second. At that point, by international agreement, everyone counts an extra second before midnight of New Year's Day to bring the two standards once more into synchronization. This is the leap second. It does not follow a regular cycle, because it is determined by observation, and the differences accumulate irregularly. It has no practical effect on our daily lives.

In the long run, however, the slowing of the earth's rotation causes the number of days in the year to change very gradually. One effect of this is that no calendar that is cyclic can ever be more accurate than a day in about forty or fifty thousand years.

So far, I have only discussed the solar calendar. The Church determines Pascha and the feasts depend upon it by taking into account a lunar reckoning. The Nicene Council adopted the lunar reckoning used by the Alexandrine astronomers, a 19-year cycle in which the phases of the moon repeat on the same calendar days. This, too, is an approximation, but it had the advantage of simplicity. After a long drawn out struggle the whole Church came to accept the Alexandrine Paschalion adopted by the Fathers of the First Ecumenical Council. Over the course of time, its use became deeply embedded within the festal cycle of the Church and provisions were made in the Typicon for all possible combinations of the lunar and solar reckoning. This recurred exactly every 532 years, over which the same pattern of Pascha dates were repeated. This is the product of the 19-year lunar cycle and the 28-year Sunday cycle (the days of the week repeat exactly in the Julian calendar every 28 years, this is the 4-year leap year cycle times the 7 possible days of the week), so that 19 x 28 = 532.

Since this lunar reckoning was also only approximate, and the error accumulated at the rate of one day in about 307 years, Pope Gregory also revised the lunar reckoning by dropping a day every 300 years. However, the Gregorian Calendar is now practically not cyclic, since the period over which the calendar repeats is several thousand years.

The astronomers who proposed the "Revised Julian Calendar" offered no cyclic correction to the Alexandrine Paschalion, but proposed that the actual astronomical full moon after the astronomical vernal equinox, both calculated for the meridian of Jerusalem, be used to reckon the date of Pascha. This would have the effect of abolishing the periodicity of the calendar entirely. It would also make dating the festal calendar in the past and in the future extremely difficult, and would require complicated astronomical calculation. In the event, this proposal was not adopted by anyone, and the adherents of the "Revised Julian Calendar" had to be content with calculating the fixed feasts (the Menolgy) by a calendar practically identical with the Papal calendar, and the movable feasts (Paschalion) according to the traditional Alexandrine (Julian) Paschalion, with all the dislocations that this entails. The Roman Church, and any Eastern Rite Catholics that follow the Papal Calendar, would never have any problem with circumstances unforeseen by the Typicon, since they would follow a consistent calendar that keeps Pascha between the conventional bounds of calendar 22 March and calendar 25 April. The calculation of the date of Gregorian Easter is not very simple.

The Traditional Paschalion, in contrast, is a model of simplicity. It has a 19-year table of Paschal full moons ("nomikon phaska" or the Pascha of the Law) which represents the nominal Jewish Passover, and the Sunday thereafter is Pascha. The dates repeat every 532 years, but the calculation is simple.

This simplicity served the practical purposes of the early Church. It was achieved after much controversy, and was accepted by all who call themselves Christian until Pope Gregory's reforms. It was the unmarred heritage of all Orthodox Christians until 1924. The ancient astronomers who developed these cycles, as well as the Fathers of the Church were aware of the slight inaccuracies, but the calendar admirably served the Orthodox Church for so many centuries. It never presented any hardship to the farmers who use the calendar, for it is immaterial what the number on the calendar was that marked spring planting or the fall harvest, so long as it was consistent. It would have presented no hardship to modern civilization to have retained the Julian Calendar, because it makes no difference to engineering and commerce whether Christmas is celebrated 13 days earlier or later.

The fact that we follow a different calendar (almost all Orthodox still follow the Traditional Paschalion), from that followed by the world around us is good. It marks us out as a distinct and peculiar people that "kept the ways that are hard" (Psalm 16). We have a practical advantage in keeping the Old Calendar in that we can avoid the noisy and crass commercialism that is secular Christmas, and usually, also that surrounding secular Easter.

We have no need to ask the Jews or the astronomers when the Church should celebrate her Holy Days, for it is entirely a matter for the household of the Faith to order her celebrations according to her own needs. The traditional calendar is an icon of time. It has become sanctified by centuries of use. It is not "realistic" in the same way that icons are not realistic. It is the product of a hard-won unity that is now broken by the innovators. None of the reasons set forth for adopting the Papal calendar hold water. Our purpose is not astronomical accuracy, for as we have seen, this is won at the cost of great complexity. Everything in the Church should be done decently and in order. Anything as momentous as that touching the liturgical unity of the Church should be a matter of unanimous decision of the Church, and the proposal should have been set forth properly and before all.

