On the Free Serbs: A History and Analysis of the So-Called “American Schism” and Reunification

Bishop Atanasije (Jevtić) of Herzegovina

 

 

HISTORY OF SCHISM

The schism in the Orthodox Church in the U.S.A., and elsewhere in the Diaspora, is connected with Bishop Dionisije, but it is apparent from the documented accounts of the schism that it was not only his work. The schism, above all, contributed to the immature and unfortunate situation of our Diaspora, and her condition was especially burdened with the post-World War II political aftermath. With this, we do not defend Bishop Dionisije because his fault in the schism is undeniable, rather, we wish to state that other factors also contributed to the schism.

In any regard, our Diaspora was not mature enough for the situation faced in the New world, and itself brought difficulties for the church-life of our people, such as the level of our church consciousness and different church traditions from politically and culturally different regions of Serbia from which they emigrated. In addition, the catastrophic situation of the war and post-war, especially the situation in our homeland held hostage by communism, compounded the difficulties for the Serbian Diaspora. We must recognize without justification, but understanding, our national and church immaturity in this newly created situation, difficult in our own country and in the Diaspora. In addition, we must also add the general unpreparedness of the entire Orthodox world to properly act and provide responses of its great mission in the New World. (The question remains: has the Serbian or Greek Diaspora adequately responded to that mission?)

Bishop Dionisije arrived in the U.S. to be the bishop on April 15, 1940, and soon after the war followed. The situation which he encountered (I have already mentioned the tribulations and bitterness of Bishop Mardarije) was only made worse by the war, and most especially by the post-war situation, such as with the influx of a great number of Serbian refugees—primarily war and political ones. The survivors carried with them the remembrance of the great sacrifices and wounds of the people. It was not easy for anyone, and the relationship with the Mother Church, decimated and persecuted in the homeland by the godless communists, was weak, and even when the relationship was reestablished, it remained weak.

It appears that Bishop Dionisije, as a man and a bishop was not mature enough for the situation he was to face. It was questionable whether he was adequate for the times faced when he was sent to America—he encountered a different time than that which he was sent for. It was certainly not easy for him, but it is certain that he contributed to the creation of, and failure to resolve many problems. His adaptability, instability in relations with the people, and distant personal contact with Bishops and the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Mother Church, who for a long time lacked the strength to establish tighter contacts and better understand the situation in the Diaspora—all contributed to the complex state from which the schism surfaced. Yet, for the view and collective consciousness of the Church’s history, it would not be honest nor accurate that Bishop Dionisije be declared the “black devil,” who is alone guilty for one and all, as some have easily condemned him.

We should not overlook the undoubtedly positive efforts of Bishop Dionisije for the organization and furtherance of the life and work of our Church in the Diaspora, his help of parishes held hostage in the homeland, and for the sheltering and care of tens of thousands of Serbian war refugees. Bishop Dionisije also sheltered the exiled Bishops Nicholai and Irinej. While it is true that his relationship with them was not on the needed level, they nonetheless (especially bishop Nicholai), in their own manner “cover” for him, and in any case did not contribute to his problems, nor did they diminish him among faithful, as did the light of conscience priests, theologians and Serbian politicians. It should be recognized that the unresolved status of Bishops Nicholai and Irinej in America could have potentially contributed to tension and disagreements with Bishop Dionisije as Diocesan Bishop, whose guests (refugees) they were. But it is certain that they did not diminish his work, rather they helped him. If they had lived, it is certain that the schism would not have taken place.

Influence on the continuation of the schism undoubtedly has been, but should not be hidden, rather, it should be emphasized, the completely different situation of the Church held hostage in the homeland and in the free world. Just those two different situations themselves were creating conflict, but for nearly two decades were being overcome with understanding and mutually wise maneuvering by the Church’s economia inherent to brothers in the same House of God and house of the people.

We all know how difficult it was for the tormented and decimated Church following the war, and what the communist government of tyrant Josip Broz did to the martyric Church of St. Sava and St. Lazar. One must be blind to not see the weakness of their own positions regarding the Church in the homeland, for whom the free Diaspora sometimes had and did not have understanding and forgiveness. Yet, that difficult situation of the Church in the homeland did not give the right to Bishop Dionisije and to politicians around him to, suddenly, proclaim the Church in 1963 a “servant of communism.” Likewise, the defenders of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, those in homeland and in the Diaspora, did not have right to, without any hesitation, claim that the Church in the homeland “was free in all her decisions,” etc. We should principally say that, the so called, “black-and-white” technique of observing and viewing the situation of the Church in the homeland and the Diaspora simply did not correspond to historical facts. All was much more complex and complicated, as it always is in real life.

Already from 1945 to 1947, we know that complaints were brought against Bishop Dionisije to the Holy Synod. These were from American pro-communist priests (Drenovac, Gacinovic, etc.), whose complaints the Synod returned to Bishop Dionisije for him “to answer them”), and then there were complaints from the Yugoslavian Consulate in the U.S., UDBA (Yugoslav secret police) and domestic grovelers from the Clergy brotherhood in the homeland of Yugoslavia (this is seen in excerpts of publications from the Synod archives, all the way to Tito’s and Rankovic’s “thunderous” charges against Bishop Dionisije and Bishop Nicholai, and against Metropolitan Josif, Patriarch Gavrilo and the Synod “for supporting the people’s enemies”). Even though Metropolitan Josif and Patriarch Gavrilo warned both Bishops Dionisije and Nicholai in letters “not to engage in politics,” which warning was also continued by Patriarch Vikentije, Dionisije’s “political activism” against communism (which he called “Serbian national work”) did not, at least, create greater problems until the time of Patriarch German. Especially strong was the state’s reaction and pressure on the Synod when Bishops Nicholai and Dionisije took part in the work of the Ecumenical Congress of the World Council of Churches in Evanston in 1954 and when Bishop Dionisije provided a memorandum to the World Council of Churches (as was similarly done in 1942 regarding the genocide committed against the Serbian people in the Independent State of Croatia) regarding the “Prosecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia under Tito’s regime” (a copy of this memorandum was sent to Synod by the Federal Religious Commission on September 14, 1954; and it would be useful to publish the text today).

It should be stated that Bishop Dionisije and especially Bishop Nicholai did not encounter problems only due to their “political activity” in amongst the immigrants in the Diaspora, but their unique problem was in establishing an appropriate relationship with the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in the homeland under communism; especially from the time when Patriarch Vikentije was elected (whom bishop Nicholai did not immediately recognize, while Bishop Dionisije did right away, as he did thereafter also recognize Patriarch German; whose election he welcomed). These two bishops sent to the Holy Assembly of Bishops a memorandum, in which, under the influence of Nicholai, prepared a list of comments about the work and conduct of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate with the government, and they also recommended some important changes for the Diaspora. News also reached the Synod and the Holy Assembly of Bishops that Bishop Nicholai was planning on “creating [an] independent Serbian Synod, following the model of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia,” which Bishop Dionisije used against Bishop Nicholai in his own defense, stating that he is “fervently against such a proposal.” In as much as I was able to study documents, and the texts of Bishop Nicholai, no such explicit proposal was found. On the contrary, Bishop Nicholai brought up several times, orally and in written form, proposals to create more dioceses in the U.S. and Canada, or at least, to have more bishops, wherein he wrote to Patriarch Vikentije on August 27, 1951: “In relation to my work (in the U.S.), he is now as always been on the church-laity and St. Sava path modeled after the great Metropolitan Stratimirovic... Not one Serbian hierarch should stray from such path.”

It is interesting to note that at that time, Bishop Dionisije was opposed to Bishop Nicholai’s proposals for more Bishops in the Diaspora. (Specifically, during the VII Church-Laity Assembly in 1952, Nicholai making a guest appearance proposed: “We need to strengthen our Church abroad. We need more hierarchs here, so that at any moment, we can be independent. The people want more hierarchs... We need a bishop for the West, and for the East, and more for Canada). Back then the Assembly of Bishops did not look upon the proposal favorably. Later, we shall see, Bishop Dionisije and the Assembly of Bishops reach the same conclusion regarding the proposals of Nicholai, whose foresight regarding the church was far-reaching. Perhaps at that time, the Assembly of Bishops could have helped the Diaspora, shortening Bishop Dionisije’s “monopoly.” He was not a shepherd with foresight and a mission orientation as was Nicholai who was only a “guest” of the American-Canadian diocese. The Patriarch and Synod, at that time, sent only their first delegation (Vicar Bishop German and Prof. Glumac) “to visit and become familiar with our Church abroad.”

Even at that time, during their first visit from the homeland, the delegation (who until the Fall of 1951 spent approximately two months in the U.S.) was immediately asked by Bishop Dionisije whether they “were given an assignment to investigate” him personally. Though, Bishop Dionisije and others had doubts and suspicions about the makeup of the delegation “from Tito’s Yugoslavia” and their purpose. When Bishop Dionisije was told that they did not come to investigate him, he with relief answered, “some communist priests and some on the right (Ljotic guard) wish to get rid of me and are fabricating charges against me.” With this, Bishop Dionisije was exhibiting signs of restlessness in his conscience, but he did say to Bishop German: “If I am guilty, may the regular Church process take place, and we will see.” At the same time, he asked for the written complaints of those who brought the same against him, a request he continued as further complaints were raised. The delegation, as instructed by the Assembly of Bishops from Belgrade, was more interested in news about a “break away” of the American-Canadian Diocese from the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, while Bishop Dionisije emphasized that he “firmly wished to stay in union with the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate,” and he immediately withdrew his prior proposal where he sought vicar bishops. One might ask: why is it that the Assembly of Bishops did not do anything to help the American-Canadian Diocese and Diaspora? When later the Assembly of Bishops under Patriarch German decided to act, the already complicated situation led to the schism due to rapid action and even swifter reaction. Perhaps it was because German’s period saw the emergence of other problems as well, one of which was very serious—the creation of the so-called “Macedonian Church.” On several occasions, Bishop Dionisije stated his disagreement and lack of recognition, but in 1959 he greeted the granting of autonomy to Macedonians as a “wise and expedient solution.” When he later undertook schism, Bishop Dionisije raised the Macedonian question as his supporting argument and to great extent “invited” Macedonian autonomy. On the other hand, Bishop Dionisije complicated and made his own situation more difficult, and the entire Diaspora and American-Canadian Diocese in that situation were looking for faster and more comprehensive solutions. Yet, the question remains: why the Assembly of Bishops, during the time of Vikentije and German did not respond more creatively, instead depriving, the well explained and justified petitions and proposals of Bishop Dionisije and the Diaspora for the furtherance of the Church’s life and work, which would have, if addressed then, prevented the resultant schism.

Bishop Dionisije was reproached for not attending the meetings of the Assembly of Bishops, but was not considered a serious transgression until 1962 when Patriarch German raised that question more radically and even refused to receive the delegation of Bishop Dionisije and the American-Canadian Diocese, “unless it is led by Bishop Dionisije himself.” Everyone understood that a visit by Bishop Dionisije to Yugoslavia would have been a great risk, especially understanding the politics of Tito’s regime towards Serbian emigrants. Yet, Bishop Dionisije had been sending, perhaps not regularly, his annual reports regarding the status of the American-Canadian Diocese (I saw, for example, reports for 1951, 1952, 1956, etc.), though, looking from the perspective of Church Tradition, the failure of one bishop in sending his report to the Assembly of Bishops itself was not a violation, because a bishop is not an “authorized agent” or “accredited representative” of the Patriarch and Assembly of Bishops. In his reports and correspondence with the Patriarch and Synod, Bishop Dionisije had several times, over the years, returned to the question of assigning more bishops in the American-Canadian Diocese and Diaspora. The fact that he was looking for “suffragans” or “vicar” bishops, using “American practice” as an example, or that he was told by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate that we “do not have [the] practice of vicar bishops except [in the case of the] Patriarch,” was further proof, in both cases, of the weakened knowledge of ancient Orthodox Tradition regarding a bishop (where all these titles “suffragans” or “vicars” are without a canonical basis, because a bishop is either Hierarch and Archpastor simultaneously, or all else is a diminution of the bishop’s title). That’s why we can immediately state, regardless of the act itself, which due to its swiftness caused many problems, the Assembly of Bishops in 1963 had correctly responded to the proposals and petitions “for more bishops” in America by choosing three diocesan bishops for three respective dioceses. But this should not have been done without the prior consultation of Bishop Dionisije.

