Hierodeacon Theodosius of Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, NY
1985 Orthodox
Conference, July 22-26, 1985, Seattle, Washington
St. Nectarios
American Orthodox Church
10300 Ashworth
Avenue North
Seattle, Washington
98133
INTRODUCTION
In the Acafist [Akathist] to the
Mother of God we read: “All angel-kind was amazed at the great act of Thine
incarnation; for they saw the inaccessible God as a man accessible to all,
abiding with us...” [1] In the act of incarnation, the inaccessible God became
a man, accessible to all. This was the divine economy. The great Byzantine
theologian of the fourteenth century, Nicholas Cabasilas, explains:
“Though men were
triply separated from God — by nature, by sin, and by death — yet the Saviour
made them to attain to Him perfectly and to be immediately united to Him by
successively removing all obstacles. The first barrier He removed by partaking
of manhood, the second by being put to death on the cross. As for the final
barrier, the tyranny of death, He eliminated it completely from our nature by
rising again.” [2]
This was an act of God’s love, “a
mode of economic condescension”; [3] God became man in order to give man the
chance to become deified and to find eternal life and happiness with Him.
“God so loved the world that He
gave His only-begotten Son” (John 3:16).
The “divine economy”, therefore,
in this sense, is God’s descent into the world, motivated by love, where He
built Himself a house — that is, the womb of the Mother of God, and thus made
possible man’s salvation.
But this “self-emptying and
abasement” [4] of the Son of God in the act of incarnation is not the subject
of this talk. The economy that I want to talk about is that arrangement of
man’s affairs in relation to the Church — that “mode of economic condescension”
— exercised by the Church also out of love, and also so as to facilitate man’s
salvation.
It will be easier to look at this
idea of economy from three distinct points of view so as to see how it is put
into practice and for what reasons, and with what aims and results. Then we
will be able to draw some conclusions as to what exactly economy is.
1. RELATIONS WITH
NON-ORTHODOX
My first area for observing the
operation of economy is in the relations of the Orthodox with the non-Orthodox.
But I must quickly point out that economy is not something new. In the Acts of
the Apostles, we read of the centurion Cornelius, a just man and one that
feared God, who, together with other Gentiles, received the gifts of the Holy
Spirit before he was baptised (Acts 10:44). In his commentary on this event,
St. John Chrysostom says: “Observe God’s providential management”. [5] This was
an exception to the established order.
Further, again in Acts, we read
that the apostle Paul circumcised his disciple Timothy “because of the Jews
which were in those quarters” (Acts 16:3). Timothy’s father was a Gentile and
Timothy, therefore, was uncircumcised. But to satisfy the Jewish law and to be
more acceptable to the Jews in his ministry among them, St. Paul decided that
Timothy should undergo circumcision, rather than allow it to cause an obstacle.
This, Timothy’s circumcision, was an exception to the established order.
In both these scriptural examples
of economy, exceptions were made in particular cases, in particular
circumstances.
In the 37th canon of the Sixth
Ecumenical Council (held in 680), we actually have the legislation of a general
rule of economy, that is, the fathers of this council laid down that, in a
particular situation, when a bishop is unable to go to his see because of its
occupation by “barbarians”, or, we might say, “atheists”, then that bishop does
not have to observe the letter of the law by making his way to his diocese,
through hell and high water, as it were, but has the right, as a condescension
and in mitigation of the strict rule, to administer his diocese from outside.
This canon prescribes a solution based on economy, until such time as the
normal, strict, canonical position can be observed.
(A) Recognition of
Heterodox Holy Orders
In the last century, the question
arose of the recognition of the validity of the orders of the Anglican Church.
With regard to the attitude of
the Orthodox Church to the sacraments of the heterodox, the position is clear
and unambiguous: “According to the teaching of the Church, every heretic is
outside the Church and outside the Church there can be neither true Christian
baptism nor true Christian sacrifice, and, in general, no true holy mysteries.”
[6]
This view is based on the
teaching of St. Cyprian of Carthage, which is restated in the canons: “those
who have been baptised or ordained by [heretics] cannot be either of the
faithful or of the clergy” (68th Apostolic canon); and, “no one can be baptised
outside the catholic Church, there being but one Baptism and this being
existent only in the catholic Church” (1st canon of the Council of Carthage).
[7]
From the strict canonical point
of view, therefore, any ordination performed outside the Orthodox Church is
invalid and of no effect. The question arises, however, about the nature of
this “ordination” when a person seeks to join the Orthodox Church. Can this
“ordination” be accepted? Does the person need to be re-ordained, or more
accurately, ordained (since ordination can be performed only once and he has no
real ordination)?