It was, however, introduced by force and deceit, and in disobedience to the traditions and canons of the Church. When we see the arguments, disputes, and divisions caused by the introduction of the New Calendar, can we call it a good thing? Our Saviour tells us that by their fruits shall we know them. If some change is controversial, it is the responsibility of those that propose to show that it is beneficial and needful, and if it is rejected by a large part of the Church, they should, in all humility and out of a desire not to offend the brethren, withdraw the proposal. The harmful results of the introduction of the New Calendar, viz scandal and schism, are the fruits of disobedience on the part of the innovators.

The purpose of the introduction of the New Calendar was not for astronomical accuracy, but for ecumenism, for bringing Orthodox faith and practice more in line with those of the heterodox, so as to prepare the way for union with them. Those that resisted this change were therefore resisting ecumenism. Even now, one of the barriers to union with the heterodox is a different festal calendar. When the calendar innovators changed the calendar, they did not dare to change the Paschalion for fear of outright rejection on the part of the Orthodox faithful. They have thereby introduced a hybrid monster of a calendar that is neither truly New nor truly Old. Thus, the liturgical unity of Orthodoxy was not entirely broken. But if the Paschalion could be changed, it would make union with the heterodox easier. Contrariwise, if the innovators would abandon their innovation, they would go a long way toward restoring unity within the Orthodox Church. It is in their power alone to do so. What has been stolen, let it be restored.

I should be very much interested to know whether those Orthodox Churches that have officially adopted the New Calendar have, in fact, adopted the "Revised Julian Calendar" with its 900-year cycle, or have merely embraced calendar reform without specification of this intricate detail, being content to use the Papal reckoning of the fixed calendar.

I would also like to point out that using astronomical observation or calculation for determining Pascha was but one of several proposed innovations to the Orthodox Church Calendar. Among others are: 1) A proposal to use the Papal Paschalion (which has been adopted by the Church of Finland and the OCA mission in Mexico), and 2) A proposed fixed day for Pascha, say, always the second Sunday of April, regardless of the phases of the moon. This latter is proposed for adoption by all Christian bodies in the world. This is not the final end of calendar innovation. One such proposal is the World Calendar, whereby the number of days in the month is regularized, and the sequence of the weekdays is broken up once (on leap years, twice) a year for the sake of keeping any given calendar date on the same day of the week year after year. This, needless to say, is totally unacceptable to any religion that celebrates a seven-day week. If the Jews and the Muslims can keep their peculiar religious calendars in a modern society, why cannot we Orthodox Christians stand for our own traditions and faith? Some have already answered that question for themselves. Let us also have the courage to do so, too.

On the Ongoing Ecclesiological Divisions among Non-Commemorators in Romania, from one perspective

Why It Is Not Necessary to Amend Point 10 of the Resolution of the Assembly of Confessors Who Have Ceased Commemoration, Held in Botoșani in June 2017

Mihai-Silviu Chirilă | July 30, 2026

 

After separating from the moderate anti-ecumenist confessors, Fr. Claudiu Buză came into contact with certain priests who had ceased commemoration, who convinced him to campaign for challenging Point 10 of the Resolution of the 2017 Assembly of Botoșani, on the grounds that it was supposedly “schismatic” because it provides for unconditional communion with others within the Church.

This material was written in 2023 and brought to the attention of Fr. Claudiu Buză. Unfortunately, just like the materials concerning that text of Venerable Paisios, this material also failed to convince Fr. Claudiu Buză in the slightest. He remained firm in his position and continues to campaign for the amendment of Point 10.

In this material, I demonstrate that, at the time the Botoșani Resolution was adopted, Point 10 was intended to make it clear to Monk Savvas that we did not agree with his radical view of relations with the other members of the Church. At that time, this was all that could be stated, given the circumstances and the presence in our group of those holding extremist views, who certainly would not have accepted the definition of communion with those within the Church that we articulated after the division became clear and the extremists separated from us.

Point 10 attests to a state of affairs within the Romanian Orthodox Church that took shape as a result of the hierarchy’s reaction to our struggle, and must be understood in the broader context of all the subsequent documents that we, the moderate clergy and faithful who have ceased commemoration, have made public, in which we have explained all the details concerning ecclesiastical communion.

 

Following Fr. Claudiu Buză’s formulation of a position regarding Point 10 of the Botoșani Resolution of June 18, 2017, which was signed and endorsed by the priests present at that assembly, in which he calls for its amendment so as not to give the impression that our movement was already in schism at that time, I take the liberty of offering a theological response. I do so on the grounds that only someone who is familiar with every aspect of this struggle and who actively participated in all the initiatives and struggles undertaken at that time can provide the most pertinent explanation in response to the objection raised by these priests, which, as we shall see, repeats the identical objection previously raised by other priests.