In his stated proposals, Bishop Dionisije in 1956 and 1960 had requested that in the event of a revitalization of the American-Canadian Diocese or the election of new bishops, that it be mandatory to ask the faithful of the American-Canadian Diocese, which the Assembly of Bishops effortlessly refused in 1957. This request of Bishop Dionisije was based on the practice of the Ancient Church, which was bypassed during difficult times of the Church (as was our time under communism), but there is no serious reason that this practice could not be renewed and applied, because the Orthodox Church is not only an assembly of bishops, without clergy and people, rather, it is always a unified organism of bishops, clergy and the people. Later, when Bishop Dionisije engaged in the schism, he called upon this ancient Church practice, as a way out of his personal crisis, but all the same, the Diaspora put the practice of the participation of the people in the election of their bishops back on the agenda. This practice now for centuries, more or less, applied not only in the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate of the motherland and abroad, but also in other Orthodox Churches (except Cyprus and a select few).

Coming to the year 1962, Bishop Dionisije wrote to the Synod on February 13, 1962, that in the American-Canadian Diocese the work of “amending and changing the Constitution” was under way, which would be presented to the Assembly of Bishops by a designated delegation. In that communication, Bishop Dionisije proposed that the American-Canadian Diocese be elevated to that of a Metropolitanate with two or three vicar bishops, “suffragans in the American context or vicars as understood by our Church.” He further added that we must “pay close attention to autonomy of these people and their rights,” but in such a manner “such that under no circumstances do these people break away from their Patriarchate, nor simultaneously morph to the practice of the election of their bishops.” This position of Bishop Dionisije was the subject of much speculation in the U.S.A. and our country, but in our opinion, such position contains nothing more than realistic state of our Church in the Diaspora and her already existent autonomy (with one special Diocesan Constitution). It is another matter that Bishop Dionisije was a man who constantly changed his mind, which required a cautious approach, but not with the total refusal of all his proposals over the years, such that in the end, suddenly, everything “was put over the knee,” as it occurred in May and July of 1963. In our opinion, it was necessary that the Assembly of Bishops in May of 1962 receive the announced delegation of American-Canadian Diocese. Instead, the Assembly of Bishops recommended to the Synod (June 12, 1962) to dispatch to America a delegation “to study all of the questions raised on the spot with the agreement of Bishop Dionisije, and to make concrete proposals for the upcoming Assembly of Bishops.”

During the June of 1962 session of the Assembly of Bishops in Belgrade, Protopresbyter Milan Brkić from the American-Canadian Diocese was visiting, though on personal business. On this occasion, Bishop Dionisije wrote to the Patriarch on July 30, 1962, that Protopresbyter Milan returned and informed him that the position of the Assembly of Bishops was that it was unable to create a Metropolitanate in the U.S.A., but that for the election of a bishop a solution could be found. Bishop Dionisije in the same letter commented: “First possibility—increase of bishops in this Diocese—underscores division of the same in several dioceses. I doubt that the people of this Diocese would agree to such division. On the other hand, we personally will never make such a proposal, because in it we see a weakening of this Diocese and the church-life of the Serbian laity.” Furthermore, Bishop Dionisije contended that it is “financially impossible,” which was not a good argument, just as is his contention that the people would not accept it, or even worse yet that it would be a “weakening” of the American-Canadian Diocese and church-life of the laity. On the contrary, Bishop Nicholai, as we saw, even though he was not a diocesan bishop in the U.S., recommended an increase in the number of dioceses and bishops in the U.S. and throughout the Diaspora. Bishop Nicholai, as a worthy pastor, knew that this would only strengthen the Serbian church-laity position and church life, which later was shown to be true. The only serious and arguable reason for not accepting this proposal by Bishop Dionisije was that without his consent the American-Canadian Diocese should not be divided. This will be discussed in more detail later.

According to a previous conversation and agreement with Patriarch German, and the Synod with the Religious Commission of the Federal Executive Council (June 2, 1961), when Dilparic was first to “recommend that a delegation be sent to America... and the government would pay for all travel expenses” (as stated in the official transcript of the conversation), and according to the decision of the Assembly of Bishops (June 12, 1962), the Synodal delegation, comprised of Metropolitan Damascene, Bishop Nikanor and protodeacon B. Petrović, traveled in the Autumn of 1962 to the USA for three months. Here it is necessary to recall the following: at that time, it was not possible nor permissible to undertake anything more substantial, especially with respect to foreign affairs, without prior approval and agreement with Tito’s totalitarian government, subject to their intentions and actual disposition towards the Church (unfortunately, the custom of similar “good relations” with the state was achieved by many in our Church even before the war, but the established relationships with the pre-war and post-war governments of Yugoslavia regarding the Church were not the same). Thus we may assume that Tito’s government suggested, if not demanded, Bishop Dionisije’s removal from the American-Canadian Diocese. Bishop Dionisije, of course, knew of this, but it does not mean that he lacked pre-existing reasons for a hearing. Certain leaders in the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate were not so “free and independent” in making decisions about the removal of Bishop Dionisije, which can be seen from the documents which remain in the Synodal archives. Had our Church been persecuted the entire time by the communists, we would not need to look further than at the Synod’s acts of 1962 and 1963, where one would find dozens of cases where the communists persecuted bishops, priests, faithful and churches in Yugoslavia (shooting through the window of Bishop Makarije of Srem, attacks on churches in Trebinje and Mostar, abuse of students in Glibovac, Sumadija for participating in the celebration of St. Sava, punishment of Fr. A. Lazarević and two faithful in Kragujevac, and not to mention the persecution in Kosovo and Metohija). Sometime previously, Father Justin Popović prepared a 40 page memorandum regarding the persecution of the Serbian Orthodox Church by the communist government. This text, which he showed to certain bishops, to this day has not been published.

With certainty we can say that one of the controversial facts regarding the relationship between Bishop Dionisije, the Patriarch and a portion of our bishops in Yugoslavia had to do with their relations with the government. Bishop Dionisije was warned in the early post-war years to “not engage in political activity,” which can be acknowledged as a tactical decision by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate operating under a communist totalitarian system. But, for this there was less justification in the 1960’s. In that sense, Bishop Dionisije characteristically spoke to Metropolitan Damaskin, as the leader of the Delegation (a man who was tormented, and fearful): “[the] Delegation requested (writes Bishop Dionisije on January 5, 1963, in his report to the Synod about the Delegation’s visit), that we cease our nationalistic endeavors” (the Delegation told him literally: “not to use his senior role in the Church for goals that are not endorsed by the Church,” but it was understood that “political activity” was synonymous with that which Bishop Dionisije referred to as “national activity,” according to Serbian emigrant vocabulary)... “That which I undertake is not political activity and involvement, rather it is leading Serbian nationalism efforts. Here it is not possible for us to move that line.” From these cited words, it is obvious that this has to do with, mildly stated, a disagreement that comes from differences in the position of the Church in the free world and under a communist regime. The tendency of Tito’s regime was well known, as well as that of all communist regimes in the world, which was, to hinder the Church at home, or at least control, the migration of the Church’s work in the world. This problematic relationship with communist regimes, until recently was a reality and not a “concocted” problem.

No matter how great this “political moment” of Bishop Dionisije and his politicians might have been in the crisis of the schism, an objective historical view cannot deny the existence of the “political aspect” of Dionisije’s case, as some shortsightedly (like Noah) have denied in our country and diaspora. Bishop Dionisije, with reason, asked the Delegation of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate: “Why does our Patriarchate defend the regime (in Yugoslavia) from our attacks? Did Patriarch Varnava not attack the government of Yugoslavia?... And Metropolitan Mihailo the government of his time? The Church cannot bend to every demand of every regime and every government!” Yet, these words of Bishop Dionisije in his report to the Synod, appear somewhat differently in the report to the Synod of the same Delegation led by Damaskin (January 24, 1963): “[the] Diocese (Bishop Dionisije states himself) is prepared to become less confrontational with the state government (of Yugoslavia), but the state must work towards this end as well.” Obviously, none can or should contest the position of Bishop Dionisije towards the Yugoslavian government, represented by him in the free world, and knowing the relationship of Tito’s regime towards the Serbian emigration that was under the spiritual care of Bishop Dionisije. But, the thesis of Bishop Dionisije and politicians around him, brought forth during the creation of the schism: “that his entire case is ‘communist skullduggery’ which was brought upon him by ‘communist servants’ in the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate and in America, may be disputed. The entire problem of the schism was far more complex.

Bishop Dionisije obviously feared the Synod delegation’s arrival. Even prior to their May 1, 1962 arrival, he wrote to the Patriarch: “Rumors abound regarding the purpose of the (delegation’s) visit ... that an investigation of us with an unknown purpose is to be completed ... we know that numerous complaints of a political nature have been brought against us, just as in recent times libelous statements have been sent to Your Holiness, but we believe, that if taken seriously by the Synod, it all [the complaints] should have been provided to us for our thoughts and an eventual response.” Likewise, when the Delegation arrived in the U.S. and during its visit, Bishop Dionisije writing to the Patriarch on October 10, 1962 stated: “I did not provide responses to any personal complaints, because, I believe that all complaints brought against me personally should be provided in written form—for my written response.” To that last letter the Patriarch and Synod responded to him that he should: “inform the Delegation of all his requests,” and the Synod would forward them to the Assembly of Bishops.

The Synodal Delegation, which was in the U.S. from September 10, 1962 to December 2, 1962, provided the Synod a lengthy Report (January 24, 1963, 40-page text), which was an ostensibly honest account. Following a careful reading of the report, readers were impressed upon the fact that on the basis of the report the actions of the Assembly of Bishops in May of 1963 could and should not be repeated in a hastily assembled manner. The Delegation was tasked with: (i) investigating Bishop Dionisije’s proposal regarding the elevation of the American-Canadian Diocese to a Metropolitanate level, (ii) reviewing the proposal to add to the American-Canadian Diocese both South America and South Africa, (iii) the election of two or three vicar bishops, and (iv) “anything further found to be in accordance and necessary to its work,” but in reality this created an ever expanding scope of investigation, which was separately communicated to the Delegation. These expanded tasks included “to investigate certain suggestions and tendencies regarding the separation of the American-Canadian Diocese from the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate”; then, Bishop Dionisije’s “use of his authority” for “political goals,” as well as “the personal complaints against Bishop Dionisije.” In Bishop Dionisije’s Report regarding the Delegation’s visit, some of the tasks were formulated somewhat differently, but was inconsequential.

From both Reports it is apparent that the Delegation was well received by Bishop Dionisije and the American-Canadian Diocese, and the Synod was left with a satisfactory impression overall. As it relates to the personal complaints against Bishop Dionisije, the Delegation reported, “so as to not consciously err,” the following: “The majority of the comments we received were in regards to his personal life,” and mostly from the clergy, which is understandable, given the members of the delegation had the most contact with them. But, the Delegation on multiple occasions informed Bishop Dionisije “that they did not come as an investigative committee” regarding the personal complaints against him, but that it “had a duty to inform him that over the last several years many complaints were lodged against him with the Synod regarding both his professional and personal life,” and furthermore, “there were complaints which the Synod could not ignore, and that sooner or later they would have to be addressed.”

I am not sure whether the Delegation addressed Bishop Dionisije exactly in such manner or whether it was written in such manner in the Report upon their return home. I state this because the delegation, which was not “an investigative committee” acted in a somewhat inappropriate manner. In their Report they wrote: “[the] Delegation had in several instances indicated that it was not necessary to send the Synod the names of persons filing complaints, if justifiable.” Matters were made worse, when upon their return to Belgrade, the Delegation during its conference with the Synod (as noted December 5, 1962 in the official records), informed them that: “Individuals who complained to the Delegation against Bishop Dionisije were told to provide all details they had in writing to us, and that confidentiality was guaranteed.” Knowing the mentality of some circles within our Church, starting with the Patriarchate, then California, it is clear that such act by the Delegation had openly “legalized” an illegal manner in which to raise various complaints and libel, a range of intrigue, and without confirmation or responsibility leaving the prosecutor to bear the consequences, if the complaints are found to be slander, as is clearly stated in the canonical tradition of Orthodox Church (Canon 6 of II Ecumenical Council).

Irrespective of the truly great or the amplified mistakes and sins of Bishop Dionisije, I think that the Patriarch and the Synod should not have pursued an uncertain and irresponsible path of investigating a bishop. It is known to us that, unfortunately, the moral compass of similar prosecutors here and in the Diaspora, predisposed them to recklessly believe in intrigue of the “he-said-she-said variety.” Unfortunately, the same or similar card was played by Bishop Dionisije, who instead of spending time improving his life and addressing the issues that resulted in rumors about him (of which Bishop Nicholai certainly knew, but the great soul of this hierarch cared more for the unity of the Church and the protection of the meek than those prone to crises of the conscience and scandals). With brotherly love the Delegation conveyed to Bishop Dionisije the Synod’s message “that he alone should not give rise to the complaints.” And further, the Delegation in its Report provided sage advice to the Synod: “As for the matters submitted against Bishop Dionisije, the Delegation is of the opinion that a special committee should be appointed to study the entire matter.” However, the Delegation simultaneously diminished its own recommendation by giving this statement: “Although, before all we must be mindful of using an appropriate process, so as not to enable a prima facia local challenge in the civil courts regarding the liability of the plaintiffs, which Bishop Dionisije constantly refers to.” The Delegation was concerned about possible machinations by Bishop Dionisije to “silence” his persecutors with countersuits, which later did emerge, when many of the plaintiffs before the American courts withdrew or denied their charges.