I shall talk about the actual
reception of these people into the Orthodox Church later, but as far as the
acceptance of their ordination is concerned, on being received, the Church
takes the view that, if received by a bishop, such a person’s empty sacrament
of ordination (received in his heretical church) “receives the complement of
grace only through that sacrament which unites [him] with Holy Church
(chrismation or penance)” [8] (Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky)
Other writers, when discussing
this topic of the acceptance of Anglican orders, always speak of such
acceptance being an economy. For example, in an article in The Greek
Orthodox Theological Review, on the validity of Anglican orders, it is
stated:
“The orders of
clergymen joining the Orthodox Church from the Anglican Communion may be
recognised ‘by economy’ so long as the competent functionaries of each
particular Orthodox Church accepting him, think that there are reasons for the
application of such ‘economy’.” [9]
The point of Metropolitan
Anthony’s article is that, after reception into Orthodoxy, the question as to
any supposed exercise of economy with respect to the person’s ordination is
irrelevant, provided there exists “the outward form of the sacraments of baptism,
chrismation and orders” [10] because the person’s ordination has been filled up
with grace overflowing from the grace received in the sacrament of reception.
In this, Metropolitan Anthony is
echoing the view of the great nineteenth century Russian lay theologian, Alexei
Khomiakov, who said:
“Reconciliation
[by baptism or penance] renovates the Sacraments or completes them, giving a
full and Orthodox meaning to the rite that before was insufficient or
heterodox, and the repetition of the preceding Sacraments is virtually
contained in the rite or fact of reconciliation.” [11]
In another place, he expressed
the very same idea that the person coming to Orthodoxy has not received the
grace of baptism. He receives this grace “either by the repetition of the Rite
[of baptism] or by the prayers of reconciliation [i.e. penance] giving power to
a rite otherwise powerless.” [12]
In all this discussion of
accepting heterodox ordination by economy, one also finds the statement that
economy will not be applied in the cases of (1) “heresiarchs and originators of
schism, and (2) those who have mutilated the outward act of the Sacraments
where that act has been laid down canonically by tradition.” [13]
There can be no room whatsoever
for any consideration of the possibility of the exercise of economy in these
two cases, because the exercise of economy is a preliminary matter
connected unavoidably with the question of the person’s mode of reception into
the Orthodox Church, and to this I shall now turn.
(B) Reception of
Converts
As I have already stated, the
Church’s position with regard to the sacraments of other churches is clear: she
acknowledges no sacraments as valid except those of the Orthodox Church. On
that premise, therefore, the Church received converts either by baptism, or by
chrismation (and sometimes by confession and communion) and I will not go into
the long history of the divergent practices, not only as concerns the rite of
reception but also the divergent practices of the Greek and Russian Churches.
To receive by baptism was an
application of the strict rule: the canons, in as many words, demand that
heretics coming to the Orthodox Church from other faiths be baptised. Anything
less than baptism was an application of economy because economy was resorted to
when the effect of what was done by the Church was to lessen the strictness as
demanded by the canon. What is interesting, however, in this particular area,
is to read the comments of textbook writers when they describe the effect of
such a practice of economy on the previous heretical rites.
A typical example, although the
author is not a scholar and his work is not a textbook of canon law, is the
statement of Chrysostomos Stratman in “Orthodox Baptism and Economy”: “The
Baptism administered by heretics secures no remission of sin, regeneration, or
illumination, even if the correct form is used... The form is of divine
institution, and if it has been correctly performed, even though it is of
itself nothing but a wetting of the body, the authority of the Church can
validate it.... the one missing element is the Grace of the Holy Spirit.”
[14] The mistake here is to say, as do many others, that if a person is not
received by baptism but by economy, then it follows that the exercise of
economy makes the previous (heretical) baptism “valid”.
This conclusion is stated in the
same terms by the well-known author and bishop of the Ecumenical Patriarchate,
Callistos Ware. In his book Eustratios Argenti, Callistos Ware states as
follows:
“[The Church] is
therefore in a full sense the steward (οἰκονόμος) and sovereign administrator
of the sacraments; and it falls within the scope of her stewardship and economy
to make valid — if she so thinks fit — sacraments administered by
non-Orthodox, although such sacraments are no sacraments if considered in
themselves and apart from the Orthodox Church. Because a person’s baptism
is accepted as valid — or rather made valid by economy — when he becomes
Orthodox, it does not therefore follow that his Baptism was valid before he
became Orthodox. The use of economy implies no recognition of the validity of
non-Orthodox sacraments per se; it is something that concerns only the
sacraments of those entering the Orthodox Church.” [15]
No less a person than the great
canonist and commentator, Bishop Nikodim Milash, was deceived by the same false
logic. In his commentary on the seventh canon of the Second Ecumenical Council,
he writes with regard to the practice of economy:
“The Orthodox
Church recognises as valid and salvific the baptism of any Christian group
which is outside her confines, whether heretical or schismatic, but whose
baptism is performed correctly in the name of the Father and of the Son and of
the Holy Spirit.” [16]
The false logic in this
conclusion lies in the mistaken understanding of the effect of economy in these
cases. Economy does not make valid what was never valid. “It cannot pronounce
that to be a sacrament which dogma denies to be a sacrament.” [17] The truth
lies in the statement of Khomiakov which I have already quoted: the grace of
baptism is received in the rite of reconciliation, which I might add, involves
the performance of a mystery, and which gives “power to a rite otherwise
powerless.” Chrysostomos Strandman corrects himself a little further in his
text when he says: “When the Church accepts the convert and adopts, as it were,
this correct but empty form as her own, she supplies at the same time,
the sin-remitting, regenerating power of the Spirit.” [18] In other words, the
Church supplies the deficiency of the heretical baptism by filling it with the
grace of the rite (mystery) of reception. It is simply wrong to speak of any
supposed “validity” of the heretical baptism. As Bishop Gregory succinctly puts
it, “when any heretic or schismatic is accepted into the Church without
re-baptism, that does not signify recognition of the validity of the heretical
rite or sacrament. It simply means that he receives the grace of baptism by
another rite.” [19]
Some of you may be aware of the
spiritual recriminations that a lot of people have suffered (and suffer)
because they were not received into the Orthodox Church by baptism. There was
the well-known case in England in the late 60s. The facts briefly were that
some people had been received into the Moscow Patriarchate by economy. They
were subsequently received into the Synod Abroad by economy, namely, by
confession and communion, two distinct mysteries of the Church. After some
time, they became troubled that they had never received Orthodox baptism, and
so, after petition to the bishop, they were baptised by a second economy, in
order to quieten their spiritually troubled souls.
