Showing posts with label Official Orthodoxy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Official Orthodoxy. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 25, 2026

Conclusion from “In Defense of the Conciliar Structure of the Orthodox Church: The Theory of the Primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople and its Critique”

 Abbot Dionysius (Shlenov), Th.D.

Doctorate of Theology dissertation, Moscow Theological Academy, 2026

 

 

The present study took shape over the course of recent years, incorporating material from articles, papers, and lectures, as well as experience gained through debates and discussions. Naturally, as the conflict steadily intensified, the need for a systematic study and comprehensive analysis of the causes that gave rise to it also increased. Many years of studying the Byzantine patristic heritage—primarily in the original language—enabled the author to make such an attempt and to focus on a critique of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople from the standpoint of the Church’s conciliar structure. More recently, this work was carried out while serving as superior of St. Andrew’s Stavropegial Monastery in Moscow and as head of postgraduate studies at the Moscow Theological Academy.

The systematic course of lectures taught in the canon-law division of the master’s program at the Moscow Theological Academy—“Equality and Primacy in the Church According to Greek Primary Sources”—which covers both the canons of the Ecumenical Councils and the texts of the Holy Fathers and Christian writers concerning the Church’s conciliar structure, contributed to the preparation of this dissertation.

Papers and lectures on the subject of the research were delivered at St. Andrew’s Monastery and the Moscow Theological Academy. Off-site presentations were also given at other educational institutions, both in Russia and abroad, including in the dioceses of the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. [3020] Owing to time constraints, several of these off-site events were introductory in nature, presenting only the most essential material.

Presentations before an audience required taking account of the rapidly changing ecclesiastical situation and drawing upon the most relevant materials, both scholarly and journalistic.

A significant place in the papers was devoted to patristic ecclesiology, within which each of the Fathers, while preserving the common leitmotif, introduced his own distinctive emphasis. Thus, St. Athanasius of Alexandria taught of the “Catholic Church” as the Universal Church, free from heresies, meaning by this not one of the Local Churches, but the entire Church as a whole, in which the Local Churches are represented as equal members of the one Body of Christ. St. John Chrysostom conveyed this same meaning when he taught of the “commonality of the Churches” (τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἐκκλησιῶν) as a common spiritual heritage and a single foundation—something that pertains not to one Local Church, but to all the Churches.

St. Ambrose of Milan, one of the Latin Fathers of the period of the anti-Arian controversy, pointed out that in Arian teaching the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, Christ the Savior, was diminished in comparison with the First Person, God the Father. In our own day, the situation is even more grievous: Christ the Savior—the cornerstone and sole Head of the Church—although not placed below God the Father, is effectively equated with the “sole earthly head” of the Orthodox Church. This also entails a diminution of God the Word, for, owing to the existence of an earthly head in the Church, the Heavenly Head becomes less necessary. St. Ambrose wrote:

“The Church is the mother of the living, which God built upon the highest cornerstone, Christ Jesus, in Whom the whole building, being fitly framed together, grows into a temple (Eph. 2:20; cf. 1 Pet. 2:6).” [3021]

Both an in-depth study and the very act of turning to the teaching on the Church of the Holy Fathers cited above, as well as of many others, provide a foundation for an objective analysis of Constantinople’s new ecclesiology and demonstrate its untenability.

The principal aim of the dissertation is to reveal the meaning of the conflict with the Patriarchate of Constantinople and to show that, in this confrontation, the Russian Orthodox Church is grounded in the tradition of the Church and the principles of patristic theology. Summarizing the contents of the dissertation, we shall briefly formulate its principal conclusions.

* * *

The theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople stands in profound contradiction to traditional Orthodox conciliar ecclesiology and does not accord with the established tradition of the Church.

The multifaceted analysis conducted in the present study shows that the theory of the primacy of honor and power is, in its essence, comparable to the theory of primacy in Roman Catholicism. Although the primacy of the Roman pope is worldwide in character, it theoretically remains intrajurisdictional. The primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, however, is conceived as extraterritorial and extrajurisdictional, and this directly harms the other Local Churches.

Advocates of the theory of primacy rely upon the theology of Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon, which, after taking shape in the 1960s and 1970s, became the basis for the development of their theological positions. Metropolitan John combined openness to ecumenical dialogue with the principles of personalist philosophy and, in light of these approaches, regarded the Patriarchate of Constantinople as the principal bearer of the values of Orthodoxy in the modern world. His concept of the monarchy of God the Father among the Persons of the Holy Trinity finds its continuation in the idea of a special ecclesiastical-administrative role for the Patriarch of Constantinople among the Local Churches—an idea that became one of the principal theological leitmotifs of the theory of primacy.

Despite the outward diversity of their themes and approaches, advocates of the theory of primacy adhere to common principles and interpretations. For them, the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople is an axiom, which gives them confidence in constructing further theoretical structures. These structures, however, rest upon a false foundation. Taken together, the arguments of Metropolitan Hierotheos (Vlachos), Metropolitan Gregory (Papathomas), Metropolitan Cyril (Katerelos), Archbishop Makarios (Griniezakis), and the historians, canonists, and authors V. Feidas, A. Massavetas, and A. Vavouskos permit the conclusion that the theory of primacy constitutes a single, coherent system incompatible with the principles of conciliar ecclesiology.

The theory of primacy, which existed previously, received additional arguments intended to justify Constantinople’s actions in 2018–2019. The publication The Texts Speak serves as a kind of “manifesto” of the theory of primacy, attempting to provide a justification for the uncanonical measures taken to incorporate the Ukrainian schismatics. The trajectory of the original theses, as well as their subsequent transformation, can be traced in the documents and statements of several hierarchs of the Orthodox Church of Greece who, regrettably, became champions of this theory in defiance of the traditional ecclesiastical order of their numerous flock.

The findings of this dissertation demonstrate that the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, especially in its modern expression, cannot be derived from the patristic tradition, the canonical tradition, or the historical practice of the Orthodox Church. All the sources examined in the present work—when interpreted correctly in their historical and canonical context—confirm the principles of conciliar ecclesiology and provide no basis for the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople. In the concluding part of the work, eight principal postulates of the theory of primacy are formulated and critically examined. Their analysis permits the assertion that the primary aim of the advocates of this theory is to provide a “theological” rationale and justification for any uncanonical actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The essence of the theory of primacy lies not in the realm of theology, but in the sphere of claims to power.

Conciliar ecclesiology affirms that the highest authority in the Church is an Ecumenical or Pan-Orthodox Council, founded upon the equality of the primates and the principle of fraternal service, rather than upon individual authority. Conciliar ecclesiology is not a concept of a lower order in relation to hierarchy. The Orthodox hierarchy, which ascends to Christ as the sole Head of the Church, precludes the possibility of attributing to any one primate a hierarchically superior position in relation to the others.

The arguments advanced in support of the theory of primacy rest upon arbitrary interpretations of theological terms, texts, and canonical rules, as well as upon isolated historical precedents that were conditioned by particular circumstances and do not demonstrate the theory’s validity in the present day.

  • The claims of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to a special position in the Church as the supreme judge, possessing the authority to receive appeals from members of other ecclesiastical jurisdictions, are illegitimate.

Similar cases occurred in the past. They were asserted most consistently by the See of Rome, which relied upon certain canonical grounds—primarily in the early period—although these claims were never recognized in their entirety in the Orthodox East. The Ecumenical Council was traditionally regarded as the highest judicial authority in the Church. The Patriarchs of Constantinople and the other Eastern primates historically opposed Rome’s judicial primacy and rejected the very model of ecclesiastical governance based upon the juridical supremacy of a single see.

The Eastern hierarchs adopted an equally consistent position toward Constantinople’s immoderate claims to primacy. A special place among them belongs to Patriarch Dositheos II of Jerusalem—from the second half of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century—a renowned polemicist not only against the primacy of Rome, but also against the primacy of Constantinople during the period when its initial formulations and precedents were emerging. He consistently emphasized that the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople in judicial matters was confined to the boundaries of his own jurisdiction and could not be extended to other Churches. [3022]

The conciliar canons establish the intrajurisdictional rights of the primate of the Church of Constantinople as equal to, but not exceeding, the rights of the primates of the other Local Churches. An expanded and distorted understanding of those same canons, together with legal norms that were not received at the level of the universal Church, falls outside the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church. The Eisagoge, which expresses the ecclesiology of the Patriarch of Constantinople, was neither received by the Church nor put into practice, unlike Justinian’s Novella 123, which preserved conciliar equality.

The right of supreme judicial authority within a particular Local Church—an independent jurisdiction—belongs specifically to the primate of that Church.

  • The attribution to the Church of Constantinople of the exclusive status of “Mother Church,” and to its primate of supreme authority over all the Local Churches, contradicts both the tradition of the Church and historical truth.

Patristic ecclesiology throughout the various eras—from the early centuries to the late Byzantine period—is united in its foundation: the true Head of the Church is Christ the Savior. Just as Christ is infallible, so too is the Church—the Body of Christ. The members of this Body have different ministries, but these are equal in significance. The members of the ecclesial Body may also be understood as the Local Churches—holy communities called not to exercise headship over one another, but to serve one another. “Vertical” administrative-hierarchical relations are impossible among equal Churches; such relations exist only within a Local Church.

“Mother Church” is an epithet whose theological meanings were traditionally explained through the conception of the one Universal Church. The motherhood of the Church corresponds to divine fatherhood. The rare instances in which a particular Local Church was called the Mother Church do not negate, but only emphasize, its universal character.