For the Orthodox Church’s canonical tradition, the following is clear: what kind of plaintiffs are they, and how can one seriously consider their complaints when they are not prepared to stand behind their charges and then responsibly bring forth canonical and legal consequences? Consequently, following such a slippery slope was not permitted, and understandable (perhaps premeditated, but in principle justifiable) why Bishop Dionisije insisted that all charges against him be provided in written form so that he knew by whom and why he was being accused. He always asked for that beginning with the Delegation from 1951, then the Delegation of Bishops Damaskin and Nikanor, and then the Investigative Commission of Hrizostem and Visarion (July 1963). At the Patriarchate they persistently denied the request, and in our opinion, the Patriarch, with the most authority, bears responsibility for this part of Dionisije’s schism, because Bishop Dionisije was adjudicated without a regular, prescribed canonical investigative procedure. Even when Bishop Vasilije of Zica as prosecutor against Bishop Dionisije had invested his unreproachable moral authority, he did not believe that one bishop could, even remotely, be charged with such repulsive conduct as was Bishop Dionisije. It was, nonetheless, necessary that such unreproachable moral authority, canonical awareness and humane consideration be invested in the work of the Synod’s Investigative Commission, in July of 1963, which due to its non-canonical conduct, also, bears responsibility for the emergence of Dionisije’s schismatic behavior and splitting of our church.

From the conduct and writings of Bishop Dionisije, it can be concluded that he lacked a clear conscience. From this comes to light, his insistence over the years, that he be provided with “all complaints by his persecutors”—“[so as] to provide written responses to written complaints,” to avoid personal and pastoral confrontation with his flock, brethren and concelebrants. Here is an example of his avoidance in openly dealing with his own problems: in his Report regarding the Delegation’s visit (January 5, 1963) he wrote to the Synod: “Regarding the complaints submitted against us... we requested that no prejudgment occur. May they follow their proper legal course, a proper legal investigation. They all should be sent to us for a formal response, may justice be served for both sides, i.e. claimant and respondent!... We would be very disappointed if the Assembly of Bishops, with undue pressure, of work and prior to completion of an investigation undertook disciplinary or legal action against us, as we could not accept that... We do not shy away from responsibility, neither will we run, nor have we ever ran. But if the cane above our heads should quickly and suddenly break, there will be someone to defend us, and the battle, unforeseen, will be started through no fault of our own... This I say because of the ensuing consequences.” Previously, Bishop Dionisije wrote to Metropolitan Damaskin of Zagreb (December 21, 1962) demanding to know what and which priests in South Bend, speaking to the Delegation, said concerning him, and adding with a lack of candor: “[the] Objectivity and impartiality of the highest court of the Serbian Orthodox Church, in which there can be no doubt, and which may not be contested, stipulates that the other side must be heard,” as if this were the case of a slandered child. Shortly thereafter (January 20, 1963), he wrote to the Patriarch an almost sentimental letter, in which he expounds about his “need for a spiritual renewal,” similar to the great and Holy Fathers, requesting permission to “go to Mount Athos—to Hilandar monastery, where he was tonsured as a monastic—for a few months, for a spiritual renewal,” but “only after the Church-Laity Assembly (September 1963) and “after the sitting of the Holy Assembly” (Belgrade, May 1963). The Patriarch responded to him with the same general “frankness”: “With brotherly love we wish to inform you that we will always, whenever requested, respond similarly to like requests,” writing to him (March 21, 1963), one-and-one-half months before the final settling of his misdeeds, with which Patriarch German undoubtedly had a leading role, amongst others from our country and the Diaspora.

In his Report of the Delegation’s visit (January 5, 1963), Bishop Dionisije stated that he knows that “Tito wants my head” and that he is applying pressure to that end on the Holy Assembly, which was not unfounded, but why then did Bishop Dionisije make such “pious” combinations and maneuvers regarding a visit to Hilandar? We believe that from his texts and actions it be can concluded that Bishop Dionisije was a tragic person and his tragedy was not completely negative (nothing truly tragic can be only negative). Bishop Dionisije was not a completely bad person or bad Church elder, for he also undoubtedly had merits and capabilities exhibited during 23 years of service leading the American-Canadian Diocese during very difficult and complex times. The tragedy of Bishop Dionisije was that as someone who knew the Diaspora better than many in our country and abroad and fighting for the betterment of the Church’s life and her work, he neglected to recognize the personal struggles in his life—with self-criticism, humility and repentance (for which I cannot with confidence say that he did not embrace). It appears that he was more of a “ruler,” a man in power, but it was necessary first to be a Christian and Pastor.

His proposals for change in the American-Canadian Diocese and Diaspora were interpreted, without reason, by some as “intending to break away” from the Serbian Orthodox Church in our country. In the end, Dionisije’s proposals resulted in the same position by the Holy Assembly in 1963 and later. Bishop Dionisije swore an oath to maintain unity with the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, and the fact that during the crisis of 1963, the break-away was not his fault alone. In great part, the schism occurred because he was pushed towards it, or at the critical juncture brotherly love was not offered to aid him, while he himself did not seek a true Christian, pastoral and church path in aid of himself and his Church flock. Aside from not having a “clear conscience,” he ostensibly lacked true Archpastoral awareness and understanding of the Great Mystery of the Church, its life, body, and organization (although he in some respects he understood the Holy Canons better than some of those who would him). He was too much of a man, or a poor disciple in his time, drowning from the infirmities and disorder of the secularized Diaspora. On the other hand, he did not receive, nor did he know how to ask for help from his brothers—bishops and concelebrants, who might have provided similar aid as which was extended by Bishops Nicholai and Irinej.

Turning to the events of 1963, Bishop Dionisije wrote to the Holy Assembly, on his behalf and that of the ill-fated Serbian Diaspora, barely one month before its meeting (May 10, 1963) (decree from April 12, 1963). He complained about not receiving the agenda for discussion with the Holy Assembly, stating he was awaiting “a resolution to the question of the Diaspora’s organization” and the “question relating to the bishop” of the American-Canadian Diocese, methodically and with clarity, discussing the organization and expansion of the Diaspora “on an autonomous basis, in which the people participate in the administration of their Church.” He correctly concluded that “strong centralization and autonomy cannot coexist” adding that the central place of the Serbian Orthodox Church was the Holy Assembly, but should be appended as the “Holy Assembly with the clergy, and together with people, because it represented the notion of universality,” maintaining, still with apparent honesty: “I will never succumb to separating from St. Sava’s church—the Serbian Orthodox Church—as I am committed to remaining with her, I will not tear the fabric of St. Sava, as Arius had torn Christ’s.” At that moment, those words were difficult and tragic sounding even for Bishop Dionisije, who in our opinion stated them before the emergence of his personal torment and church-pastoral problems of the Diaspora. That was not just “maneuvering” about his personal “ambitions,” as some have asserted, but that Bishop Dionisije obviously lacked a well thought out and consistent Orthodox ecclesiological position (such as, unfortunately, is lacking amongst a not inconsequential number of contemporary then hierarchs in the Diaspora, and not just there). With his indecisiveness and inconsistency, there certainly was also frivolity and untruthfulness, but also some human and episcopal misfortune; and I repeat, assistance from brethren and bishops was neither timely nor useful. It appears that the Patriarch and certainly some Hierarchs unaccustomed to dialogue, not only with everyone in the Church, but neither with their peers. It is well known that the ancient Church of Christ began with brotherly and ecclesiological dialogue during the Apostolic Council (Acts 2,4,6,7,13,15.22-28), and continued with her Local and Ecumenical Councils.

All that has been stated thus far is not intended to provide justification for Bishop Dionisije, and even justification for the schism, for which he is bears the most responsibility. We only wish to point out that the American and Dionisije’s schism, did not occur unexpectedly, without reason or motive, rather from the pure “spite” of one “disobedient” bishop. That is why today, to overcome the schism it is necessary, first and foremost, to change hitherto methods and apply a true pastoral, church-salvific prudence and leniency. It is not a “return to the beginning,” nor “reexamination of all decisions,” rather simply identifying the salvific medicine for the wound created in the Church, in which we all have played a role, in our country and Diaspora.

Decisions and events at the Assembly of Bishops in May of 1963 and onwards, were coming quickly and irresponsibly, ill-conceived from a canonical perspective, and with unknown pastoral consequences. During its regular session in May of 1963, the Holy Assembly suddenly issued a number of decisions regarding the American-Canadian Diocese and Bishop Dionisije, which resulted in the rapid wave of reaction in the American Diaspora, and the conscience of a number of Serbian hierarchs. If carefully studied, the recordings from the regular working sessions of the Holy Assembly held in May of 1963, it is clear that there was a lack of order and conciliarity among the Hierarchs of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate. The Holy Assembly first considered reports from the Delegation of Bishops Damaskin and Nikanor, and then moved on to decisions which did not come from the recommendations of this delegation, not Bishop Dionisije, nor the Church-Laity Assembly of the American-Canadian Diocese. During the regular meeting held April 30, 1963, Metropolitan Damaskin suddenly declared that “the Delegation was not tasked with preparing recommendations, rather, to investigate matters regarding Bishop Dionisije and provide gathered materials to the Holy Assembly for consideration,” contradicting the previously stated position and duties of the Delegation. The reaction of two bishops (Vladislav and Pavle) was from the beginning different then from the others, but, even, among those others, e.g., Bishop Emilijan of Timok, it was understood that the rule: “that no one may be judged without being heard, and we too in this instance cannot and should not depart from that basic rule” (referencing to Acts 25:16 and many Holy Canons).

On May 10, 1963, the Holy Assembly decided (Holy Assembly № 20 and 21, recording 77) that “upon request of the Church-Laity Assembly and Bishop Dionisije the Holy Assembly of Bishops is establishing three dioceses on the territory of the American-Canadian Diocese” (there were bishops supporting only two dioceses, but they were in the minority). Immediately thereafter, the Holy Assembly referred “the matter of complaints against Bishop Dionisije” to the Synod “with [the] recommendation” to commence an ecclesiastical proceeding against Bishop Dionisije. The Assembly of Bishops immediately halted its conference in order for the Synod’s meeting to take place (an old Synod practice from 1962, that during meetings of the Assembly of Bishops the Synod is not in session), “ordering the commencement of a disciplinary process against Bishop Dionisije” and immediately “placed him under suspension from performing Church duties ... and dismissed him from all duties in his Diocese until the matter was finally investigated and adjudicated.” The following day (May 11, 1963), the Patriarch proposed “filling [the open positions] in the newly-created dioceses in the U.S.A.” This proposal was met with opposition from certain bishops. Metropolitan Damaskin reminded “that the problem of our church in the USA [was] very complex and difficult.” Bishops Vladislav and Pavle suggested not electing the third bishop, that is, for the Midwestern Diocese for which Bishop Dionisije had been nominated. For the Eastern Diocese Protopresbyter Stevan Lastavica was elected and the Patriarch’s proposal to elect as vicar bishops and administrators for the Midwestern and Western Dioceses, Archimandrites Firmilijan and Grigorije, did not pass even after two rounds of voting. Bishops Vladislav and Pavle declared their abstentions from voting because “they believed that this method of electing bishops was contradictory to the rules and the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Article 69, Paragraph 18 and 105).” During the May 17, 1963 meeting, the Synod appointed Fr. Stevan Lastavica, Archimandrite Firmilijan (of Bishop Dionisije’s Diocese) and Archimandrite Grigorije as Administrators for the Eastern, Midwestern, and Western Dioceses, respectively. Adding to this the decisions of the Holy Assembly during its extraordinary session of July 27, 1963 (Holy Assembly № 42/ recording 2), at which Bishop Dionisije had been “released from all duties as the Diocesan Bishop” and the Midwestern Diocese was “pronounced vacant,” two things were clear: that Bishop Dionisije thought he was chasing a rabbit, but found a wolf,” and secondly the Holy Assembly and Synod suddenly made several decisions which were not sought nor recommended by Bishop Dionisije and the Church-Laity Assembly of the American-Canadian Diocese—they were not consulted, and some of those decisions were not entirely canonical. Let us consider them in good order.