Objectively, on the facts of this
case and without any regard to the persons involved, it is necessary to say
that there was absolutely no need for the subsequent baptism after having been
received by economy. Although there was no external performance of the rite of
baptism and there was no triple immersion, nevertheless these people had in
fact received the grace of baptism when they had been received into the Synod
by economy. The grace which they received at that time in the mysteries of
confession and communion (the rites of reception) overflowed, as it were, and
filled up what was lacking. These people have already been united to the
Church. Their subsequent baptism is superfluous — they have already received
the grace of baptism, the only thing lacking was the 3-fold immersion. However,
if presentation of these facts fails to persuade them and quiet their troubled
thoughts, then, of course, a second economy is permitted.
Let us pass now to the second
area where economy is said to be exercised.
2. DIVORCE
At the present time, the Church
will dissolve a legally contracted marriage on any of the following grounds:
1. apostasy from
Orthodoxy;
2. adultery and
unnatural vices;
3. incapacity
for marital cohabitation;
4. affliction by
leprosy or syphilis;
5. unknown
absence;
6. jail
sentence, with deprivation of rights;
7. infringement
upon the life and health of the other spouse and children;
8. incest or
prostitution of spouse;
9. entering into
new marriage;
10. serious,
incurable mental sickness;
11. intentional
desertion.
These grounds for divorce were
established by the Council of the Russian Church held in 1917–18 — the same
council that restored the Patriarchate.
It is interesting that in the
preamble to this decision, the Council states that “marriage should be
indissoluble. ‘Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder’ (Matt.
19:6).” But immediately after that, it is added: “Dissolution of marriage is
permitted only as a concession to human weakness and out of concern for the
parties’ salvation” — a clear statement of economy.
The Council, it can be seen, lays
down the strict principle — marriage is indissoluble — but, out of
consideration for human weakness, will permit divorce on certain grounds. It is
instructive to investigate the basis for these grounds and attempt to reconcile
this apparent infringement of the evangelical law.
The New Testament teaching is
quite straightforward: “Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.”
These words of our Lord assert the absolute indissolubility of the first lawful
marriage, so that the very concept of a second marriage is alien to the
Christian ideal. “By its nature, there is one marriage, just as there is one
birth and one death” — St. Gregory of Nyssa to his sister St. Macrina, who had
refused to remarry on the death of her husband. The fathers of the Church write
that second marriages do not accord with the Christian ideal of marriage, not
only because they violate the monogamy divinely established in paradise, but
because, according to Christian teaching, death is not a complete annihilation
and therefore does not destroy the marriage. [20] Consequently, even on the
death of one of the spouses, the second marriage by the survivor is a violation
of the first marriage by its being a secret adultery.
“A second [marriage] is but a
specious adultery.... Anyone who deprives himself of his first wife, even if
she be dead, is a hidden adulterer. In breaking the bond of flesh with flesh,
which union was formed for the intercourse of the race, he is resisting the
hand of God, inasmuch as, in the beginning, God made one man and one woman”. So
said Athenagoras of Athens (+180). [21]
Tertullian writes: “A woman,
after the death of her husband, is bound no less firmly but even more so, not
to marry another husband ... indeed, she prays for his soul and asks that he
may, while waiting, find rest.” [22] Further, he says that a second marriage
would be an insult to the deceased’s memory and he calls it “a form of
adultery.” [23] So also Justin the Martyr: “According to our Teacher, ... they
are sinners who contract a second marriage, even though it be in accord with
human law...” [24]
Against this, however, must be
measured the apostolic injunction of St. Paul, twice repeated in his first
Epistle to the Corinthians: “I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is
good for them if they abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them
marry” (1 Cor. 7:8–9); and “the wife is bound by the law as long as her husband
liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she
will; only in the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:39).