After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, a number of special powers were delegated to the Patriarch of Constantinople. This was an administrative decision: the patriarch-ethnarch became the sole representative of the “infidels”—the Orthodox population of the Muslim Ottoman Empire—as their spiritual head and leader. During the later period of Ottoman rule, statements concerning the Church of Constantinople’s special providential role began to appear with increasing frequency in its official acts. The Patriarchate of Constantinople came to regard itself as preeminent in the East, but this primacy was not universally recognized.

According to the principles of conciliarity, the Local Churches are equal to one another, and among them there are neither greater nor lesser Churches.

  • The autocephalous Local Churches, which together constitute the Universal Orthodox Church, possess equal rights regardless of the date of their establishment or their statistical characteristics. Autonomous Churches constitute an exception to this rule.

The term αὐτοκέφαλος itself—“independent”—emphasizes the fullness of ecclesiastical authority and responsibility possessed by every Local Church. The history of the term during the Byzantine and post-Byzantine periods helps to clarify what Orthodox theologians and canonists understood by this concept as applied to the Church’s structure.

A brief historical survey of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries permits the conclusion that the autocephalies granted during this period were full and complete. This meant that each newly established Local Church entered the family of equal sister Churches, thereby excluding any dependence upon the Local Church that had granted it autocephaly.

  • No primate of a Local Orthodox Church may regard himself as possessing a higher degree of authority or a more perfect dignity than the other primates. Clergymen may belong to different hierarchical ranks, but within the same rank they are equal to one another.

The concept of “hierarchy” (ἱεραρχία), which literally translated into Russian means “sacred order,” is one of the key concepts in the doctrine of the Church. It is impossible to conceive of the Church without hierarchy, just as it is impossible to conceive of a ship without a crew and a helmsman to guide it.

The Dionysian corpus is of essential importance for understanding the term “hierarchy.” According to this teaching, the heavenly hierarchy consists of three orders, with three ranks in each. Each rank occupies a particular level of the hierarchy, standing above or below the others according to the degree of its proximity to God. From the first and highest order, which is “purified, illumined, and perfected” by God Himself—the “First Light”—illumination and spiritual knowledge are transmitted to the lower ranks. The six-rank earthly hierarchy reflects and follows the nine-rank heavenly hierarchy, differing in that its first hierarchical order corresponds not to ranks, but to three Mysteries of the Church: Baptism, Communion, and the consecration of Holy Chrism. The  Dionysian corpus contains the idea not only of hierarchy, but also of complete unity. The very raising of the question of a hierarchy among patriarchs who belong to the same rank contradicts and is foreign to the theology of the Areopagitica.

Equality is of fundamental importance in establishing relations among the primates of the Local Orthodox Churches. Under any other interpretation, the very meaning of both the heavenly and the earthly hierarchy is abolished.

  • The interpretation of the epithet “Ecumenical” (οἰκουμενικός) as indicating the worldwide authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople contradicts the principle of hierarchical equality within a single ecclesiastical rank and is not supported by the history of the term’s usage.

Originally, this epithet referred to the confession of faith and the conciliar principle within the Church, rather than to the hierarchs who represented her. The establishment of this epithet with a different meaning is associated with the reign of Emperor Justinian, who sought to emphasize the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople as the bishop of the imperial capital. Because of Rome’s firm opposition, this approach could not be implemented; and with the transition to a new era, the designation itself provoked persistent rejection in the West and in the other Eastern Patriarchates. Through historical inertia, the term became established in the official titulature of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

The epithet “Ecumenical,” to which advocates of the theory of primacy attach extraordinary importance, was and remains merely an honorary title that cannot serve as proof of a special hierarchical status for the primate of Constantinople.

  • Ecclesiastical-administrative authority over the diaspora cannot be concentrated in the hands of a single hierarch—the primate of the Church of Constantinople.

The question of ecclesiastical-administrative authority over the diaspora was first addressed by Canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon (451). At present, the stumbling block is the expression “among foreign peoples” (ἐν τοῖς βαρβαρικοῖς) contained in Canon 28. In its original meaning, this expression indicated which of the Local Churches provided pastoral care for the barbarian—that is, non-Greek and foreign—peoples. At the time of the Council, those peoples who did not belong to Greco-Roman culture were called barbarians. The dissertation demonstrates that, in the complete wording of Canon 28, the reference was to barbarians living within the boundaries of the three dioceses of Asia, Pontus, and Thrace—that is, within the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, newly established in the fourth century—or in territories immediately adjacent to them. Subsequently, as understood by the Byzantine canonists of the twelfth century, the term also encompassed those peoples who, as a result of missionary activity, entered its expanded jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, advocates of the theory of primacy rely upon an expansive interpretation of the expression “among foreign peoples,” which today has assumed a universal scope: the Patriarchate of Constantinople claims authority over the entire worldwide Orthodox diaspora. This does not correspond to the meaning established by the Council of Chalcedon, which was never subsequently abrogated. To use this formulation to justify rights of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the worldwide diaspora is an impermissible innovation.

An examination of the question of the diaspora in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries leads to the same conclusion. The study demonstrates that the claims of the Patriarchate of Constantinople to govern the Orthodox diaspora have never received universal recognition, while the conception of Greek (Greek Orthodox) metropolitanates in the diaspora as the only possible arrangement was and remains unfounded and contrary to the canonical tradition.

Extraterritorial oikonomia, exercised contrary to the canons of the Church, led not to the reconciliation of the schismatics with the Church, but laid the foundation for open cruelty toward members of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and for aggression against the faithful.

The Patriarch of Constantinople does not possess the authority to restore schismatics belonging to another jurisdiction. Still less does he have the right to receive into ecclesiastical communion those who never possessed ecclesiastical orders conferred under the proper canonical conditions.

In the relationship between akribeia and oikonomia, akribeia—the strict observance of the canons—is the norm, while oikonomia is the exception. Although intrajurisdictional oikonomia is permissible when certain prerequisites are met, analogous measures toward clergy of other jurisdictions, without the fulfillment of the essential conditions, are unacceptable. The attempts of advocates of primacy to justify Constantinople’s actions by precedents involving the exercise of ecclesiastical oikonomia in the past are unfounded. A detailed examination of these precedents reveals that heretics or schismatics were restored by the same authority that had imposed the ecclesiastical censure upon them and, most importantly, that their reception into ecclesiastical communion was preceded by sincere repentance.

The Ukrainian schismatics who passed under Constantinople’s omophorion not only failed to repent, but continued their obstinate opposition to the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the primacy of Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky).

Nevertheless, this supposed restoration took place, and the situation in Ukraine, which had been conflict-ridden from the outset, deteriorated still further. In the second half of 2024, a bill was introduced [3023] whose principal aim was to terminate the activity of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The canonical Church was given a final period of nine months in which to sever all ties with the Russian Orthodox Church. [3024] This separation was to be effected either through union with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine; through recognition of dependence upon the Patriarch of Constantinople—to one degree or another; or through the unilateral proclamation of complete independence, which is fraught with the danger of schism and is uncanonical.

The adopted law was published on August 20, 2024, under the title “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of the Activities of Religious Organizations,” No. 3894-IX. [3025]

The anti-Church law did not produce an immediate result. The struggle to terminate the activity of the canonical Church shifted from the legislative sphere to that of law enforcement, and the conflict is currently at the stage of protracted judicial and administrative proceedings.

On August 27, 2025, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) officially recognized the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. Under this decision, the Ukrainian Church was deprived of the right to use state and municipal property. Two days later, on August 29, DESS filed a lawsuit seeking a complete ban on the UOC (MP) throughout Ukraine.

The defense of the Ukrainian Church adopted a strategy of procedural opposition that included numerous petitions from thousands of the faithful. In November 2025, the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal in Kyiv denied the plaintiff’s request to freeze the property of the UOC (MP). This decision was based on procedural violations; however, the key determination concerning its ties with the Moscow Patriarchate remains in force, while the legal conflict remains unresolved.

At the regional level, the situation is developing along its own course. Thus, on February 26, 2026, the Kyiv Regional Council effectively required district administrations to facilitate the transfer of UOC (MP) communities to the OCU or to other jurisdictions severing their ties with the Moscow Patriarchate.

According to DESS statistics, approximately 1,378 religious communities transferred to the OCU between 2022 and 2025. The Ukrainian Church, however, maintains that decisions concerning such transfers were often made without regard for the views of the parish communities. The widely practiced “legal” seizure of churches simulates an expression of the community’s will—when in fact it is the will of outsiders participating in sham meetings—after which the “community’s decision” is legalized through state registration.

The number of violent church seizures is steadily increasing. Forcible takeovers involving organized groups wearing balaclavas and camouflage have become commonplace. These groups employ direct violence against clergy and parishioners using various special-purpose weapons and devices, including gas pistols and smoke grenades. Such administratively supported seizures take place with the connivance or participation of law-enforcement agencies—the police and special units—which not only fail to impede the perpetrators, but effectively legitimize their actions. Church property is confiscated, rendering the churches unsuitable for the celebration of divine services.

The seizure of the Cathedral of the Archangel Michael in Cherkasy on October 17, 2024, became one of the most striking acts of violence in the recent chronicle of events—events that have already entered the history of the persecution of the Church.

Local attacks upon the Church by hostile members of the public also continue. One example is a petition to prohibit the use of sound-amplification equipment for broadcasting divine services, submitted by a group of citizens in the city of Rivne in March 2026.