First, neither Bishop Dionisije nor the Church-Laity Assembly in the U.S. requested additional dioceses. The Holy Assembly in regards to its decision relied upon Article 16 of the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which states that only the Holy Assembly can establish a diocese, but this is in direct opposition to the canonical tradition of our Church (Carthage 62, 65, 96 and 109, according to another enumerations, such as Milas: 53, 56, 87, 99, and also, Rule 16 of the First-Second Council, and with consultation Apostolic Canon 34, known according to the principal of conciliarity, and to it correlated the Antiochian Rule). According to the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church, which protects the ecclesiological (dogmatical) structure of the Church, the diocese of one bishop cannot be changed, divided, etc., without his agreement, neither can he be relocated without his agreement (though, principally the canons forbid relocation of bishops). Quoting Rule 109 (99) of Carthage: “It is resolved that the people (faithful) which have not ever had their own bishops (specifically), cannot have them, except pursuant to the decisions of the Council of every region and the first among the hierarchs (Patriarch), and according to him” under which administration that Church was. Carthage Rule 96 (87) states: “To take a diocese from a bishop before the conclusion of proceedings against him, is not considered correct among any Christians.” And, more characteristic of our case is Canon 16 of the First-Second Council: “Under no circumstances should a bishop be appointed in the Church whose predecessor is alive and operating in his capacity, except if he voluntarily petitions to be released. Moreover, it is necessary to complete a canonical investigation for the reason, i.e. cause, fault), for the bishop’s removal and expulsion [from his diocese], and thereafter establishing another bishop in his place.”

This clear canonical position of the Orthodox Church requires no further comment. If a Legal Committee of the Holy Assembly, and the Holy Assembly itself, did not know these canonical rules, that are respected everywhere by the Orthodox Church, then they should have listened at least to the voices of bishops from the Holy Assembly, e.g. Bishop Emilijan of Timok, who orally and in writing pointed out: that in the Serbian Orthodox Church “it is not clear how a bishop should be judged” (which was noted in the actual judgment against Bishop Dionisije, as comments of the Synod: “that with our positive church law it is not sufficiently clear how a judicial process against a bishop should take place,” which we will return to later); or, also, Bishop Pavle, who later gave his separate opinion (during a meeting of the Synod on July 10, 1963, before the extraordinary meeting of the Holy Assembly, having read the report of the Investigative Commission of Bishops Hrizostom and Visarion in which they requested an emergency meeting of the Holy Assembly): “I think that the Holy Assembly during its regular meeting brought forth clear decisions as to what should be done in order to improve the situation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the U.S.A. and that the Synod should act according to the spirit of those decisions. That is why I think that we should wait for the return of the Delegation (Investigative Commission) and based on the facts which they will bring, peacefully take further actions, but not to quickly convene the extraordinary meeting of the Holy Assembly, asking to bring forth decisions which are contrary to already delivered decisions, and this based on one letter of the Delegation written three or four days after their arrival with negative impressions formed as a result of hostile gestures directed toward the Delegation by some of the political factions there. Suggestions of the Delegation created in such manner cannot be taken as supporting arguments which will be reached in a self-fulfilling manner during its stay in the U.S.A.” (Synod № 2242/recording 338 from July 10, 1963). This later expressed opinion of Bishop Pavle was perhaps not presented as clearly during the regular session of the Holy Assembly, but we have already seen his reservations towards decisions of most Holy Assemblies, but especially his opposition to immediately replacing suspended Bishop Dionisije and in appointing in his place Archimandrite Firmilijan.

It should be mentioned that Article 16 of the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as many other articles quoted at the time, are in no way a greater authority than the Holy Canons of the Ancient Church which are more explicit (it is our firm opinion: that the entire Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church needs to be reconciled to the canonical tradition of the Church, as well all Constitutions used in the Diaspora). That is why the decisions brought forth by the Holy Assembly of Bishops and Synod (to which most of today’s bishops did not contribute) were not in accordance to the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church. How was it possible to divide a diocese of a bishop who was not granted a hearing and was not adjudicated (no verdict against him) and nominate and elect three new bishops? Was everything decided in advance, put over the knee “in [such] short order, that our until-late brother and bishop was not heard nor given the opportunity to face his accusers? Such humiliation of a bishop, and the office of the bishop itself, has never been recorded in the history of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Irrespective of all the accusations against Bishop Dionisije, to his defense, supported by canonical tradition, is the fact that he did not seek nor did he agree to the division of his American-Canadian Diocese and on relocating him to a non-existent diocese. It is another matter altogether whether it was truly necessary to create more dioceses in the U.S. and Canada, to which, Bishop Dionisije would most likely have been opposed, but this should have been resolved in one of two possible ways: either through greater dialogue with Bishop Dionisije, individually convincing a number of Hierarchs or waiting until he was adjudicated according to a canonical “review and conclusion as to his actions,” as the canons state (i.e. his culpability), and then undertake changes and reorganization within the American-Canadian Diocese. It was also necessary to take into consideration the proposal of the Damaskin-Nikanor Delegation: “without delay there should be an election of vicar bishops” and “to this there would be no considerable objections (in the U.S.A.), especially if the candidates under consideration came from the Diocese” (which I recall vividly at the time, was being proposed by Fr. Justin Popovic, verbally to some of the bishops—these vicar bishops would then slowly assume the administration of the American-Canadian Diocese and with a supporting decision of the Holy Assembly of Bishops remove Bishop Dionisije).

Instead, Bishop Dionisije’s Diocese was taken away from him before adjudication and final judgment (verdict), while true he was “suspended,” but the question of a suspension of one bishop according to the Holy Canons is not the same as that which is recommended by the cited paragraphs in the decision of the Synod of the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church and notorious “rules on culpability” (an especially anti-canonical creation of the newer Serbian “canonists”). The Holy Canons discuss akoinonia (exclusion from communion with others, from serving and Holy Communion) of an accused bishop, but not at the same time as his dethronement, i.e., removal and denial of any presence in the diocese [1] before his process and tribunal are concluded (as already cited Canon 16 of the First-Second Council).

This form of “suspension” as is currently in practice is uncanonical and came about as a result of secular influence, secularized “positive law” (but today, the Church needs to clearly decide: will she adhere to a canonical-benevolent or legal-juridical order, and there is frequent conflict between the two principles, to the detriment of the pastoral-soteriological mission and work of the Church, which was later seen in the American courts).

Further, the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Synod addressed Bishop Dionisije, the Church bodies of the American-Canadian Diocese, and the three administrators with a special Encyclical. The Synod appointed an Investigative Commission, i.e. Bishops Hrizostom and Visarion (with Protopresbyter Mladenović and Deacon Tripković) on June 13, 1963, “entrusting them to travel to the U.S.A... to enforce and investigate the matters, and to carry out all necessary hearings, of the accused and witnesses, as well as to gather all evidence regarding the current situation, with all pertinent writings, and to report to the Synod for further instruction.” Prior to that, Bishop Dionisije had already stated, in his announcement and proclamation on May 25, 1963, that he did not recognize the Synod’s decision regarding [his] suspension. On June 3, 1963 he wrote to the Patriarch and Hierarchs, members of the Holy Assembly of Bishops and Synod, that, “confirming the receipt of the decree” from May 10, but further stated: “I do not recognize the decision of the Holy Assembly of Bishops and Synod regarding the division of this one diocese into three new dioceses, nor my suspension and removal from the administration of the Diocese, neither will I relinquish my responsibilities to the Diocesan Church-Laity Assembly, because the aforementioned decisions are in contradiction to the Constitution and unlawfully brought forth.” In his letter, he did not deny the “authority of the Holy Assembly and Synod over him so long as they hold to the canons and judicially prescribed rules,” but he adds: “I recognize and wait for the court of these people here to whom I have served for the last 23 years, gathered at the Church-Laity Assembly. If they adjudicate against me... then I will relinquish my duties.” Further, he complained about the fact that all the complaints brought against him were not provided to him, then regarding the Damaskin-Nikanor Delegation (“the report of the Delegation is one sided, incorrect and does not correspond with the truth. Based on that report, the Diocese was taken from me, I was suspended and found culpable, and I categorically demand a copy of the report... I ask for it as a member of the Holy Assembly and I have a right to it”). In the end, he casts the entire problem on political terrain, foretelling “the splitting of our entire Church and splitting of this Diocese,” for which the Patriarch and Hierarchs are at fault, believing that a minority will support the Patriarchate. On June 6, 1963, a meeting of the American-Canadian Diocese brought forth a decision informing the Synod: “the Diocesan meeting (plenum) unanimously states that this Plenum is not authorized to receive nor to refuse a question regarding the division of the American-Canadian Diocese into three dioceses, instead this whole matter will be turned over to the Church-Laity Assembly” which is being urgently convened for August 6-9, 1963. (The Church-Laity Assembly was scheduled for a regular session in October, 1963, but it was moved to the earlier date). The Plenum also asked that the Synod send the “Synodal Investigative Committee,” which shall “inquire of the complaints against our Bishop Dionisije and investigate and conclude as soon as possible,” but changes in regards to the administration of American-Canadian Diocese “cannot be carried out” until a decision is made at the scheduled meeting of the Church-Laity Assembly.

Bishop Dionisije wrote to the Patriarch on June 9, 1963 in a conciliatory tone: “The people need to be calmed, this Church needs to remain in unity with its Patriarchate... If you love God, stop; do not undertake further action. Begin to resolve this situation” promising “from my side to contribute as much as I can.” He recommended delaying implementation of the decisions of the Holy Assembly of Bishops, and to “send a second commission for negotiation and conversation with us and the people; perhaps a peaceful solution for calming the people could be found,” further stating he himself was ready “to discuss a peaceful resolution of the complaints brought against me, or a voluntary withdrawal from the duties as a bishop.” As no response was received from the Patriarch, Bishop Dionisije, over the ensuing months of June and July 1963, issued various texts (approximately 15 proclamations, protests, letters and pamphlets with titles that were measured to slanderous). These publications, unfortunately, despite well intentioned protests and doubts were dominated by non-pastor and non-bishop-like behavior and quick conclusions and language, with a plethora of attacks, accusations and mandatory politicizing of his entire case (i.e. “It was necessary to Tito’s regime to begin ‘Operation Dionisije,” etc.). In these texts of Bishop Dionisije, he walks a tight rope, manipulating the people, with justice, the justified cries of one accused and unheard man and Bishop, “over whose head everything was now being brought down.” It appears, we dare say, that actions against him and his response to those actions are like two sides of the same coin, just as the same low level of Church consciousness among some, and fortunately a small number, from Belgrade to California.

Carefully collected and recorded were all the texts and actions of Bishop Dionisije, by the new Administrators and until late, his closest and faithful coworkers, sending them to the Synod. On June 10, 1963, the three administrators sent their first report to the Synod, advising they “have begun execution of the decision” of the Holy Assembly of Bishops and Synod, but, that “[they] were encountering various difficulties,” mostly from Bishop Dionisije, who refused to relinquish administration to Archimandrite Firmilijan. Following which, they stated that on June 4, 1963 in Shadeland, they held a meeting with the Board of the Clergy Brotherhood, which greeted and welcomed all decisions of the Holy Assembly of Bishops “as very useful”: calling Bishop Dionisije’s behavior “as distancing himself from the Church of St. Sava and schismatic,” and Dionisije’s disobedience was considered “uncanonical and punishable,” while their “priestly disobedience to him, in this case, was canonical, lawful and properly placed.” Administrators then brought forth Bishop Firmilijan’s and their “general impression” from the meeting of the Diocesan Plenum (June 6, 1963) that “the majority of the members of the plenary session believed, and the same was felt among the parishes of the American-Canadian Diocese, that decisions of the Holy Assembly of Bishops and Synod regarding the creation of new dioceses... were brought forth too quickly and without consultation of the Diocesan bodies and Church-Laity Assembly,” consequently the members of the Plenum believed that the Holy Assembly of Bishop’s “decisions were made in contradiction to the Constitution of the American-Canadian Diocese and that is why they cannot be accepted.” The three administrators then suggested that it was necessary to: “speed up the disciplinary proceedings against Bishop Dionisije and deliver a final ruling,” asking that if possible it be done prior to the Church-Laity Assembly in August, and that is why “according to the former understanding of legal procedure, it would be beneficial that one delegation (from Belgrade) lead an investigation there taking the opportunity to conduct in-person hearings.

