From MP historian A. A. Kostryukov: “The Position of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia on the Question of Grace in the Moscow Patriarchate under Metropolitan (Voznesensky)”

Russian source: Bulletin of PSTGU. Series II: History. History of the Russian Orthodox Church, Issue 98, 2021, pp. 130–142.

 

 

Abstract: The article is devoted to the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR) toward the Moscow Patriarchate under Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky). During the years of his administration of the Russian Church Abroad, criticism of the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate intensified. The occasion for the criticism was the latter’s compelled support of the communist state, as well as its participation in the ecumenical movement. Metropolitan Philaret, who at first expressed himself with restraint, gradually changed his rhetoric. In part, the metropolitan’s sharpness is explained by the influence upon him of radicals — Protopresbyter George Grabbe (later Bishop Gregory) and Archimandrite Panteleimon (Metropoulos). Sharp statements also came from the Councils and the Synod of Bishops of ROCOR. In particular, it was said that the Moscow Patriarchate could not be considered the successor of His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, and that its directives were unlawful. Attempts were made to declare the Moscow Patriarchate devoid of grace. Such an opinion was expressed by the First Hierarch of ROCOR himself, Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky), as well as by the secretary of the Synod of Bishops, Protopresbyter George Grabbe. They believed that a cleric of the Moscow Patriarchate could receive grace only at the moment of joining the Russian Church Abroad. Despite this opinion, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad did not officially declare the Moscow Patriarchate devoid of grace. A considerable part of ROCOR spoke of it with respect and was prepared for dialogue.

 

In May 1964, the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) elected Bishop Philaret (Voznesensky) of Brisbane as the chairman of the Synod of Bishops and the First Hierarch. The leadership of Metropolitan Philaret, which lasted until his death on November 21, 1985, has not yet found its researcher. The most comprehensive work, "Pillar of Fire," prepared by Nun Kassia (Senina), is largely aimed at justifying the actions of the archpastor. [1] Other works dedicated to this topic are mainly of a review nature and are limited to listing facts and events. [2] And although certain aspects have already been reflected in scholarly literature, [3] one of the most important questions — the attitude towards the Moscow Patriarchate — remains outside the scope of research interest.

The limited study of the topic leads to a number of extreme assertions circulating in journalism. These assertions boil down to the idea that the Russian Church Abroad not only denied the grace of the Moscow Patriarchate but allegedly did not consider it a Christian denomination at all. For example, one of the Russian authors wrote in the early 1990s: "The Synodal Church Abroad does not consider those who are under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate to be Christians at all." [4]

What did the Russian Church Abroad actually say about the Moscow Patriarchate, and did it recognize its grace? The official resolutions of the Councils of Bishops of ROCOR, as well as the decisions of the Synod of Bishops, provide an answer to this question. Understanding the attitude towards the Moscow Patriarchate is also aided by materials from the periodical press of the Russian emigration and the correspondence of the clergy of the Russian Church Abroad.

By the time of Metropolitan Philaret's election, the Russian Church Abroad had been effectively independent for over 40 years. Since 1927, relations with the Moscow Patriarchate had been characterized by opposition. After the "Declaration" of Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) and his demand for loyalty to the Soviet regime, ROCOR refused to submit to the Moscow Patriarchate, and Metropolitan Sergius' official statement about the absence of persecution (1930) led to a break in prayerful communion. In 1953, in response to the requiem service for Stalin held by the Moscow Patriarchate, the Council of Bishops of ROCOR decided that its clergy could only be accepted through repentance. Some representatives of the Russian Church Abroad indeed went as far as to engage in outright blasphemy. In one interview, Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom) of Sourozh recalled how Archimandrite (later Metropolitan) Vitaly (Ustinov) of ROCOR once said to him: "If one is to be polite, you are not a priest, and if one is to be direct, you are a servant of Satan." [5] In the will of Metropolitan Anastasy (Gribanovsky), who held the position of First Hierarch of ROCOR from 1936 to 1964, there were the following words: "As for the Moscow Patriarchate and its hierarchs, since they are in close, active, and friendly alliance with the Soviet government, which openly professes its complete godlessness and strives to implant atheism in the entire Russian people, the Church Abroad, in preserving its purity, should not have any canonical, prayerful, or even simple everyday communication with them, while leaving each of them to the final judgment of the future free Council of the Russian Church." [6]

Under Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky), the situation became even more tense. Unlike his predecessors, Metropolitans Anthony (Khrapovitsky) and Anastasy (Gribanovsky), who began their service in Tsarist Russia, Metropolitan Philaret grew up spiritually in emigration, and on its periphery at that. It seems that living in a non-Orthodox Chinese environment, as well as the political events of the 1920s–1940s, developed in him a habit of existing in a "ring of enemies." His limited administrative experience also played a role — he was elevated to the position of head of ROCOR from the rank of vicar bishop of the distant Australian diocese. As a result, the metropolitan came under the strong influence of his zealous entourage, primarily the secretary of the Synod, Protopresbyter George Grabbe (later Bishop Gregory), and the abbot of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery in Boston, Archimandrite Panteleimon (Metropoulos).

Initially, Metropolitan Philaret's statements about the Moscow Patriarchate were moderate. "We do not condemn the Soviet hierarchs for being forced to praise the antichristian power and act according to its directives," the archpastor wrote in 1971, "we do not condemn them because we understand their terrible situation: never before in the world has the Church been in such dreadful conditions. We reject communion with them, but we pity them and pray that the Lord will free them from this spiritual captivity, and He Himself, the just and merciful, will judge them." [7]

Other hierarchs held a similar view. In the same year, Archbishop Averky (Taushev) of Syracuse and Holy Trinity also spoke about the grace of the Moscow Patriarchate. Discussing the issue of granting autocephaly to the North American Metropolia, he stated: "We cannot speak about the validity of the sacraments in the Metropolia if we do not even reject grace in the Soviet Church." [8]

Nevertheless, harsh criticism of the Moscow Patriarchate was gaining momentum. Whereas previously the accusations against it were limited to servility, support of the atheist state, and betrayal of the New Martyrs, new reasons emerged in the 1960s — the participation of the Moscow Patriarchate in the ecumenical movement, the formal permission to admit Roman Catholics to the Chalice, which was in effect from 1969 to 1986, and others. [9]

It was only natural that sooner or later ROCOR would have to address the question of the grace of the Moscow Patriarchate. Attempts to declare it devoid of grace were made, for example, at the Council of Bishops in 1971. "If heretics are without grace," insisted Archbishop Anthony (Sinkevich) of Los Angeles at the time, "then the Patriarchate must be even more so, for its situation is worse than heresy because it collaborates with the theomachists." [10] However, the proposal did not gain support. It was understood that such a step would inevitably lead to the severing of the already thin thread of canonical communion with the Local Churches and the transformation of ROCOR into a global outcast. Even an anti-Moscow hierarch like Archbishop Seraphim (Ivanov) of Chicago and Detroit reminded that the final decision, according to the will of Metropolitan Anastasy (Gribanovsky), should be made by a Council in a Russia liberated from communism. Bishop Savva (Saračević) of Edmonton also spoke in the same vein, insisting that the question of recognizing someone as devoid of grace is complex from a theological point of view and has not yet been resolved.

The archpastors refused to condemn the Moscow Patriarchate for the same reason that it refrained from imposing sanctions against ROCOR. Let us recall that during those years in Moscow, there were also unsuccessful attempts to anathematize the Church Abroad. [11] In both cases, there was a fear of "uprooting the wheat along with the tares" (cf. Matt. 13:29).

By refraining from harsh judgments, the participants of the ROCOR Council of Bishops in 1971 agreed that, alongside the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate, there are many Orthodox believers in the homeland who belong to it but do not sympathize with its course. Even Archbishop Vitaly (Ustinov) of Montreal and Canada, who had previously made blasphemous remarks about Moscow clerics, did not support the condemnation. "The Patriarchate," said the archbishop, "consists not only of Nikodim [Rotov] and those like him. By making a decision about the lack of grace, we touch all the clergy and laity. The catacomb Church is not only those who are hiding but also some of the open clergy." [12]

Archbishop Averky (Taushev) added that the church people in Russia are able to distinguish the "true" pastors from the unbelievers, and he also spoke of a priest from the Moscow Patriarchate who joyfully spoke about the canonization of Father John of Kronstadt, which had taken place abroad. Archbishop Nikon (Rklitsky) of Washington and Florida held a similar opinion, stating that the efforts of the Council should be directed against the higher hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate, not against all believers.

