The Main Positions of the Theory of the Primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople and Their Critique

Hegumen Dionisy (Shlenov)

Abbot of Saint Andrew's Stavropegial Monastery, Moscow, and Professor and Head of Postgraduate Studies at the Moscow Theological Academy

October 24, 2025

Part 1

In the present statement, the main positions or axioms of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople will be analyzed— a theory which has been intensified in recent years with the aim of justifying the uncanonical and extra-territorial actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Ukraine and other regions (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), as well as other cases (issuance of overriding decisions in matters concerning clergy of other jurisdictions). In other words, the theory of primacy has begun to support the practice of primacy— to the detriment of the unity of global Orthodoxy.

The positions or axioms of the theory of primacy can be clearly identified in statements, articles, and books by representatives of the senior clergy of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, professors of theological faculties at universities in Greece, individual scholars, theologians, and journalists from the sphere of the Greek Orthodox world.

During the study of the field of conflict and its causes, eight fundamental positions were identified:

1. The Patriarchate of Constantinople possesses an ecumenical character.

2. The Patriarch of Constantinople has acquired the judicial-administrative rights of the Popes of Rome.

3. The Patriarch of Constantinople possesses the right of the highest judicial instance (final appeal).

4. Only the Patriarch of Constantinople can grant autocephaly.

5. Only the Patriarch of Constantinople has the right to govern the global diaspora.

6. Only the Patriarch of Constantinople can convene a council of primates or an Ecumenical Council.

7. The Patriarchate of Constantinople is the head or the mother of the Churches it established.

8. The institutional organ of primacy is identified with the unity of the Church.

These axioms are considered a priori by the supporters of the theory of primacy as true, generally accepted, and just. However, the evidentiary basis in reality proves to be not only insufficient but also false. These positions do not correspond to the tradition of the Church, are not supported by canon law, ecclesiastical history, or theology, and moreover, they come into substantial contradiction with them. As a result, various areas of the faith are distorted—chiefly, Trinitarian theology and Ecclesiology. The theory of primacy stands in profound opposition to the widely accepted principles of Synodal Ecclesiology, which is generally accepted in the world of traditional Orthodoxy. At the same time, certain historical events or canonical provisions that are cited in support of primacy are merely indicative of the situation at the time, and their application cannot be extended to the contemporary era.

The book by the author of the present statement was recently published, titled "Defense of the Synodal Structure of the Church: The Theory of the Primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople and Its Critique", issued by the Stavropegial Monastery of Saint Andrew in cooperation with the Moscow Theological Academy. This book was written over the course of the last six years, as an effort to investigate the subject. The present statement constitutes, on the one hand, a concise presentation of the book’s positions, and on the other hand, an attempt to identify a unified framework for the description of externally heterogeneous, yet internally fairly coherent and non-conflicting arguments and views, which, nevertheless, depart from ecclesiastical tradition.

1. The Patriarchate of Constantinople Possesses an Ecumenical Character

In 2007, in order to justify the stance of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and its support for the Apostolic Orthodox Church of Estonia (AOCE-CP), Archimandrite Grigorios (Papathomas) stated that the Patriarchate of Constantinople is “ecumenical,” whereas the other Churches, including the Russian Church, are only “local.” Consequently, as “ecumenical,” it is entitled to do what no other Church can allow itself to do—namely, to redesign jurisdictional boundaries or to establish new jurisdiction, even at the request of local authorities.

At the present stage, the supporters of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople—as well as the Patriarch of Constantinople himself—think as follows: “ecumenical” (οἰκουμενικός) means global, without borders, exceptional; “local” (τοπικός) – limited by place, by borders, provincial.

In ecclesiastical organization, the adjectives “ecumenical” and “local” emphasize the fundamental distinction between the ecumenical Church of Constantinople and the other Local Churches.

However, this distinction is unacceptable, as it distorts the equal relations among the Local Churches—among which the Church of Constantinople itself belongs—being first among equals in honor, but not in authority.

One of the arguments from the side of the supporters of synodal ecclesiology is that in ecclesiastical tradition (Greek patristic and Christian texts from the 1st to the 20th century, acts of councils, etc.), the Ecumenical Church of Constantinople is never mentioned in contrast to less mature Local Churches. At the same time, within the Church’s tradition, the concepts of Ecumenical and Local Councils have been established. For example, Saint Theodore the Studite wrote that he accepts “every council—both Ecumenical and Local” (πᾶσαν σύνοδον οἰκουμενικήν τε καὶ τοπικήν). Saint Photius the Confessor, Patriarch of Constantinople, pointed out the distinction between the more catholic Ecumenical Councils and the more Local ones, particularly emphasizing the ecumenical character of the Council of Chalcedon. Dositheos, Patriarch of Jerusalem, wrote: “Better than the Local Councils is the Ecumenical one, and it is the criterion of the Church, not the Roman (Papal one),” and regarding the adjective “ecumenical” in the title of the Popes of Rome and the Archbishops of Constantinople—he regarded it as conventional.