St. John Chrysostom in his
commentaries on this Epistle, passes over these words as self-explanatory,
except that he adds, “He (that is, St. Paul) allows even a second marriage,
saying ‘only in the Lord’. Now what means ‘in the Lord’? With chastity, with
honor.” [25]
Elsewhere, in his homilies, he
says:
“Let women
listen to this (for it is on their account especially that I refer to the
departed) who enter into a second marriage, and defile the bed of their
deceased husband, though they have loved him. Not that I forbid a second
marriage or pronounce it a proof of wantonness, for Paul does not allow me,
stopping my mouth by saying to women, ‘If she marry she hath not sinned’ (1
Cor. 7:28 & 40).” [26]
On second marriage in general,
St. John Chrysostom says: “But what will they say, who are knit together in
second marriages? I speak not at all in condemnation of them, God forbid; for
the Apostle himself permits them, though indeed by way of condescension.” [27]
The code of Orthodox canon law at
first did not recognise second marriages and in fact did not approve of them.
The seventh canon of the Council of Neocaesarea (315) states: “No presbyter is
permitted to dine at the wedding of persons marrying a second time. For, if the
plight of a digamist is one demanding repentance, what will be that of a
presbyter who is lending his consent to the wedding by attending it?”
Ultimately, however, the Church had to come to terms with second marriages
since they were permitted by the civil law. But the Church’s participation for
a long time was expressed as a usual reaction to a breach of church law —
namely, the imposition of an epitimia. When second marriages were finally
accepted, this did not imply a change in the Church’s teaching, but only was a
consequence of the civil order; in other words, the Church was constrained by
the state to admit them and this she did by economy. According to St. Theodore
Studite, this occurred in the reign of Constantine the Iconoclast (741–775)
because, before him, there were no such second marriages. St. Theodore Studite
is the first to classify them as an economy: “In the Christian Church, second
marriage is not a law, but a condescension.” [28] Apart from Constantinople,
other local churches did not allow this until the thirteenth century.
At the present time, therefore,
second marriage, permitted as an economy, is performed in an abbreviated,
penitential ceremony noticeably different from the usual marriage rite. There
are prayers asking for “forgiveness of transgressions”, for “purification” and
“pardon”. These marriages are considered an appropriate limit to man’s
weakness, formally recognised by the Church.
The law of the Gospel is that
marriage, once legally contracted, is indissoluble. It is stated in both St.
Mark and St. Luke as follows: “Whoever shall put away his wife, and marry
another, committeth adultery against her” (Mark 10:11, Luke 16:18). St. Matthew
has it slightly differently: “Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it
be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery” (Matt.
19:9). All these evangelists assert the strict rule: husband and wife are one
flesh and cannot be divided. The bond is as close as between Christ and the
Church. A second marriage, they all assert, is adultery. However, as I have
already said, the civil law recognised second marriages and the Church was
faced with the manifestation of man’s weakness. In this context, it is
interesting that St. Matthew quotes our Lord as allowing an exception to
divorce if there had been “fornication”. Further, St. Paul himself allows
separation (divorce, if you prefer, but not re-marriage) for unbelief: “If the
unbelieving [spouse] depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under
bondage in such cases” (1 Cor. 7:15). Now we have another exception. Next, if
we look at the canons of St. Basil the Great (330–379), we see that he allows
another exception, in the case of a wife’s desertion, the innocent husband may
remarry (canon 35). We already have three grounds for divorce. The extremely
authoritative basis for these exceptions or reasons for divorce cannot but have
laid the ground for the later acceptance of others.
It is interesting, by the way,
that in his commentary on our Lord’s words that “Whoever putteth away his wife,
and marrieth another, committeth adultery” (Luke 16:18), Tertullian states:
“Since therefore, His prohibition of divorce was a conditional one [that is, a
divorce is prohibited if it is for a reason ‘wherefore a woman ought not to be
dismissed’], He did not prohibit absolutely; and what He did not absolutely
forbid, that He permitted on some occasions, when there is an absence of the
cause why He gave His prohibition”. [29] In other words, it seems, Tertullian
would allow divorce if it is not for an “unlawful” reason.
In his commentary on St. Paul’s
text, St. John Chrysostom says: “Since there are cases of separation for
continence, or for other reasons, or for ‘infirmities of temper’ (in Russian
“неудовольствие”), and then he goes on to exhort the wife to stay with her
husband. The point is that this commentary shows the matter-of-fact attitude
that existed then (fourth century) to marital separation. [30] Further, St.
John Chrysostom adds, “if the unbelieving husband directs you to bring
sacrifices and participate in his ungodliness, by force of the marriage, or
else depart, it is better to give up the marriage.” [31] (In Eerdmans Series
translation, “it were better the marriage were annulled”.) Further, he writes
“if the unbelieving one daily insults you and causes arguments, it is best to
separate.”