Criminal cases are being brought against clergy of the UOC (MP) on charges of high treason, incitement of hostility, denial of the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine, and numerous other grounds. Among the most widely publicized precedents have been the prosecutions of Metropolitan Arseny (Yakovenko), abbot of the Holy Dormition Sviatogorsk Lavra in the Donetsk region, and Metropolitan Pavel (Lebed), former superior of the Kyiv Caves Lavra. The conflict surrounding the Kyiv Caves Lavra itself also remains far from resolved.

The cases of persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate are countless. The state is systematically diminishing the influence of the canonical Church, pursuing a policy aimed not only at its marginalization, but also at its effective expulsion from the territory of Ukraine.

The adoption of the anti-Church law and the aggressive actions directed against the clergy and faithful of the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church proved to be a clear manifestation of the theory of primacy in practice.

Meanwhile, several Greek theologians—advocates of the theory of primacy who attach particular importance to the Council of Crete (2016)—attempt to blame the Russian Orthodox Church for its refusal to participate in the Council and to shift onto it their own responsibility for the subsequent tragic events.

However, the nonparticipation of representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate in the Council of Crete was due to several objective factors. It was evident from the Council’s agenda itself that the Patriarchate of Constantinople expected all the Local Churches to recognize certain claims of the theory of primacy—for example, its special role in convening the Council and in the question of granting autonomy. The same intentions could also be discerned in the events preceding the Council, the most notable of which was the pre-council meeting of January 2016. The dissertation demonstrates that throughout the entire period in which the theory of primacy was actively promoted—from the 1920s through 2016—the Russian Orthodox Church consistently demonstrated its adherence to conciliar ecclesiology, and this position remained unchanged. Consequently, the promotion of particular aspects of primacy at the Council of Crete in 2016 could not, by definition, be accepted by the Russian Orthodox Church; its refusal to participate was not a violation of the principle of conciliarity, but, on the contrary, its consistent expression.

Having failed to obtain conciliar support, the Patriarchate of Constantinople proceeded to take unilateral measures. The extraterritorial and uncanonical oikonomia that it extended to the Ukrainian schismatics was, in essence, a “cacodicy”—a justification of evil as such.

No primate of a Local Church is, or can be, endowed with such a degree of judicial and administrative authority as would permit him to restore to the bosom of the Church persons who possess neither the external nor the internal prerequisites for such restoration. This assertion applies all the more to the Patriarch of Constantinople, whose uncanonical actions became the cause of the present lawlessness.

The accusations against the Russian Orthodox Church of the “heresy of ethnophyletism” and the “heresy of the Russian World” are an attempt by the Patriarchate of Constantinople to justify itself and to defend the theory of primacy.

  • Advocates of the theory of primacy regard the condemnation of the Bulgarians at the Council of Constantinople of 1872 as one of two indisputable arguments for accusations of the “heresy of ethnophyletism”—the predominance of national interests to the detriment of doctrine and ecclesiastical unity. In the Council’s final decision, or Horos, phyletism was allegedly classified as a heresy.

The dissertation offers the author’s own translation of the conciliar Horos—as close as possible to the Greek original—as well as translations of documents varying in tone from moderate to severe. These materials make it possible to reconstruct the course of the discussion that preceded the adoption of the conciliar decision. An analysis of the sources reveals a substantial moderation of the Council participants’ position, which was reflected in the text of the Horos. The considerably more lenient attitude of the Patriarchate of Constantinople toward the Bulgarian Exarchate during the subsequent period confirms this conclusion.

The second argument advanced by advocates of primacy is that the transfer of the Metropolis of Kiev in 1686 was conditional rather than unconditional. The Russian Orthodox Church’s disagreement with this approach is portrayed by advocates of primacy as an unwillingness to make concessions because of its narrow national interests—to the detriment of the interests of the Church as a whole.

In their view, the text of the Charter of 1590 granting patriarchal status to the Russian Orthodox Church contains a formulation describing the Patriarch of Constantinople as the head of the primates of the other Churches. The presence of such a formulation in the document’s original text, however, cannot be regarded as an indisputable fact, since the relevant passage of the Greek charter was damaged and subsequently restored by another scribe—whether correctly or not is unknown. Nevertheless, relying upon this questionable foundation, the Patriarchate of Constantinople is fully convinced that the 1686 decision transferring the Metropolis of Kiev to the Moscow Patriarchate could be revoked at any time. From its perspective, this is precisely what occurred in 2018–2019, when the Metropolis of Kiev was removed from the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate.

In contrast to Constantinople’s position, the dissertation examines in detail the position of Patriarch Dositheos II of Jerusalem—a Church historian and ecclesiologist who consistently defended the equal standing of the Local Churches. Patriarch Dositheos, who played a significant role in the events of that period, was distinguished by his friendly attitude toward Russia and the Russian Church. [3026] Advocates of the theory of primacy substantially distorted his position, attributing opposite sentiments to him and constructing conclusions convenient to themselves.

  • The accusations against the Russian Orthodox Church of the “heresy of ethnophyletism” are based entirely upon a substitution of the actual meaning of the historical evidence, while the “heresy of the Russian World” is, in essence, a false concept actively promoted both by advocates of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople—in order to establish his primacy of power throughout worldwide Orthodoxy—and by circles hostile to Russia and traditional Orthodoxy, for a whole range of reasons.

Nevertheless, the untenability of the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s approaches causes no sense of contradiction among advocates of the theory of primacy. They fail to perceive the ethnophyletism of Greek nationalism, which formed the basis of the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s self-understanding during the Ottoman period and continues to determine its policies in the twenty-first century. In promoting the idea of the Greek world’s special mission as the “cradle” of worldwide Orthodoxy, with the Church of Constantinople exercising a coordinating and dominant role, these “fighters against an excessive national principle” in other Churches themselves prove to be the foremost adherents of a skillfully concealed ethnophyletism.

The Russian World, which possesses a genuine right to exist by virtue of its own identity, has encountered a challenge from the Greek World, which remains captive to the illusion of Hellenism—the phantom of a Byzantium that long ago ceased to exist. The resulting boomerang is, in reality, becoming an instrument of self-punishment, since extraterritoriality and ethnophyletism have proved characteristic of the Greek World to a far greater degree than of the Russian World. In other words, there is a profound distinction both between genuine and false extraterritorial approaches and between genuine and false ethnophyletism, and a clear boundary must be drawn between these concepts.

The theory of primacy is the principal cause of the immense ecclesiastical division of the present day.

The dissertation demonstrates a direct chronological and substantive connection between the intensified promotion of the theory of primacy within the Patriarchate of Constantinople—especially after the Council of Crete in 2016—and the emergence of a schism that remains unresolved to this day and may lead to consequences comparable to those of the Great Schism of 1054.

Extraterritorial oikonomia, applied contrary to the canons of the Church, did not lead to the reconciliation of the schismatics, but laid the foundation for open pressure upon the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The logic of the theory of primacy, when carried to its extreme, enables its advocates to justify unilateral actions regardless of their consequences for the faithful of other jurisdictions; to support political forces conducting an aggressive campaign against the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church, including legislative prohibitions and the physical seizure of churches; and to use accusations of the “heresy of the Russian World” as an instrument of ideological struggle rather than of theological criticism.

As demonstrated in the study, none of these claims possesses a canonical foundation. Their implementation led to the rupture of Eucharistic communion, the politicization of ecclesiastical relations, and ultimately to a situation in which the Ukrainian Orthodox Church found itself under threat of legislative prohibition—with the direct or indirect support of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

The Russian Orthodox Church’s defense of conciliar ecclesiology is vitally necessary for the entire Church, which is always infallible.

The Russian Orthodox Church’s position in defense of the conciliar equality of the Local Churches is neither national egoism nor politics.

The Church, as the Body of Christ, is infallible in her conciliar fullness; individual parts of her, however, including patriarchal sees, can fall into error and depart from the truth. History provides examples of individual Churches—including the Church of Constantinople—supporting heresies or schisms and being restored to the truth precisely by the conciliar mind of the Church.

The temporary weakening of relations with some of the Greek-speaking Local Churches calls for greater attentiveness, discernment, and zeal in matters of theological theory and Christian practice. Scholarly theological and ecclesiastical-historical research constitutes an essential means of correcting the present situation and restoring unity and mutual understanding among the Local Orthodox Churches.

The present study concludes that the theory of primacy, in its current manifestation, has led to situations that can scarcely be characterized as anything other than a spiritual and physical intrusion into the life of an entire Local Church. No theory claiming to belong to the Orthodox tradition can justify this.

The real consequences of the practical implementation of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople leave the Russian Orthodox Church no alternative but resolutely to oppose and criticize this theory. Whatever the current objectives of the individual Local Churches may be, the Russian Orthodox Church is defending a truth of salvific significance for the whole of Orthodoxy.

* * *

Unlike advocates of the theory of primacy, defenders of conciliar ecclesiology propose resolving the “Ukrainian ecclesiastical question” at the level of the entire Church. A council of primates must assume the peacemaking role in this conflict, together with a return to jurisdictional boundaries that the Russian Orthodox Church could accept as the party most severely affected by Constantinople’s uncanonical measures. The practical implementation of the theory of primacy cannot be accepted. In a disputed matter, the other side must also be heard; ignoring it can lead only to a further deepening of the schism.

Among the critics of the theory of primacy are more radical figures, such as Protopresbyter Theodoros Zisis, and less radical figures, such as Archbishop Anastasios of Albania and Metropolitan Nikiforos of Kykkos.