The Synodal Investigative Commission arrived in the U.S. about June 30, 1963. From Pittsburgh, they wrote to Bishop Dionisije that they would be visiting him to, according to the initiated actions, “inquire of the situation and to interrogate him.” Rather than first and foremost leading an inquiry and interrogation of Bishop Dionisije and the complainants, the Commission exceeded its authority. In its letter of July 3, 1963 to the Synod, written before their first meeting with Bishop Dionisije, scheduled for July 5, 1963, the Committee requested “an emergency meeting” of the Assembly of Bishops in Belgrade. In the meantime, the same Commission “wreaked havoc” across the American-Canadian Diocese, whose division Bishop Dionisije did not recognize, and was still to be determined [by the Commission], by tonsuring and scheduling enthronements, and making further decisions as if they were executors rather than investigators. To that the “old fox” Bishop Dionisije replied with “equal measure”: by avoiding a meeting with the Commission at the St. Sava Monastery in Libertyville, ostensibly “because of the many people and numerous protests,” then assuming the meeting would be held in a secular “club.” The investigative discussions began, and were led by the unsuitable Bishop Visarion and the minutes were written by Bishop Chrysostom (instead of the reverse), and they quickly stalled, because Bishop Dionisije gave the investigators his letter written in response to their previous letter issued from Pittsburgh, and further rejected acknowledging the commencement of the investigative discussions, because he requested in advance the written complaints be brought forth. In his letter to the Investigative Commission he informed them that they had failed to notify him “at the proper address,” because he was not the “Bishop of the Midwestern American Diocese,” because he had never accepted the title, nor was he asked to accept it (i.e. the division of his American-Canadian Diocese and the change in his title). He further protested “against the prejudicial decisions” of the Synod in forbidding his performance of Church duties and dismissal of the Diocesan Council, and in furtherance the Investigative Commission ceased further hearings instead of accepting Bishop Dionisije’s letter as his position in the matters (if we are to believe Bishop Dionisije’s complaint directed to the Patriarch on July 11 at the Commission’s meeting). Bishop Visarion halted the investigation stating: “there is nothing further to be learned, the materials published in print to date by Bishop Dionisije are sufficient.” In his letter, Bishop Dionisije continued complaining to the Patriarch that the Commission “did not provide any complaints in response” to him, and that he still did not know who was bringing complaints and why, against him; and obviously with bitterness protesting further actions by the Commission in Milwaukee, where they explicitly and with finality were adjudicating him! Herein is the justification for the statements.

The behavior of the Investigative Commission, which would have been uncanonical and impermissible by any secular legislative body, instead of investigating, it transformed into an executor, rendering its own decisions and verdicts, which on July 6, 1963, in Milwaukee culminated in the issuance of a “communiqué to all clergy, church-school congregations and to all Serbian men and women in America and Canada,” stating in verbatim: “Since Bishop Dionisije, through his actions and statements, has in totality confirmed that he has trampled upon his hierarchical oath and has renounced his obedience to the higher Church authority and thereby committed, among other things, Church iniquities in accordance with the ‘Disciplinary Rules’ Articles 10,15,17 by which the guilty party bears the greatest ecclesiastical punishment of being deprived the Episcopal rank and excommunication from the Church community, we therefore call upon all clergy, all church-school congregations and all the faithful of the three Dioceses (and those from which Bishop Dionisije has not been removed from by the Synod!)—that they not obey Bishop Dionisije in any matters,” etc.

The first thing to note is the actions of the investigator (Investigative Commission): according to the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church this Commission deserves greater punishment than the accused party which it was supposed to have interrogated. And secondly: in this special “verdict” the Investigator was teeming with uncanonical and anticanonical positions and conclusions. Considered in order: nowhere in the Holy Canons is there any “hierarchical oath” (there is only an Episcopal Confession of Faith, while the postulating of an anti-evangelical oath of a Bishop and priest should be eliminated as soon as possible from the newly minted and incorrect practice). Then: What kind of an Episcopal “obedience to higher church rulers” was this, and who are these “rulers” above a Bishop in the Orthodox Church? This thesis becomes more senselessly formulated in the very Verdict of Bishop Dionisije (later, but here is its source), where it is stated (in Article 6) that Bishop Dionisije’s fault was “failing to execute the lawful orders of the assumed authority, negating and criticizing their orders and actions.” The question remains: what kind and based on what from the Tradition of the Holy Canons of the Orthodox Church do these organs suspend, investigate, prosecute, judge and invent a calling upon the knowledge, rite and rank of the Orthodox Bishop in the Orthodox Church, when they so easily appoint to him “assumed powers,” who “order” him about, and he cannot even “negate and criticize their orders and actions”!? Something such as this can only exist and be valid in the Roman church and the “papal” or “half-papal” mentality, for the history of the Orthodox Church does recognize, nor can it, accept something like this (unfortunately, today this is the fate of many of our priests, for whom only the written so-called Disciplinary Rules, where a Bishop is not mentioned nor any fault of a Bishop, nor the irresponsibility of a Bishop for uncanonical or non-father-like relations towards priests, as it has always been in all places in the Holy Canons, where equality in the court is for all). In the canonical tradition of Orthodoxy, on the contrary, the Bishop’s duty is not to first “listen” to the “assumed authorities,” for they do not exist in the Orthodox Church, but it is the duty of the Bishop to watch over the decisions and even “criticize” them, if they are not in accordance with Orthodoxy. For instance, this right is given even to monastics and faithful—granted, in times of crisis—according to Canon 15 of the First-Second Council of St. Photius, that, for the ecclesiological rule and church conscience of the right of final adoption or non-adoption of even the decisions of the highest and mightiest Councils in the history of the Church. It is abundantly clear, therefore, if there were no other real faults of Bishop Dionisije, they would not have even been considered a fault and he would have been adjudicated and pronounced innocent.

It was evident that the work of the Commission was not proper, a non-canonical expression of its investigative role. How could it, and how was it permissible for it to immediately pronounce “judgment” not having heard the Bishop’s position, and to call upon his clergy in an insurgence against a Bishop who was not yet tried and adjudicated? The fact that Bishop Dionisije avoided the first hearing did not give the Commission any right to take further action except to attempt to hold another hearing, which even the Patriarch attempted to convince the Commission of in a telegram: “Attempt to hear Dionisije again” (which Bishop Hrizostom somehow attempted, indirectly through Deacon B. Tripkovic, but was in vain). According to canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church a new, separate Commission should have been sent and up to three times, for the defendant could claim “bias” on the part of the Investigative Commission. In addition, another pertinent, canonical and general legal question could be posed: what would have happened, for instance, if the Investigative Commission found or if the judges established, that Bishop Dionisije had been slandered, and that he is innocent, or that his faults were less consequential? Perhaps that possibility was excluded beforehand? But why then the “theatrics” of a formal procedure: investigations, hearings, lawsuits, trials? Furthermore, what would the accused and overthrown Bishop Dionisije have received “in exchange” had the trial proven him innocent, for the punishment and humiliation already inflicted? Thus is the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church (Canon 16 of the First-Second Council, etc.) so clearly and expressly stated: that patience must be exercised “until a reason (cause, fault) of the accused be questioned and be brought to a conclusion.” This was also suggested by Bishop Pavle of Ras and Prizren, but to such time it lacked sufficient support.

The Investigative Commission, in our opinion, could have at a minimum recommended to the Synod that a Church-Laity Assembly be convened, providing a forum and opportunity for negotiation, to avoid the schism, or to unmask Bishop Dionisije before the Church-Laity Assembly. Regarding such August convention of the Church-Laity Assembly, the Board of the Clergy Association attempted (on July 18, 1963 from Pittsburgh) to prevent it from being held by pressuring the clergy to not take part in it, but was unsuccessful. One of its “aces,” which was later employed by the Legal Committee of the Assembly of Bishops (at their special session of July 27, 1963), was that Bishop Dionisije had “illegally called and presided over” a Church-Laity Assembly, for which he was adjudicated and disciplined. According to the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church, Bishop Dionisije, by summoning and convening the Church-Laity Assembly, that is, a gathering of clergy and faithful from his Diocese, was still functioning as a Bishop of the Diocese, for he had not yet been adjudicated, and therefore the meeting was not a “canonical violation.” The Investigative Commission did not need to rush and seek a “special meeting” of the Assembly of Bishops under the guise of Bishop Dionisije and the Diocesan board of the American-Canadian Diocese “wanting to delay the issue until the Church-Laity Assembly in August, where he would have the backing of the majority,” and instead with more Hierarchs take part in the church-laity assembly and attempt to confront Bishop Dionisije before his people and flock. I doubt he would have endured such a confrontation before the clergy and laity, in which, in fact, lies his main sin and canonical transgression.

Thus far, we have not addressed the issues as such to suggest that Bishop Dionisije was in the right and that he was “innocently” found liable, rather we have merely pointed out the unnecessary mistakes in the process of investigation and adjudication, and the civil procedure of all courts is known: that the mistakes and behaviors of the accused neither allow nor justify the errors and omissions of the court. The Investigative Commission did, however, reach one correct conclusion: it confirmed that Bishop Dionisije with his entreaty on Vidovdan of 1963, called upon all those who have broken away from the Mother Church and all Serbian Church congregations throughout the world, to join him, even though they were not within the American-Canadian Diocese. Just this truly great canonical transgression of the already expelled Bishop Dionisije would have been sufficient, pursuant to canonical tradition, to adjudicate and dethrone him. For this was truly a canonical and established fault, greater than the first violation in which he first refused to speak with the Commission, or that he did not recognize the partition of his Diocese (for which he had not been consulted), nor tried or found liable and dethroned. Secondly, the assuredly canonical mistake of Bishop Dionisije was that he came to a split with his own clergy and entire flock, he provoked a division in the church laity. The Investigative Commission, instead of using the justified revolt among the clergy and laity as proof against Bishop Dionisije, instead aided the revolt among a significant number of clergy and laity to turn against the Patriarch and Serbian Patriarchate, indirectly contributing to a deepening of division.

It appears that as Bishop Dionisije turned to schism, he even invited other Church congregations outside of his Diocese join in schism. In fact, a more precise reading of the regulation, according to Canon 1 of St. Basil, Dionisije’s actions and separation from the Mother Church would not fall under the title of schism, rather parasynagogues (a Greek term which even Milas leaves untranslated, but gives it a Russian equivalent: “samocinoje sbornisce,” that is, an unlawful, unapproved collection of faithful). For such persons St. Basil characteristically says: “Parasynagogues is... if someone, questioned with respect to mistakes, then restricted from serving, following which did not subjugate himself to the canons, rather taking upon themselves a leadership role and pastoral service, and with them others followed, leaving the Conciliar Church.” Such persons, according to St. Basil, may be accepted back as follows: “Those from parasynagogues, when they themselves return through true repentance, unite themselves once more with the Church, and when the ordained followed those that were disobedient, upon repentance, are accepted in the same rank.” Such a canonical position by St. Basil is useful in the efforts of overcoming Dionisije’s schism. According to canonical tradition, apart from his moral faults, Dionisije’s sin and transgression is first and foremost the fact that he caused a split among his flock and clergy, and that at least half of his own flock and clergy accused and left him—as Archpastor and Bishop here for so many years, he bears great fault. He should not have stubbornly sought only the written accusation of his accusers (that later he might, most likely, submit them to the secular courts, by which he would only engage in new canonical transgressions, for according to the Canons, it is violation to turn to the world’s secular courts at all), instead he himself should have sought and endured a reckoning with his clergy and people, publicly at the Church-Laity Assembly, before representatives from the Assembly of Bishops and Synod of Bishops, and not merely before preselected “delegates” and “representatives” of the people, but instead before all the people ([it] is known to me and many, all the forms of manipulation engaged in, at the time and afterwards regarding “outvoting” in certain church-school congregations in America in order to secure a “majority vote” for or against Dionisije or the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate).

Furthermore, and most importantly, the moral accusations on the life and behavior of Bishops under the Holy Canons are a very serious matter, and Bishop Dionisije should have known this, and not play games with them, and not bring scandal to the consciousness of his flock, as if the issue was regarding a petty leader of some “political party,” to whom the “opposition” plants intrigue and defamation. However, at the same time we should say that his accusers (Devrnja, Djujić, and others) should have conscientiously carried out their responsibilities as prosecutor and witness, which they took upon themselves. But, irrespective of the prosecutors and witnesses, if even half of the personal accusations of immoral conduct of Bishop Dionisije were correct, then he would surely have been removed from the position of Bishop and Archpastor. In any case, there were problems in proving all of the “delicate” accusations, and as is almost always the case, and Bishop Dionisije certainly depended upon this, but according to the canonical tradition of the ancient Church (which dates from the Apostle Paul—1 Tim. 3:7: “A bishop must have a good rapport with those on the outside”), Bishop Dionisije had already lost rapport from those outside with a clear conscience (the former Metropolitan of Thessaloniki, the late Panteleimon, was for this very reason dethroned despite not being defrocked). As a conscientious Hierarch and Archpastor of the faithful people he should have: either publicly appeared before his clergy and people, since the public scandal had already burrowed itself into the souls and conscience of many in the American-Canadian Diocese, so that he could provide justification himself before them, or at least submit his resignation with dignity and withdraw peacefully. From his many writings and documentation stems the view that Bishop Dionisije either resembled a “moral monster” (Hieromonk Arsenije Tošović had written to the Synod in Belgrade, in 1954 that Dionisije’s “licentious exploits were becoming pathological,” but the light-hearted assessment of the Hieromonk was irreverent, even if it was as he stated; a wiser and more spiritually mature position was that of Bishop Nicholai who did not “trumpet before the world” the sins of his brother, but looked more to the general good of the Church); or Bishop Dionisije was a “defamed innocent,” who was not cognizant of the situation and what was happening around him, which itself was certainly irresponsible for the position and service of an Archpastor and Bishop of the Church of God in the world. However, it was more likely that Bishop Dionisije was a man of weak character and for that reason remained incomplete and unclear, inconsistent and indecisive, tragic in his own way, but without the strength to find a way out of his personal and episcopal drama, or the advice of one more experienced and spiritual, to pull him from his maelstrom.