[For the complete Botoșani Resolution, see: https://orthodoxmiscellany.blogspot.com/2024/10/2017-resolution-from-botosani.html]

The text under discussion is Point 10 of the Botoșani Resolution, adopted at the Botoșani Assembly of June 18, 2017, the most important declaration against ecumenism. At this event, ecumenism was condemned as a heresy, a demand was made for our Church to withdraw from all ecumenist organizations, Freemasonry was condemned for the second time in the history of our Church, and we made it clear that we categorically reject the notion that we are schismatics or that we are separating ourselves from our ancestral Church. Here is the text of Point 10 of that landmark document:

We firmly reject the accusation that, by ceasing to commemorate the hierarchs who are participants in ecumenism and the assembly of Crete, we have committed a schismatic act or rebelled against the bishops of our Church. We are in communion with the Local Churches and bishops who publicly reject ecumenism and the assembly of Crete, with their priests and faithful, as well as with the priests and faithful who have ceased communion with the bishops who accept them. We remain within the Universal Orthodox Church, as part of the Romanian Orthodox Church, having no intention of separating from it, joining heretical or schismatic organizations, or placing ourselves under the obedience of bishops other than those of our own locality.

In order to understand correctly the content of Point 10 of the Botoșani I Resolution, it is first necessary to be familiar with certain historical and theological aspects of the situation at that time, which I will explain in detail below.

Separation from the Schism of the Greek Monk Savvas Lavriotis

On April 4, 2017, an assembly of Greek clergy and faithful who had ceased commemoration was held in Oreokastro, near Thessaloniki, to which we were also invited. I attended as the delegated representative of the Romanians who had ceased commemoration, entrusted with delivering an address presenting the struggle of the Romanians against heresy at that time.

The assembly took place against the backdrop of serious disagreements between Monk Savvas and Professor Protopresbyter Theodoros Zisis. Monk Savvas strongly advocated a radical break with all those who had not ceased commemoration by that time, while Professor Zisis proposed a more flexible approach to the issue, involving the application of economia in the spirit of Canon 3 of St. Athanasius of Alexandria.

On the day of the assembly, I visited Professor Zisis at the offices of the publication Theodromia in Thessaloniki, where he explained his position. I recorded his remarks on video and subsequently presented them to the Romanian delegation at Oreokastro, which included, among others, the late Fr. Antim Gâdioi, Fr. Ieronim Cosma, and other clergy and laypeople.

After watching the video, I recommended that the Romanian delegation not participate in the assembly and that they leave the Greeks to resolve their problems among themselves. I continue to believe, even today, that this was the most appropriate course of action in that situation.

As was proper, Monk Savvas was also asked for his opinion, and he managed to convince those present that he had no intention whatsoever of adopting such a position, that he was Orthodox, etc. Following the discussion with the Greek monk, the majority of the Romanian delegation agreed to participate in this assembly, and consequently, I participated as well.

After the assembly itself, Monk Savvas traveled to Bănceni to inform Bishop Longhin of what had taken place at Oreokastro and to ask his opinion. On that occasion, Monk Savvas told us, in a private discussion, that we must sever ties with all those who had not yet taken a stand against Crete, including autocephalous Churches that had not participated in the assembly or Orthodox bishops such as Bishop Longhin.

At that moment, I realized that we had been deceived at Oreokastro and that Monk Savvas actually intended to carry out this plan to its conclusion. Since, during a conference held in Bucharest toward the end of April, the monk had invited us to organize an assembly similar to the one at Oreokastro, I understood that this conference provided us with an opportunity to tell Monk Savvas and his followers openly that we did not agree with the direction he was taking, but wished to remain in communion with all those who had made at least some effort to combat the heresy.

Consequently, Point 10 of the Resolution was not conceived as a negative, exclusive statement concerning our communion with the rest of the Church, but, on the contrary, as a positive, inclusive one. In other words, through this point, we did not intend to wall ourselves off from the rest of our ancestral Church, as is evident from the final part of the second sentence of the point, where we clearly state that we are part of the Romanian Orthodox Church, but rather to open ourselves to all those who, in one way or another, are struggling against the heresy of ecumenism, and whom Monk Savvas had begun to regard as equally heretical as the participants in the Synod of Crete, inciting some of those among us who had ceased commemoration to adopt the same position.

It is in this context that Point 10, adopted by those who participated in that assembly and who are familiar with the details of this struggle, must be understood. Point 10 infuriated Savvas the Lavriote, who immediately thereafter launched a fierce campaign against any form of economia toward those who had not ceased commemoration, leading to a rupture between the moderate Orthodox who had ceased commemoration and the extremists.

Anyone who reads Point 10 objectively, honestly, and with knowledge of the details set out above will understand from it that we, the moderate Romanian Orthodox who have ceased commemoration, refused to accept that there was no longer anyone in the world who had remained Orthodox and that everyone was complicit in the heresy, not that we had denied communion with the rest of the Romanian Orthodox.