The First Hierarch summed it up: "There are people who, although they have erred, do so while internally reproaching themselves; nonetheless, they serve the flock and uphold the faith. Undoubtedly, Archbishop Anthony of Los Angeles is right that a complete betrayal of the truth leads to a loss of grace, but for now, it is better not to dwell on this issue." [13]

No matter how much some hotheads wanted to anathematize the Moscow Patriarchate, public opinion was clearly not on their side, and therefore the harsh statements of the zealous émigrés were interspersed with vague and relatively peaceful formulations. In the report "On the Spiritual Essence of the Moscow Patriarchate," delivered at the Third All-Diaspora Council (1974), Archbishop Nikon (Rklitsky) rejected any hostility towards the clergy and believers, testified to deep respect for the Russian people, and only expressed sorrow that "the Moscow Patriarchate, in the person of its head and leaders, aligns itself with the oppressors and enslavers of the Russian people and the international villains, the communists." [14] The Third All-Diaspora Council also cited the confessional service of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate — Archbishop Hermogenes (Golubev), priests N. Gainov and D. Dudko, and layman B. Talantov. [15]

An example of yet another irenic text was Protopresbyter George Grabbe’s reply to A. I. Solzhenitsyn concerning his message to the Third All-Diaspora Council. In it, the writer reproached “the line of subservience begun by Metropolitan Sergius… and continued by his followers, even rolled further down the slope.” Solzhenitsyn pointed out that the émigrés should not bow beneath the yoke placed by the godless regime upon the Moscow Patriarchate. Yet Alexander Isaevich did not dare to reject it. “The present Church in our country,” Solzhenitsyn wrote, “is captive, oppressed, crushed, but by no means fallen!” The writer insisted that the Moscow Patriarchate would overcome its problems by itself, from within, without help from abroad. And it was naïve to suppose that after the overthrow of the Bolshevik yoke, the Orthodox people would rush to the Church Abroad with a plea that it take the lead over them. Therefore, “the only correct path is the path toward the future merger of all branches of the Russian Church.” [16]

The writer's thoughts expressed in the message were sound, and responding to them in the spirit of anti-Patriarchate propaganda would have been inappropriate. Therefore, Protopresbyter G. Grabbe in his response pointed out that no one in ROCOR sees themselves as judges called to pass a verdict on the Patriarchate and that the Church Abroad merely hopes to be represented at a free All-Russian Council when it is convened. According to the ideologist, the Church Abroad also does not harbor hostile feelings toward the Moscow Patriarchate, welcomes Orthodox laypeople arriving from the USSR "as brothers," and any priest of the Moscow Patriarchate who baptizes without documents and registration is already to some extent a catacombnik, risking his life for Christ. [17] The arguments of Protopresbyter G. Grabbe were later repeated (sometimes directly quoting his secretary) by Metropolitan Philaret. [18]

Unfortunately, the beautiful words did not reflect reality — the anti-Moscow course had long been set. In 1968, Archbishop Savva (Raevsky) of Sydney and Australia-New Zealand issued a decree prohibiting any meetings between ROCOR clergy and laity with representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate, whether clergy or laity. [19] On January 1, 1970, the Synod of Bishops in its message declared that the Moscow Patriarchate was a conscious tool of the godless government, and therefore any spiritual and social interaction with it was unacceptable. [20] The confrontation took on severe forms in places where the parishes of the two jurisdictions were neighbors, such as in Israel. Archimandrite Anthony (Grabbe), who headed the ROCOR mission in the Holy Land and was the son of the Synod's secretary, actively obstructed visits to the monasteries under his authority by official delegations of the Moscow Patriarchate. Upon learning of the planned visits in advance, the archimandrite would declare these dates as "Days of Mourning" and close the monasteries to pilgrims. [21]

Protopresbyter G. Grabbe, who assured A. I. Solzhenitsyn of brotherly feelings toward the Moscow Patriarchate, openly declared its lack of grace. In his report to the 1979 Council, the protopresbyter explained that all sacraments outside the Church, including baptism, are not valid at all; they only become effective and filled with grace after a heretic or schismatic is united with the Church. According to the report, this principle should also apply to the "apostate" Local Churches, [22] including the Moscow Patriarchate. In the opinion of the powerful protopresbyter, its clergy should be accepted only after renouncing "Sergianism," repenting, and receiving the "laying on of hands by a bishop." This procedure would also have to be undergone by dissidents, such as priests Dmitry Dudko and Gleb Yakunin, if they were to go abroad. Even though they oppose the Patriarchate's policies, they still commemorate their ecclesiastical authorities, which is already a sin. The protopresbyter also took a straightforward approach to the question of how to deal with laypeople: they should not be received "as brothers," but only after a confession in which they would promise not to receive communion in the churches of the Moscow Patriarchate. For certain categories of clergy and believers, Protopresbyter G. Grabbe proposed even stricter measures. For example, the protopresbyter had a strong aversion to the popular priest in Russia, Protopriest Alexander Men. Father George refused to consider both him and his followers as baptized: "It is impossible, for example, to allow the followers of the Judaizing priest [Alexander] Men, who is no longer a Christian, to receive communion." For such people, only public repentance is possible, and perhaps even a second baptism. [23]

In their logical conclusion, such ideas would have led to decisive actions like re-baptisms and re-ordinations. However, such actions were too scandalous and would have met with fierce resistance from a significant part of the ROCOR clergy, not to mention the laity.

Fearing to officially voice radical views, the leadership of the Church Abroad found a way out by publishing anti-Moscow articles signed by laypeople. This approach allowed for criticism of the Patriarchate while shielding the hierarchy from accusations of extremism, making it possible to attribute unwarranted conclusions to journalistic zeal if necessary. And the journalists were not restrained in their expressions. For example, Peter Mar, citing the fact that the Soviet government was anathematized by Patriarch Tikhon and the All-Russian Council of 1917–1918, argued that all its supporters are also subject to anathema. Since the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate is among those supporters, it too is under anathema, which can only be lifted by a legitimate All-Russian Council. [24] From this, it was only a short step to writing the word "patriarch" in quotation marks when referring to His Holiness Pimen (Izvekov), something that was quite common in ROCOR periodicals.

Metropolitan Philaret gradually changed his attitude toward the Moscow Patriarchate. In a letter to Metropolitan Ireney (Bekish), the head of the Orthodox Church in America, he compared the grace of the Moscow Patriarchate to a barrel of honey into which a dead rat had fallen. "The honey itself is excellent, but it has been tainted by the poison and stench of a corpse. Do you, in good episcopal conscience, truly consider those dressed in cassocks and klobuks who serve the KGB to be the true spiritual leaders of the much-suffering Russian Church? Can you not see that at the bottom of that quasi-church Soviet organization with which you have associated yourself lies the dead rat of Soviet communism?" [25]

Toward the end of his life, the metropolitan became even more hardened. Like Protopresbyter G. Grabbe, the head of ROCOR explained the acceptance of Moscow clergy in their existing rank solely as an act of economia — a fear of alienating those who were wavering. In reality, however, according to Metropolitan Philaret, the Moscow Patriarchate has no grace, and the sacraments performed by its clergy only become valid after they repent of "Sergianism." In the summer of 1980, the head of ROCOR wrote to Protopriest Victor Potapov: "When we accept Soviet clergy, we apply the principle of economia. We accept clergy from Moscow not as those who possess grace, but as those who receive it upon joining. But we certainly cannot recognize the church of the deceitful as a bearer and keeper of grace. For outside Orthodoxy, there is no grace, and the Soviet church has deprived itself of grace." [26]

Like Protopresbyter G. Grabbe, Metropolitan Philaret began to speak out against the opposition clergy of the Moscow Patriarchate. Neither their bravery nor the appearance of their names in the pages of émigré periodicals helped these pastors. The mere fact of belonging to the "Soviet church" became, for Metropolitan Philaret, sufficient reason to consider these clergy almost as heretics. "On what basis did you and other clergy have direct communication with Fr. Dudko?" Metropolitan Philaret asked Priest Victor Potapov in the summer of 1980. "You wrote him letters, etc. ... If Fr. Dudko had said: 'I am breaking with the official church and leaving it,' then you could have entered into a lively communion with him. But without this, your actions are a violation of church discipline. Dudko wrote to me personally, but I did not reply, although I could have said much in response." [27]

It reached the point of fanaticism—some ROCOR priests refused to give Communion to infants if their parents had taken them to receive Communion in Moscow. This even applied to children whose parents were under the spiritual care of Priest Dmitry Dudko. [28] However, it was unclear what the infant was supposed to do in such a situation—repentance was impossible due to their unconscious age, and re-baptism was not allowed in the Church Abroad, at least not officially. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that if the power of Metropolitan Philaret and his "gray cardinal" Grabbe had been all-encompassing, and if their supporters had formed a majority in ROCOR, the Moscow Patriarchate would not have avoided being "anathematized."

The Council of Bishops in 1981 stopped just short of making an irreversible decision. In the resolution dated October 27, it was stated that only universal repentance and the revival of the Orthodox Church in Russia could halt the global apocalyptic processes. However, its subordination to the godless government and participation in the ecumenical movement cast doubt on such a possibility: "In safeguarding the purity of Orthodoxy, we cannot have any communion with the Moscow Patriarchate, which is in full service to the atheist government, even if some of its servants may think they are simultaneously serving both Belial and Christ, which, according to the words of the Apostle Paul, is incompatible." The acts of the Moscow Patriarchate were recognized by the Council as uncanonical and invalid. [29]

Nevertheless, ROCOR never officially recognized the Moscow Patriarchate as devoid of grace, as it repeatedly affirmed. The Russian Church Abroad did not accept the emigrated catacomb figure A. Chernov (Schemamonk Epiphanius). The reason was Chernov's fanaticism and his preaching of the gracelessness of the Moscow Patriarchate. [30] When another catacomb figure, Hieromonk Lazarus (Zhurbenko), contacted ROCOR, Archbishop Anthony (Bartoshevich) of Geneva and Western Europe reminded him that the Russian Church Abroad had never declared the Moscow Patriarchate to be devoid of grace and did not repeat the sacraments performed by its clergy. Therefore, Fr. Lazarus was allowed to use holy chrism consecrated by the Moscow Patriarchate and, in extreme cases, to resort to its sacraments, albeit with trusted priests. [31]

Fortunately for the Russian Church Abroad, radicals did not constitute a majority within it. Alongside extremely negative statements, there was also a calm perspective. Until the end of his days, Saint John (Maximovitch) did not deny the grace of the Moscow Patriarchate. Protopriest Vladimir Rodzianko (a cleric of the Serbian Church) wrote: "Every time he came to London, he invariably invited me to serve with him, even though he knew that I often served with Bishop Anthony (Bloom) in the patriarchal church... He didn't even raise the issue: the factually existing Eucharistic communion (through the Serbian Church) was ABOVE canonical disputes." [32]

Archbishop Anthony (Bartoshevich) spoke similarly about Bishop John. Responding to another anti-Moscow outburst from Protopresbyter G. Grabbe, the archpastor expressed the saint's point of view: "He asserted, as I have already written to you, that the Moscow Patriarchate is not devoid of grace, and so on. Now, alas, it's too late to re-educate us. That's all!" [33]

There are many examples of the positive attitude of ROCOR hierarchs and clergy towards the Moscow Patriarchate.