Perhaps from Dionisije’s personal drama and tragedy the only light and saving grace was when he, some years before his death, wrote his letter of repentance and acknowledgement to the Patriarch and the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate. (I personally saw Fr. Justin Popovic’s faded copy, and Fr. Petar Milosevic, Dionisije’s then secretary, personally told me of the letter, who immediately thereafter fled to Bishop Firmilian with that “made up” letter of repentance and acknowledgment from Dionisije and the Bishop (Firmilian), who based on that letter, through the Cardinal of Chicago and the US Supreme Court, finally regained control of the monastery in Libertyville on behalf of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate. If that news was correct: that Patriarch German himself ignored the letter of repentance and acknowledgement and plea of Bishop Dionisije to be pardoned, then is the action was highly immoral and not Christian, and even uncanonical, for the 52nd Apostolic Canon states: “If any bishop or presbyter, does not receive him who turns away from his sin, but rejects him, let him be deposed; for he grieves Christ who said, There is joy in heaven over one sinner that repents” — Luke 15:7. In the Archives of the Synod I found no copies of Dionisije’s letter of repentance, but it certainly existed). [2]

To once more repeat what we have previously stated: it was not a particularly great mistake of Bishop Dionisije to have summoned and held a Church-Laity Assembly in August and then in November 1963, as he still had not been provided the dignity of a hearing much less was he tried and adjudicated, while the process of dividing his Diocese and being dethroned was not recognized by him, and a portion of his clergy and people. The bureaucratic pettiness and the reference to “paragraphs” is of little consequence here (his disobedience to the Assembly of Bishops before the final verdict could, but not necessarily, be taken as a hindrance—as it is according to the canonical tradition of the Orthodox Church, which is the not the same as secular civil law). For summoning and convening a Church-Laity Assembly, Bishop Dionisije cited the tradition of conciliarity as his authority. (We quote only in brief, but clearly, the position of St. Basil regarding conciliarity in the Orthodox Church: “Decisions and the placement of Churches is brought by those under whose care are the Churches (Bishops), but they are accepted and confirmed by the people” (meaning the body of faithful—Letter 230). The fact that, of late, conciliarity among our people is practiced only a little or not at all is insufficient reason to deny Bishop Dionisije every canonical courtesy in discussions with his clergy and people, and with bureaucratic casuistry accuse the not yet tried nor convicted Bishop, who in his Diocese was still more canonical than his “replacement,” the well-known Administrator (Firmilian), who was controversially elected in Belgrade, a topic to which we will return).

The truly great and almost unforgivable mistake, a genuine canonical transgression, of Bishop Dionisije and his entire group—“parasynagogue,” was committed at the second Church-Laity Assembly, where the following position and proclamation, more specifically Article 3 of the Resolution of the Church-Laity Assembly (August 6-8, 1963), were made: “[f]uture relations of the Serbian Orthodox American-Canadian Diocese and its mother Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia is to be based on the broadest sense of autonomy for this Diocese, whereby they would be connected by a spiritual and moral-hierarchical unity, and not a canonical-hierarchical one. This form of unity would connect the Diocese and Mother Church until such time as the Church was unencumbered in its activities and decision making in Yugoslavia, which could only be expected after the liberation of Yugoslavia from communist oppression.”

This truly schismatic and negative rejection of the connection and unity with the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, was formulated outside all ecclesiological-canonical and patristic bounds, as well as the advance rejection of everything arising from the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, as if it were some upstart communist creation, and not the glorified Church of St. Sava and Peć, the Great Church of our Savior—this is, to us, a truly sufficient deed for Bishop Dionisije to be adjudicated and finally be canonically disciplined. In the above text, which could not have arisen without Bishop Dionisije, the entire ecclesiological confusion is evident, contained in the senseless separation of the “spiritual and prayerful-hierarchical” unity from the “canonical-hierarchical” unity, which is only further evidence of the theological and church illiteracy of the composer of this type of formulation, and also completely politicized. In conciliar Orthodoxy there are not two, or some form of dual unities, but only a liturgical-hierarchical, which is simultaneously a canonical unity. The above artificial separation into “two unities” is only proof of the estranged ecclesiological awareness, and represents Dionisije’s and his group’s speculation that somehow establishes his evident departure to an (un)canonical separation from the communion and fellowship of eucharistic-hierarchical unity with his brothers, with bishops and the other Orthodox Churches in the Diaspora and the entire world. With this did Dionisije’s schism truly begin, and that was his main fault, since he dragged his followers into isolation, that is, into the impossibility of liturgical concelebration and communing with one another (the canonical term koinonia refers to full church communion and fellowship in the Liturgy; Greeks to this refer to communion synonymously with koinonia; and every other form communion and unity without it is false and not salvific—that is a schism in the Orthodox Church).

The last part of Article 3 of the Resolution was completely senseless and unfounded ecclesiologically: connecting and conditioning unity to the Mother Church with the “political freedom” of the Serbian Orthodox Church from under communism and “expecting liberation” of Yugoslavia in order for full unity to be reestablished! This, according to us, is a direct blasphemy against the Holy Spirit—the Comforter of the Orthodox Church. For if the Ancient Church had acted in such manner under Roman rule, who bloodily persecuted and deprived it of freedom for centuries, or our Peć Patriarchate under five centuries of Ottoman rule, what would remain of the Church of Christ, to which not even the gates of hades can prevail? Regardless of all the possible political influences in Dionisije’s case (and there always were and will be, more or less, while the Church is in this world), the brethren surrounding him all too easily lost faith in the Church of Christ and the Serbian Orthodox people, when with such ease they were able to take the fate of our unity in Christ the God-man in His Church and reduce it to a dependence with any kind of political situation in the world. For instance, what will all of those say today that “blindly” hold to those senseless decisions of the tenth Church-Laity Assembly? At any rate, I am sure that various sections of brothers can no longer stand by these “conciliar” uncanonical positions, and I understand their and our mutual complaints and it is painful that until now we have inflicted them on one another, suing one another, and taking one another to court—to our “general defeat,” according to the words of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 6:5-7). (Contributing to the deepening of the wounds on the entire Church organism were many writers and polemicists situated about the American split, on both sides, beginning with Djoko Slijepčević to Živan Stefanović, all of whom I have purposely excluded from this analysis, even though I have read all of them). As we have already noted, per the suggestion of the Investigative Commission, a special meeting of the Assembly of Bishops was convened (July 27, 1963), and despite the opposition of Bishop Pavle, the Holy Assembly of Bishops generally adopted the suggestions of the Investigative Commission and Administers from the U.S., such that Bishop Dionisije was also deprived of the Central Diocese, and appointed in his place was Archimandrite Firmilian (a man who up until then was a close co-worker and accomplice of Dionisije in nearly all things, then had to be an opposing candidate to that same Bishop Dionisije), while Archimandrite Gregory was elected Bishop of Western America. At the meeting of the Assembly of Bishops, Bishop Pavle said: “We should treat Bishop Dionisije in the spirit of the regulations of our Church... The proposed decision of the Legal Committee (at the Assembly of Bishops: Danilo, Valerian, Vasilije, Visarion, who wanted Bishop Dionisije to be relieved of his duties immediately) was premature, it would be important to wait to confirm the canonical faults of Bishop Dionisije, for which the Synod had put him under adjudication and restriction.” Since he was overruled, Bishop Pavle, upon the proposal that Firmilian be elected bishop, first reminded the Assembly of Bishops that the obligation to obey and respect the canons applies to all Bishops and added: “We punish one man whose adulterous deeds have not been proven, and we reward (with this election) another man whose immoral deeds have been proven... The benefit that is now being stressed with the election of Archimandrite Firmilian is fictitious, and it’s true consequences are yet to be seen.” (Following the words of this highly moral hierarch, a question remains for the conscience of the moral “puritans” in Dionisije’s case: What was achieved and who was the victor? Other highly moral persons, such as Bishop Nicholai and Fr. Justin, were not insensitive to the moral questions of the Church, but they were more “churchly” and like church-builders).

Dionisije’s Church-Laity Assembly in August of 1963, while not recognizing the May and July decisions of the Assembly of Bishops and the Synod, and proclaiming “the broadest autonomy,” still did not sever all ties with the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, for in Article 6 of the Proclamation (with reference to the Church-Laity Assemblies from 1956 and 1960) expressed as a requirement an old church custom: that in the case of the American-Canadian Diocese having an episcopal vacancy, three candidates would be chosen from which the Assembly of Bishops in Belgrade would confirm one as the new bishop. Consequently, the 10th Church-Laity Assembly provided a 60-day waiting period for reactions and decisions of the Assembly of Bishops and the Synod, and if the decisions were not positive, as was the case (the Synod decided on September 3, 1963 that “all decisions of the so-called Church-Laity Assembly be considered unlawful, unconstitutional, and invalid”), that the work of the Church-Laity Assembly continue November 12-14, 1963 in the same form. At that Church-Laity Assembly the American-Canadian Diocese was proclaimed “completely autonomous” and all the political arguments were repeated from August’s resolutions, Irinej Kovacevic was selected as vicar bishop to Bishop Dionisije and later on December 7, 1963 was ordained by two Ukrainian Orthodox Bishops Genadius and Gregory in Libertyville, with the participation of Bishop Dionisije (not yet defrocked). The Holy Assembly of Bishops on March 5, 1964 proclaimed once more this November Church-Laity Assembly and all its decisions as “unlawful, uncanonical, anti-constitutional and nullified,” regarding the election and ordination of Bishop Irinej they said: “that the so-called ‘ordination’ of Archimandrite Irinej Kovacevic as bishop, which took place on December 12, 1963 in Libertyville by two self-appointed ‘bishops,’ was null and void. Null and void are all the services by the those named in that capacity.” Furthermore, “the ruling hierarch was given the duty of initiating disciplinary proceedings against Archimandrite Irinej.” This same meeting of the Holy Assembly of Bishops, occurring on March 5, 1964 issued a final decision by which Bishop Dionisije was “punished by being deprived of the episcopal and monastic rank ... and was returned to the order of laity.” Previously, as is known, the Synod on September 3, 1963 entrusted Bishop Vasilije of Žiča to issue a formal complaint against Bishop Dionisije which was submitted to Bishop Dionisije from the Synod in writing at the beginning of November 1963, for which he confirmed receipt on December 3, 1963, and instead of the 30 days given him, he requested six months to reply, once more asking for all the charges, complaints and naming of his persecutors in a certified letter. The Synod (based on a one-sided reference to Rule 19 of Carthage, which we cited earlier in our notes) extended the deadline for another month, and refused to issue Bishop Dionisije transcripts of the evidentiary material—“since there is no canonical nor any other legal writings requiring this” (which is, to say at a minimum, purely arbitrary)—adding that “against this decision there is no right of appeal.” To this Bishop Dionisije replied by returning the complaint to the Synod (January 25, 1964), with an ironic statement (“The circus is over,” April 6, 1964), in which he has justifiable complaints: “The accused was not only denied the right to defend himself, he was not even invited or allowed to have defense counsel, or representation, just as he was not permitted to review the evidentiary material.” Here he appealed for the “formation of a special court of free Orthodox bishops, where I could defend myself and prove that I am not guilty,” but at the same time calling “all of free Serbdom to join ... in the free and autonomous Church in the free world,” which was a repeated canonical violation, that would enter as a new burden on the verdict regarding his defrocking, a decision which was made soon after, of which we spoke.