The Internal Situation of the Romanian Orthodox Church

Having explained the importance of Point 10 in the context of our struggle to avoid the schism into which Monk Savvas subsequently fell, it is also appropriate to add that, given the circumstances in which the conference took place and the situation created by the Patriarchate in its response to the movement of those who had ceased commemoration, an unconditional affirmation of liturgical communion with those who continued to commemorate their bishops would have been both inappropriate and unrealistic.

From what I have explained in the first point, it can be seen that the communion of which we spoke in that point of the Botoșani Resolution was more a communion in confession of faith than a liturgical communion, since its purpose was to make Monk Savvas aware that not all bishops and Churches were heretical and had fallen away. Now, as regards communion in confession of faith, at that time there was no one left within the Romanian Orthodox Church, apart from the movement of those who had ceased commemoration and a few priests who sympathized with it, who publicly opposed the Synod of Crete and ecumenism in general. Even today, there are very few such people, and if they have the courage to establish contact with us, we readily receive them into communion.

Affirming liturgical communion with those in churches where commemoration had not ceased was, at that time, on the one hand, unrealistic and, on the other, carried the risk of causing serious confusion among those who had only recently ceased commemoration and who did not yet understand all its theological implications. That this was indeed the case is demonstrated by the fact that, a few months after that assembly, the well-known controversy over “participation in heresy” erupted, resulting in a split among those who had ceased commemoration, some of whom have not understood, even to this day, what the proper relationship between those who have ceased commemoration and those who continue it should be. If they have still not understood this after seven years, how could they have understood it in 2017? Do the priests who submitted this request believe that the more recent initiative to hold an “assembly of reconciliation,” promoted through various channels, with some of these priests would be viable, given that in 2021 they unanimously declared that they were openly separating themselves from everyone in our Church who had not ceased commemoration? [1]

On the other hand, such a statement at that time would also have been inappropriate and unrealistic because of the situation established by the Patriarchate following the cessation of commemoration. I would remind readers that the majority of those who participated in this assembly had already been deposed by the Patriarchate for ceasing commemoration, while the other priests of the Patriarchate had already been indoctrinated into believing that those who had ceased commemoration were “schismatics,” and that therefore no form of communion whatsoever could exist with them. In our case, there was no normal ecclesiastical situation, such as exists in Greece or the Republic of Moldova, where priests who have ceased commemoration can concelebrate freely with those who continue to commemorate their bishops, if they so wish, without this resulting in any sanctions from anyone.

For this reason, taking the circumstances into account, at that stage of the struggle, Point 10 served primarily to inform the entire Church that we refuse to regard ourselves as being outside the Orthodox Church, that we are members of it, and that we are not schismatics. I believe that this is sufficient, for the sake of the historical record invoked by these priests, to make it clear that we have never broken communion with the other Orthodox Christians within the Church, but that they have, in practice, broken communion with us and with the truth of the faith that we uphold, since we continue to affirm that we are members of the Church, whereas they hastened to deprive us of this privilege, acquired at our spiritual birth through Holy Baptism.

The Dynamic Process of Affirming Ecclesiastical Communion

If the above considerations are not sufficient for history to record that we have never broken communion with the other Orthodox Christians within the Church, future analysts of the movement will be able to read all our subsequent documents, issued by us, the moderate Orthodox who have ceased commemoration, in which we demonstrated, first of all, that cessation of commemoration is a stance, not an identity, in the sense that we do not substitute the designation “non-commemorator” for that of Orthodox Christian, but merely use it to indicate the manner in which we conduct our struggle among the other Orthodox Christians; that we are open to cooperation with all those who wish to confess the faith; that we rejected the decisions made at Roman [in 2018] and at other such meetings of radical non-commemorators, where all those who had not ceased commemoration were considered heretics; that we refused to accept that grace was no longer present among those who continued commemoration, and stated this in the Resolution of 2018 (which for a time was called the “draft resolution”), signed and endorsed by Fr. Theodoros Zisis as the true Orthodox manifesto of the Romanian struggle against heresy, read before thousands of faithful by Fr. Maximos Karavas on the Sunday of Orthodoxy, and received with enthusiasm by the Greek pleroma; that we recommended that those who cannot attend services celebrated by priests who have ceased commemoration act according to the guidance of their conscience regarding priests who have not taken an openly anti-ecumenist stance but who neither preach nor defend the heresy, and attend services celebrated by priests who continue commemoration but have publicly confessed their opposition to ecumenism, as decided at Bănceni in 2018, where we insisted on the importance of a public confession of faith by those whose services the faithful may attend; and that we wrote and acknowledged that cessation of commemoration is merely one means of conducting the struggle—the fullest, but not the only one—and that we gladly welcome all forms of confession of the faith wherever they exist. We stated this last point in the two brochures concerning the pitfalls of ceasing commemoration (the blue brochure, published anonymously) and the theological identity of those who follow the correct path (the yellow brochure). Our openness to communion with those who continued commemoration, while maintaining a consistent and forceful confession of faith on our part, prompted certain comments even from some of our fellow moderate Orthodox Christians who had ceased commemoration, some of whom were disciples of the two petitioning priests who had ceased commemoration. In 2022, when the yellow brochure was written, these comments required clarification concerning the risk of completely erasing the line of demarcation between our correct position and that of those who have not yet done anything to defend the Orthodox faith.