The division of the Churches into an Ecumenical Church of Constantinople and Local Churches is an administrative-canonical neologism that has taken its final form among the modern supporters of the theory of primacy. As a model for this division, they may have used medieval Roman ecclesiology, according to which the Church of Rome as “catholic” (universalis) exists alongside all the other Churches. The division of Councils into ecumenical and local may also have been transferred by them into the structure of the Church. However, with this approach, the rights of the Patriarch of Constantinople are, in essence, proclaimed equal to the rights of an Ecumenical Council—something that is not merely mistaken but constitutes an unlawful appropriation of the rights of ecclesiastical plenitude.

2. The Patriarch of Constantinople Acquired the Judicial-Administrative Rights of the Popes of Rome

One of the main claims of the supporters of the theory of primacy is that the Patriarch of Constantinople holds supreme judicial and administrative authority in the East, by analogy with the corresponding authority of the Popes of Rome in the West. This claim can be formulated in various ways, depending on the different interpretations concerning the time frame of the application of Roman primacy by analogy within the Orthodox East.

According to the first scenario, the “transfer” (μεταβίβασις) to the Patriarch of Constantinople of the supreme judicial-administrative rights of the Pope of Rome took place after the schism with Rome in 1054.

According to the second scenario, the Patriarchs of Constantinople acquired equal rights with Rome at the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.) or even at the Second Ecumenical Council (381 A.D.). Nevertheless, the supporters of primacy—primarily Metropolitan Kyrillos (Katerelos)—draw attention to the fact that, as it is claimed, the Roman Popes were strengthened with supreme judicial rights at the Council of Sardica (343 A.D.). Whereas the Patriarchs of Constantinople, according to the 3rd Canon of the Second Ecumenical Council and the 28th Canon of the Fourth Ecumenical Council, obtained “equal” presbeia (honors/rank) with Rome, and consequently, from the end of the 4th century and the middle of the 5th century, came to be endowed with the privileges of a supreme court, as well as with other privileges of the Roman Popes. That is, as if from that time, the Roman Popes and the Patriarchs of Constantinople possessed a special primacy—the former in the West, the latter in the East.

However, the existence of supreme judicial-administrative rights in the Roman Popes of the first millennium is a very large and controversial issue. From the standpoint of the Holy Fathers of the Eastern Church, they did not possess such rights. The judicial competencies granted to the Roman Popes by the Council of Sardica were not absolute, while the actual formulations of the canons of the Second and Fourth Ecumenical Councils emphasized the advantages of honor (that is, the second place in honor after Rome), and not of authority. Even in the West itself, earthly primacy in the Church could be subject to criticism. For example, Saint Gregory the Great wrote to Saint Eulogios of Alexandria regarding the inadmissibility of anyone calling himself “Ecumenical,” clearly refusing to attribute to himself universal powers:

“You took care to seal the word of the proud title by calling me ‘ecumenical pope.’ This, I beg you, do not do anymore, my most holy Holiness, for what is given to another to a greater extent is taken away from you, beyond what reason demands.”

Also, one of the chief ideologues of the primacy of honor and authority in the West, Saint Leo the Great, likewise wrote that synodal decisions prevail over his personal decisions:

“[The Lord] confirmed with the irrevocable consent (irretractabili firmavit assensu) of the whole brotherhood that which He had previously established through our service—to show that truly it was from Him Himself that what was originally established by the first of all sees (a prima omnium sede formatum) proceeded, and thereafter received the judgment of the whole Christian world (totius orbis judicium recepisset): so that even in this, the members remain in agreement with the head.”

The very primacy of Rome in the first millennium—if one recognizes it with some degree of condescension—was perceived critically in the East and became one of the causes of the schism in the mid-11th century. The authoritarian primacy which Rome pursued could not be imitated by Constantinople, which was oriented toward the synodal structure of all the Churches of the Orthodox East.

If, however, Constantinople—either before or after the defection of Rome and under certain conditions—acquired a kind of authoritative-administrative primacy, then such primacy had an abusive character, which today (in contrast to the Byzantine and later Ottoman period) is not supported by any objective factor.

3. The Patriarch of Constantinople Possesses the Right of the Highest Judicial Instance (Final Appeal)

In the present period (especially from 2018 onward), the Patriarch of Constantinople considers the right of final appeal to be his inviolable prerogative. He reinstates clerics from other jurisdictions despite the decisions of their immediate and sole ecclesiastical authority, etc. Upon what is such certainty based?

The most significant canons on this matter—the 9th and 17th Canons of the Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.)—spoke of the possibility of appealing either to the exarch of the administration or to the Bishop of Constantinople as the final judicial instance (appeal), for those located within the bounds of his jurisdiction, but not for members of other Local Apostolic Churches.

Nevertheless, it is precisely the 9th and 17th Canons that are said to constitute the most significant source for the modern groundless judicial decisions of the Patriarch of Constantinople. In other words, Canons 9 and 17, together with the important Canon 28, are considered the principal foundation of the theory of primacy. They are alleged to clearly demonstrate special judicial (Canons 9 and 17) and extra-territorial (Canon 28) privileges of the Patriarch of Constantinople—privileges which none of the other Primates of the Local Churches possessed or possesses.