According to the report of the hierarch of the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Philaret (Vakhromeev) of Berlin and Central Europe, Archbishop Philotheus (Narko) of Berlin and Germany (ROCOR) had a great deal of sympathy for the Church in the Homeland. He did not plan to leave the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia but also did not prevent the faithful of his diocese from receiving communion in the churches of the Moscow Patriarchate. At the same time, the archpastor understood that unity was impossible under those conditions, which he attributed solely to the stubbornness of ROCOR's higher leadership. In his conversation with Metropolitan Philaret (Vakhromeev) in March 1976, Archbishop Philotheus said that it was useless to try to reach an agreement with the First Hierarch of ROCOR and that the best approach was to establish connections at the grassroots level. Archbishop Philotheus's position, known in New York, did not contribute to his friendship with ROCOR's leadership. The archbishop himself admitted that he was removed from the real management of the Berlin diocese — all matters were handled by Bishop Paul (Pavlov) of Stuttgart. [34] However, Bishop Paul's attitude towards the Moscow ecclesiastical authorities was also not hostile — he later met with hierarchs from Russia as well. [35]

Respectful attitudes towards the Moscow Patriarchate were also observed among the clergy. In 1982, Sydney priest Nikolai Gan requested permission from Archbishop Vladimir (Sabodan), the rector of the Moscow Theological Academy, to attend a course on the history of the Russian Church, even if only for one year. The issue was discussed at the level of the Department for External Church Relations (OVCS). They were hesitant to accept a cleric from a hostile jurisdiction. The request was denied on the grounds that there was no one-year course for studying individual subjects at the MTA. [36]

When visiting Russia in July 1989, ROCOR cleric Protopriest Andrei Semyanko told the OVCS representative accompanying him that approximately 25% of the clergy and laity of the Russian Church Abroad were already ready for reunification, 25% were strongly opposed, and the remaining 50% were indifferent to the issue and would follow the leadership. Therefore, the negotiation process should be productive. [37]

Thus, the statements regarding the gracelessness of the Moscow Patriarchate remain the responsibility of private individuals. Unfortunately, among them was also the First Hierarch of ROCOR, Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky). As for the conciliar and synodal resolutions of ROCOR, they were often harsh, denied the succession of the Moscow Patriarchate from Patriarch Tikhon, and rejected the canonicity of its acts, but they did not address its grace. Overall, a significant portion of ROCOR's hierarchy and faithful were already in the 1960s–1980s ready to thaw relations with the Church in the homeland and clearly understood that the sacraments within it remained valid. It is precisely thanks to this segment of its clergy that the Russian Church Abroad never officially declared the Moscow Patriarchate to be without grace.

 

NOTES

1. Pillar of Fire. Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky) of New York and Eastern America and the Russian Church Abroad (1964–1985) / compiled and annotated by Nun Cassia (T. A. Senina). St. Petersburg, 2007.

2. The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad: 1918–1968. Vols. 1–2 / edited by A. Sollogub. New York, 1968; Makovetsky A., Archpriest. The White Church: Far from Atheistic Terror. St. Petersburg, 2009; Popov A. The Russian Orthodox Diaspora. Moscow, 2005.

3. See, for example: Anashkin D. “On the Question of the Peculiarities of the Liturgical Life of the Russian Church Abroad in 1946–2000” // XXVII Annual Theological Conference of PSTGU. Moscow, 2017. Pp. 164–172; Bochkov P., Priest. A Survey of Non-Canonical Orthodox Jurisdictions of the 20th–21st Centuries. Vols. 1–4. St. Petersburg, 2018; Kornilov A. A Monk from Optina to Platina: The Life of Bishop Nektary of Seattle (Kontsevich). N. Novgorod, 2008; Psarev A. “The Development of the Worldview of the Russian Church Abroad in Relation to the Local Churches and Heterodoxy” // Acts of the Fourth All-Diaspora Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia. Moscow, 2012; Slesarev A. The Old-Style Schism in the History of the Orthodox Church (1924–2008). Moscow, 2009.

4. Borisov A., Priest. The Fields White unto Harvest: Reflections on the Russian Orthodox Church. Moscow, 1994. P. 62.

5. Pokrovsky V. “Relations with the Church Abroad Have Become Milder” // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. No. 113 (284). 7.06.92.

6. “The Testament of His Beatitude Metropolitan Anastasy” // Church Life. 1965. No. 1–6. P. 4.

7. Philaret, Metropolitan. Letter to Archpriest V. Rodzianko. 1.09.1971 // Archive of the DECR. File “The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.” Folder “1971.” Fol. 6.

8. Minutes No. 8 of the session of the ROCOR Council of Bishops, 16.09.1971 // Archive of the ROCOR Synod of Bishops. File “Council of Bishops, 1971. Minutes.”

9. Decisions of the Holy Synod // Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1970. No. 1. P. 5; Decisions of the Holy Synod // Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1986. No. 9. Pp. 7–8.

10. Minutes No. 6 of the session of the ROCOR Council of Bishops, 14.09.1971 // Archive of the ROCOR Synod of Bishops. File “Council of Bishops, 1971. Minutes.”

11. The Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, May 30–June 2, 1971. Moscow, 1972. Pp. 36, 127, 173–174.

12. Minutes No. 6 of the session of the ROCOR Council of Bishops, 14.09.1971 // Archive of the Synod of Bishops. File “Council of Bishops, 1971. Minutes.”

13. Ibid.

14. Nikon (Rklitsky), Archbishop. “On the Spiritual Essence of the Moscow Patriarchate” // Church Life. 1975. No. 1–6. P. 25.

15. “Epistle of the Third All-Diaspora Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia to the Orthodox Russian People in the Homeland” // Church Life. 1974. No. 7–12. P. 27.

16. Letter of A. I. Solzhenitsyn to the Third Council of the Russian Church Abroad // Orthodox Russia. 1974. No. 18. Pp. 7–8.

17. Orthodox Russia. 1974. No. 18. P. 11.

18. Reply of Metropolitan Philaret to Mr. Solzhenitsyn // Orthodox Russia. 1974. No. 19. Pp. 5–6.

19. Decree for the Australian-New Zealand Diocese of ROCOR // Unity. 22.11.1968. No. 47 (950).

20. Archpastoral Epistle of the Synod of Bishops // Church Life. 1970. No. 1. P. 4; Epistle of the Free Bishops of the Russian Church to the Orthodox Russian People in the Homeland // Church Life. 1971. No. 7–12. P. 71.

21. Visit of a Delegation of the Moscow Patriarchate to the Holy Places in the Holy Land, including those belonging to the Church Abroad // Church News. 1989. No. 3. P. 6.

22. Grabbe G., Protopresbyter. Report to the Council of 1979 on Questions Arising in Contemporary Church Practice. Pp. 1–8 // Stanford University, Special Collections Librarian. F. “Grabbe.” Box 4. Folder 3.

23. Ibid. Pp. 11–13.

24. Mar P. “In Search of Unity” // Orthodox Russia. 1975. No. 9. P. 4.

25. Philaret, Metropolitan. Reply to Metropolitan Ireney // Orthodox Russia. 1975. No. 7. Pp. 6–7.

26. Pillar of Fire. P. 200.

27. Ibid.

28. Rodzianko V., Archpriest. Letter to Protopresbyter G. Grabbe. 3.02.1979. P. 7 // Stanford University, Special Collections Librarian. F. “Grabbe.” Box 6. Folder 13.

29. Decisions of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia // Orthodox Russia. 1981. No. 24. P. 11.

30. Anthony (Bartoshevich), Archbishop. Report to the Council of Bishops on the Reception of a Group of Catacomb Christians // HTSA. F. “Catacomb Church”; “A Noteworthy Biography” // Notification No. 37 from the DECR under the ROCOR Synod of Bishops. 1981. April–June. Pp. 4–5.

31. Anthony (Bartoshevich), Archbishop. Report to the Council of Bishops on the Reception of a Group of Catacomb Christians.

32. Rodzianko V., Archpriest. Letter to Archpriest G. Grabbe. 3.02.1979. Pp. 5, 7 // Stanford University, Special Collections Librarian. F. “Grabbe.” Box 6. Folder 13.

33. Anthony (Bartoshevich), Archbishop. Letter to Protopresbyter G. Grabbe, 25.07.1975 // Stanford University, Special Collections Librarian. F. “Grabbe.” Box 1. Folder 7.

34. Philaret (Vakhromeyev), Metropolitan. Report addressed to the Chairman of the DECR, Metropolitan Juvenaly, 29.04.1976. P. 2 // Archive of the DECR. File “The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.” Folder “1976.”