Although the number of publications in defense of conciliar ecclesiology within the world of Greek Orthodoxy has declined recently, this does not signify a change in positions or approaches. The immense conflict remains unhealed and continues to receive neither approval nor support from traditionally minded theologians and zealous defenders of the truth.

The systematic analysis of the theory of primacy presented in this study may serve as a reliable support for defenders of conciliar ecclesiology, may be heard and accepted by the opposing side, and may also provide guidance for those who are wavering or remain undecided—both in the Greek world and throughout Orthodoxy.

The present study cannot be called exhaustive: several of the topics raised require deeper theological analysis and a broader patristic context. Research across a wide range of fields may prove fruitful in overcoming the present situation within the Orthodox Church.

One such avenue of research would be a detailed analysis of every instance in which autocephaly or autonomy has been granted. This would make it possible to develop and deepen the general classification proposed in the present work, which already presupposes a differentiated and, in certain cases, critical approach. A detailed examination must also be undertaken of the precedents from Church history that advocates of the theory of primacy invoke in their favor. Although considered in the present work from a general perspective, they require separate and more thorough analysis.

The “Ukrainian ecclesiastical question” is closely connected with particular episodes in both Russian and broader Slavic Church history. Owing to the vast amount of material, which lies beyond the objectives of the present study, this historical context remained outside its scope. In light of current ecclesiastical events, there is an urgent need to return to this material and reconsider it more fully from a new historical perspective.

The key points demonstrating the inconsistency between the Patriarchate of Constantinople’s present claims and its previous position require clarification and further detailed theological, canonical, and historical study. Further research into the patristic heritage, engagement with relevant aspects of theological scholarship, and inter-Church theological discussions conducted in a spirit of conciliarity may lead to the discovery of an answer. This would make it possible to substantiate the principles of the Church’s conciliar structure in still greater detail and to defend her teaching against distortions—in both theory and practice.

The prospects for future research are not exhausted by these questions; only some of them have been identified here. All these tasks are ultimately directed toward a single goal: to overcome the exclusivity of one Church and return to the conciliar past.

In her tradition, the Orthodox Church has never recognized the doctrine of a single “earthly head” of the Church. Earthly power, privileges, and prerogatives are foreign to the nature of the Church. The postulates of the theory of the primacy of honor and power stand in direct contradiction to the Church’s teaching. Exaggerated conceptions of a “supranational” Church of Constantinople—“ecumenical” or “worldwide,” founded upon the Greek ethnos yet possessing no boundaries, unlike the other Local Churches—contradict the spirit of conciliarity and sow discord, thereby disrupting ecclesiastical unity.

The postulates of the theory of primacy are prerequisites for the creation of a new type of Church—a church under the sole authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople throughout the entire Orthodox world.

* * *

The most important question remains, and it may be formulated in different ways. What is to be done? Is there any prospect of overcoming the present division? Is it possible to restore unity between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate of Constantinople? This question cannot be answered without first evaluating the position of each side according to the principles of traditional theology, canon law, and the objective history of Church and state in Byzantium and Russia. When one side is profoundly in the wrong, the only way forward is to step back and reconsider its unjust decision.

“The things which are impossible with men are possible with God” (Luke 18:27). The Holy Fathers, martyrs, and confessors were not afraid to defend the truth, regardless of threats and trials. In the present age, the Russian Orthodox Church is compelled to defend the truth under intense pressure from advocates of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, with tragic consequences in Ukraine and throughout the world. Yielding neither outwardly nor inwardly, she preserves the tradition of Orthodoxy for the good of all Orthodox Christians. By revealing and communicating the truth, there remains hope that it may also be heard by the opposing side.

Following the adoption of the discriminatory law against the canonical Church in Ukraine, a Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church was issued on August 22, 2024, [3027] noting the personal responsibility of the Patriarch of Constantinople for the ongoing lawlessness:

“In its scale and centralized character, this measure may surpass all previous historical repressions against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, including the persecutions during the period of the Union of Brest, and is comparable to such sorrowful historical precedents as the persecutions in the Roman Empire under Nero and Diocletian, the so-called dechristianization of France during the French Revolution of the eighteenth century, the atheistic repressions in the Soviet Union, and the destruction of the Albanian Orthodox Church by Enver Hoxha’s regime in the 1960s…

“It is with particular bitterness that we must note the negative role of Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople and the hierarchs who share his views. Through their unilateral and hasty actions, contrary to the spirit of the sacred canons, they have only deepened the ecclesiastical schism in Ukraine rather than healing it. The leadership of the schismatics recognized by the Phanar demanded with particular vehemence the adoption of a law effectively banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Patriarch Bartholomew, who had previously publicly approved the criminal prosecution and arrest of its hierarchs and clergy, has now, like the high priests Annas and Caiaphas, openly supported the actions of the state authorities, whose aim is the crucifixion and destruction of the canonical Church in Ukraine. The Patriarch of Constantinople thus bears personal responsibility for organizing the persecution of the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.” [3028]

What is the basis for such a severe assessment of the position of the Church of Constantinople? Regrettably, the position of Patriarch Bartholomew follows logically from the principal postulates of the theory of primacy. It was as though the moment had arrived to employ the resources of state power in Ukraine to destroy the country’s largest and most traditional religious confession, which refused to accept the uncanonical decisions of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Shortly before the bill was adopted, Ukrainian President V. Zelensky—both personally and through representatives of the OCU and the secular authorities—asked the Patriarch of Constantinople for support in attaining Ukraine’s “spiritual independence.” Patriarch Bartholomew blessed this “spiritual independence” (Greek: πνευματική ανεξαρτησία), [3029] whose true objective is the prohibition of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Shortly before the discriminatory law was adopted, Patriarch Bartholomew met at the Phanar on August 13, 2024, with Pseudo-Metropolitan Epiphany (Dumenko), Pseudo-Metropolitan Eustratius (Zorya) of Bila Tserkva, and several laypersons bearing particular responsibility for ecclesiastical policy in Ukraine. [3030] Soon after the law’s adoption, at the Synaxis of the episcopate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople held on September 1–3, 2024, the “ideology of the Russian World” was categorically condemned. [3031] Patriarch Bartholomew has consciously embarked upon the path of schism, which, through the potential consequences of the law of August 20, 2024, may reach its apogee throughout worldwide Orthodoxy and distort the God-given unity of Christ’s Church for many years.

Meanwhile, the primates of several Local Churches did not remain indifferent. In a synodal epistle, Patriarch Porfirije (Prvoslav Perić), Primate of the Serbian Orthodox Church, expressed his profound support for Metropolitan Onufriy. [3032] Patriarch John X (Yazigi), Primate of the Orthodox Church of Antioch, sent a fraternal message to Metropolitan Onufriy of Kiev. [3033] The Albanian Orthodox Church issued an official statement calling for the repeal of the law banning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. [3034] Bulgarian Patriarch Daniil blessed the convening of a conference in support of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church entitled “Blockading Aggression against the Church—Defending Orthodoxy,” [3035] and personally called upon the faithful to pray for her. [3036] The Church of Jerusalem [3037] and the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia [3038] also spoke out in support of the persecuted canonical Church in Ukraine.

On January 12, 2026, the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation issued a statement concerning the destructive activity of the Patriarch of Constantinople. [3039] Though severe in form, it was just in substance. This statement prompted a series of responses united by a common confidence in the correctness of the theory of primacy and in the extraterritorial activity conducted on the basis of that theory. The Patriarchate of Constantinople stated in its response that attacks of this kind “do not deter the Ecumenical Patriarchate from continuing its ministry and ecumenical mission.” [3040] Metropolitan Apostolos of New Jersey asserted that the Church of Constantinople, “by the sacred canons of the Ecumenical Councils and according to the tradition of the Church, possesses the primacy of service and sacrifice among the Orthodox Churches.” [3041] The Organization for National and Religious Affairs decided to republish one of the books justifying the implementation of the theory of primacy in the “Ukrainian ecclesiastical question.” [3042] From the broad range of pronouncements and statements, we shall cite the following words of Archbishop Elpidophoros of America as characteristic of the theory of primacy:

“The canonical existence of any Church or any ecclesiastical structure is granted solely by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. That is why it is called the Ecumenical Patriarchate. We have the supreme authority in the Orthodox Church—not, of course, in the same manner as in the Roman Catholic Church, where the pope possesses supreme authority—but there is a highest Orthodox authority governed by our own rules, in accordance with the canons of the Ecumenical Councils, by which the canonical status of autocephaly and patriarchal organization was granted even to the Russian Church itself.” [3043]

From these and similar statements, one may conclude that the theory of primacy is assuming increasingly grotesque features that provoke rejection and revulsion. It is evident that the conflict between the theory and practice of primacy, on the one hand, and the Church’s traditional conciliar structure, on the other, has reached an extreme level of tension. Without substantive answers to the questions at issue, this conflict can scarcely be overcome in the foreseeable future.

The principal conclusion of the dissertation is that the implementation of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople amounts to nothing less than a rejection of the Church’s canonical order and a distortion of conciliar ecclesiology. By arrogating to itself the right to exercise headship over the Local Churches, the Patriarchate of Constantinople initiated division and schism, inflicting serious damage upon the ecclesiastical unity of worldwide Orthodoxy.

From the outside, it may appear that the conflict between the Churches has external causes and arose from human ambitions. However, as demonstrated in the dissertation, the implementation of the theory of primacy entails a departure from traditional values and concepts.