If all these positions of ours do not reflect communion with the rest of the Church, to the extent that such communion can and should exist in the present circumstances, then what else were we supposed to do? Cease commemoration one day and resume it the next, in order to satisfy the “purists of unconditional communion” with those who have taken no stand against the heresy even after seven years?

The process of defining our position has been, and continues to be, a dynamic and diachronic one, just as the process of defining the doctrine of the Church has been, with the Church providing dogmatic or canonical responses over time to various problems that have arisen throughout history. For this reason, I believe that an honest researcher who wishes to ascertain the correct position of the moderate Orthodox who have ceased commemoration will be able to understand it through an analysis of all the documents of this movement. These will reveal that there has been a sustained effort to acknowledge and eliminate certain theological errors inherent in such a struggle; to assimilate the practical theological knowledge acquired in the course of the struggle by reconciling theoretical truths with the situation on the ground, so as to find a realistic course that does not, however, compromise the truth of the faith (what else is the economia that we have been applying for years?); and to overcome certain entrenched attitudes among those who preferred to separate themselves from the legitimate struggle rather than accept that those who have not ceased commemoration are also Orthodox, that not all of them are heretics, and so forth. Anyone who wishes to know who we are and how correct our struggle has been cannot confine himself to a single document, but must read them all. This is a minimum requirement of honest and serious scholarly research.

It is astonishing that, after seven years, priests who were at the forefront of the effort to define our position correctly—and who, in 2017, signed without reservation the very document they now challenge—have forgotten the sacrifices and hard work involved in setting out in detail the correct path of the Holy Fathers. This seven-year process will remain a point of reference for all those who come after us and who, compelled by circumstances, will have to do what we have done. For, whether we like it or not, we are pioneers of this kind of struggle within our Church, which has never before faced this form of resistance to heresy, characteristic of the Byzantine world, where the great struggles in defense of Orthodoxy were fought during both the first and second millennia.

I wonder how many priests who continue commemoration have been in liturgical communion with these fathers since 2017, welcoming them to concelebrate and refraining from commemorating the hierarch during the service. How many such priests have they invited, and how many have accepted their invitation? How many faithful have they advised to remain quietly in their parishes and attend the services of their parish priests, regardless of whether those priests actively oppose ecumenism or not, so as not to break communion? If the answer to these rhetorical questions is negative, or at least unsatisfactory in light of the new demands concerning the Botoșani Resolution, can we not affirm that, when read and interpreted literally, Point 10 confirms a historical reality created by the Romanian Patriarchate, which we have been unable to change in the manner suggested by those who criticize this point? What real and full communion can there be in Romania between the confessors who have ceased commemoration and the other faithful, when, in Orășeni, the priests of the Metropolis of Moldavia and Bukovina (MMB) who continue commemoration will not tolerate our presence even in the courtyard of our own church, let alone inside it, unless we renounce our confession of faith and resume commemoration? Moreover, in order to have our right to membership in the parish assembly recognized—a right we have never lost and which was upheld by the civil court in Civil Decision No. 506A/2021 of the Botoșani Tribunal—we were required, on January 16, 2022, to sign a document recognizing the ecumenist priest who defends the metropolitan and his heresy. This was imposed as an uncanonical prerequisite, contrary to the regulations, for permission to participate in the parish elections. We were compelled to refuse, and for this reason we were expelled from our parish church. What communion between priests can there be when Fr. Ioan Ungureanu has two brothers who are priests and who do not even wish him “Happy New Year!” at the beginning of the year or greet him with “Christ is Risen!” at Holy Pascha, much less share a meal with him, whether at his table or theirs, as brothers and fellow priests? Have the petitioning priests forgotten that within the Romanian Patriarchate, Orthodoxy and liturgical communion have, in recent years, been defined as being strictly centered on the commemoration of the hierarch, exactly as in the Vatican, where the commemoration of the pope is the visible sign of the unity of their worship? And so, would not an affirmation of communion with these people, in the manner suggested by those who challenge Point 10, be mere empty boasting even today, since such communion does not exist—not because of us, but because of them? For, after all, it is not we who have fallen into schism from the Church and the truth, but they, and Point 10 merely reflects this sad reality.

And one more essential question, which will lead us naturally to the next point in the argument: Apart from those whom we shall discuss below, who else has ever called us “schismatics” because of what we wrote in Point 10 of the Botoșani I Resolution, rather than because we ceased commemorating the ecumenist hierarchs? Since I have responded to all of them in writing, I can confirm that no one else has.