This commentary is a clear
recognition of the fact that some marriages may not work out. The answer is to
separate. But nowhere do the Scriptures or fathers advocate the contracting of
a second marriage. The operative word is “separate” — although the spouses
remained married, the only solution was to separate. Then, however, deprived of
the restraints of marital cohabitation, man’s weakness prevailed and in most
cases he wished to re-marry.
In view of all this, therefore,
it is easy to understand the mentality of the Church in allowing divorce and
remarriage in practice, whilst still teaching the ideal of marital fidelity and
eternal union. The Scriptures and fathers recognise that some marriages will
fail and they even advocate separation. Since the civil law permitted divorce
and remarriage, it was a short step for the Church, out of love for her
children, to regularize that second union as a condescension (economy).
It is instructive to read the
comments of those who participated in the Pre-Council (Russian Church Council
of 1917–18) Commission when they discussed the establishing of the grounds for
divorce, and to see what, to their minds, the important factors were in
allowing this or that ground.
They acknowledged that since
“marriage is the full unity of the spouses”, the grounds for divorce could only
be those that, as a result of their existence, made it impossible for the
spouses to realize the aim of the marriage, to the same extent as when adultery
had occurred. It is clear, they admitted, that adultery destroyed the
sacramental sanctity of the marital union, but marriage is not just a religious
rite but a relationship giving rise to moral, juridical, social, governmental,
natural and economic factors. The mutual rights and duties of the spouses,
therefore, had to be considered when establishing a reason for divorce.
These factors were particularly
significant when they looked at incurable insanity. This was specifically
discounted as a reason for divorce by canon 15 of Timothy of Alexandria. Yet
the participants in the Pre-Council Commission were moved, out of compassionate
considerations, to allow it and it remains to this day as a ground for divorce.
The members of the Commission said: “Insanity signifies mental and therefore
civil death if it is incurable. It causes more tragedy than natural death.
Insanity so changes a person’s personality that everything human in him dies.
In a moral sense, an insane spouse, usually being unaware of his condition or
surroundings, undergoes no loss if the other spouse remarries. Mental illness
is tantamount to spiritual death, removing not only the physical but also the
moral basis of the marriage.” [32]
(I should add, incidentally, that
before being made a separate ground, it was often cited in actions brought on
the basis of incapacity for marital cohabitation.)
Syphilis, leprosy and other
infectious diseases were considered grounds for divorce “if they deprive
spouses of all possibility of conjugal cohabitation or if they create a danger
of infection of the offspring.” [33]
It is even more interesting to
look at how the canon law textbook writers justify divorce.
In his book, Orthodox Church
Law, (St. Petersburg, 1897, in Russian), Bishop Nikodim Milash (whom I have
already mentioned with regard to his mistaken view of the effect of economy on
the validity of heterodox sacraments), makes the following two points:
1. “It is only
possible to dissolve legally the marital bond by death, or for such reason as
overcomes the Church’s concept of indissolubility and which destroys its moral
or religious basis and in itself represents the same death, but in another
form. Thus, only death, physical, moral or religious, may dissolve the marital
union.” [34]
2. “The
dissolution of marriage is not an act recognised by the Church’s law-making
authority, but it is in itself the consequence of the destruction of the
marital union; for, as between the spouses, the very basis of the marriage and
the aim of the marital union cannot be achieved — there is no marriage.
Therefore, the
Church authority does not dissolve the marriage but only juridically testifies
to the sad fact that a legal marriage has been deprived of its basis and
consequently is dissolved by God Himself.” [35]
This second point is akin to the
Roman Church’s concept of annulment where, usually by some canonical fiction,
the marriage is said never to have existed and is therefore declared annulled.
On this reasoning, because of some legalistic and basic fault, God Himself
recognises that no marriage exists and the Church officially testifies to this
fact (that is, grants a divorce).
The same point, however, is taken
up by others and expressed in less scholastic and legalistic terms. Thus,
Protopriest V. Pevtsov in his book, Lectures on Church Law (St.
Petersburg, 1914) states: “Only as an exception to the general rule, the words
of Christ allow divorce for such a reason as infringes the sanctity of the
marital union and destroys its very basis” (page 192).
These writers (as well as the
author of Notes on Church Law, Kiev, 1871) all emphasize that the
Church’s recognition of various grounds for divorce was a reaction to the Roman
custom, enshrined in the civil law, of allowing divorce at will and by common
consent.
The strict teaching of the Church
is that marriage, once lawfully contracted, is indissoluble. However, as even
the Church fathers recognise, some marriages will fail for one reason or
another and man, being weak and hardhearted, will want to embark upon another
relationship. At this point the doctrine of economy is invoked in practice in
order to allow the possibility of that second relationship AND to facilitate
man’s salvation, for without economy in this case, man would be liable to
condemnation as an adulterer. The Church provides for such an arrangement (but
nevertheless subjects the parties to penance) out of love, and to mitigate the
harshness and terrible consequences of the strict rule. Though it is a
condescension to man’s weakness, still the Church, as a loving mother, does not
close her eyes to her children’s weaknesses and provides an alternative, while
teaching the ideal of perfection, just as did our Lord.