The unity of the Church is a precious spiritual treasure that must be carefully preserved by guarding against divisions and attempts to exercise dominion over others. Relations among the Local Churches must be patterned after the members of a body whose Head is the Lord Jesus Christ Himself. Only adherence to the canonical foundations and to conciliarity can preserve the Orthodox Churches in the unity commanded by God.

Commenting on 1 Corinthians 1:2, St. John Chrysostom observed: “Unto the Church of God. Not of this or that man, but of God. Which is at Corinth… The Apostle Paul calls it the Church of God, showing that it ought to abide in unity. For if it is God’s, it is united and one, not in Corinth only, but throughout the whole world.” [3044]

Monk Antiochos (seventh century) wrote: “It is pleasing to God to care for the unity of the Church, than which there is nothing better among men.” [3045]

The late Byzantine dogmatic theologian Monk Euthymios Zigabenos emphasized: “The Church is the name of communion and unity.” “Κοινωνίας γὰρ ὄνομα καὶ ἑνώσεως ἡ Ἐκκλησία.” [3046]

Over the past several years, several articles and publications addressing the pressing question of ecclesiastical unity have appeared in Russian secular and ecclesiastical scholarship. The Poznanie Publishing House has issued several books by both Russian and foreign authors in defense of the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. One of these authors, the specialist in Byzantine history P. V. Kuzenkov, published a series of books, the latest of which is devoted to clarifying the meaning of the concepts “prerogative” (πρεσβεῖα) and “primacy” (πρωτεῖον) [3047]—and its conclusions do not favor the theory of primacy. The works of Priest Pavel Ermilov, M. V. Graziansky, and other members of the Center for the Study of Primacy at St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University [3048] constitute an exceptionally valuable scholarly analysis of the questions associated with the concept of “primacy.” [3049] These studies have not yet been fully taken into account by the author of the present dissertation. Nevertheless, direct recourse to the primary sources enabled the author to form his own independent view of the theory of primacy as incompatible with the tradition of the Church, both in the past and in the present.

The expression of the Hieromartyr Ignatius the God-Bearer, “presiding in love” (προκαθημένη τῆς ἀγάπης), [3050] which refers to the Church of Rome, may be interpreted as signifying a real primacy according to the degree to which good works are performed—in other words, with the emphasis not upon primacy, but upon love and good works. [3051] In essence, any Church, even the youngest and smallest, may be “presiding in love” if, during a particular historical period, she surpasses the others in works of love. This is not an eternal and immutable authority of primacy, but the possibility of becoming first through zeal for works of love. Emphasis upon the spiritual and moral dimension of primacy makes it possible to avoid the temptation of self-confidently claiming primacy without sufficient grounds.

Despite the somewhat diverse character of the dissertation’s chapters, taken together they can provide an overall understanding of what has occurred and what is now occurring. The work of interpreting the situation continues at present, in the hope that both this dissertation and further research in this field will help not only to establish the fact of division, but also to understand its causes and, consequently, the means of overcoming it for the sake of restoring ecclesiastical unity upon the foundation of truth.

 

NOTES

3020. For further details, see the itinerary of these trips in the following news reports: “Lessons in Conciliar Ecclesiology in Several Dioceses of the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church” (November 20, 2023). URL: https://andreevsky-monastery.ru/news/detail/uroki-sobornoy-ekklesiologii-v-ryade-eparkhiy-belorusskogo-ekzarkhata-russkoy-pravoslavnoy-tserkvi/; “A Critique of the Theory of the Primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople in Several Eastern Dioceses of the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church” (March 19, 2024). URL: https://andreevsky-monastery.ru/news/detail/kritika-teorii-pervenstva-konstantinopolskogo-patriarkha-v-ryade-vostochnykh-eparkhiy-belorusskogo-e/; “Visit to the Belarusian Exarchate” (February 10, 2026). URL: https://andreevsky-monastery.ru/news/detail/vizit-v-belorusskiy-ekzarkhat/.

3021. Ambrose of Milan. Exposition of the Gospel According to Luke 2.86 // CSEL. Vol. 32.4. Pp. 90:17–91:9.

3022. At the round table “The Procedure for Appeals in the Orthodox Church Today,” held on October 11, 2024, as part of the Pokrov Academic Conference, the paper “Appeals in the Tradition of the Church and in the Present Day: An Introduction to the Problem” was presented, setting forth arguments against the judicial primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople in the matter of receiving appeals.

3023. Adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on August 20, 2024. See: “Rada Adopts Law Permitting the UOC to Be Banned over Its Ties with Russia” (August 20, 2024). URL: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/20/08/2024/66c460609a79473d49afccbf

3024. See: Ibid.

3025. For a detailed critique of the bill, see: Gotsopoulos, Anastasios K., Protopresbyter. “Zelensky’s Expert Report as a Proposal for the Suicide of the Church in Ukraine: A Critical Evaluation of the DESS Decree against the Church of Ukraine” (January 9, 2025).

https://eeod.gr/oukraniko-autokefalo/82896--pragmatognomosni-to-zelnsky-s-prtasi-atoktonas-ts-kklisas-stn-okrana

3026. To the documents, quotations, and theoretical position of Patriarch Dositheos examined in the chapter, it remains only to add that it would hardly be natural to suppose that a man who personally conducted lengthy negotiations for the publication of a collection of his own polemical manuscripts specifically in Moscow held a negative attitude toward the Russian Church. On the fate of the manuscripts and the negotiations, see in particular: Fonkich, B. L. Greek-Russian Cultural Relations in the Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries (Greek Manuscripts in Russia). Moscow, 1977. Pp. 205–211.

3027. “Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the Adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of a Bill Aimed at the Elimination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (August 22, 2024). URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6152918.html.

3028. “Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the Adoption by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of a Bill Aimed at the Elimination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (August 22, 2024). URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6152918.html.

3029. “Ukrainian Presidency: The Ecumenical Patriarch Supports Ukraine’s Spiritual Independence” (August 13, 2024). URL: https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2024/08/13/oukraniki-proedria-o-ecum-patr-ypostirizei-pneumatiki-aneksartisia-oukranias/

3030. “The Primate of the Church of Ukraine at the Ecumenical Patriarchate” (August 13, 2024). URL: https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2024/08/13/kiev-epiphanios-sto-ecum-patr/

3031. See: “Communiqué of the Tenth Synaxis of the Hierarchy of the Ecumenical Throne” (September 3, 2024). URL: https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2024/09/03/anakoinothen-synaxews-ierarxias-tou-thronou/

3032. Published on August 23, 2024. See: “Support of the Serbian Orthodox Church for the Canonical Church in Ukraine” (August 23, 2024). URL: https://spc.rs/podrska-srpske-pravoslavne-crkve-kanonskoj-crkvi-u-ukrajini/

3033. The message was sent on Ukraine’s Independence Day, August 24, 2024. See: “The Patriarch of Antioch Proposes the Convening of a Council on the Question of the UOC” (August 24, 2024). URL: https://orthodoxostypos.gr/ο-πατριάρχης-αντιοχείας-προτείνει-τη/

3034. “The Albanian Orthodox Church Calls for the Repeal of the Law Banning the Canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (August 28, 2024). URL: http://edinstvo.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6154812.html. See the original statement of the Albanian Orthodox Church: “The Church of Albania Regarding the Persecution of the Canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church by Law 8371” (August 26, 2024). URL: https://orthodoxalbania.org/2020/en/2024/08/26/declaration/

3035. The conference was held on August 26, 2024, in Sofia, Bulgaria. See: “International Conference in Defense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Held in Bulgaria” (August 30, 2024). URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6155214.html. See also the report on the website of the Diocese of Lovech of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church: “Participants in an International Conference Call for the Defense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (August 28, 2024). URL: https://www.predanie.bg/новини/акценти/2517-участници-в-международна-конференция-призоваха-за-защита-на-украинската-православна-църква

3036. The appeal was made on August 26, 2024, following the Liturgy in the Church of St. John of Rila in Pernik, Bulgaria. See: “His Holiness Patriarch Daniil of Bulgaria Calls upon the Faithful to Pray for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (August 30, 2024). URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6155217.html. See also the Bulgarian website: “‘Let Us Pray for the Survival of the Ukrainian Church,’ Metropolitan Daniil of Sofia and Patriarch of Bulgaria Urges in Pernik” (August 25, 2024). URL: https://www.bta.bg/bg/news/lik/731074-da-se-pomolim-za-otselyavaneto-na-ukrainskata-tsarkva-prizova-ot-pernik-sofiysk

3037. “The Patriarchate of Jerusalem Calls upon the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to Repeal the Anti-Church Law” (September 4, 2024). URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6156336.html

3038. “The Synod of the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia Expresses Support for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church” (September 6, 2024). URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/6157083.html. See also the following publication in defense of the UOC: “Statement of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia concerning the Adoption of Law No. 8371 in Ukraine.” URL: https://www.eparchiapo.sk/sk/dokumenty/aktuality/spravodajstvo/vyhlasenie-posvatnej-synody-pravoslavnej-cirkvi-v-ceskych-krajinach-a-na-slovensku-k-prijatiu-zakona-c-8371-na-ukrajine

3039. “Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople: ‘An Antichrist in a Cassock’” (January 12, 2026). URL: http://www.svr.gov.ru/smi/2026/01/konstantinopolskiy-patriarkh-varfolomey-antikhrist-v-ryase.htm

3040. “Announcement concerning the Statement of the Russian Agencies against the Ecumenical Patriarch” (January 13, 2026). URL: https://ec-patr.org/anakoinosi-schetika-me-tin-dilosi-ross/

3041. “Metropolitan Apostolos of New Jersey Expresses Support for the Patriarchate and the Patriarch” (January 23, 2026). URL: https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2026/01/23/stirixi-neas-yerseis-sto-ecum-patr-kai-ton-patr/

3042. Angelopoulos, A.; Karageorgoudis, E. The World of Orthodoxy amid Contemporary Geopolitical Developments in Europe: The Metropolis of Kiev of the Church of Constantinople (1686 AD), the Archbishopric of Ohrid, and the Metropolis of Skopje of the Church of Serbia (1922, 2004 AD). Thessaloniki, 2019. (Theological and Historical Library; Vol. 15). See: “The Foundation for National and Religious Reflection Supports the Patriarch” (January 27, 2026). URL: https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2026/01/27/iethp-stirizei-ton-ecum-patr/

3043. “Interview of Archbishop Elpidophoros of America with the Ukrainian Channel Viche” (January 30, 2026). URL: https://fosfanariou.gr/index.php/2026/01/30/synentefxi-amerikis-elpidoforou-se-oukraniko-kanali/

3044. See: John Chrysostom. Homilies on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (Homilies 1–44), 1.1 // PG. Vol. 61. Col. 13:9–16.