The basic formulation of Canon 9:

“…If a bishop or cleric disputes the decisions of the metropolitan of the province, let him appeal either to the exarch of the large province (administration) or to the throne of the imperial city of Constantinople, and from them let him be judged.”

It proves to be a stumbling block and a field for riddles, despite the rather specific wording of its meaning. With a precise understanding of the text and the terms of the canon, the exarch of the administration was not one of the presidents of the Local Churches of the time (in Alexandria there was no exarch at all, while in Antioch and Jerusalem there was one exarch of the East), but at most one of the three exarchs of the dioceses of Pontus, Asia, and Thrace, who were incorporated into the Patriarchate of Constantinople according to the 28th Canon of Chalcedon, or the exarch of Thrace, within whose territory Constantinople was located.

In the following centuries, recourse to the court of the Patriarch of Constantinople, by analogy with the imperial court, could only be occasional, arising from the conditions of the late Byzantine period.

The ancient Churches of the Christian East—namely Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, as well as the Archdiocese of Cyprus, which had apostolic origin—possessed their independence. The Church of Constantinople did not exercise any superior administrative or judicial oversight over them. When these Churches found themselves in adverse circumstances in territories that fell under the dominion first of the Persians, then the Arabs and the Turks, they looked to Constantinople—the capital of a free Orthodox empire—and to its hierarch, the bishop of the imperial capital, who had particular support from the Emperor. Yet even under such conditions, the Churches preserved a fundamental equality—on the basis of an ancient custom.

The principle of equality in the spirit of conciliarity in the mutual relations of the ancient Churches must also be applied within the family of Autocephalous Churches that appeared in later periods.

In the period from 2018 onward, at the height of the spread of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, a series of uncanonical judicial decisions were issued, which caused harm primarily to the integrity of the Russian Orthodox Church. From a moral standpoint, the supreme judge in the Church—if such a position were possible—would have to bear responsibility for the fate of global Orthodoxy, presenting through his own person a flawless example of truth.

However, as the situation in Ukraine has demonstrated, the extra-territorial judicial actions of the Patriarch of Constantinople worsened an already complex situation. The persecutions of Christians belonging to the canonical Church in Ukraine, the seizures of monasteries and churches, and in certain cases the sacrilegious treatment of sacred things, proved to be the result of the implementation of the measures of the Patriarch of Constantinople, including judicial ones. His appropriation of the right of the supreme court led to hatred, intensification of strife, and schism—not only in Ukraine but also in the global Orthodox world.

4. Only the Patriarch of Constantinople Can Grant Autocephaly

In contemporary ecclesiastical and canonical science, Churches are distinguished as either Autocephalous or Autonomous. Autocephalous Churches are completely independent, whereas Autonomous Churches possess limited autonomy and are connected to the Mother Church that endowed them with specific rights. Supporters of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople insist on a fundamental distinction between the ancient Churches of apostolic succession and those Churches that were established in the Middle Ages or in the modern era—namely, the Autocephalous ones. According to their position, the “Autocephalous” Churches—despite the actual meaning of the word—are not fully independent when compared to the ancient apostolic ones. In reality, however, the term autocephalous (αὐτοκέφαλος) means “self-governed / independent” and, in ecclesiastical tradition, has been used both to describe ancient Churches and later-established ones that are fully autonomous. During the second millennium A.D., the adjective autocephalous was applied to both ancient, later Patriarchal Churches—such as those of Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Cyprus—as well as to newly established Churches, such as the Bulgarian Church or that of Ohrid, whose existence dates back to the Justiniana Prima. The historical use of the term autocephalous itself shows that the division between ancient apostolic Churches and others—as Churches supposedly possessing greater or lesser rights—is artificial and does not correspond to the equality of the Churches according to the principles of synodal ecclesiology.

In the ecclesiology of the contemporary Patriarchate of Constantinople and of the supporters of the theory of primacy, the distinction between ancient apostolic and more recent Autocephalous Churches carries significant consequences. If there is any difference in rights and competencies between the ancient apostolic Churches and those that were subsequently established (something which in reality does not exist and cannot exist!), then the very process of the creation of newer Churches depends both on the ancient Churches and especially on that Church which is considered first in honor—namely, Constantinople.

The discussions concerning the document on autocephaly, which was finalized by the Inter-Orthodox Preparatory Commission (Chambésy 1990; 1993), and which took place in Geneva in February 2011, reveal two fundamentally different approaches. Constantinople, by means of a special signing right, sought to assert its determination of primacy in the matter of granting autocephaly, whereas the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and a number of others sought the imposition of a joint decision by all the Local Churches—something that, in their view, should also be reflected in the manner of signing the Tomos of Autocephaly.

Subsequently, the Patriarch of Constantinople and his collaborators followed a path of even more unilateral action, reserving for themselves the right to decide on the granting of autocephaly according to two scenarios. According to the first scenario, a later Pan-Orthodox Council, internally and externally under their control, would approve this decision.