33. Artemov N., Archpriest. Discussions between Representatives of the Clergy of the Two German Dioceses (MP and ROCOR), 1993–1997, as the Beginning of the Restoration of the Unity of the Russian Church // XVIII Annual Theological Conference of PSTGU. Moscow, 2008. Vol. 1. P. 317.

34. Gan N., Priest. Letter to Archbishop Vladimir (Sabodan), n.d. // Archive of the DECR. File “The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.” Folder “1982”; Platon (Udovenko), Archbishop. Letter to Bishop Alexander (Timofeev), 16.02.1983 // Archive of the DECR. File “The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.” Folder “1983.”

35. Report on the Stay in Vladimir of Archpriest A. Semyanko, July 1–3, 1989. Pp. 1–2 // Archive of the DECR. File 43 “Reports.” Folder “1989.”

 

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Makovetsky A., Archpriest. The White Church: Far from Atheistic Terror. St. Petersburg, 2009.

Popov A. The Russian Orthodox Diaspora. Moscow, 2005.

Psarev A. “The Development of the Worldview of the Russian Church Abroad in Relation to the Local Churches and Heterodoxy” // Acts of the Fourth All-Diaspora Council of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia. Moscow, 2012. Pp. 180–205.

The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad: 1918–1968. Vols. 1–2 / edited by A. Sollogub. New York, 1968.

Slesarev A. The Old-Style Schism in the History of the Orthodox Church (1924–2008). Moscow, 2009.

Pillar of Fire. Metropolitan Philaret (Voznesensky) of New York and Eastern America and the Russian Church Abroad (1964–1985) / compiled and annotated by Nun Cassia (T. A. Senina). St. Petersburg, 2007.

 

Russian source online:

 https://periodical.pstgu.ru/pdf/files/article/en/article_2302_date_1615369528.pdf

From the Moscow Patriarchate: "A Brief Overview of the Largest Modern Church Divisions Operating on the Canonical Territory of the Russian Church" (2024)

Dr. Pavel Vladimirovich Bochkov

Associate Professor of the Department of Church History and Church-Practical Disciplines, Kostroma Theological Seminary [1]

 

 

Abstract. The article presents a very brief overview of the largest non-canonical Orthodox jurisdictions currently operating within the canonical territory of the Local Russian Church. Six major structures are examined based on the number of communities of believers within them: the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine,” the “Russian Orthodox Church Abroad” under the jurisdiction of “Metropolitan” Agafangel (Pashkovsky), the “True Orthodox Church of Russia” under the jurisdiction of “Schema-Metropolitan” Seraphim (Motovilov), the “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church” under the jurisdiction of “Metropolitan” Feodor (Gineevsky), the “Apostolic Orthodox Church,” and the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” under “Patriarch” Filaret (Denysenko). The article provides the most concise information about the time and history of the formation of these groups, as well as the number of communities, clergy, and “episcopate.” The overview makes it clear that non-canonical groups, having separated from the Russian Church for various reasons, are often in a state of conflict among their religious leaders in the course of their jurisdictional development and internal organization, which in turn leads to further divisions and fragmentations of these structures. Nevertheless, due to the increase in their “episcopate,” these groups pose a significant threat to ecclesiastical unity. The collection and analysis of materials on the history and current state of non-canonical groups can not only reflect the real situation in the world of schismatic communities, but also serve as a basis for a pan-Church response to this phenomenon—a comprehensive anti-schismatic strategy and the development of further measures for the protection of Church unity and the canonical order of the Church.

 

The issue of church divisions has always been particularly painful for the canonical Church, as it directly concerns the subject of ecclesiastical unity. Schism as a phenomenon always poses a great danger, arouses anxiety not only among the church hierarchy, but also brings discord and misunderstanding into the relationships between clergy and laity, divides society on religious grounds, and can lead to acute conflict situations with a wide range of negative consequences.

By 2024, several dozen schismatic communities of various ideological foundations and different origins were active on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. All these groups, despite the fact that they are mostly in sharp denial of one another, nevertheless act together against the Russian Orthodox Church.

There are a number of classifications and typologies by which church divisions can be examined. However, so as not to overload the audience with this introductory information, we will simply state that in our brief overview we have listed the non-canonical jurisdictions based on the principle of assessing their size from larger to less significant. At the same time, we will consider only the six largest non-canonical communities. We emphasize that the proposed list is intended only to highlight the most prominent groups and does not aim to provide a deep and detailed description of specific jurisdictions, which have been described in sufficient detail by the author in other works. [2] In our report, there is no room for a detailed retelling of the history of the emergence of a particular schism, the personal composition of the episcopate, or the origin of its “apostolic succession.”

Of course, the largest body that has set itself in opposition to the canonical Russian Church is the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), unlawfully created by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2018. In 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate unilaterally “restored to rank” the defrocked and deposed former Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret (Denysenko), who was also under anathema from the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, and at that time headed the non-canonical “Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate” (UOC-KP), as well as the leader of the non-canonical “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” (UAOC), the former priest of the ROC Makariy (Maletych). In 2018, at the initiative of state authorities and personally of the President of Ukraine P. A. Poroshenko, a so-called “Unification Council” of these non-canonical structures was held, which resulted in the creation of a new structure — the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine.” In January 2019, the Patriarchate of Constantinople issued a Tomos granting this jurisdiction autocephalous status. By doing so unilaterally, the Ecumenical Patriarchate delivered a most serious blow to inter-Orthodox relations, the consequences of which pose unprecedented threats to the unity of the Local Churches, not seen since the Great Schism of 1054. As of 2024, the OCU is recognized by the Orthodox Churches of the Greek world: the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Alexandria, as well as the Churches of Greece and Cyprus (while a number of hierarchs of the latter two Churches have made strong statements refusing recognition of the OCU). [3] In the other Local Churches, there is no unity on the issue of canonical recognition of the OCU.

As of mid-February 2024, this jurisdiction had within its episcopate 63 “hierarchs,” of whom 22 were “metropolitans,” 19 “archbishops,” and 22 “bishops.” Of these, 46 are ruling, 10 are vicars, 3 hold titular sees, and 4 are retired (including the former “Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine of the UOC-KP,” Filaret (Denysenko)). [4] As of January 1, 2022, the OCU comprised 6,187 parishes, 71 monasteries, and 3,842 “clergy.” [5] In the past two years, it can be said that the number of communities has increased due to the violent seizure and forced incorporation of communities belonging to the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. By mid-2024, the total number of OCU clergy fluctuates around 5,000 people. However, among the faithful and church-attending populace, the OCU holds no authority; their churches are almost always empty, and strong communities continue to exist only in the territory of Western Ukraine.

The OCU is rather politicized and aggressive. In its rhetoric, it speaks sharply against the Russian Orthodox Church, seeks to absorb, and actively persecutes the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. At the same time, the canonical "Ukrainian Church comprises up to a third of the parishes and faithful of the entire Russian Church (Moscow Patriarchate), and therefore the outcome of the current confrontation determines the fate not only of the Russian, but of all world Orthodoxy." [6] A number of hierarchs and clergy of this jurisdiction declare the idea of the Russian World to be heretical, demand that the leadership of the Russian Church be put on trial, and the like. The head of the OCU is “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine” Epiphanius (Dumenko), formerly the “Patriarchal Vicar” of Filaret (Denysenko) and, in effect, the second-in-command in the UOC-KP. His canonical legitimacy personally is questioned not only by the majority of the faithful but also by a number of Primates of Local Orthodox Churches. [7]

The next largest non-canonical jurisdiction is the non-canonical "Russian Orthodox Church Abroad" under the jurisdiction of "Metropolitan" Agafangel (Pashkovsky) (ROCA[A]).

It is worth mentioning here that after 1990, a long series of schisms occurred in ROCA, which led to endless fragmentations and the creation of various synods retaining the unchanged abbreviation ROCA. At present, around thirty small non-canonical jurisdictions consider themselves heirs of the historical ROCA, and through it, of the Orthodox Russian Church.

ROCA(A) arose as a result of the refusal by part of the parishes and communities of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad to recognize the Act of Canonical Communion between ROCA and the ROC in 2007. [8] The most uncompromising clergy, critical of the Moscow Patriarchate, led by Bishop Agafangel (Pashkovsky), fell into schism, declaring that their part of ROCA is the true successor of the historical Russian Church Abroad. As a result, Bishop Agafangel was suspended from ministry and later defrocked. Entering into union with a conglomerate of Greek Old Calendarist jurisdictions, Agafangel (Pashkovsky) carried out a series of ordinations, creating his own hierarchy, which was soon joined by two "bishops" of the non-canonical “Seraphimo-Gennadiev branch of the True Orthodox Catacomb Church,” also known as the “Sekachev” branch (named after the co-founder of this structure, “Schema-Metropolitan” Gennady (Sekach)). It is noteworthy that this branch of the Catacomb Church is completely devoid of apostolic succession, as it originates from the impostor layman Mikhail (Pozdeyev) (1886–1971), who passed himself off as the allegedly surviving Archbishop Seraphim (Ostroumov) (1880–1937) [9] during the years of repression. According to some reports, these “bishops” were received through cheirothesia, according to others—through re-ordination. Moreover, the Synod of Bishops of the historical ROCA was well informed about the lack of apostolic succession among the “Sekachevites,” as the Catacomb Archbishop of ROCA, Lazar (Zhurbenko), who possessed complete information on the state of the Catacomb Church in the USSR, repeatedly informed the ROCA Synod of the origin of the “Sekachevites.”