It seems to me, however, that the
doctrine of economy becomes relevant at the point when a person wishes to
dissolve his existing union in order to contract another. People do not,
usually, seek to obtain a church divorce merely for the sake of it but to be
free so as to marry another. Divorce and second marriage, therefore, are
closely bound and the economy of divorce is allowed for the sake of a second
marriage, which is itself an economy.
Divorce cannot be allowed on whim
(as it is in the civil law today and is obviously the cause of the gradual
breakdown of society and its moral decay). Since divorce was not absolutely
forbidden by our Lord, and second marriage is allowed on the death of one of
the spouses, then the Church gave her blessing to such reasons as, by analogy
with adultery and physical death, violated the sanctity of the marriage bond,
on one hand, or, on the other, destroyed its moral or religious basis and thus
effectively prevented the spouses from achieving the aim of the marriage.
3. EPISCOPAL
CELIBACY
I wish, finally, to attempt to
respond to a remarkable article that appeared recently in The Greek Orthodox
Theological Review (Vol. 29, #1, Spring 1984), entitled Married Bishops
(Agreement between Sacred Scripture and Holy Canons) by Panagiotes I.
Boumis, a lecturer in the School of Theology, University of Athens. It is
remarkable because the author has to perform amazing contortions to
substantiate his argument.
Ostensibly, the author’s object
in his brief article is to reconcile what he sees as the apparent contradiction
between holy Scripture — “A bishop must be above reproach, the husband of one
wife” (1 Tim. 3:2, Titus 1:5–7) — and the twelfth canon of the Sixth Ecumenical
Council which prescribes that bishops should not live with their wives after
their consecration; in other words, that bishops should not be married. “We
assert this, however, not with any intention of setting aside or overthrowing
any legislation laid down apostolically, but having due regard for the
salvation and safety of peoples and for their better advancement with a view to
avoiding any likelihood of giving anyone cause to blame the priestly polity” (The
Rudder, p. 303).
The author’s main point is that
the twelfth canon, prescribing episcopal celibacy, is a canon of economy, as
opposed to the strict rule, laid down in the Epistles of St. Paul, that bishops
should and must be married!
He tries to establish this point
by bringing forward arguments against it:
1. how can the
twelfth canon prescribing episcopal celibacy be a rule of economy if it is
stricter than the so-called strict rule that bishops be married?
2. how can the
twelfth canon prescribing episcopal celibacy be a rule of economy if the great
canonists — Balsamon, Zonaras — allowed married bishops as an economy?
3. how can the
twelfth canon prescribing episcopal celibacy be a rule of economy if a rule of
economy is only temporary and the twelfth canon seems to be permanent?
Apart from these contrary
arguments which he hardly discusses and if he does, he lamely dismisses, he
brings forward two additional truly amazing arguments.
1. the Lord and
apostles allowed the marriage of bishops, thus, it is a strict rule that
bishops must be married; and
2. the 30th
canon of the same Sixth Ecumenical Council says that, as an economy, married priests
living in barbarian lands may separate from their wives by agreement, to
strive after sobriety and virginity. As this was permitted by economy (contrary
to the fifth Apostolic canon), by analogy, the author maintains, the rule in
the twelfth canon that bishops separate from their wives is also an
economy.
In his first epistle to Timothy,
St. Paul says: “A bishop then must be blameless, the husband of one wife...” (1
Tim. 3:2). He repeats this in his Epistle to Titus (Titus 1:6).
St. John Chrysostom explains:
“What is said here about the marriage of bishops does not relate to other
times, for a bishop is embellished by complete purity and holiness. But among
the Jews and Gentiles who were committed to self-indulgence, to have only one
wife was considered a great thing. Therefore the Apostle does not make it a
law, but shows condescension to people’s understanding at that time.” [36]
In the first centuries of
Christianity, as St. John Chrysostom expressly acknowledges, it was not the law
that a bishop be married, but it was a practice observed by some. The majority
of bishops were not married. [37]
The great Russian canonist,
theologian and preacher, Bishop John of Smolensk, in his book The
Monasticism of Bishops [38] makes out a complete case supporting the
concept of episcopal celibacy. In respect of St. Paul’s words, Bishop John says
that in fact, St. Paul was addressing himself to priests, not bishops, because
in speaking of the duties of the clergy, he mentions bishops and then passes to
deacons, omitting priests. In Apostolic times, Bishop John says, the title
“bishop” also applied to priests.