“Unto the Church of God. Not of this or that man, but of God. Which is at Corinth… He calls it the Church of God, showing that it ought to be united. For if it is God’s, it is united and one, not in Corinth only, but throughout the whole inhabited world.”

3045. Monk Antiochos. Pandect of Holy Scripture 80:2–3 // PG. Vol. 89. Col. 1673B:3–4.

“It is pleasing to God to care for the unity of the Church, than which there is nothing better among men.”

3046. See Monk Euthymios Zigabenos’s commentary on 1 Corinthians 11:22: Euthymios Zigabenos. Commentary on Paul’s First Epistle to the Corinthians 11.22:10–11 // Euthymios Zigabenos’s Interpretation of the Fourteen Epistles of the Apostle Paul and the Seven Catholic Epistles, Now Published for the First Time from an Ancient Manuscript, with a Prologue and Notes by Nikephoros Kalogeras: in 2 vols. Vol. 1. Athens, 1887. P. 303.

3047. Kuzenkov, P. V. “Prerogative” and “Primacy”: Toward an Explication of Ecclesiastical-Canonical Concepts. Moscow, 2024.

3048. The Concept of Primacy: Origins and Contexts (collective monograph) / Managing editors: P. V. Ermilov and M. V. Graziansky. Moscow, 2022.

3049. Priest Pavel Ermilov proposes abandoning the concept of “primacy” in favor of the concept of “seniority.” See: Ermilov, P., Priest. “The Concept of ‘Primacy’ in Light of Orthodox Ecclesiology.” Formal academic address delivered by Priest Pavel Ermilov, Associate Professor at St. Tikhon’s Orthodox University and Candidate of Historical Sciences, on November 18, 2022, at the ceremonial convocation marking the university’s thirtieth anniversary (November 18, 2022). URL: https://pstgu.ru/actual/novomucheniki/ponyatie-pervenstva-v-svete-pravoslavnoy-ekkleziologii/

3050. Ignatius of Antioch. The Seven Genuine Epistles (Middle Recension). Ep. 4p, 1:8 // SC. Vol. 10 bis. P. 106. Literally: “presiding in love.”

3051. A. L. Dvorkin wrote in this vein in his Essays on the History of the Universal Orthodox Church. See: Dvorkin, A. L. Essays on the History of the Universal Orthodox Church. Moscow, 2020. Pp. 100–102.

 

Russian source (pp. 1302-1337):

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aNEDx7hcpLeVJ4lz4OjIiSMK9Y1Vgu-K/view

For more information in English: 

https://spzh.eu/en/zashhita-very/95291-a-dissertation-on-constantinoples-primacy-a-dispute-that-will-have-to-be-resolved

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

From the Moscow Patriarchate: "A Brief Overview of the Largest Modern Church Divisions Operating on the Canonical Territory of the Russian Church" (2024)

Dr. Pavel Vladimirovich Bochkov

Associate Professor of the Department of Church History and Church-Practical Disciplines, Kostroma Theological Seminary [1]

 

 

Abstract. The article presents a very brief overview of the largest non-canonical Orthodox jurisdictions currently operating within the canonical territory of the Local Russian Church. Six major structures are examined based on the number of communities of believers within them: the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine,” the “Russian Orthodox Church Abroad” under the jurisdiction of “Metropolitan” Agafangel (Pashkovsky), the “True Orthodox Church of Russia” under the jurisdiction of “Schema-Metropolitan” Seraphim (Motovilov), the “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church” under the jurisdiction of “Metropolitan” Feodor (Gineevsky), the “Apostolic Orthodox Church,” and the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” under “Patriarch” Filaret (Denysenko). The article provides the most concise information about the time and history of the formation of these groups, as well as the number of communities, clergy, and “episcopate.” The overview makes it clear that non-canonical groups, having separated from the Russian Church for various reasons, are often in a state of conflict among their religious leaders in the course of their jurisdictional development and internal organization, which in turn leads to further divisions and fragmentations of these structures. Nevertheless, due to the increase in their “episcopate,” these groups pose a significant threat to ecclesiastical unity. The collection and analysis of materials on the history and current state of non-canonical groups can not only reflect the real situation in the world of schismatic communities, but also serve as a basis for a pan-Church response to this phenomenon—a comprehensive anti-schismatic strategy and the development of further measures for the protection of Church unity and the canonical order of the Church.

 

The issue of church divisions has always been particularly painful for the canonical Church, as it directly concerns the subject of ecclesiastical unity. Schism as a phenomenon always poses a great danger, arouses anxiety not only among the church hierarchy, but also brings discord and misunderstanding into the relationships between clergy and laity, divides society on religious grounds, and can lead to acute conflict situations with a wide range of negative consequences.

By 2024, several dozen schismatic communities of various ideological foundations and different origins were active on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. All these groups, despite the fact that they are mostly in sharp denial of one another, nevertheless act together against the Russian Orthodox Church.

There are a number of classifications and typologies by which church divisions can be examined. However, so as not to overload the audience with this introductory information, we will simply state that in our brief overview we have listed the non-canonical jurisdictions based on the principle of assessing their size from larger to less significant. At the same time, we will consider only the six largest non-canonical communities. We emphasize that the proposed list is intended only to highlight the most prominent groups and does not aim to provide a deep and detailed description of specific jurisdictions, which have been described in sufficient detail by the author in other works. [2] In our report, there is no room for a detailed retelling of the history of the emergence of a particular schism, the personal composition of the episcopate, or the origin of its “apostolic succession.”

Of course, the largest body that has set itself in opposition to the canonical Russian Church is the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), unlawfully created by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2018. In 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate unilaterally “restored to rank” the defrocked and deposed former Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret (Denysenko), who was also under anathema from the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, and at that time headed the non-canonical “Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate” (UOC-KP), as well as the leader of the non-canonical “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” (UAOC), the former priest of the ROC Makariy (Maletych). In 2018, at the initiative of state authorities and personally of the President of Ukraine P. A. Poroshenko, a so-called “Unification Council” of these non-canonical structures was held, which resulted in the creation of a new structure — the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine.” In January 2019, the Patriarchate of Constantinople issued a Tomos granting this jurisdiction autocephalous status. By doing so unilaterally, the Ecumenical Patriarchate delivered a most serious blow to inter-Orthodox relations, the consequences of which pose unprecedented threats to the unity of the Local Churches, not seen since the Great Schism of 1054. As of 2024, the OCU is recognized by the Orthodox Churches of the Greek world: the Patriarchates of Constantinople and Alexandria, as well as the Churches of Greece and Cyprus (while a number of hierarchs of the latter two Churches have made strong statements refusing recognition of the OCU). [3] In the other Local Churches, there is no unity on the issue of canonical recognition of the OCU.

As of mid-February 2024, this jurisdiction had within its episcopate 63 “hierarchs,” of whom 22 were “metropolitans,” 19 “archbishops,” and 22 “bishops.” Of these, 46 are ruling, 10 are vicars, 3 hold titular sees, and 4 are retired (including the former “Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine of the UOC-KP,” Filaret (Denysenko)). [4] As of January 1, 2022, the OCU comprised 6,187 parishes, 71 monasteries, and 3,842 “clergy.” [5] In the past two years, it can be said that the number of communities has increased due to the violent seizure and forced incorporation of communities belonging to the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. By mid-2024, the total number of OCU clergy fluctuates around 5,000 people. However, among the faithful and church-attending populace, the OCU holds no authority; their churches are almost always empty, and strong communities continue to exist only in the territory of Western Ukraine.

The OCU is rather politicized and aggressive. In its rhetoric, it speaks sharply against the Russian Orthodox Church, seeks to absorb, and actively persecutes the canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church. At the same time, the canonical "Ukrainian Church comprises up to a third of the parishes and faithful of the entire Russian Church (Moscow Patriarchate), and therefore the outcome of the current confrontation determines the fate not only of the Russian, but of all world Orthodoxy." [6] A number of hierarchs and clergy of this jurisdiction declare the idea of the Russian World to be heretical, demand that the leadership of the Russian Church be put on trial, and the like. The head of the OCU is “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine” Epiphanius (Dumenko), formerly the “Patriarchal Vicar” of Filaret (Denysenko) and, in effect, the second-in-command in the UOC-KP. His canonical legitimacy personally is questioned not only by the majority of the faithful but also by a number of Primates of Local Orthodox Churches. [7]

The next largest non-canonical jurisdiction is the non-canonical "Russian Orthodox Church Abroad" under the jurisdiction of "Metropolitan" Agafangel (Pashkovsky) (ROCA[A]).