The second scenario, which is now considered the principal one, consists in the claim that the Patriarchate of Constantinople has the right to grant autocephaly unilaterally, without the need for any synodal approval. According to this approach, the granting of autocephaly to the "Orthodox Church of Ukraine" in 2018 – early 2019 does not constitute a violation of the "rights of the Churches," but rather appears to be an indisputable method. Thus, since 2018, the Patriarchate of Constantinople has abandoned the more traditional and mutually agreed methods of granting autocephaly in favor of its individual right over this process, which is of exceptional importance for the entire global Orthodox world.

Certain Autocephalous Churches originated from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In such a case, it is natural and proper that the Patriarch of Constantinople, as a rule with the synodal consent of the other Churches, granted them autocephaly, which was confirmed by a Tomos.

The following Churches belong to this category:

1. Russian Orthodox Church (1589; 1593).

2. Church of Greece (self-proclamation of autocephaly in 1833; recognition by the Patriarchate of Constantinople on 29 June 1850).

3. Serbian Orthodox Church (1879).

4. Romanian Orthodox Church (self-proclamation of autocephaly in 1865; recognition by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1885).

5. Albanian Orthodox Church (self-proclamation of independence in 1922–1929; recognition in 1937).

6. Bulgarian Orthodox Church (self-proclamation in 1870; recognition on 22 February 1945).

The granting of autocephaly to each of the aforementioned Churches constitutes an intra-territorial act of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and, as such, cannot be used as a precedent for extra-territorial actions—namely, for the unilateral granting of autocephaly to Churches that existed within the territory of other Local Churches.

A number of Churches emerged following the separation of states that had belonged to the Commonwealth of the Russian Empire. These include:

1. Polish Orthodox Church (Tomos of Autocephaly issued by the Patriarchate of Constantinople on 13 November 1924).

2. Finnish Orthodox Church (Tomos of Autonomy issued by the Patriarchate of Constantinople on 6 July 1923).

3. Estonian Orthodox Church (Tomos of Autonomy issued by the Patriarchate of Constantinople on 7 July 1923).

In the pre-revolutionary period, the faithful of these Church regions belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, they found themselves in independent states, whose centrifugal tendencies led their leadership to seek new ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the Church of Constantinople. However, the Russian Orthodox Church—mindful of Byzantine examples from Church history (which did not always strictly follow the state administrative system)—did not agree with such re-subjugation and restructuring.

In other words, the Patriarchate of Constantinople took advantage of the extremely unfavorable political conditions for the Church in post-revolutionary Russia and, for the first time in its history, granted autocephalous or autonomous status to Churches whose parishes historically belonged to another jurisdiction—specifically, the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church. Such actions required a peculiar theory of primacy, which, in general terms, lay in the reserves of the Phanariotes, who had acquired extensive experience in asserting the dominance of their Church within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.

Beyond these Churches, the recognition of the OCU (Orthodox Church of Ukraine) marked the peak of uncanonical conduct in this area. In early 2019, the OCU was entered into the diptychs of the Orthodox Churches on the website of the Patriarchate of Constantinople—an act that led not to legitimization, but to a further deterioration of the overall ecclesiastical situation.

Today, the unlawful extra-territorial activity of the Patriarchate of Constantinople continues in the Baltic countries: Latvia and Lithuania, as well as in Estonia.

All these processes in the Baltic aim to significantly weaken the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and to strengthen the position of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as if it possesses special rights.

Certain Churches were previously under the jurisdiction of other Patriarchates—specifically, the Church of the Czech Lands and the Macedonian Church were under the aegis of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Constantinople’s claims to special authority over them are likewise insufficiently substantiated.

Therefore, when Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople claims an exclusive right to grant autocephaly in all cases where it is requested, he often presents what is desired as though it were actual. Extra-territorial actions—including extra-territorial autocephalies—are categorically unacceptable and cannot be accepted in light of the traditionally established and existing canons of Orthodox canon law.

It is evident that the Russian Orthodox Church likewise possesses the same right to grant autocephaly, just as the other Local Churches do—for Churches that are formed within the regions of its jurisdiction.

In antiquity, the Georgian Orthodox Church acquired its independence from the Church of Antioch in 1053. At the beginning of summer 2022, the Serbian Orthodox Church issued a Tomos of Autocephaly to the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

In the case of granting autocephaly within its own canonical territory, the voice of the Mother Church holds decisive significance—with the consent of all the other Churches. If the primary right is assigned to the first-ranking Church—in this case, Constantinople—then it would be able to decide matters concerning other Churches to its own advantage, but to the detriment of their interests, as occurred in the "Estonian" and subsequently in the "Ukrainian ecclesiastical issue."

 

Part 2

5. Only the Patriarch of Constantinople has the Right to Govern the Global Diaspora

In general terms, one may note that a model of diaspora administration was tested on the Greek-American flock from the early 1900s to the 1920s, which soon began to be replicated in relation to other parts of the world. It must, however, be taken into account that this exclusive right over the diaspora, which is still being claimed even in the early 21st century, does not correspond to the actual rights of the Patriarch of Constantinople either during the flourishing period of Byzantium or during the period of Turkish rule.