Be that as it may, it was a
church tradition, not carried into law until the Sixth Ecumenical Council, but
preserved in church life, that bishops be celibate. Clement of Rome (first
century) said: “It is good for a bishop to be unmarried; if he is not, at least
he should be married only once.” [39]
Until the Sixth Ecumenical
Council laid down the rule of celibacy, there was an attitude in the Church
directed at that aim. This attitude had its origin in the spirit of the Gospel
which tried to turn man away from the world, from the flesh and direct him to
the spirit, to God. Therefore, pastors as preachers of the Gospel and the
representatives of Christianity, most of all had to embody this spirit.
As the Church is represented in
Scripture as the bride of Christ, a holy and chaste virgin in a mystical union
with Christ, and this union with Him is presented in the image of the marital
bond (Eph. 1.5), so the bishop, as the highest pastor of the Church and the
image of Christ, is represented in Church teaching as the guardian of her
spiritual virginity, that is, inner purity in faith, life, in all her activity
in the world and so he is betrothed to her, as the apostle Paul speaks of
himself in relation to the Corinthian church (2 Cor. 11.2). This bond of the
bishop must be exclusive and single. Thus, a church (or group of the faithful)
that is left without a bishop is called “widowed”. This was so strictly
understood in the ancient church that the occupation of two sees was called
bigamy and the unlawful occupation by a bishop of another’s see was considered
adultery.
Thus a bishop should be
unmarried, celibate in the sense of complete moral renunciation of flashy and
worldly ties, so that his union with the Church (and his diocese) will be
completely pure, spiritual and independent of the flesh and world, as is proper
for a bridegroom of the Church. [40]
This attitude of the Church,
therefore, was given formal definition in the canon of the Sixth Ecumenical
Council, and this rule, without doubt, is a strict rule for all time in the
absence of another ecumenical council.
In his commentary on this canon,
Bishop Nikodim Milash writes:
“The rise of
monasticism [in the third century] which had given the Church many great
bishops on one hand, on the other hand gave a lofty understanding of bodily
abstinence and a consciousness that, inasmuch as the hierarchical rank is the
highest in the Church, then there is the least right to bodily indulgence and
all the more must it be directed to total service of God and the Church in body
and soul — all this contributed to the fact that, already in the fourth
century, unmarried bishops were regarded as naturally basic to church order and
that it was essential, sooner or later, that it become the law.” [41]
Further, he says,
“In 390, a
council was held at Carthage and the second canon of this council prescribed
that a bishop must be unmarried and preserve his virginity, with respect to
which, the fathers of this council, in order to have a basis for their decree,
refer to the apostolic tradition preserved by the Church from ancient times.
This and other
testimonies show how deeply rooted was the practice of appointing only
unmarried persons as bishops. They also show us that the majority of bishops
came from the monks and that these bishops from the monks were the greatest
luminaries of the Church.” [42]
In view of this ancient and
weighty authority, it staggers the mind to read in the pages of The Greek
Orthodox Theological Review that this rule was a mere economy and
therefore, being an economy, exactness (that is, married bishops) may be
restored without an ecumenical council. But it is obvious at the very beginning
of his article what motives have produced such alien ideas. The author states
in his second paragraph: “I was encouraged by revered ecclesiastical
personalities to present this paper.” Then, in a footnote to his very next
paragraph, he writes:
“The usefulness
of the present study can be clearly understood from what was stated at the
Pan-Orthodox Conference in Constantinople, 1923. In relation to our topic,
Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios Metaxakes proposed the following: ‘I am of the
opinion that... promoting married priests to the office of bishop, without
compelling them to send their wives to a monastery, is a proper goal and is
urgent and rational at this time.’” [43]
CONCLUSION
The three areas that I have
examined in relation to the application of economy show the usefulness of this
doctrine, but two of them especially also show the dangers inherent in it when
misinterpreted and misapplied. Economy is a doctrine of compassion and is
available to be used for man’s benefit and ultimately, his salvation.
Consequently, it cannot be used frivolously. One often hears it invoked in
cases of personal weakness, for example, to justify one’s breaking the fast,
but this is an abuse and a misconception. Every dispensation from the rule of
the Church is not an economy, especially when used to excuse one’s own
weakness.
St. Cyril of Alexandria said that
the peace and general good of the Church are the only legitimate grounds for
the use of economy. [44] He compares economy to a ship at sea which is in
danger when a storm blows up and some things have to be thrown overboard in
order to save the people on board. It is, in effect, the sacrifice of something
(in this case, strictness) for the greater good, which is man’s salvation.
St. Theodore the Studite is of
the same mind as St. Cyril. He says economy is a derogation of the general rule
of law which re-establishes its strictness once the situation has returned to
normal.⁴⁵ He distinguishes two types of economy, temporary, for example, the
reception of converts by confession and communion, and permanent, like the
permitting of second marriage. As Nicholas the Mystic, Patriarch of
Constantinople expressed it, its aim is to deliver from sin and not to cause
its commission. [46] Strictness is the rule of law and economy is the practice
of love.