Point 10 and the Ruining of the International Conference at Bănceni in March 2018

Criticism of Point 10 of the Botoșani Resolution is nothing new to us. On the contrary, it is an exact reproduction of the position expressed in March 2018 by three priests, none of whom had signed the Resolution: Hieromonks Lavrentie Carp, Macarie Banu, and Eftimie Mitra.

In March 2018, after it had become clear that the anti-ecumenist struggle had become divided over the application of akribeia or economia, and that some of those who had been with us at Botoșani no longer accepted even that those who had not ceased commemoration were members of the Church, much less the idea of communion with them, a conference was held at Bănceni, to which Professor Protopresbyter Theodoros Zisis was also invited.

On the occasion of that conference, I presented the position of the Romanian confessors, which at that time was also endorsed by some of the priests who are now calling for the amendment of Point 10. According to this position, the situation in Romania is such, owing to the hierarchy’s complete attachment to the heresy of ecumenism and the extremely weak opposition to Crete and ecumenism in general, that we in Romania cannot wholeheartedly encourage the faithful to attend the services of just any priest who continues to commemorate his bishop. We succeeded in establishing the principle, which was accepted both by the Greek priests and by some of the priests who have ceased commemoration and who now criticize Point 10, that only attendance at the services of priests who continue commemoration but have publicly confessed their opposition to ecumenism can be recommended without reservation, while leaving it to the conscience of the faithful whether or not to attend the services of priests who continue commemoration but are passive or lax in their stance toward the heresy, and unequivocally recommending that they avoid the services of those who defend, adhere to, or preach the heresy, whether bishops or priests. Furthermore, given that the number of those who have made a public confession of faith is also very small, it was agreed that we in Romania should encourage people to follow the guidance of their conscience, after ascertaining the ecclesiastical convictions of the priest whose services they intend to attend, without encouraging them to attend the services of priests who continue commemoration whose convictions are not publicly known, but also without condemning them if they do so. For years, some of the priests who now criticize Point 10 wholeheartedly endorsed this coherent and theologically correct limitation of communion.

During that conference, the three aforementioned priests, Frs. Lavrentie, Macarie, and Eftimie, who at that time constituted an ad hoc group, which was apparently dissolved later, presented an “indictment” against us, accusing us of being schismatics because we had formulated and endorsed Point 10 of the Botoșani Resolution.

From the discussions that followed during the conference, it became clear that the accusation was unfounded and that the practice proposed by the three priests was consistent neither with their own stated positions nor with the realities in Romania.

Hieromonk Lavrentie Carp put forward certain arguments at that time, which he also advanced on other occasions, that diluted the practice of ceasing commemoration to the greatest possible extent, making it almost as effective and important as complete inaction. According to certain information we have received, although we cannot vouch for its accuracy, it would appear that Fr. Lavrentie continued for some time to have as his spiritual children the faithful from the Monastery of the Three Holy Hierarchs, whom, as I understand it, he still hears in confession, or at least continued to hear in confession for some time after ceasing commemoration. This suggests that he may have received preferential treatment from Metropolitan Teofan, who, as far as we know, has not taken any punitive measures against him, even though he has ceased commemoration for at least six years. Such treatment, if it is indeed taking place, may make it easier for Fr. Lavrentie to maintain unrestricted communion with priests who continue commemoration, but it represents an exception from which the other priests who have ceased commemoration do not benefit.

Hieromonk Macarie Banu told us at Bănceni about services he celebrates together with priests who continue commemoration in the area where he serves, without, however, mentioning again the nature of his relationship with the local bishop, which he had described to us during the few meetings we had while we were still in communion and consultation with one another. If what he told us is true, this relationship could lead the bishop to grant an exception that other bishops do not grant with regard to such concelebrations. Fr. Macarie did not explain how his openness to full and unconditional communion with priests who continue commemoration can be reconciled with what he told us in 2016, from which we understood that his spiritual children confess their sins before an icon every day, receive absolution from the priest over the telephone, and administer Holy Communion to themselves using the Holy Mysteries reserved in a thermos. Nor is it clear, even now, how much of his position is motivated by theological considerations and how much by personal ones, such as the visceral hatred he displayed toward the late Fr. Antim Gâdioi, or his frustration at not having been involved in the Botoșani I project, having already withdrawn from our group. Nor can we find any particularly convincing explanation for the fact that he maintains open communion with those who continue commemoration, but virtually no communion with us, the Orthodox confessors recognized as moderate throughout the Orthodox world engaged in the struggle. Are we, with our Point 10, somehow more culpable than those who continue commemoration, with all their documents from Crete, Chieti, Toronto, Porto Alegre, Busan, Karlsruhe, Harare, and Ravenna? Is it possible that those who are Orthodox in the eyes of Professor Emeritus Dr. Theodoros Zisis, who had access to a translation of the Botoșani I text, and of the spiritual father Maximos Karavas, should be considered heretics by Fr. Macarie Banu, Fr. Eftimie Mitra, or Fr. Lavrentie Carp?