Nevertheless, the group of Agafangel (Pashkovsky) very soon came to represent a large structure, extended its influence to almost all continents, and engaged in polemics with other groups derived from ROCA.

At present, the jurisdiction numbers about 170 parishes, located both in the post-Soviet space and in countries of the far abroad. In addition to this, the jurisdiction includes 11 “bishops” and 125 “clergy.” [10] The data provided also includes the parishes and communities of the “Free Serbian Orthodox Church,” which are under the jurisdiction of ROCA(A), located in Australia. [11]

The third largest group in terms of numbers is the “True Orthodox Church of Russia” (TOCR) under the leadership of “Schema-Metropolitan” Seraphim (Motovilov), formerly better known as “Metropolitan” Raphael (Prokopyev). This jurisdiction traces its succession to the “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” and is essentially a conglomerate of “hierarchs” of various origins. Its history begins in the early 2000s, when, based on one of the groups that emerged from the disintegration of the “Russian True Orthodox Church,” under the leadership of retired military specialist L. Prokopyev, a structure began to be built that aimed to incorporate the entire so-called “non-canonical ‘alternative’” operating in Russia and neighboring countries. In 2003, a “Unification Council” was held, which absorbed a multitude of non-canonical clergy and “hierarchs.” [12] Thanks to a constant process of migration of “hierarchs,” the group is continuously replenished by various kinds of “bishops,” most of whom later leave the TOCR. Over the years of its existence, several dozen non-canonical hierarchs have passed through its ranks.

As of January 1, 2015, the jurisdiction included 33 religious organizations registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Of these, 3 were centralized organizations, 27 were local, and 3 were monasteries. [13] In addition to this, there exists a certain number of small communities without the status of a religious organization.

As of August 1, 2023, the jurisdiction consisted of 11 “bishops” who operated not only within the territory of Russia but also in countries of Latin America. [14] In addition, a number of this structure’s “hierarchs” are retired or inactive. The jurisdiction includes several dozen communities and several monasteries, with at least two large monasteries located in the Moscow region. Some communities are registered with the justice authorities. The TOCR itself holds the status of a centralized religious organization. Conferences and various theological discussions are held periodically. In particular, a process of rapprochement is observed with the “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church,” another offshoot of the Russian part of ROCA.

At the initiative of the TOCR, the so-called “Synaxis of True Orthodox Churches” was established, which became yet another form of unity for a number of non-canonical communities from various countries. [15]

Speaking of the already mentioned “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church” (ROAC), currently headed by “Metropolitan” Feodor (Gineevsky), it should be noted that, like ROCA(A), it is a derivative of ROCA.

The Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church traces its history to an intra-jurisdictional crisis that arose within the Russian part of ROCA in the mid-1990s, when the ROCA Bishop of Suzdal and Vladimir, Valentin (Rusantsov) (1939–2012), made the decision to break canonical communion with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and began organizing an independent jurisdiction in Russia, which was initially called the “Higher Church Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church,” later transformed into the ROAC.

For a time, the ROAC was a fairly substantial jurisdiction and, compared to other non-canonical entities, exhibited all the signs of an independent structure: a number of dioceses, a functioning synod, and a regularly convened “Council of Bishops.” After the death of the head of this jurisdiction, “Metropolitan” Valentin (Rusantsov), which occurred in 2012, and following the confiscation of all historical churches from the ROAC by court orders initiated by state authorities, the influence of the ROAC was significantly weakened, and a substantial portion of its clergy transferred to other so-called “ROCA splinters”—formations that broke away from ROCA from 1995 to the present.

As of the second half of 2016, the ROAC had about 90 parish communities and about 60 “priests,” as well as the Suzdal Theological School. [16]

By 2024, the ROAC includes no fewer than 8 “hierarchs” and several dozen small communities throughout the country, including some that are historical catacomb communities.

The next notable non-canonical organization is the “Apostolic Orthodox Church” (AOC). It emerged as a movement for the “renewal and revival of Orthodoxy” and was originally named the “Orthodox Church of the ‘Revival’,” later renamed to the AOC. From 2000 to 2018, the AOC went through a long journey, actively disseminated its ideas, organized a multitude of “dioceses,” for which a considerable number of “bishops” were ordained, most of whom later left the AOC. [17]

It should be noted that at present this religious organization is undergoing a phase of rapid structural expansion. Numerous vagantes (independent “hierarchs,” usually with virtually no flock) from Africa and Asia are joining it; new “episcopal consecrations” are regularly carried out, and statements are made about the accession of entire dioceses, allegedly encompassing the territories of entire countries. However, unlike all the previously mentioned communities, this jurisdiction is neo-renovationist, treats tradition and heritage rather loosely, espouses broad liberalism both in relation to the liturgical tradition and in the area of parish and general ecclesial life, and recognizes a married episcopate. While at its founding in 2000 it bore the features of a typical non-canonical jurisdiction, in light of various reforms, leadership changes, and the mass ordinations of the past three years, one can say that the AOC has transformed into a kind of confederation of religious communities of widely varying traditions and levels of canonical awareness. As a rule, the main flock of the AOC consists of unchurched individuals detached from tradition: members of the intelligentsia, youth involved in various subcultures, representatives of socio-political opposition, liberal thinkers, and the like. The AOC, as a central religious organization, is headed by the illegitimate son of the poet A. A. Galich (real name: Aleksandr Aronovich Ginzburg, 1918–1977), former priest of the Novgorod diocese, Grigory (Mikhnov-Vaytenko). At different times, the AOC has included the anathematized former priest Gleb Yakunin (1934–2014), “Metropolitan” Vitaly (Kuzhevatov), the well-known neo-Pentecostal “Archbishop” Sergey Zhuravlyov, “priest” Lev Regelson, and others. Due to the organization of communities based on the personal contacts of parish leaders, there are currently several dozen small AOC groups and communities active in Russia. A similar situation is observed in Ukraine, where the AOC has its own structures in the form of several non-canonical groups united by a common origin of their “hierarchy” and, in some cases, being in canonical communion with one another. Despite the small size of these groups and the amorphousness of their structure, the AOC poses a serious threat to ecclesiastical unity, as it exploits a number of fashionable liberal slogans and seeks to preach among the socially vulnerable segments of the population, especially the youth.

Regarding the size of the jurisdiction, one can quite confidently speak of several dozen groups in Russia and no fewer than a hundred communities in various countries around the world. At the same time, it is often the case that each individual small community is headed by a “bishop.” The total number of the “episcopate,” by the most conservative estimates, ranges from 20 to 40 persons, including African “hierarchs.” The “Orthodoxy” of the AOC’s representatives is highly conditional; among its “episcopate” one can often encounter rather exotic figures. For example, at one point the AOC included a “bishop” who was simultaneously a Hindu guru, professing a belief system far removed from Christianity and actively practicing syncretic rituals. The presence of such a figure in the “episcopate” led to a schism within the AOC. [18]

Another notable structure within the canonical territory of the Local Russian Church is the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” headed by the long-standing “Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine” Filaret (Denysenko). Despite the fact that after his separation from the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” very few clergy followed him, he nevertheless managed to effectively revive his structure, contrary to the decisions of his own “Local Council” of 2018 regarding its dissolution and unification with the UAOC. [19]

According to various estimates, in 2023–2024 the UOC-KP consisted of approximately 25 parish communities in Ukraine, none of which had legal registration. Some reports indicate that the largest number of these are located in the Odesa region (about 10 parishes), in the Kryvyi Rih region (7 parishes), and in the Kyiv region (up to 5 parishes). There is also an active European deanery (protopresbyterate), headed by “Protopriest” Volodymyr Chaika, [20] which includes up to 15 communities of Ukrainian believers living in Germany and Denmark. [21] In the United States, there is also the “Vicariate of the UOC-KP in America and Canada,” headed by “Bishop” Luka (Zgoba), rector of the “Patriarchal St. Nicholas Stavropegial Parish” in Philadelphia, USA (the vicariate also includes a St. Nicholas parish in Chicago). Two “bishops” of the UOC-KP reside in Greece; however, the likelihood that a significant number of communities and clergy operate under their jurisdiction is extremely low. In addition, in the spring of 2022, it was announced that several parishes from Australia and New Zealand, led by Archimandrite Nektarios (Alexandratos), were received into the UOC-KP. [22] The synod of the UOC-KP consists of 13 “hierarchs.” [23] The extensive life experience and long service in administrative church positions have enabled Filaret (Denysenko) to keep the UOC-KP afloat. As before, he demands special treatment from the governmental authorities and society of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that Filaret (Denysenko) is the longest-serving hierarch in terms of consecration (1962) and one of the oldest by age (born in 1929) among the heads of non-canonical jurisdictions, surpassed only by the head of the non-canonical “Romanian Old Calendar Orthodox Church,” “Metropolitan” Demosfen (Ioniță).

Structures of the Kyiv Patriarchate also exist in Russia, specifically in the Belgorod region, both in the city of Belgorod itself and in regional towns. Two “hierarchs” of the UOC-KP reside permanently in Russia: “Metropolitan of Belgorod and Oboyan” Ioasaph (Shibayev), who was defrocked by the Bishops’ Council of the ROC in February 1997, and his vicar “Bishop of Valuyki” Peter (Moskalev). [24] Both “hierarchs” became practically the only “bishops” who supported Filaret (Denysenko) in his efforts to “revive” the Kyiv Patriarchate, for which they were defrocked by the “Holy Synod” of the OCU in May 2022. [25]

Of course, there are also other non-canonical groups that declare to all interested parties that they consist of hundreds of parishes and thousands of faithful, but such claims are far from reality. Perhaps the only structure that maintains a stable number of strong church communities located directly on the territory of Russia is the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church. However, Old Believer jurisdictions lie outside the scope of our review.