It is worth mentioning here that after 1990, a long series of schisms occurred in ROCA, which led to endless fragmentations and the creation of various synods retaining the unchanged abbreviation ROCA. At present, around thirty small non-canonical jurisdictions consider themselves heirs of the historical ROCA, and through it, of the Orthodox Russian Church.

ROCA(A) arose as a result of the refusal by part of the parishes and communities of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad to recognize the Act of Canonical Communion between ROCA and the ROC in 2007. [8] The most uncompromising clergy, critical of the Moscow Patriarchate, led by Bishop Agafangel (Pashkovsky), fell into schism, declaring that their part of ROCA is the true successor of the historical Russian Church Abroad. As a result, Bishop Agafangel was suspended from ministry and later defrocked. Entering into union with a conglomerate of Greek Old Calendarist jurisdictions, Agafangel (Pashkovsky) carried out a series of ordinations, creating his own hierarchy, which was soon joined by two "bishops" of the non-canonical “Seraphimo-Gennadiev branch of the True Orthodox Catacomb Church,” also known as the “Sekachev” branch (named after the co-founder of this structure, “Schema-Metropolitan” Gennady (Sekach)). It is noteworthy that this branch of the Catacomb Church is completely devoid of apostolic succession, as it originates from the impostor layman Mikhail (Pozdeyev) (1886–1971), who passed himself off as the allegedly surviving Archbishop Seraphim (Ostroumov) (1880–1937) [9] during the years of repression. According to some reports, these “bishops” were received through cheirothesia, according to others—through re-ordination. Moreover, the Synod of Bishops of the historical ROCA was well informed about the lack of apostolic succession among the “Sekachevites,” as the Catacomb Archbishop of ROCA, Lazar (Zhurbenko), who possessed complete information on the state of the Catacomb Church in the USSR, repeatedly informed the ROCA Synod of the origin of the “Sekachevites.”

Nevertheless, the group of Agafangel (Pashkovsky) very soon came to represent a large structure, extended its influence to almost all continents, and engaged in polemics with other groups derived from ROCA.

At present, the jurisdiction numbers about 170 parishes, located both in the post-Soviet space and in countries of the far abroad. In addition to this, the jurisdiction includes 11 “bishops” and 125 “clergy.” [10] The data provided also includes the parishes and communities of the “Free Serbian Orthodox Church,” which are under the jurisdiction of ROCA(A), located in Australia. [11]

The third largest group in terms of numbers is the “True Orthodox Church of Russia” (TOCR) under the leadership of “Schema-Metropolitan” Seraphim (Motovilov), formerly better known as “Metropolitan” Raphael (Prokopyev). This jurisdiction traces its succession to the “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” and is essentially a conglomerate of “hierarchs” of various origins. Its history begins in the early 2000s, when, based on one of the groups that emerged from the disintegration of the “Russian True Orthodox Church,” under the leadership of retired military specialist L. Prokopyev, a structure began to be built that aimed to incorporate the entire so-called “non-canonical ‘alternative’” operating in Russia and neighboring countries. In 2003, a “Unification Council” was held, which absorbed a multitude of non-canonical clergy and “hierarchs.” [12] Thanks to a constant process of migration of “hierarchs,” the group is continuously replenished by various kinds of “bishops,” most of whom later leave the TOCR. Over the years of its existence, several dozen non-canonical hierarchs have passed through its ranks.

As of January 1, 2015, the jurisdiction included 33 religious organizations registered with the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Of these, 3 were centralized organizations, 27 were local, and 3 were monasteries. [13] In addition to this, there exists a certain number of small communities without the status of a religious organization.

As of August 1, 2023, the jurisdiction consisted of 11 “bishops” who operated not only within the territory of Russia but also in countries of Latin America. [14] In addition, a number of this structure’s “hierarchs” are retired or inactive. The jurisdiction includes several dozen communities and several monasteries, with at least two large monasteries located in the Moscow region. Some communities are registered with the justice authorities. The TOCR itself holds the status of a centralized religious organization. Conferences and various theological discussions are held periodically. In particular, a process of rapprochement is observed with the “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church,” another offshoot of the Russian part of ROCA.

At the initiative of the TOCR, the so-called “Synaxis of True Orthodox Churches” was established, which became yet another form of unity for a number of non-canonical communities from various countries. [15]

Speaking of the already mentioned “Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church” (ROAC), currently headed by “Metropolitan” Feodor (Gineevsky), it should be noted that, like ROCA(A), it is a derivative of ROCA.

The Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church traces its history to an intra-jurisdictional crisis that arose within the Russian part of ROCA in the mid-1990s, when the ROCA Bishop of Suzdal and Vladimir, Valentin (Rusantsov) (1939–2012), made the decision to break canonical communion with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and began organizing an independent jurisdiction in Russia, which was initially called the “Higher Church Administration of the Russian Orthodox Church,” later transformed into the ROAC.

For a time, the ROAC was a fairly substantial jurisdiction and, compared to other non-canonical entities, exhibited all the signs of an independent structure: a number of dioceses, a functioning synod, and a regularly convened “Council of Bishops.” After the death of the head of this jurisdiction, “Metropolitan” Valentin (Rusantsov), which occurred in 2012, and following the confiscation of all historical churches from the ROAC by court orders initiated by state authorities, the influence of the ROAC was significantly weakened, and a substantial portion of its clergy transferred to other so-called “ROCA splinters”—formations that broke away from ROCA from 1995 to the present.

As of the second half of 2016, the ROAC had about 90 parish communities and about 60 “priests,” as well as the Suzdal Theological School. [16]

By 2024, the ROAC includes no fewer than 8 “hierarchs” and several dozen small communities throughout the country, including some that are historical catacomb communities.

The next notable non-canonical organization is the “Apostolic Orthodox Church” (AOC). It emerged as a movement for the “renewal and revival of Orthodoxy” and was originally named the “Orthodox Church of the ‘Revival’,” later renamed to the AOC. From 2000 to 2018, the AOC went through a long journey, actively disseminated its ideas, organized a multitude of “dioceses,” for which a considerable number of “bishops” were ordained, most of whom later left the AOC. [17]

It should be noted that at present this religious organization is undergoing a phase of rapid structural expansion. Numerous vagantes (independent “hierarchs,” usually with virtually no flock) from Africa and Asia are joining it; new “episcopal consecrations” are regularly carried out, and statements are made about the accession of entire dioceses, allegedly encompassing the territories of entire countries. However, unlike all the previously mentioned communities, this jurisdiction is neo-renovationist, treats tradition and heritage rather loosely, espouses broad liberalism both in relation to the liturgical tradition and in the area of parish and general ecclesial life, and recognizes a married episcopate. While at its founding in 2000 it bore the features of a typical non-canonical jurisdiction, in light of various reforms, leadership changes, and the mass ordinations of the past three years, one can say that the AOC has transformed into a kind of confederation of religious communities of widely varying traditions and levels of canonical awareness. As a rule, the main flock of the AOC consists of unchurched individuals detached from tradition: members of the intelligentsia, youth involved in various subcultures, representatives of socio-political opposition, liberal thinkers, and the like. The AOC, as a central religious organization, is headed by the illegitimate son of the poet A. A. Galich (real name: Aleksandr Aronovich Ginzburg, 1918–1977), former priest of the Novgorod diocese, Grigory (Mikhnov-Vaytenko). At different times, the AOC has included the anathematized former priest Gleb Yakunin (1934–2014), “Metropolitan” Vitaly (Kuzhevatov), the well-known neo-Pentecostal “Archbishop” Sergey Zhuravlyov, “priest” Lev Regelson, and others. Due to the organization of communities based on the personal contacts of parish leaders, there are currently several dozen small AOC groups and communities active in Russia. A similar situation is observed in Ukraine, where the AOC has its own structures in the form of several non-canonical groups united by a common origin of their “hierarchy” and, in some cases, being in canonical communion with one another. Despite the small size of these groups and the amorphousness of their structure, the AOC poses a serious threat to ecclesiastical unity, as it exploits a number of fashionable liberal slogans and seeks to preach among the socially vulnerable segments of the population, especially the youth.