At the time of the Bănceni conference, Fr. Eftimie Mitra was a priest who continued to commemorate his bishop, and probably remains so today. He justified his position by asserting that the late Bishop Gurie had not been a signatory at Crete and had an Orthodox mind, although he frequently invited the arch-ecumenist Zaharia Zaharou to Deva, who, on the occasion of one such conference, strongly condemned the cessation of commemoration and defended the heresy of ecumenism. [2] After harshly condemning us as schismatics because of Point 10, Fr. Eftimie refused to participate in the concelebration at Bănceni with Bishop Longhin, Fr. Zisis, and the Romanian priests who had ceased commemoration, explaining that he had woken up late and had not arrived in time for the service. This prompted the affectionate, fatherly humor of the distinguished professor of theology, who, during the communal meal, invited Fr. Eftimie to bless the food. Through this gesture, he was alluding to the words of St. Theodore the Studite, who says that a priest who commemorates his heretical bishop may be invited to bless a meal, but not to participate in the Eucharistic Supper. I know of this incident from the accounts of the priests, since I personally left the conference after the first day, deeply disgusted by the way our struggle had been ridiculed over precisely the same issue we are discussing now.

Under these circumstances, we cannot fail to observe a clear discrepancy between the statements of these three priests and their actual practice, which reinforces our position that, in the Romanian context, Point 10 in no way reflects any schismatic inclination on our part, but rather a situation that is still evolving.

We must also mention here the extremely radical attitude of Hieromonk Paisie of Vrancea, who, upon learning that one of the priests who had ceased commemoration had a spiritual father who continued to commemorate his bishop, refused all communion with him until he severed his relationship with his spiritual father, who is a well-known anti-ecumenist priest, recognized for his clear and public stance against the heresy, even though he continues commemoration. The priest in question retained his spiritual father after consulting us, as we encouraged him to do so. Is such advice characteristic of those with a schismatic mentality? If we do not have such a mentality, how could we have issued a schismatic resolution?

Why, then, this sudden concern over Point 10 of the Botoșani Resolution?

To What Extent Is Communion with Those Who Have Not Ceased Commemoration Possible Today?

Communion is a relationship involving at least two parties. Therefore, the simplest answer to this question is that communion is possible with anyone who wishes to be in communion with us. This means that, apart from notable exceptions, communion is currently possible with very few priests who continue to commemorate their bishops, especially among those who have an Orthodox mind and are willing to accept the risks involved, given that the vast majority of priests refuse, whether out of conviction or fear, to have anything to do with us, who have been struggling against the heresy in recent years by ceasing commemoration.

For years, we have maintained that we consider heretics only those who adhere to, profess, and defend the heresy of ecumenism, as well as the heretical hierarchs. Consistent with this correct position, which reflects Canon 3 of St. Athanasius the Great, [3] we have affirmed that the Mysteries celebrated by priests who continue commemoration are valid, that grace operates through them and even through the heretical hierarchs, for the proper functioning of the Church of Christ, even though the ecumenist hierarchs and the priests who openly preach their heresy are not to be approached for participation in their services and stand condemned before God. The Mysteries cannot be defiled by the actions of these clergy, as the assembly at Roman deliriously claimed in 2018. However, by refusing communion with them, we neither dishonor nor reject their grace-filled ministrations, nor do we thereby manifest any lack of communion with the rest of the Orthodox pleroma. Rather, we simply make it clear to these priests that we do not agree with their heresy or with their attitude toward its propagation. The same understanding must be applied to our reluctance to receive the Holy Mysteries, antidoron, or holy water from their hands: not as a disparagement of these grace-filled ministrations or as any separation from the rest of the faithful within the Church, but as an expression of our desire not to have communion with the particular priests concerned, with the heresy preached and/or defended by those priests, and/or with the attitude of these clergy toward the struggle against the heresy of ecumenism.

The same applies when someone who has ceased commemoration is reluctant to attend the services of priests who continue commemoration or to receive the holy water or antidoron that they bless. If such a Christian does not refuse these grace-filled ministrations from the hands of priests who continue commemoration because he considers them invalid or defiled by heresy, or because he considers himself separate from the Orthodox people—for if he did so, he would be mistaken—then it means that he refrains from receiving them simply because he disagrees with the cowardice or ignorance of the priests. This does not constitute schism, but rather a warning to those priests who find themselves being refused when they offer their religious ministrations to Christians. For this reason, St. Theodore the Studite said that a priest who continues to commemorate his bishop may be invited to bless a meal, but not to share in the Eucharistic Chalice. Was St. Theodore in schism because he did not have communion with those who continued commemoration? Did he despise the Mysteries celebrated by a priest who continued commemoration? Of course not. If he invited such a priest to bless a meal, this means that he recognized his priesthood and his ability also to bless the Mystical Supper, the Holy Eucharist, but wished to warn him that he was not fulfilling his duty. If someone who has ceased commemoration refuses to attend a service at which the hierarch whom he himself has not commemorated for years is commemorated, preferring instead a service at which that hierarch’s name is not heard, this does not mean that he is a schismatic, but that he is consistent with his confession of faith, even if the priest who commemorates that hierarch has an Orthodox mind. The psychological discomfort a person experiences at the commemoration of a heretical hierarch does not constitute schism. These matters must be understood far more deeply than simplistic statements would suggest.