There are, of course, still many other events, acts and writings which occurred and appeared in the meantime, but I do not believe they are relative or important for the different pictures of the American and Dionisije’s schism. It remains to be said, what is important and significant, is that the Patriarch sent a letter on September 13, 1963 to the heads of all the Orthodox Churches regarding the changes which had occurred in our Church in the U.S., and on March 20, 1964 he informed all Orthodox Patriarchs of Dionisije’s defrocking. It is well known that the answer from all of the Orthodox Churches was a confirmation, that is, they all accepted and recognized all of the decisions of the Serbian Orthodox Church, for, per custom, other Orthodox Churches almost never, at least in modern times, enter into the internal affairs and decisions of other Autocephalous Orthodox Churches. Knowing how things typically transpire, and not diminishing the significance of the canonical acceptance by the other Orthodox Churches of the Assembly’s decisions, was a clear sign to Bishop Dionisije that he had become schismatic and was left isolated, outside the Eucharistic communion of all the other Orthodox Churches, which in fact was his greatest canonical and ecclesiological transgression (the greatest ecclesiological sin, both a wound and disruption to Eucharistic communion and fellowship)—we can nonetheless rightfully assume: that, if the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate would have changed its decisions and, for instance, rehabilitated the accused brothers, the other Orthodox Churches would accepted that revision, that is, the new decision, not questioning the “contradictions” and other associated questions. It is safe to assume tomorrow all Orthodox Churches will positively accept the decisions of the Serbian Orthodox Church regarding the overcoming of the American schism and, for instance, recognizing Bishop Irinej Kovacevic, his services and clergy. After all, this is a centuries old practice of all Orthodox Churches, and is very significant and to be respected. It is a brotherly trust and peace, love and fellowship among sister Orthodox Churches. Furthermore, it should be added that Bishop Dionisije also wrote letters to the Ecumenical and Russian Patriarchs, seeking their intervention and protection. Athenagoras of Constantinople wrote on December 26, 1963 a “complaint and lawsuit against the Serbian and Macedonian Patriarch German,” in which he cites his “uncanonical decisions” regarding the American-Canadian Diocese and “for creating a schism in the ‘Macedonian Church.’ It is noteworthy, or more appropriately a tragicomedy, that Bishop Dionisije states in his letter that the three newly elected bishops lack the “moral fortitude” making them “unworthy” as bishops! For his suspension and replacement he stated: “I haven’t even been adjudicated but have already been dismissed; the complaints against me were never provided to me for a lawful response,” and he quotes—for good reason—Canon 6 of the Second Ecumenical Council: that complaints against a Bishop may not be accepted without verification and questioning of the complainant, and that those complaints are to be first discussed at a Diocesan level, that is, Diocesan Assembly, and if they are not addressed there, then move to a “Higher Council,” that is, an Assembly of Bishops of a broader region. [3] Bishop Dionisije is, therefore, referred to—with good reason—Article 11 of the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which stated that a Bishop can be removed by an Assembly of Bishops “only upon a canonical conviction” (actually, the first part of the Article states that, while the second part points to Article 104, which Bishop Dionisije does not mention, but that part is not clear hence why Emilijan of Timok was correct when he stated that it is not known in the Serbian Orthodox Church how a Bishop is to be judged). Bishop Dionisije further states that the “people sought a compromise with the Patriarch,” referring to the Church-Laity Assembly, but, maintains, Patriarch German “turned a deaf ear to the justifiable complaints and requests of our people,” failing to mention, however, that those same people in the American-Canadian Diocese were divided because of him—Dionisije—divided for and against, by which his positions were automatically weakened and more difficult to defend.

On March 2, 1966, Bishop Dionisije wrote to the Russian Patriarch a complaint against Patriarch German and the Assembly of Bishops, in which he for the most part, reiterated the same position, asking for the protection and sponsorship of the Russian Patriarch, to whom he was simultaneously complaining about Patriarch Athenagoras of Constantinople for his silence. It is interesting to note that Bishop Dionisije never questioned: whether the Russian Patriarch was more “enslaved” by the communist government of their homeland? Of course, both Patriarchs responded negatively such that Bishop Dionisije and his church group remained isolated for an entire year.

After events such as these and the already formed Schism of Dionisije—where all the decisions, verdicts, defrockings and so on, from whatever side it originated the other side didn’t find it valid, so that Dionisije’s group (parasynagogue)—should be viewed as a separate church group—comes a long and sad period of endless trials and court hearings regarding many issues, beginning with those basic decisions of the Assembly of Bishops and the Synod from May and June 1963, and then later local suits regarding Churches and Church properties, and the classic “Serbian dispute (parba)” which to date has not stopped or been completed. It’s interesting to note the dual natured self-justifications: both sides sought to stop the court processes and yet—both continued them! The disaster—for both sides of the Serbian church—a history of passive-aggressiveness in the secular courts (forbidden by the Holy Canons), where the Bishops and the Synod were involved, brought significant harm to both sides, both moral and material. From the documents preserved we see the well-known stubbornness and bickering of the Serbs, the hatred between brothers smearing one another, with the usual “washing of one’s hands” and shifting of blame exclusively to the “other side.” No one was willing to listen to the brotherly advice of one Orthodox Bishop from the Antiochian jurisdiction (that itself endured many court battles in the U.S.): that all should know that no one has ever left a court “cleaner” than when they had entered it. Particularly sad was the history of the mutual relations, arguments among friends and even family members, slanders and the labeling (“schismatics-federalists,” “traitors-communist servants,” etc.)

In all of these legal actions, one thing became readily apparent: conflict and incompatible canonical and legal elements existed in the Church conflict among the Serbs. The American courts brought to light that the organs of the Serbian Orthodox Church, who in their decisions referred to the canonical rules and the legal-court regulations held valid in the “positive law” of the Serbian Orthodox Church, were right only in some matters, while in many other matters they were not. Namely, the American courts maintained the right of the Serbian Orthodox Church to judge and overthrow their Bishops, and they did not consider it further, but they rightfully concluded that the adjudicative process of Bishop Dionisije by the Serbian Orthodox Church organs did not adhere to their own rules and regulations! In the case of the decision to divide the American-Canadian Diocese into three dioceses and other related questions, the American courts found that the actions were “unlawful,” because “the valid Constitution” of the American-Canadian Diocese “was violated,” since the Church-Laity Assembly was not consulted. The three Dioceses and the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate found themselves before the courts in a difficult, almost hopeless situation, such that in a letter by Bishop Firmilian dated February 17, 1967, the Synod sent to all Bishops the following motion for consideration (№ 634 and 723, dated March 10, 1967): that the decisions of the Assembly of Bishops and the Synod from 1963 “be adjusted to the judgments of the Illinois Appellate Courts” which means “to return to the state of things previously—one Diocese for America and Canada with one Bishop.” The Bishops accepted the motion (Bishop Hrizostom’s reply is characteristic: “We have nothing against recognizing our mistake and—if it is now possible—to correcting it”), such that the Synod withdrew the decisions regarding the division of the American-Canadian Diocese into three dioceses. The Synod’s explanation was interesting: “withdrawing this decision has been somewhat unpopular for the Synod of Bishops, for a mistake is admitted, but it’s better to admit a mistake and correct it, and then reach the same goal in due time by proper means, that is, to once again establish three dioceses when and if the Church-Laity Assembly of the American-Canadian Diocese makes such a motion, which in this case should have occurred from the beginning. It is true, by this the Assembly of Bishops was admitting a mistake, but a mistake of the administrative board, not a dogmatic nor canonical mistake, where the Assembly of Bishops cannot make a mistake.”

Consequently, on this occasion the Synod, made the decision to proclaim Firmilian Ocokoljic as Bishop Dionisije’s “legal” replacement and successor, who was previously appointed administrator in place of Bishop Dionisije in May of 1963, and was considered authoritative by the American courts. This, despite being unnecessary, confirmed the hastiness of the decision brought in May, 1963. The same outcome could have been achieved gradually, canonically and with pastoral wisdom or through economia. In any case, this precedent from 1967 serves as an example even today for attaining Church economia as opposed to just the problems of resolving the schism.

Tensions arose during the endless processes of considering the position of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate towards the schism, and so the Synod made a rigorous decision on February 4, 1969, which did not appear pastoral and had a negative effect. There was discussion about excommunicating everyone from the Church who was in schism: “The leaders of the devious schism in the U.S. and Canada... evidently are deceiving their followers and other people, claiming that they are still members of the Serbian Orthodox Church,” continuing to speak of “their so-called services” and “so-called sacraments,” and in the end the Synod directs the three Hierarchs in the U.S.: “that, if they deem necessary, they may inform every individual who left the Serbian Orthodox Church, following former clergy, that they are no longer members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, that by their own free will they have excluded themselves from the community of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Holy Orthodoxy... As such, they cannot partake in the Holy Mysteries, they cannot be buried in an Orthodox manner, nor may they be they buried in the cemeteries of the faithful children of the Serbian Orthodox Church.” This decision, which could formally have had a pedagogical character (even though Dionisije’s group was radically over-characterized as a schismatic and cult-like group, and we see that St. Basil differentiated schism and parasynagogue, even though St. Basil’s division was not strictly upheld by tradition, so that all groups, besides the heretical, were mainly referred to as schismatic), evidently did not bring about the desired results in the American situation and the Diaspora in general, and made the situation worse by agitating the people. The Clergy Brotherhood of the American-Canadian Diocese reacted to the decision (July 7, 1969 in Libertyville), stating: “there is no recollection of any Orthodox Church in the world being in the same situation, ever carrying out a final excommunication of all of its members in such form and with such rationale, that would be similar to the one here signed by Patriarch German.” In the announcement, it was also stated “that the steps taken by the Patriarchate in its two schisms”—in the U.S. and Macedonia—differ, which must be questioned—“as if the relative Church laws were not the same in each case.”

However, as time passed many Orthodox Serbs in the Diaspora, clergy and Bishops, attempted, gradually and carefully, to repair the relations of the two sides of the Serbian Church. Thus, Bishops Sava, Firmilian and Gregory, in a letter dated July 31, 1976, attempted a recommendation to the Synod to “apply church economia wherever possible for the purpose of establishing Church order and canonical validity of certain Church related acts” (e.g. Holy Mysteries), that the ordinations conducted by Bishop Dionisije, under ban and before his defrocking, be recognized; recognition of the sacraments given by clergy ordained prior to but now in schism, and not to recognize the ordinations conducted by Bishop Dionisije after being defrocked and from his vicar Bishop Irinej, none of his sacraments “with the exception of baptism and the validity of marriage,” and to also call upon “all the clergy not defrocked” and “all of the laity” that they return to the Church from schism. It should be noted that the Synod lacked sufficient pastoral sensitivity even for these minimal suggestions of the three Bishops from the U.S., such that the suggestions essentially failed. Only nine years later, with the decision of May 16, 1985, the Synod showed more, but not significantly more, leniency: “to provide leniency to the greatest extent possible, and allow members of the separated brothers to be kumovi at our baptisms and weddings, if the Holy Mysteries are carried out in our Churches; and to allow clergy not defrocked from their side to enter our cemeteries and conduct services.”

This decision of the Synod, even though far from being “lenient to the greatest extent,” was as a small fruition of the many efforts and appeals from the past from all sides that the American schism finally could be overcome and resolved. We will briefly mention a few of the more important appeals and motions, and this is only a tenth of them, from both sides, and they are not all connected to this subject in the archives. First and foremost, I would like to mention the letter of Svetko Radlović to the Patriarch (June 16, 1963), who, because of the exacerbated situation and out of a fear of division and chaos, recommended that the Synod send Bishop Varnava Nastic, who could calm the people!” (Varnava had publicly expressed himself thereafter in Dionisije’s favor, such that the Synod sent bishops to him on two occasions to “investigate,” and he refused to deny his statement—Synod № 337/554, November 1, 1963). Then, two suggestions for reconciliation should be mentioned that were received at the end of 1963: from engineer Vlasta Djordjević and Boža Marković, both of Toronto, and there were probably others. The first of the more significant appeals to the Assembly of Bishops to find a resolution for the schism among Serbs was sent by Fr. Justin Popovic, at Easter, 1975. The appeal was negatively received by the Patriarchate, almost as if “in support of the schism,” while the followers of Dionisije welcomed it as if it “granted them the right [for schism].” Some found fault in Fr. Justin’s text “because he did not provide specific suggestions” to resolve the problem, despite Fr. Justin pointing to the path of Church economia in a clear and concise manner: “that a more humane resolution be found” (in accordance with the phrase in Canon 5 of the First Ecumenical Council). In the fall of 1975, appears the “Hilandar Message to Serbdom in the Diaspora” which Abbot Nikanor personally handed to the Patriarch (October 3, 1975—on the occasion of the 800th anniversary of the birth of St. Sava). The same year the Diocesan Council of the American-Canadian Diocese recommended that the Patriarchate recognize the “Free Diocese” as the fourth in the U.S. The suggestion went mostly unnoticed, but it was also a departure from the positions of the Dionisije party to that point, that is, from the decision of the 10th Church-Laity Assembly in 1963, which in and of itself was a positive shift.