In reality, during the period from 1922 (the establishment of the Metropolises of Thyateira and America) until 2008 (the establishment of the Metropolis of Singapore), the entire world—except for the immediate jurisdiction of other Local Churches and those regions where a conflict of interests was foreseen or the situation was utterly hopeless—came under the jurisdiction of the diaspora of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The continent of Africa remained outside the activity of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as it was related to the Church of Alexandria, although Africa, apart from the ancient jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, could also, from the perspective of Constantinople, belong to the regions of the diaspora.

The 12 regions of the diaspora, which were defined at the 4th Pre-Conciliar Pan-Orthodox Meeting in 2009, turned out in practice to be practically identical to those Greek metropolises which claim full ecclesiastical authority over their regions.

In the global sphere, there existed and continue to exist other Orthodox diasporas with their own divisions into provinces. Particularly strong diasporas were held by the Churches of Russia, Antioch, Serbia, and Poland. These very Churches were the principal opponents of the consolidation of all diasporas under the authority of Constantinople. However, for the sake of ecclesiastical peace and the preservation of unity, the establishment of Episcopal Assemblies was permitted in connection with the metropolises of the diaspora of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, whose hierarchs were to preside over the very Episcopal Assemblies. For the Patriarchate of Constantinople, this was a certain small gain, which was to be completed by the full subjection of the entire diaspora to it in a Pan-Orthodox Council.

In the document of the Council of Crete concerning the diaspora, the list of the diaspora metropolises of the Patriarchate of Constantinople for the year 2016 is presented, with the addition of the Canadian Metropolis in the first position. This list is understood by the supporters of the theory of primacy as the normative list of regions of the entire global Orthodox diaspora. The ambiguity embedded in the introduction of the document (ethnophyletism – anti-ethnophyletism) remains entirely intact. It could not be eliminated by those who see in these Greek regions of the diaspora a space in which to include faithful of other national Churches living outside their homelands.

The supporter of the theory of primacy Fr. Ioannis Riera considers that the rights of the Patriarchate of Constantinople over the diaspora stem from the theory of primacy itself, if it is recognized. As if the Church of Constantinople, as Mother Church, has the right to govern the entire diaspora. However, since the theory of primacy is not proven, the governance of the diaspora under the leadership of the Patriarch of Constantinople, as part of that theory, is shown to be just as uncanonical as the theory itself.

The rejection of the model of diaspora administration proposed by Constantinople sets new responsibilities before global Orthodoxy and each Local Church. Without attempting to predict the decision that could be taken at a pan-Orthodox level in order to improve the situation with the diaspora, one may say that even the current state of the diaspora—even if outwardly heterogeneous—may prove more successful than the mechanistic plan of diaspora governance under the leadership of Constantinople, devoid of the spirit of love and genuine brotherhood. In perspective, mechanisms of interaction between the diasporas of various Local Churches should be sought, and, possibly, both secondary and primary cases should be resolved individually. The Holy Fathers left no canons for such situations. The Church has always lived and continues to live by taking into account the events of the world. Nevertheless, in view of the current state of affairs, one must contribute carefully in accordance with ecclesiastical tradition, as much as possible—both in form and in spirit.

One may pose the question: but what should be done if, in the modern world, the ecclesiastical diaspora cannot be organized according to the principle “one city – one bishop”? It is difficult to find an answer to this question. Nevertheless, the restriction of the rights of the Autocephalous Churches and the attribution to a single Church, that of Constantinople, of those rights which historically never belonged to it—neither in the time of Byzantium nor during the Turkish rule—is not a solution. If the Patriarch of Constantinople were to exercise his primacy of honor with dignity and serve the other Churches in a spirit of humility, then perhaps the issue of the diaspora could—with mutual agreements—be coordinated more precisely, both in line with the actual competencies of Constantinople itself and with the responsibilities of the other Churches, in a spirit of peace and concord. But in the current conflictual situation, which has been exacerbated due to the persecution of the Church in Ukraine, the claims of the Patriarch of Constantinople to govern the diasporas of all the other Autocephalous Churches sound particularly biased, since one who became the instigator of the schism cannot govern parishes that consider themselves in organic relation with other Local Churches—especially with those that do not recognize the said schism.

6. Only the Patriarch of Constantinople can Convene a Council of Primates or an Ecumenical Council.

The Russian Orthodox Church, in its history, recognized the primacy of honor and the coordinating role of Constantinople, which was based on its historically established authority. However, when the coordinator claims powers—as the Patriarch of Constantinople does—then the very primacy of honor, as well as such a coordinating role, becomes unacceptable. These positions are understood in relation to the question of who has the right to convene a Pan-Orthodox Council.

In the first millennium (and theoretically also in the second), the right to convene an Ecumenical Council belonged exclusively to the Byzantine Emperor. The modern academic presentation of the role of the Emperors/Kings in the convocation of the Ecumenical Councils has been made by Protopresbyter N. Afanasiev and F. Lauritzen.