Insofar as we have affirmed for years, at the cost of the utter hatred directed against us by the extremists, that the Mysteries celebrated by those who continue commemoration are not invalid, and that these clergy are not themselves heretics if they do not preach the heresy, this means that we have affirmed real communion with the others within the Church, to the extent that such communion is possible under conditions of heresy. To advocate unconditional communion means to fail entirely to understand the reasons why we entered into this struggle and its true purpose.

The same applies to our willingness to concelebrate with those who have not yet ceased commemoration, on the natural condition that the hierarch’s name is not commemorated during the concelebration. If there are priests who continue commemoration and who wish to do this, all they need to do is contact the priests who have ceased commemoration and invite them to concelebrate, or come themselves to concelebrate with them. And if they do not do so, does this mean that we are in schism, or that they are in schism from the truth of the faith? This willingness means that we have affirmed real communion with the others within the Church, to the extent that such communion is possible under conditions of heresy.

Epilogue

Taking into account everything said thus far, it follows that no amendment to the Botoșani I Resolution is necessary. Such an amendment would also be impossible after seven years, given the number of publications in which the Resolution has been reproduced. As I have already stated, the Botoșani Resolution was translated into Greek in its original form and presented to our Greek associates, including Fr. Zisis, who expressed no concern whatsoever that it might constitute any indication of schism. Nor did the distinguished professor express any such concern following our discussions at Bănceni in 2018, as demonstrated by the fact that he honored the Botoșani II Assembly with his presence, being fully aware of the content of the declaration issued there as well.

If there is concern about what history will say about us, I believe that a simple reading of this material will be sufficient to explain fully all aspects of the Botoșani I Assembly that might remain unclear. With the agreement of the priests who have remained in communion and consultation with us from the beginning until now, publishing this text on the Mărturisirea Ortodoxă website would be sufficient for the historical record.

The 2017 Botoșani Conference represents a defining moment in the struggle against the heresy of ecumenism in Romania, when, beyond the actual text of the Resolution, all those who had embarked on the same path a year earlier came together for the last time, united in the same Orthodox mind. Many of those who were present at that time say that the assembly was blessed by the Holy Spirit and long for those days of peace and brotherhood, especially after finding themselves in various communities torn apart by a schismatic spirit of constant rebellion and aimless pursuits. To propose amending the Resolution adopted on that extraordinary occasion in order to satisfy a few individuals who did not see fit to become involved at the time, but preferred to criticize from the sidelines, is to disregard an international effort undertaken by a thousand confessors and dozens of priests who had the opportunity to express their views on every point of that Resolution during the preliminary consultations that took place, and who also had the option of not signing the document if they disagreed with it.

Last but not least, I wish to emphasize that falling into the trap of amending Point 10 on the pretext that it might appear schismatic would mean accepting the otherwise false notion that, from 2017 until now, we, the signatories of the Botoșani Resolution, have been in schism. This would also entail acknowledging that most of the depositions pronounced against the priests on charges of schism were justified. Who, I wonder, would wish for such a distortion of reality and for all of us to be drawn into such a trap?

The reality is that neither Point 10 nor the Botoșani Resolution as a whole is schismatic, and therefore there is no reason whatsoever to call either of them into question.

 

NOTES

[1] https://www.marturisireaortodoxa.ro/parintele-antim-gadioi-adera-fara-rezerva-la-doctrina-adunarii-de-la-roman-din-2018-intrerupand-comuniunea-cu-aproape-toata-ortodoxia/.

[2] https://www.marturisireaortodoxa.ro/arhimandritul-zaharia-zaharou-recunoaste-ca-lupta-contra-ecumenismului-ii-terorizeaza-pe-sustinatorii-ereziei/.

[3] https://www.marturisireaortodoxa.ro/canonul-sfantului-atanasie-cel-mare-despre-reprimirea-celor-ce-nu-s-au-facut-partasi-eresului-de-bunavoie/. In The Rudder, the canon is numbered as the second.

Romanian source:

https://www.marturisireaortodoxa.ro/de-ce-nu-este-necesara-modificarea-punctului-10-din-rezolutia-sinaxei-marturisitorilor-nepomenitori-de-la-botosani-din-iunie-2017/

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