With regard to the last case I
looked at, episcopal celibacy, it is manifestly obvious that the proponent of
this so-called economy was falsely creating a situation of economy to serve his
own purposes. His purpose was to advocate a married episcopate, but the
doctrine of economy failed him here, not only on historical grounds. “Economy
exists when, by necessity or for the greater benefit of some or of the whole
Church, a deviation from strictness is allowed, on certain conditions,
temporarily or permanently, as much as to ensure that piety and the purity of
dogma remain unaltered.” [47]
It is clear that the whole of
Church tradition favoured an unmarried episcopate. Economy, therefore, cannot
be invoked to change the Church’s belief or to alter her piety.
What, then, can our conclusion be
as to the nature of economy? Essentially, it is the overflowing of God’s love,
expressed through the Church, to cover man’s imperfection. It is God’s
“providential management” of man’s affairs, when he falls short of the ideal.
The doctrine of economy is
flexible but not frivolous. It has social and salvific significance rather than
juridical. Strictly, it is not “dispensation” as practised in the Roman Church,
for it takes no account of legalities. Its motivating factor is the good of
souls, a human element, and this also is its purpose, to ensure the salvation
of those souls. To some, it may appear to be “hypocritical dissimulation” [48]
but, in fact, it is merely evidence that “the ways of God are inscrutable.”
[49] Our limited human reason bears no relation to God’s limitless love.
FOOTNOTES
1. Kontakion 9.
2. The Life in Christ by Nicholas Cabasilas, St.
Vladimir’s Seminary, 1974, page 106.
3. St. John of Damascus, Contra Jacobitas in The
Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church by Vladimir Lossky, James Clarke
& Co., Ltd., Cambridge and London, 1957, page 138.
4. idem, page 144; St. Cyril of Alexandria.
5. Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Eerdmans Series,
Volume XI, page 155.
6. Bishop Nikodim Milash, quoted in Strictness and Economy
by Protopresbyter George Grabbe (now Bishop Gregory), Orthodox Life, #2,
1979, page 36.
7. See also the first canon of St. Basil the Great.
8. Why Anglican Clergy could be Received in their Orders
by Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky, The Christian East, Volume VII,
1927, pages 60–69, reprinted in Orthodox Life, #4, 1980, page 29.
9. Volume IV, No. 1, page 63.
10. Orthodox Life, #4, 1980, op. cit., page 34.
11. The Unity of the Church and the World Conference of
Christian Communities by Archbishop Ilarion, Montreal, 1975, page 69.
12. Russia and the English Church by W. Birkbeck,
London, 1895, page 158.
13. The Relations of the Anglican Churches with the
Eastern Orthodox by Rev. J. Douglas, London, 1921, page 58.
14. published by The Orthodox Christian Educational Society,
Chicago, page 25.
15. Eustratios Argenti, Eastern Orthodox Books, 1974,
page 84.
16. Правила Православной Церкви с толкованиями, Никодима,
Епископа Далматинско-Истрийского, С.-Петербург, 1911 г., стр. 283.
17. The Orthodox Principle of Economy and its Exercise
by J.A. Douglas in The Christian East, Volume XIII, London, 1932, page
103.
18. Op. cit., page 26.
19. Op. cit.
20. Догматический смысл запрещения второбрачия
священнослужителям, С. Троицкий, Церковные Ведомости, № 13, 14, стр. 7–8, № 15,
16, стр. 14.
21. Supplication for the Christians in The Faith of
the Early Fathers by W. Jurgens, Volume I, The Liturgical Press,
Collegeville, Minnesota, 1970, page 71.
22. idem, page 158.
23. Ante Nicene Fathers, op. cit. On Monogamy,
pages 59–72.
24. Jurgens, op. cit., page 52.
25. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., Volume XII, page 111.
26. idem, Volume XIII, “Homily VII on 2 Tim. 3:1–7”,
page 503.
27. idem, Homily XX on Eph. 5:22–24, page 148.
28. Троицкий, op. cit.
29. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., Volume III, Against
Marcion, page 405.
30. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., Volume XII, page 106.
In Russian, Volume 10, page 180.
31. Russian edition, Volume 10, page 182. Eerdmans Series, op.
cit., page 108.
32. Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний Высочайше Учрежденного
Предсоборного Присутствия, С.-Петербург, 1907 г., Том 4, стр. 97–134.
33. idem.
34. Православное Церковное Право, С.-Петербург, 1897 г., стр.
635.
35. idem, стр. 635.
36. О монашестве епископов, Иоанна, Епископа Смоленского,
Москва, 1981, стр. 6.
37. idem, page 5.
38. op. cit.
39. idem, page 9.
40. idem, page 63.
41. op. cit., page 462.
42. idem, page 464.
43. op. cit., page 82.
44. L’économie dans le droit byzantin par Mgr Pierre
Raï, Orient et Occident, Istina 3 (1973), page 266.
45. idem, page 274.
46. idem, page 279.
47. idem, page 359.
48. Russia and the English Church, op. cit.,
page 149.
49. idem, page 159.
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