At present, the schismatics continue to engage in their non-canonical religious activity. When examining the offshoots of ROCA, it becomes clear that the vast majority of their communities located in the post-Soviet space have entered a state of regression and chaotic “ordinations” to “episcopal” rank of completely random individuals. These trends will only further accelerate the disintegration of the already few communities and will lead to the phenomenon of “vagantes” becoming widespread throughout the entire canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is dangerous that such individuals are, as a rule, simultaneously religious fraudsters, and their rhetoric and methods of preaching in some cases fully fall under the definition of religious extremism.

Active opposition to the schismatics, the creation of one’s own scholarly school, the strengthening of conciliarity and canonical consciousness may be effective means of combating these phenomena. But for this, the participation of the fullness of the entire Church is necessary.

 

NOTES

1. The article is based on the theses of a report delivered at the 3rd All-Russian Scientific and Theological Conference “The Renovationist Schism in Siberia: Canonical, Theological, and Historical Assessments” (Tomsk, Tomsk Theological Seminary, June 17, 2024).

2. See: Bochkov Pavel, Priest. Overview of Non-Canonical Orthodox Jurisdictions of the 20th–21st Centuries. 2nd ed., revised and expanded. St. Petersburg: Svoe Publishing, 2018–2020. Vols. 1–5.

3. See: Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus. The Ukrainian Church Question. Moscow: Publishing House “Poznanie,” 2021; Nikifor, Metropolitan of Kissamos and Tylliria. The Contemporary Ukrainian Question and Its Resolution According to the Divine and Sacred Canons. Moscow: Publishing House “Poznanie,” 2021.

4. Episcopate [Electronic resource] // Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 2024. URL: https://www.pomisna.info/uk/tserkva/yepiskopat/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

5. Report on the Network of Religious Organizations in Vinnytsia Region as of January 1, 2022 [Electronic resource] // State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience. 2024. URL: https://dess.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Zvit-pro-merezhu-relihiynykh-orhanizatsiy-Form1-2022.xlsx (accessed: 20.06.2024).

6. Shchipkov V. A. The USA Against Orthodoxy: Systemic Pressure of the USA on the Russian Orthodox Church as a Means of Geopolitical Struggle Against Russia Amid the Ukrainian Crisis: Monograph / Scientific editors: O. I. Bykova, E. E. Mamaeva. Moscow: Russian Expert School, 2023. p. 35.

7. For example, see: Primate of the Polish Church Refused to Recognize the Head of the OCU as a Clergyman [Electronic resource] // News in Russia and the World. TASS. 2024. URL: https://tass.ru/obschestvo/5980184 (accessed: 20.06.2024).

8. Act of Canonical Communion (signed on May 17, 2007) // Collection of Documents of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vol. 1. Normative Documents. Moscow: Publishing House of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2013. pp. 337–340.

9. See: Alekseev V. V., Nechaeva M. Yu. The Resurrected Romanovs?.. On the History of Imposture in 20th Century Russia. Part I. Yekaterinburg, 2001; Alekseev V. V., Nechaeva M. Yu. The Resurrected Romanovs?. On the History of Imposture in 20th Century Russia. Part II. Chelyabinsk; Yekaterinburg, 2002.

10. List of Clergy and Parishes of the Russian Church Abroad with Their Addresses [Electronic resource] // Synod of ROCA. 2024. URL: https://sinod.ruschurchabroad.org/address.htm (accessed: 20.06.2024).

11. Bochkov P. V., Priest. “The Serbian Free Orthodox Church in Australia: The Emergence of the Jurisdiction and Its Current State” // The Lord’s Field. Bulletin of the Penza Theological Seminary. 2023. No. 3(29). pp. 108–116.

12. “Unification Council of Bishops of the True Orthodox Church in Russia” // Church Gazette. Independent Organ of Orthodox Church Thought. Oradell: NJ, 2003. No. 8–9 (121). pp. 6–7.

13. Statistics of Registered Religious Organizations as of 01.01.2015 (according to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation) // Religion and Law. 2015. No. 1 (72). p. 59.

14. Episcopate [Electronic resource] // True Orthodox Church. Official Website. 2024. URL: https://ipckatakomb.ru/епископат/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

15. See: Bochkov P. V., Priest. Non-Canonical International: “Synaxis of the True Orthodox Churches” – A Challenge to the Canonical Unity of the Orthodox Church // The Lord’s Field. Bulletin of the Penza Theological Seminary. 2022. Issue No. 1 (23). pp. 101–114.

16. Representatives of the Vladimir branch of the FSB explained that the ROAC hierarchs they interviewed “have no connection to extremist activity.” They were interested in another individual [Electronic resource] // Portal-Credo.Ru. 2016. URL: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=122032 (accessed: 18.09.2016).

17. Bochkov P., Priest. Renovationism in Our Days. The History of the Emergence and Current State of the Non-Canonical Jurisdiction ‘Apostolic Orthodox Church’ // Ryazan Theological Bulletin. 2016. No. 1 (13). pp. 54–73.

18. For more details, see: Bochkov P. V., Priest. The Emergence of New Non-Canonical Jurisdictions as a Result of Divisions in the Neo-Renovationist “Apostolic Orthodox Church” in 2018–2023 // Ryazan Theological Bulletin. 2015. No. 2 (28). pp. 114–125.

19. The Kyiv Patriarchate and UAOC Self-Dissolved Before the Council [Electronic resource] // Information Portal “RBK-Ukraine.” 2023. URL: https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/kievskiy-patriarhat-uapts-samoraspustilis-1544894232.html (accessed: 15.09.2023).

20. Chaika Volodymyr, Protopriest. Open Appeal of the European Deanery to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2020. No. 11. pp. 11–13.

21. Dean of the European Deanery Congratulated Ukrainians on Easter in Many Cities of Germany and Denmark // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2022. No. 4. p. 24.

22. Parishes from Australia and New Zealand Were Received into the Kyiv Patriarchate // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2022. No. 3. p. 20.

23. Episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate // Orthodox Church Calendar. Year 2023. Kyiv: From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 2022. pp. 2–5.

24. Resolution of the Bishops’ Council on the Deposition from Holy Orders of the Suspended Clergy Archimandrites Valentin (Rusantsov), Adrian (Starina), and Igumen Ioasaph (Shibayev) [Electronic resource] // Russian Orthodox Church. Official Website. 2024. URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/417799.html (accessed: 20.06.2024).

25. Documents of the Holy Synod Meeting of May 23, 2022 [Electronic resource] // Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 2024. URL: https://www.pomisna.info/uk/document-post/dokumenty-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-synodu-23-travnya-2022-r/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

 

Source: Хризостом: научно-просветительский журнал Екатеринодарской духовной семинарии [Chrysostom: The Scientific and Educational Journal of the Ekaterinodar Theological Seminary], 2024. No. 3 (11), pp. 17-28.

In times of rampant heresy, should decentralization be the norm?

“On the canonical foundations of the existence of communities of True Orthodox Christians in times of the dominion of apostasy”

On the canonical legitimacy of applying Ukaz No. 362 of St. Patriarch Tikhon in our apostasy-filled time.

From the Appeal of the clergy and monastics of the RTOC and ROAC, June 2014.

 

 

In the present apostasy-filled times, the True Orthodox Russian Church is entering a new phase of its existence, when, for the confession of the uncorrupted purity of Holy Orthodoxy, persecutions and harassment may once again descend upon Christians, and the True Orthodox Church herself will have to return once more to a fully catacomb position.

The ascetic struggler of the Russian Church Abroad, Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose), wrote as early as 1978: “We feel that the signs of the times point more and more to an approaching ‘catacomb’ existence, whatever form it may take. The faster we can prepare for this, the better... We regard every monastery or community as part of a future catacomb ‘network’ of fighters for true Orthodoxy, and probably, in these times... the question of jurisdictions will recede into the background.” [1] According to Father Seraphim’s thought, the True Church of the last times will be not centralized official jurisdictions headed by an ecclesiastical-administrative apparatus, but a “network” of self-governing catacomb communities and dioceses of True Orthodox Christians, united not by external forms of administrations and institutions, but by spiritual unity in the faith, through Eucharistic communion and the common confession of the true faith. He considered that “devotion to Christ is impossible in organizations, plans, projects—it is in the soul of each person,” [2] and therefore he was “a preacher of an ‘unorganized’ movement of simple believers, which he called ‘catacomb cells.’” [3]

These convictions of Father Seraphim were formed in ROCOR under the influence of his spiritual mentors—Hierarch John (Maximovitch) of San Francisco and Shanghai, Archbishop Averky (Taushev) of Syracuse and Holy Trinity, and like-minded hierarchs of the Russian Church Abroad, such as Archbishop Leonty (Filippovich) of Chile, Bishop Nektary (Kontzevitch) of Seattle, Bishop Savva (Saračević) of Edmonton, and others.