Regarding the size of the jurisdiction, one can quite confidently speak of several dozen groups in Russia and no fewer than a hundred communities in various countries around the world. At the same time, it is often the case that each individual small community is headed by a “bishop.” The total number of the “episcopate,” by the most conservative estimates, ranges from 20 to 40 persons, including African “hierarchs.” The “Orthodoxy” of the AOC’s representatives is highly conditional; among its “episcopate” one can often encounter rather exotic figures. For example, at one point the AOC included a “bishop” who was simultaneously a Hindu guru, professing a belief system far removed from Christianity and actively practicing syncretic rituals. The presence of such a figure in the “episcopate” led to a schism within the AOC. [18]

Another notable structure within the canonical territory of the Local Russian Church is the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate” headed by the long-standing “Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine” Filaret (Denysenko). Despite the fact that after his separation from the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” very few clergy followed him, he nevertheless managed to effectively revive his structure, contrary to the decisions of his own “Local Council” of 2018 regarding its dissolution and unification with the UAOC. [19]

According to various estimates, in 2023–2024 the UOC-KP consisted of approximately 25 parish communities in Ukraine, none of which had legal registration. Some reports indicate that the largest number of these are located in the Odesa region (about 10 parishes), in the Kryvyi Rih region (7 parishes), and in the Kyiv region (up to 5 parishes). There is also an active European deanery (protopresbyterate), headed by “Protopriest” Volodymyr Chaika, [20] which includes up to 15 communities of Ukrainian believers living in Germany and Denmark. [21] In the United States, there is also the “Vicariate of the UOC-KP in America and Canada,” headed by “Bishop” Luka (Zgoba), rector of the “Patriarchal St. Nicholas Stavropegial Parish” in Philadelphia, USA (the vicariate also includes a St. Nicholas parish in Chicago). Two “bishops” of the UOC-KP reside in Greece; however, the likelihood that a significant number of communities and clergy operate under their jurisdiction is extremely low. In addition, in the spring of 2022, it was announced that several parishes from Australia and New Zealand, led by Archimandrite Nektarios (Alexandratos), were received into the UOC-KP. [22] The synod of the UOC-KP consists of 13 “hierarchs.” [23] The extensive life experience and long service in administrative church positions have enabled Filaret (Denysenko) to keep the UOC-KP afloat. As before, he demands special treatment from the governmental authorities and society of Ukraine. It is noteworthy that Filaret (Denysenko) is the longest-serving hierarch in terms of consecration (1962) and one of the oldest by age (born in 1929) among the heads of non-canonical jurisdictions, surpassed only by the head of the non-canonical “Romanian Old Calendar Orthodox Church,” “Metropolitan” Demosfen (Ioniță).

Structures of the Kyiv Patriarchate also exist in Russia, specifically in the Belgorod region, both in the city of Belgorod itself and in regional towns. Two “hierarchs” of the UOC-KP reside permanently in Russia: “Metropolitan of Belgorod and Oboyan” Ioasaph (Shibayev), who was defrocked by the Bishops’ Council of the ROC in February 1997, and his vicar “Bishop of Valuyki” Peter (Moskalev). [24] Both “hierarchs” became practically the only “bishops” who supported Filaret (Denysenko) in his efforts to “revive” the Kyiv Patriarchate, for which they were defrocked by the “Holy Synod” of the OCU in May 2022. [25]

Of course, there are also other non-canonical groups that declare to all interested parties that they consist of hundreds of parishes and thousands of faithful, but such claims are far from reality. Perhaps the only structure that maintains a stable number of strong church communities located directly on the territory of Russia is the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Old-Rite Church. However, Old Believer jurisdictions lie outside the scope of our review.

At present, the schismatics continue to engage in their non-canonical religious activity. When examining the offshoots of ROCA, it becomes clear that the vast majority of their communities located in the post-Soviet space have entered a state of regression and chaotic “ordinations” to “episcopal” rank of completely random individuals. These trends will only further accelerate the disintegration of the already few communities and will lead to the phenomenon of “vagantes” becoming widespread throughout the entire canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church. It is dangerous that such individuals are, as a rule, simultaneously religious fraudsters, and their rhetoric and methods of preaching in some cases fully fall under the definition of religious extremism.

Active opposition to the schismatics, the creation of one’s own scholarly school, the strengthening of conciliarity and canonical consciousness may be effective means of combating these phenomena. But for this, the participation of the fullness of the entire Church is necessary.

 

NOTES

1. The article is based on the theses of a report delivered at the 3rd All-Russian Scientific and Theological Conference “The Renovationist Schism in Siberia: Canonical, Theological, and Historical Assessments” (Tomsk, Tomsk Theological Seminary, June 17, 2024).

2. See: Bochkov Pavel, Priest. Overview of Non-Canonical Orthodox Jurisdictions of the 20th–21st Centuries. 2nd ed., revised and expanded. St. Petersburg: Svoe Publishing, 2018–2020. Vols. 1–5.

3. See: Seraphim, Metropolitan of Piraeus. The Ukrainian Church Question. Moscow: Publishing House “Poznanie,” 2021; Nikifor, Metropolitan of Kissamos and Tylliria. The Contemporary Ukrainian Question and Its Resolution According to the Divine and Sacred Canons. Moscow: Publishing House “Poznanie,” 2021.

4. Episcopate [Electronic resource] // Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 2024. URL: https://www.pomisna.info/uk/tserkva/yepiskopat/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

5. Report on the Network of Religious Organizations in Vinnytsia Region as of January 1, 2022 [Electronic resource] // State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience. 2024. URL: https://dess.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Zvit-pro-merezhu-relihiynykh-orhanizatsiy-Form1-2022.xlsx (accessed: 20.06.2024).

6. Shchipkov V. A. The USA Against Orthodoxy: Systemic Pressure of the USA on the Russian Orthodox Church as a Means of Geopolitical Struggle Against Russia Amid the Ukrainian Crisis: Monograph / Scientific editors: O. I. Bykova, E. E. Mamaeva. Moscow: Russian Expert School, 2023. p. 35.

7. For example, see: Primate of the Polish Church Refused to Recognize the Head of the OCU as a Clergyman [Electronic resource] // News in Russia and the World. TASS. 2024. URL: https://tass.ru/obschestvo/5980184 (accessed: 20.06.2024).

8. Act of Canonical Communion (signed on May 17, 2007) // Collection of Documents of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vol. 1. Normative Documents. Moscow: Publishing House of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, 2013. pp. 337–340.

9. See: Alekseev V. V., Nechaeva M. Yu. The Resurrected Romanovs?.. On the History of Imposture in 20th Century Russia. Part I. Yekaterinburg, 2001; Alekseev V. V., Nechaeva M. Yu. The Resurrected Romanovs?. On the History of Imposture in 20th Century Russia. Part II. Chelyabinsk; Yekaterinburg, 2002.

10. List of Clergy and Parishes of the Russian Church Abroad with Their Addresses [Electronic resource] // Synod of ROCA. 2024. URL: https://sinod.ruschurchabroad.org/address.htm (accessed: 20.06.2024).

11. Bochkov P. V., Priest. “The Serbian Free Orthodox Church in Australia: The Emergence of the Jurisdiction and Its Current State” // The Lord’s Field. Bulletin of the Penza Theological Seminary. 2023. No. 3(29). pp. 108–116.

12. “Unification Council of Bishops of the True Orthodox Church in Russia” // Church Gazette. Independent Organ of Orthodox Church Thought. Oradell: NJ, 2003. No. 8–9 (121). pp. 6–7.

13. Statistics of Registered Religious Organizations as of 01.01.2015 (according to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation) // Religion and Law. 2015. No. 1 (72). p. 59.

14. Episcopate [Electronic resource] // True Orthodox Church. Official Website. 2024. URL: https://ipckatakomb.ru/епископат/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

15. See: Bochkov P. V., Priest. Non-Canonical International: “Synaxis of the True Orthodox Churches” – A Challenge to the Canonical Unity of the Orthodox Church // The Lord’s Field. Bulletin of the Penza Theological Seminary. 2022. Issue No. 1 (23). pp. 101–114.

16. Representatives of the Vladimir branch of the FSB explained that the ROAC hierarchs they interviewed “have no connection to extremist activity.” They were interested in another individual [Electronic resource] // Portal-Credo.Ru. 2016. URL: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=122032 (accessed: 18.09.2016).

17. Bochkov P., Priest. Renovationism in Our Days. The History of the Emergence and Current State of the Non-Canonical Jurisdiction ‘Apostolic Orthodox Church’ // Ryazan Theological Bulletin. 2016. No. 1 (13). pp. 54–73.

18. For more details, see: Bochkov P. V., Priest. The Emergence of New Non-Canonical Jurisdictions as a Result of Divisions in the Neo-Renovationist “Apostolic Orthodox Church” in 2018–2023 // Ryazan Theological Bulletin. 2015. No. 2 (28). pp. 114–125.

19. The Kyiv Patriarchate and UAOC Self-Dissolved Before the Council [Electronic resource] // Information Portal “RBK-Ukraine.” 2023. URL: https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/kievskiy-patriarhat-uapts-samoraspustilis-1544894232.html (accessed: 15.09.2023).

20. Chaika Volodymyr, Protopriest. Open Appeal of the European Deanery to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2020. No. 11. pp. 11–13.

21. Dean of the European Deanery Congratulated Ukrainians on Easter in Many Cities of Germany and Denmark // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2022. No. 4. p. 24.

22. Parishes from Australia and New Zealand Were Received into the Kyiv Patriarchate // Orthodox Herald. From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate. 2022. No. 3. p. 20.

23. Episcopate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate // Orthodox Church Calendar. Year 2023. Kyiv: From the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, 2022. pp. 2–5.

24. Resolution of the Bishops’ Council on the Deposition from Holy Orders of the Suspended Clergy Archimandrites Valentin (Rusantsov), Adrian (Starina), and Igumen Ioasaph (Shibayev) [Electronic resource] // Russian Orthodox Church. Official Website. 2024. URL: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/417799.html (accessed: 20.06.2024).

25. Documents of the Holy Synod Meeting of May 23, 2022 [Electronic resource] // Orthodox Church of Ukraine. 2024. URL: https://www.pomisna.info/uk/document-post/dokumenty-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-synodu-23-travnya-2022-r/ (accessed: 20.06.2024).

 

Source: Хризостом: научно-просветительский журнал Екатеринодарской духовной семинарии [Chrysostom: The Scientific and Educational Journal of the Ekaterinodar Theological Seminary], 2024. No. 3 (11), pp. 17-28.

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