The ancient ecclesiastical historian Socrates Scholasticus expresses this approach as follows:

"From the time when [the Emperors] began to support the Christian faith, ecclesiastical affairs depended on them, and the great Councils functioned and continue to function based on their decision."

The Ecumenical Councils are convened by the Emperor according to the economy of the Holy Spirit. The Emperor, for the convocation of the Council, uses a "decree" (enactment), and he also holds in his power the laws by which he confirmed the first four Ecumenical Councils (Emperor Justinian), and subsequently the remaining three (Emperor Leo the Wise): "In the Byzantine tradition, a Council involving multiple jurisdictions must be convened by the Emperor."

The bishops could convene councils, but not Ecumenical ones—only Local Councils. Thus, for example, Bishop Alexander attempted to convene a council against Arius, and the Macedonian heretics held a series of their own councils.

As is known, after the era of the Ecumenical Councils, which were convened by the Emperor, such councils were no longer convened. In the second half of the 20th century, the following notion was formulated: that after the Byzantine Emperors, the right to convene Ecumenical Councils passed to the Pope of Rome, and after his apostasy, this right should belong to the Patriarch of Constantinople.

However, this notion—of which Metropolitan John of Pergamon (Zizioulas) was a supporter—does not correspond to reality. The Byzantine Emperors in no way entrusted their authority to the Popes of Rome after the Seventh Ecumenical Council.

Furthermore, by decree of the Byzantine Emperor Basil I, the Great Council of 879–880 AD was convened, in which—according to its 1st Canon—the rights of the Pope of Rome were equated with the rights of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Popes of Rome at the end of the first millennium did not convene Ecumenical or pan-Orthodox Councils, and therefore could not “transfer” to the Patriarchs of Constantinople a right which they did not possess or were unable to exercise.

The Popes of Rome insisted on their right to convene councils based on their primacy; however, this claim was not accepted in the Orthodox East. Such a “pro-Western” position, for example, was expressed by the Hierarch of Rhodes to the Byzantine Emperor at the Council of Ferrara–Florence—that the Pope “has the authority to convene Councils.” The right of the Emperors to convene Ecumenical Councils, as opposed to the claimed right of the Popes of Rome, is a characteristic principal theme of Byzantine polemical literature.

With such a controversial role of the Popes of Rome, the role of the Patriarch of Constantinople in convening a Council in the first half and the middle of the 20th century was not widely recognized. Only in 1968, at the 4th Pan-Orthodox Meeting (June 8–15, 1968, Chambésy), was the decision made that the next Pan-Orthodox Council would be convened by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

This decision to grant the right of convening the Council to the Patriarch of Constantinople was called by the main specialist in the history of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the 20th century, the priest Pavel Ermilov, a "compromise working model" and not legislation that had been enacted once and for all, nor a "recognition of the pan-ecclesial leadership of the Patriarch of Constantinople." Indeed, one may agree with this assessment. At the same time, it must be especially emphasized that in 1968, as well as at the Pre-Conciliar Meeting in January 2016, mechanisms were being developed for the convocation of a specific Pan-Orthodox Council—the first after the era of the Ecumenical Councils and thus, by design, a unique one.

Today, the discussion concerning the right to convene a Council has significantly deteriorated. In global Orthodoxy in 2018, a schism occurred, caused by the unilateral actions of the Patriarch of Constantinople in recognizing the Ukrainian schismatics. Initially, Metropolitan Hierotheos (Vlachos) attempted to present this unilateral recognition as temporary—it would later have to be ratified synodally. However, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople categorically disagreed with this view. From his perspective, he possesses the right to such unilateral actions, and no subsequent approval in Council is required.

In light of the absolute opposition of the Russian Orthodox Church to this unilateral practice and its lamentable consequences, the discussions concerning the Council have taken on increased sharpness. Essentially, the one who has the right to convene—or, conversely, to refuse to convene—a Council becomes the key stakeholder in a complex and conflictual situation. The Council must be convened so as to justify its own scenario or simply to confirm it. And conversely, the Council must not be convened in order not to hinder the realization of such a scenario.

The Patriarch of Constantinople has himself declared that he has the right to convene a Council. Other Greek-speaking Churches have accepted this position as an axiom—both those who agree with the position of the Patriarch of Constantinople and those who have taken a critical or neutral stance (the Orthodox Churches of Jerusalem and Albania).

However, after 2018 the situation has become significantly more complicated compared to the previous period. The Patriarch of Constantinople carried out an incursion into the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, through which he actively demonstrated a primacy of honor and authority. As the instigator of the schism, he does everything he can to retain pan-Orthodox initiative in his own hands, as if nothing had happened or as if something had occurred for which the opposing side is responsible.

In the meantime, modern supporters of the theory of primacy, based on the declaration of the 1968 meeting and on the regulations of the Council of Crete in 2016 (which, in essence, had begun in 1968), draw conclusions regarding a general rule: that the Patriarch of Constantinople convenes the Council. However, such a universal rule was neither discussed nor approved—something understood even by those who present the desirable as if it were reality (as seen from the analysis of the publication by A. Vavouskos).