According to the teaching of Holy Scripture, Holy Tradition, and the Fathers of the Church, the Church is the Mystical Body of Christ. Noting the mystical nature of the Church, the well-known ROCOR theologian Protopresbyter Michael Pomazansky writes in his work Dogmatic Theology: “According to the literal meaning of the word, the Church is an ‘assembly,’ in Greek ekklisia, from ekkaleo, I gather. In this sense it was also used in the Old Testament… Depicting the Church in parables, the Savior speaks of one flock, of one sheepfold, one grapevine, one chief cornerstone of the Church… The truth of the one Church is determined by the Orthodoxy of her members, and not by their number at any given moment.” [4]

According to the interpretations of the Holy Fathers, the Head of the Church is Christ, the Eyes of the Church are the bishops, the Hands of the Church are the priests, and the Body of the Church is the people of God. The Western spirit of narrow clan-like corporatism is foreign to Patristic Orthodoxy, wherein, in the person of the “infallible” papacy and hierarchy, the whole “ecclesiastical fullness” is concentrated. Unlike Catholicism, Orthodoxy is, above all, conciliarity. “Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them” (Matt. 18:20), Christ teaches.

In Orthodoxy, all the members of the Church together constitute the common Council of the people of God, which is the “defense of the faith and tradition.” As noted in the Encyclical Epistle of the Eastern Patriarchs of 1848, “The guardian of the faith among us is the very body of the Church, that is, the very people of God.” [5] It is not by chance, therefore, that according to the canons the Eucharist may not be celebrated by the bishop or priest alone, but the whole community of the faithful must participate in it, and the Liturgy must not be celebrated without parishioners, who in the Orthodox tradition are considered the “royal priesthood” (1 Pet. 2:9). At the Liturgy there must necessarily be present at least one layman as a representative of the people of God; otherwise, the Liturgy is not celebrated.

The central part of the mystical life of the Church as the Body of Christ is the Eucharist. “The Church makes the Eucharist, and the Eucharist makes the Church,” Orthodox theology teaches. The Eucharist is our personal communion and unity with the Head of the Church—Christ. Therefore, the assertion is just that the Church is where the Eucharist is celebrated, where the Bloodless Sacrifice of Jesus Christ is offered, and not where there are external juridical forms of organization.

In this respect, the experience and legacy of the Russian Catacomb Church of the twentieth century, to which Fr. Seraphim (Rose) refers, is very important for us. As is known, in the T.O.C. the Eucharist did not cease to be celebrated throughout all the years of persecution against Orthodoxy in the USSR; the true Bloodless Sacrifice of Jesus Christ did not cease to be offered; neither the priesthood nor the people of God who participated in the Mystery of the Eucharist definitively ceased to exist. And this means that precisely here, and not among the Uniates, Renovationists, or Sergianists, with whom the external institution of the episcopate and administrative church governance were preserved, was the True Church, which is founded upon the blood of the Martyrs, and whose guardian is “the very body of the Church, that is, the very people of God.”

Not having an external ecclesiastical-administrative structure or centralized governance, the True Orthodox Church of Christ in the God-fighting USSR continued to carry out her confessional ministry under conditions of conspiracy and underground existence, for which reason another name arose for her—the Catacomb Church. As in the first centuries of Christianity, the T.O.C. consisted of catacomb communities of the faithful, scattered over the vast territory of the USSR, united not administratively, not institutionally, but confessionally, spiritually, and eucharistically; for this reason, she acquired so responsible a name—the True Orthodox Church.

The Catacomb Church, as the Mystical Body, was preserved in the person of the “little flock” of faithful Confessors and Martyrs, and She was the true Church—not “figuratively” as they now try to prove in the MP, but really and effectively. In the person of the people of God, the Holy Martyrs and Confessors, this was the true Church in the full sense of the word, without Western admixtures of a juridically materialized division into earthly “institutions” and “jurisdictions.”

Speaking of the T.O.C., it is important to note that from the very beginning its ideologists and holy founding fathers rejected the idea of creating an alternative administration and centralization of ecclesiastical authority, opposing to it decentralization and local self-governance, in accordance with the Resolution of His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon, the Holy Synod, and the Supreme Church Council of the Orthodox Russian Church of November 7/20, 1920, No. 362. [6]

Thus, on the January Act of the withdrawal of the clergy of the Voronezh Diocese from Sergius Stragorodsky in 1928, St. Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovykh) wrote the resolution: “Govern yourselves, independently—otherwise you will destroy both me and yourselves.” [7] St. Metropolitan Joseph sent analogous replies to other hierarchs who sympathized with him, thereby showing that he did not desire the centralization of the T.O.C. [8]. And when in March 1928 St. Bishop Varlaam (Lazarenko) of Maikop, who was tending Orthodox parishes in the Kuban and the North Caucasus, arrived in Petrograd to St. Archbishop Demetrius (Lyubimov), who administered the “Josephite” parishes, as a result of the consultation “it was agreed that he would act in accordance with the local situation and to a significant degree independently.” [9]

Similarly, St. Archbishop Seraphim (Samoilovich), who had been Deputy of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, wrote on January 20, 1929, from exile, in his epistle “To the Archpastors, Pastors, and Flock of the Orthodox Russian Church, Beloved in the Lord”:

“…In the administrative sphere, concerning the governance of church affairs, we would recommend to all the faithful in the Lord that they take as their guide the appeal of the reposed Most Reverend Agathangel, Metropolitan of Yaroslavl, from May 1922, and our circular of December 16/29, 1926, turning in cases of extreme necessity to His Eminence Metropolitan Joseph of Leningrad, from whom we received, on December 16/29, 1926, the rights of Deputy of the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, and with whom we are in the same condition of exile.” [10]

And here is what another of the leaders of the anti-Sergianist opposition, St. Archbishop Andrew of Ufa, Prince Ukhtomsky, wrote in 1928 concerning church governance:

“The Church is such a mode of being as has no need of any external administrative props. The Church is the Pillar of Truth! She needs only the inner purification of her life; and this purification is accomplished in no other way than in the process of inner life, and is never accomplished by order of the authorities.” [11]

But the necessity of decentralizing ecclesiastical authority was set forth most fully and clearly by one of the founding fathers of the Catacomb Church, St. Cyril (Smirnov), Metropolitan of Kazan, who wrote in February 1934:

“Like everything akin to Renovationism, we cannot recognize the church administration renewed by Metropolitan Sergius as our Orthodox administration, proceeding in succession from His Holiness Patriarch Tikhon; and therefore, while remaining in canonical unity with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Peter, and in view of the present impossibility of communication with him, we recognize as the only lawful arrangement of church governance one based on the Patriarchal Ukaz of November 7/20, 1920.” [12]

In accordance with the instructions of the exiled hierarchs, the Catacomb Church operated underground throughout the whole country. In this connection, the testimony of one eyewitness is of interest: at the end of the 1930s he was serving a sentence in Stalinist concentration camps for belonging to the T.O.C., and during the war he emigrated abroad. According to him, in 1937, in a transit camp near Irkutsk, six exiled hierarchs of the Catacomb Church held a secret consultation, at which they confirmed the condemnation of the Sergianist schism and forbade their followers to receive the Mysteries “from clergy legalized by the anti-Christian government.” In addition, they decided to preserve the self-governance of the branches of the Catacomb Church while maintaining unity in prayer: “All the branches of the Church growing from the ecclesiastical tree—... and the tree is our pre-revolutionary Church—are living branches of the Church of Christ. Let prayerful and liturgical communion abide among the clergy of all these branches.” [13]

The testimonies of Prof. Ivan Andreyev, who wrote in 1947, are also indicative:

“There was no administrative center or governance of the catacomb churches. Metropolitan Cyril and Metropolitan Joseph were regarded as spiritual leaders. The legitimate Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne, Metropolitan Peter of Krutitsy, was recognized as the Head of the Church.” [14]

The testimony of Prof. Ivan Andreyev most accurately reflects the situation of the T.O.C. in Soviet times. Let us emphasize once again that the catacomb communities of the T.O.C., unlike the Renovationists and the Sergianists, were consciously united not administratively, but confessionally, spiritually, and eucharistically.

Under conditions of the dominion of God-fighting and heresies, having a centralized structure for the T.O.C. was objectively impossible and dangerous. Therefore, in their activity, the catacomb bishops and priests of the T.O.C. relied on the Resolution of St. Patriarch Tikhon No. 362 “On Self-Governance,” thus adhering, in connection with the extraordinary situation—the persecutions—to the practice of a “temporary decentralization” of church life, which in itself excluded the necessity of creating both a single central supreme organ of church governance, or administration, and the very centralization of secret church life.

Explaining the essence and meaning of Resolution No. 362, one of the founding fathers of the T.O.C., St. Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovykh), wrote thus concerning ecclesiastical authority and self-governance in the dioceses of the T.O.C.:

“Without denying my sympathy for anti-Sergianism, I must state the fact that it needs neither my nor anyone else’s special leadership, since each anti-Sergianist hierarch has received the authority to govern himself with his flock entirely independently, and has no need of another central authority, since such authority is, in essence, absent and unable to function properly. Such an exceptional situation was foreseen already under Patriarch Tikhon and confirmed by Metropolitan Peter, Metropolitan Agathangel, and other higher hierarchs, in whose hands in recent times there remained the possibility of establishing higher church governance, which now in fact does not exist… By virtue of the conciliar resolution, in the absence of a central spiritual authority clothed with trust, or when it is impossible to communicate with it, the hierarchs in their local places are invested with the fullness of rights and govern themselves completely independently.” [15]

These explanations of St. Joseph of Petrograd are a valuable indication for the application of the Resolution of His Holiness the Patriarch, the Holy Synod, and the Supreme Church Council of the Orthodox Russian Church of November 7/20, 1920, No. 362.

It was precisely on the basis of this prophetic Resolution of St. Patriarch Tikhon that both ROCOR and the T.O.C. arose. However, this Resolution has absolutely no bearing on the creation of central organs of the Higher Church Authority in the Russian Church, but provides only for temporary organs of church governance “for several dioceses situated in identical conditions” (see point 2).

Precisely for this reason, ROCOR could not lay claim to the entire fullness of the Higher Church Authority, and the claims made in the 1990s by certain representatives of the ROCOR Synod, which was created and functioned on the basis of Resolution No. 362, to the fullness of church authority not only in the Diaspora, but also in Russia, were clearly uncanonical in character, contradicting both the letter and the spirit of Resolution No. 362. Bishop Gregory (Grabbe) of Washington, the longtime secretary of the ROCOR Synod, repeatedly pointed this out. In exactly the same way, none of the present temporary Synods, or “small councils,” among the branches or parts of ROCOR, which also rely upon Resolution No. 362, has canonical rights and authority to speak in the name of the fullness of the Local Russian Church. One of two things must be true: either these “fragments” need to reduce their claims to the fullness of the higher church authority, limiting themselves only to temporary powers “for several dioceses situated in identical conditions, whether in the form of a Temporary Higher Church Administration, or a metropolitan district, or otherwise” (point 2), as Resolution No. 362 itself prescribes; or they must declare that Resolution No. 362 has lost its canonical force, declare it invalid, and only after this announce their claims to the higher church authority in the Local Russian Church, taking care to convene an All-Russian Local Council and to elect a single Patriarch for the whole fullness of the Russian Church. Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) followed the latter scenario in 1943. Other parts of the Russian Church, ROCOR and the T.O.C., always considered such a path uncanonical; therefore, for the T.O.C., this option is unequivocally unacceptable.

Thus, any Synod of any branch of the T.O.C. or ROCOR may lay claim only to limited rights and powers as a temporary organ of ecclesiastical authority “for several dioceses situated in identical conditions,” and moreover united on strictly voluntary grounds. From this situation there also follow the limited and temporary rights of such Synods, or “small councils,” with regard to judging other “fragments,” declaring their Mysteries “graceless,” and the like.

Today we are again experiencing those times of which Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose) wrote in 1978, that “the signs of the times point more and more to an approaching ‘catacomb’ existence,” when “we regard every monastery or community as part of a future catacomb ‘network’ of fighters for true Orthodoxy, and probably, in these times... the question of jurisdictions will recede into the background.”

In such conditions, formal jurisdictional disagreements, claims, and disputes over authority among the parts of the once united True Russian Church, the T.O.C. and ROCOR, are already receding into the background. And once again, as in the 1920s, the necessity of returning to exact adherence to and fulfillment of the foundational Resolution of St. Patriarch Tikhon No. 362 acquires special urgency. And, relying upon it, every effort must be made toward the gradual attainment of the unity of the True Russian Church, recognizing as possible the existence of several parallel ecclesiastical-administrative structures, or “self-governing metropolitan districts,” on one canonical territory, as is also provided for by Patriarchal Resolution No. 362 (point 2) in the event of an extraordinary situation and the absence of legitimate higher church authority in the person of a lawful Patriarch, Council, and Synod of the whole fullness of the Local Russian Church.

Resolution No. 362 provides for the possibility of temporary self-governance of “metropolitan church districts.” This is precisely how it was in the 1920s, when the self-governing Supreme Church Administration of Southern Russia, the Supreme Church Administration of Siberia, the autonomous synod in Ukraine, the Moscow Synod of Patriarch Tikhon, and even the opposition “Danilov Synod” of Archbishop Theodore (Pozdeevsky), as well as the ROCOR Synod, were all operating simultaneously. Despite several different temporary church administrations, all this was one spiritually united Russian Church. In essence, the situation is exactly the same now. This was the case for a time even within ROCOR, where in the 1920s several metropolitan church districts were created, with centers in Belgrade under Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), the United States under Metropolitan Theophilus (Pashkovsky), and Paris under Metropolitan Evlogy (Georgievsky), united by a common Council. Under present conditions, this would be the ideal canonical principle for restoring the unity of the branches or parts of the once united Russian Church, in full accordance with Patriarchal Resolution No. 362.

Resolution No. 362 ends with the following words: “All measures adopted locally, in accordance with the present directives, must subsequently, in the event of the restoration of central church authority, be submitted for approval to the latter.” The Resolution does not say that one “group” must submit its actions for approval to another “group,” but that “in the event of the restoration of central church authority, they must be submitted for approval to the latter,” that is, to the higher church authority in the person of a lawful Patriarch, Council, and Synod of the whole fullness of the Russian Church.

Since after 1927 there has been no canonical higher church authority in Russia in the person of a lawful Patriarch, Council, and Synod of the whole fullness of the Local Russian Church, Resolution No. 362 remains the canonical foundation upon which not only the existence of all contemporary branches or parts of the Russian Church is based, but also upon which alone their union is possible. Moreover, it unambiguously prescribes that self-governing church districts have Eucharistic communion with one another without creating a single administrative structure and without the subordination of one “small council,” or synod, to another. This applies to the RTOC, the ROAC, ROCOR(A), and ROCOR(V).

As is known, the first three “branches” are united not only by a common inheritance and history, but also by a common episcopal succession from one hierarch—Archbishop Lazarus. It was precisely Archbishop Lazarus who, in his time, consecrated both the bishops of the RTOC, and the bishops of the ROAC, and Bishop Agathangel. The fact that one hierarch stood at the source of the succession of all these branches was not accidental, but providential. And in this, we believe, lies the pledge of their future unity.

According to the word of the blessed-memory elder-Metropolitan Vitaly (Ustinov), the last lawful First Hierarch of the united ROCOR, “Let us be… of one mind and one soul under different church administrations. Church life itself almost dictates this to us” [Testament-Directive of February 26/March 11, 2002].

And let us remember that the secret Council of hierarchs of the Catacomb Church in the transit camp near Irkutsk in 1937 decreed and bequeathed the following concerning the self-governance of the branches of the T.O.C. and their preservation of prayerful unity among themselves: “All the branches of the Church growing from the ecclesiastical tree—... and the tree is our pre-revolutionary Church—are living branches of the Church of Christ. Let prayerful and liturgical communion abide among the clergy of all these branches.” [16]

June 2014.

Hieromonk Euthymius (Trofimov) (Lesna Monastery, RTOC)
Nun Euphrosynia (Molchanova) (Lesna Monastery, RTOC)
Priest Artemy Varlamyan (Lesna Monastery, RTOC)
Priest Sergius Myasoedov (Kharkov, RTOC)
Hieromonk Savva (Precarpathia, RTOC)
Archpriest Alexey Lebedev (St. Petersburg, ROAC)
Archpriest Roman Novakovsky (Zheleznovodsk, Stavropol Krai, ROAC)
Archpriest Valery (ROAC)
Reader Vitaly (RTOC)

 

SOURCES

1. Not of This World: The Life and Teaching of Hieromonk Seraphim (Rose) of Platina. Moscow: Russky Palomnik, 1995, pp. 915, 1000.

2. Ibid., p. 916.

3. Ibid., p. 978.

4. Pomazansky, M., Protopresbyter. Orthodox Dogmatic Theology. Moscow: Dar, 2005.

5. The Encyclical Epistle of the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church to All Orthodox Christians, May 6, 1848 / Epistles and Decrees of the Orthodox Church Concerning Heresies and Sects. Moscow: Luch, 2010.

6. Gregory Grabbe, Bishop. The Testament of the Holy Patriarch. Moscow, 1996, pp. 311–319.

7. Shkarovsky, M. V. Josephitism: A Movement in the Russian Orthodox Church. St. Petersburg: Memorial, 1999, p. 29.

8. Shkarovsky, M. V. Ibid., p. 29; Osipova, I. I. O Most Merciful One, Be Thou with Us Unceasingly… Reminiscences of Believers of the True Orthodox Catacomb Church. Late 1920s–Early 1970s. Moscow: Bratonezh, 2008, p. 19.

9. Osipova, I. I. Ibid., p. 19.

10. Shkarovsky, M. V. Op. cit., pp. 32–33.

11. Osipova, I. I. Through the Fire of Torments and the Waters of Tears… Persecutions against the True Orthodox Church. Moscow, 1998, p. 248.

12. Regelson, L. L. The Tragedy of the Russian Church, 1917–1945. Paris, 1977, p. 183.

13. B. Zachariah. “An Important Resolution of the Catacomb Church” // Orthodox Russia. 1949, No. 18; Russian Thought, September 7, 1949; Orthodox Review. 1980, No. 51.

14. Andreyev, I., Prof. “Notes on the Catacomb Church in the USSR” // Orthodox Russia, 1947; Herald of the T.O.C. 1999, July–September, No. 3.

15. “I Follow Only Christ…” Protocols of the Interrogations of Metropolitan Joseph (Petrovykh), 1929–1930 // Theological Collection, No. 9 (2002), pp. 376–424.

16. B. Zachariah. “An Important Resolution of the Catacomb Church” // Orthodox Russia. 1949, No. 18; Russian Thought, September 7, 1949; Orthodox Review. 1980, No. 51.

 

 

Russian source:

https://orthodoxrusk.livejournal.com/20548.html