Particular attention should be given to the Council of Crete in 2016. After years of preparation, it was supposed to constitute a new landmark in the conciliar life of the Church. Before it, there were Ecumenical Councils with the presence of representatives from all the Orthodox Churches, as well as particularly significant Local Councils (such as, for example, the Palamite Councils of 1341 or 1351 AD), whose decisions are exceptionally relevant for the entire Orthodox Church. The later Great Councils of the Eastern Church clearly approached, in conception, the Ecumenical Councils (such as the Council of Constantinople of 1872 against ethnophyletism), but due to the actual representation of the Local Churches and due to their moderate (and not always precise) decisions, they could not lay claim to such a role.

The Council of Crete was supposed to be the first representative Council after a gap of more than a millennium, analogous to the Ecumenical Councils—“Spirit-guided” (πνευματοκίνητη); however, the insufficient representation (four Churches were absent) and a very modest agenda without the resolution of any major doctrinal issue did not contribute to its recognition as the supreme spiritual authority.

In the meantime, the Council of Crete became a very significant milestone in the increase of the unilateral decisions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which soon led to a schism among the Orthodox Churches. In the case of the Council of Crete, the Patriarch of Constantinople exercised his right to convene it; however, this attempt cannot be characterized as successful.

For the convocation of the next Pan-Orthodox Council, it is required that the Orthodox Churches entrust this right either to the Patriarch of Constantinople or to one of the Primates of the Churches. Due to the lost unity, a unanimous entrustment is an almost unattainable task. Today, the question becomes sharper: can he who deviated from the truth and became the instigator of schism in the Orthodox Church convene a Council? Have there been precedents in which the erroneous party, without renouncing its error, could be a judge over what is right?

In any case, the position regarding the right of the Patriarch of Constantinople to convene a Pan-Orthodox Council is incorrect. He has already exercised this right and has exhausted the opportunity that was granted to him. In such a case, the reasonable question arises: what are the mechanisms for convening a Council in the subsequent era? In the mid-20th century, different answers were given to this question. In the 21st century, the general ecclesiastical situation has escalated due to the insurmountable division. With a general willingness of the Orthodox Churches—or of a portion of them—to interact in accordance with the principles of conciliar ecclesiology in a spirit of mutual assistance and love, the possibility will open for conducting a maximally representative Council with peacemaking and constructive aims.

7. The Patriarchate of Constantinople is the Head or the Mother of the Churches it Established

The historical origin of a Church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople is used to justify its sovereign character over that Church. This implies that the Russian Orthodox Church must always remain in a position of dependency upon Constantinople—something contrary to the full autonomy it acquired at the end of the 16th century.

Given that historically the majority of the autocephalous Churches received their autocephaly from Constantinople, the supporters of the theory of primacy uphold the superiority of the Church-as-Head or Church-as-Mother over the Churches that were established through its efforts. This superiority is expressed in the notion that the daughter Churches must obey Constantinople, carry out whatever it commands, and not insist upon their rights and privileges. Such concessions, in practice, can lead to the justification of wrongdoing, the distortion of ecclesiastical tradition, and the unjustified belittlement of national Churches and the peoples who bear the Orthodox faith in the modern world. This very approach is anti-historical, as it seeks to interpret present-day reality through the lens of historical conditions that no longer exist, that remain in the distant past.

In ecclesiastical tradition, custom has always been significant. Many ancient Churches, by virtue of custom, acquired and preserved their rights and privileges. However, development occurred in their history: metropolises could become patriarchates, bishoprics could become archbishoprics, etc. If the ancient metropolises had insisted on their unaltered rights, then the new Churches would not have been able to obtain their own jurisdictions. One may recall ancient Ephesus, capital of the Diocese of Asia, which did not immediately agree to submit to the Church of Constantinople, established in 451 AD. Consequently, Constantinople’s insistence on the historical primacy (by virtue of custom) stands in opposition to the new realities of the developing life of the Church—by virtue of which Constantinople itself once obtained that which it previously did not have.

In the patristic tradition, there is never any reference to a unique head of the earthly Church or to a Church-Mother par excellence—in relation to any Church in the East, including the Church ranked first in title after the separation of Rome in 1054 AD. Certain predecessors of the Roman Church from the end of the first millennium onward considered themselves to possess actual leadership. But the Orthodox East opposed this excessive primacy with the idea of conciliarity, strengthened by the internal desire for the restoration of ecclesiastical unity. Conciliarity remains to this day a precious possession of ecclesiastical tradition, from which nothing can be taken away nor added.

8. The Institutional Organ of Primacy is Identified with the Unity of the Church

The theologians and canonists of Constantinople, adopting the theological analogy of Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) between the monarchy of God the Father in the Trinity and the primatial position of the Ecumenical Patriarch in global Orthodoxy, began to formulate the indivisible unity of the Church in the image of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity and of the union of the two natures—divine and human—in the person of the Second Hypostasis of the Holy Trinity, Christ the Savior. These same analogies—if applied to the level of ecclesiastical-administrative organization of the Church—can be misleading. The Church, as the pillar of the truth, preserves it. And from this unity, among others, even Patriarchs of Constantinople have deviated.

At the same time, the supporters of the theory of primacy employ a kind of beautifully expressed rhetorical antithesis. They say “Ecumenical Church” or “Church of Christ” instead of “Church of Constantinople.” They equate the two Churches, considering that Constantinople preeminently represents the Ecumenical [Church], that if truth exists anywhere, it is precisely here, and no one is entitled to question that the Ecumenical Throne itself possesses it (the truth). Constantinople—by definition—is right, as the “Ecumenical” (!) Church.

The excessive emphasis on the concept of ecumenicity also leads to the identification of the Church that particularly claims the title “Ecumenical” with the entire Church, something clearly seen in the rhetoric of the supporters of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople. For them, the Ecumenical Church is not merely a Church without borders, but a Church that preeminently is identified with the core or essence of the whole of global Orthodoxy.

From the perspective of the supporters of the theory of primacy, those who oppose the primacy are also opposing the unity of the Church. The institutional status of primacy, for them, is the guarantee of ecclesiastical unity. Without speaking about infallibility, they effectively recognize it, as seen in the example of taking uncanonical measures in the “Ukrainian issue.” That which caused the schism in global Orthodoxy is justified, silenced, distorted, and presented positively under the prism of a new ecclesiology. Partiality becomes a method of justifying injustice, because if a greater number of parties were involved, consensus would not be achieved.

If the Ecumenical Patriarch is compared to the First Person of the Holy Trinity—the God the Father—then his words and actions are not subject to criticism. The Ecumenical Patriarch and the supporters of the theory of primacy appear to have the right to freely interpret dogma and the canons, which are primarily required in order to justify their primacy and actual leadership in the world of contemporary Orthodoxy.

Consequently, today there has occurred a loss of consensus and harmony among the Orthodox Local Churches. Unfortunately, as a result of unilateral actions by the Ecumenical Patriarch, the primacy of honor, which was transformed into a primacy of authority, has exceeded all permissible limits. The deep conviction of the evidently mistaken side in its own correctness has led to the consolidation of the supporters of the theory of the primacy of the Patriarch of Constantinople—without any attempt to provide serious scholarly-theological or ecclesiastical-historical documentation, something which is, in principle, impossible to accomplish.

The general ideology of the supporters of the theory of primacy, with the backing of the apparatus of Western European and American scholarship, nevertheless continues to be presented against a background of apparent plausibility.

The efforts of the theologians and canonists of the Russian Orthodox Church are ignored, unheard, not taken into account, left unanswered, or receive a rigid response that is based less on scholarship and more on ideological positions.

The Russian Orthodox Church partially conceded the “Estonian issue,” but it cannot make a concession on the “Ukrainian” one. Why? The uncanonical nature of the measures taken is so grave that, in the case of their recognition by any Church, that Church is threatened with serious schism and separation by a portion of the faithful oriented toward the preservation of tradition and traditional spiritual values.

The only path to overcoming the schism is the abandonment by the Ecumenical Patriarch of the overreaching measures and the healing of their consequences—something which, within the framework of his rhetoric and specific subsequent actions, appears unlikely. Nevertheless, “walking far along an endless road, one finds” (Russian proverb). In the history of the Church, there have been mass deviations into schism or heresy, which were eventually overcome.

The well-known post-Byzantine theologian Saint Neilos Kabasilas wrote that in “common” matters of the Church, the “first” may involve himself in agreement with all the others, but not alone. The primacy of honor is acceptable, but the primacy of authority enters into conflict with the “common peace of the Church.” These thoughts are more timely today than ever.

The further development of ecclesiastical-historical and canonical-theological research on the disputed issue will be able—just as water carves stone—to create the conditions for the resolution of the situation and the restoration of lost ecclesiastical unity.

 

Greek sources:

Part 1:

https://orthodoxostypos.gr/%ce%b1%e1%bc%b1-%ce%ba%cf%8d%cf%81%ce%b9%ce%b1%ce%b9-%ce%b8%ce%ad%cf%83%ce%b5%ce%b9%cf%82-%cf%84%e1%bf%86%cf%82-%ce%b8%ce%b5%cf%89%cf%81%ce%af%ce%b1%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%bf%e1%bf%a6-%cf%80%cf%81%cf%89/

Part 2:

https://orthodoxostypos.gr/%ce%b1%e1%bc%b1-%ce%ba%cf%8d%cf%81%ce%b9%ce%b1%ce%b9-%ce%b8%ce%ad%cf%83%ce%b5%ce%b9%cf%82-%cf%84%e1%bf%86%cf%82-%ce%b8%ce%b5%cf%89%cf%81%ce%af%ce%b1%cf%82-%cf%84%ce%bf%e1%bf%a6-%cf%80%cf%81%cf%89-2/