The same year (1975), a very significant event took place, which in and of itself set a very important and canonical precedent, and for our attempts in overcoming the schism, a true Church model emerged. Namely, on August 22, 1975, Patriarch Nikolaj VI of Alexandria, following the mediation attempts of Metropolitan Methodius of Aksum (who actually studied the canonicity of the Ukrainian Church), accepted and recognized Bishop Irinej Kovacevic and his clergy and people. In his Gramata, the Patriarch of Alexandria writes to Irinej: Learning of the problems of the “faithful people of our sister Serbian Orthodox Church in America and Canada” and “reviewing the documents with great care” the Patriarch of Alexandria decided: “with pleasure we proclaim Your consecration to the rank of Bishop as lawful and canonical in accordance with the existing circumstances in America and Canada” and since “this Apostolic Patriarchate of St. Mark, follows a long tradition of receiving similar requests from Orthodox Churches and replies in the same manner with maternal love and concern, we recognize You (meaning Bishop Irinej) as a canonical bishop of the Holy Apostolic Orthodox Church.” Then the Alexandrian Patriarch also on September 24, 1975 (Protocol № 287), in response to a letter of gratitude from Bishop Irinej, also wrote the following: “With this letter to You, our dear brother Bishop Irinej, we wish to inform you and reassure all of your clergy and faithful that your Episcopal position includes and spiritually protects all of them... Our desire is that all Orthodox brothers understand that our responsibility as an Orthodox Patriarchate, our Christian love and compassion have caused us to decide, that in recognizing you we recognize the rightfulness (validity) of the Holy Mysteries performed by you which are necessary and of great importance for the survival of the thousands of suffering Serbian Orthodox people, especially the innocent children, scattered throughout the free world.” (I have a copy of the original in English with Patriarch Nikolai’s signature and seal.)

The cited, truly apostolic and Church-pastoral text of the decision of the Alexandrian Patriarch, as the Patriarch himself reminds us, is only one of many similar and pastoral gestures made before by this Apostolic cathedra, which it has done throughout the centuries outside the Patriarchate of Constantinople (thus it had the title “Judge of the universe,” for it interceded even in Byzantium). However, three years later (September 21, 1978), the same Patriarch, with pressure from the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Patriarchate of Constantinople (and they through the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for which I was informed by the source), withdrew his pastoral sponsorship, and in a letter to Bishop Irinej Kovacevic states: that he regrets that “in the future I cannot recognize Your Grace any longer as a canonical bishop, since I have received much pressure from others from both governments and the Church” and that would continue to invite upon him and others “many bad things.” “We ask that Your Grace continue to try various ways to protect Your canonical position and Church which is under Your presidency and administration” (I have a copy of the original in English). Even though the Alexandrian Patriarch withdrew his canonical sponsorship of Bishop Irinej and his flock, the recognition was an important Church-canonical precedent, especially since it was done out of apostolic concern, love and compassion—and for the survival and salvation of many souls “of the suffering Serbian Orthodox people and particularly the innocent children.” We should also recall that the Gramata of the Patriarch of Alexandria was ostensibly applying economia to an irregular situation in the Diaspora: proclaiming the enthronement of Irinej as Bishop “as lawful and canonical according to the existing circumstances in America and Canada.”

At the May, 1983 meeting of the Assembly of Bishops in Belgrade, Bishop Jovan of Sabac-Valjevo (of blessed memory) presented his famous Submission about the schism in America, in which he stated: “Not even for a moment should we ever accept the schism as foregone conclusion, and give up on the schismatics. Unfortunately, we get the impression that the Serbian Orthodox Church is indifferent towards the schism and is not undertaking any efforts to overcome the schism... The Serbian division and split needs to be eliminated... The current strife should not be seen as a foregone conclusion for now and forever. No decision should be accepted here as final, since everything can still be repaired... If we are the Church of St. Sava, then we need to be a Church of peace, a Church of reconciliation.” That same year (1983), Bishop Vasilije of Australia sent an Appeal to the Synod together with his clergy (October 1, 1983) for reconciliation and a resolution to the schism. Finally, Bishop Lavrentije of Western Europe writes on December 21, 1983: “The chasm between us (in the Diaspora) grows deeper and deeper. This is the last chance for more concrete measures to be undertaken with the goal of reconciliation. Otherwise, we will have Protestantism.” He suggested that “a good review be completed of whether any canonical possibilities exist for Irinej Kovacevic to be consecrated again and that he be assigned a diocese in the Diaspora. Insofar as there is, perhaps it would be good to organize a meeting between him and representatives of the Mother Church.” In the end, he adds: “We know how much our brother Hierarchs in the U.S. have lived through insults and humiliation by brothers led astray, that they may reluctantly agree to this suggestion. We need to implore them, for the greater good of the Church, they endure and forgive all.”

In response to the appeals of the Hierarchs, the Synod, upon the suggestion of the Patriarch, requested on March 27, 1984 that Bishop Lavrentije: “travel, as soon as possible, to Libertyville and as a representative of the Synod conduct a comprehensive investigation and determine if there is any possibility of reconciling with our separated brothers over there.” On April 16, 1984, Bishop Lavrentije met with Bishop Irinej Kovacevic at the Gračanica Monastery and St. Sava Monastery in Libertyville, accompanied by 4 priests from each side, and had a discussion, issuing a joint communiqué in which they welcomed the initiative of the Synod and recommended that a meeting between representatives of the Synod and the American-Canadian Diocese be held “to find the best way to normalize our Church life in the Diaspora.” Bishop Lavrentije submitted to the Synod, on April 20, 1984, a report of the meeting and suggested: that an appeal be sent to all priests and faithful in the U.S., “that the insults cease and that all begin to rebuild the trust and mutual love that was lost between our faithful and separated brothers,” that the decision banning kumovi be withdrawn, that court trials cease “and that a multi-day meeting of representatives be scheduled as soon as possible” by both sides and that the “people have patience, goodwill and (we should) transcend as much as possible for the sake of achieving unity in the Church of Christ and St. Sava.” As I already noted, at Lavrentije’s meeting, the Assembly of Bishops replied to the report and suggestions with that all too bland of a decision (May 16, 1985) of kumovi and cemeteries, but the Assembly of Bishops also decided this: “To ask Their Graces the Hierarchs abroad... that actions towards reconciliation with our separated brothers be done more through contact with the people and the representatives of their church-school congregations. Show all the more good will, Christian love and economia.”

Appeals and suggestions for a reconciliation become more frequent: February 14, 1986, Živorad Marinković from Australia; April 24, 1986, Association of Canadian Serbs and the Serbian Democratic Federation; May 22, 1986, Bishop Amfilohije of Banat; on St. Sava Day of 1987; 40 intellectuals from Belgrade sent an appeal which was ignored and not well received; and several appeals submitted to the Assembly of Bishops in the year of Kosovo, 1989. We should also note the discussions Bishop Sava and Christopher had with two attorneys of the American-Canadian Diocesan Council, which Bishop Sava informed the Synod of (May 12, 1987), attaching the letter from the attorneys, in which they conveyed their views on a reconciliation. I mention also the well-known Appeal of the Assembly of Bishops set forth in the communiqué of 1989, the year of Kosovo.

In the end, we should also mention, that from the start of the schism of Dionisije, the American-Canadian Diocese elected and consecrated along with Bishop Irinej, who took over the American-Canadian Diocese from Bishop Dionisije (who passed away May 15, 1979), three other Bishops: Dimitrije and Petar (both deceased) and Vasilije Vejnović (consecrated on November 25, 1978 in New York) who was appointed Bishop of Western Europe even though he remained in New York. The three Bishops: Irinej as the American-Canadian Bishop, Petar as Bishop of Australia, and Vasilije as Bishop of Western America, forming on August 28, 1983 the “Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Free Dioceses,” and on August 10, 1984 at the Assembly during the consecration of Gračanica they re-named the American-Canadian Diocese a Metropolitanate and Irinej was named Metropolitan! I note also that there were many different decisions, statements and texts, issued after the split in 1963, which I did not cite here in more depth, because there were so many of them and they were not critical to a historical-canonical review and analysis of the American schism. The fact is that even with them, in recent times, there is a greater propensity towards reconciliation, but there is, and were, other harsh and irreconcilable statements. However, this can be understood, for every split and schism occurring in the extreme has an almost unavoidable fate. With Christian love and church-pastoral economia for the salvation of our brothers and children from the same Church, everything possible should be done to save them. This motivation, per the ecclesiological-canonical tradition, has always existed within the Conciliar Mother Church.

SUGGESTIONS FOR
OVERCOMING THE SCHISM

Introduction to Church Economia

The Greek word IKONOMIA (the Slavic: dispensation, literally: arrangement/arranging and administering the home) in church use and meaning comes from the Apostle Paul and is widely represented and received by the Holy Fathers, especially in the ecclesiologic-canonical texts. With the Apostle Paul it signifies God’s “dispensation of grace” or the “economia of the Mysteries” (Eph. 3:2-9; Col. 1:25), that is, Christ’s “economia” (dispensation) of salvation through Incarnation. That is how the economia of the God-man is the foundation of and the very being of the Church of Christ. For the Church is created, it exists and lives in the economia of the Incarnation, Suffering and Resurrection of Christ the Savior. Christ’s divine Incarnation, His kenotic Crucifixion and pan-philanthropic Resurrection “for us men and for our salvation,” is the essence of the Church and all Church economia. St. Basil writes of this in his Letter to the Christians in Tiyana, reminding them that we are “like the members of a body, more necessary to one another than a hand is to another hand”: “And the very dispensation the Lord took upon Himself to reconcile with His Blood those on earth and those in heaven” (Letter 97).

Therefore, Church economia (salvific leniency), which the Apostles use and their successors the Bishops as “stewards of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. 4:1) in the Church, or according to the words of Canon 6 of the Second Ecumenical Council: “economists (administers) of the Churches,” is above all support and practice of Christ’s Divine economia of leniency and salvation of us sinners. Economia in Orthodoxy is not the same as in the Roman Catholic Dispensatio (who’s narrow legal meaning entered our lexicon of “positive church law” thereby narrowing the entire broad and rich manner of the economia of the God-man, by which people are saved in the Church). According to St. Cyril of Alexandria: economia is a temporary deviation from exactitude “for greater accomplishment and achievement.” “Just as sailors,” says St. Cyril in Letter 46, “when a storm appears and the ship is in danger, in distress they throw things from the ship in order to save the rest (meaning the people on the ship), it is the same with Church matters, when we cannot preserve exactness, we pass over it, so that we would not suffer damage in everything (the entirety).”

It should be said that neither the concept nor the extent of economia in the Orthodox Church is precisely understood, particularly because it is evangelical grace and power, “binding and loosening” on earth and in heaven, and because it is freedom and love in Christ, that is, leniency and salvific philanthropy, and same as the content and extent of the Great Economia of Christ’s salvation of the world and mankind. Economia is not a deviation from the spirit of the Holy Canons, but from the mere letters of the same; it is a different application or non-application of the church rules, but with the same goal—the salvation of man. The basic rule of the blessed Church Economia was expressed by St. Mark of Ephesus who said: “Economia should be applied there where lawlessness will not be committed,” or before him St. Evlogije of Alexandria (5th century): “The true meaning of the application of economia (in the plural), is when Orthodox dogma is in no way harmed.” We will cite the most beautiful example of Divine economia, given by St. Maximos the Confessor addressing the question: “How can we piously understand God’s “regretting” (to which Holy Scripture speaks: Gen. 6:6; Joel 2:14; Jonah 4:2-3), Maximos says: “God as Creator and Providence of all, naturally thinking about mankind, has many salvific methods for that nature which he reflects upon. Since man is an ever changing being, who easily changes in response to things and time, it is then necessary that God’s Providence, even though it is always one and the same, to change according to our moods, (always) finding a way of applying suitable medicine to those evil states which appear in our nature. And, just as in medicine there exists many diseases which must be dealt with, it is necessary for the physician to be knowledgeable, since the respective (human) body falls prey to many and various diseases, the physician must apply better methods (of healing) than worse ones, and it is usually said about God in Holy Scripture that God’s “repenting” is then when His Providence passes from one method to another (reflecting)” (PG 90,812-813). To these words of God’s and the Saint’s pan-philanthropy we need not comment on.

Now we will briefly illustrate examples of economia through the history of the Orthodox Church.

As previously mentioned in Canon 1, St. Basil discusses accepting back into the Church those from parasynagogue, he further states that in applying economia (leniency) “we should follow the customs of each region,” for in different regions different relationships existed among the separated and schismatic. He provides the example of the schismatics at Carthage and the case of accepting their baptism: “Since some were in Asia, and for the sake of economia to the many (a large number of their faithful), it was resolved that they of prior baptism be accepted, let it be accepted and recognized.” Further, he similarly says for the greater schismatics the Enkratites: that they and their baptism should not be recognized, instead baptize them anew, but in the end he adds: “If this will be an obstacle to the general economia, then let the custom be applied and follow the Fathers who, with us, economized (resolved through leniency). For I am afraid, if we act in such manner (more strictly) that they will hesitate to be baptized (by us), and we will with the strictness of such a demand obstruct those who wish to be saved.” In the end, St. Basil advises that their bishops also be accepted according to their ranks (Canon 1, taken from Epistle 188).

Here are a few concrete examples of the application of church economia. The Council of Nicea in 325, resolved the well-known Meletian schism and received the schismatic Bishop Meletius of Lycopolis (without being consecrated again) and all his consecrations, that is, bishops and priests who were consecrated by him, with the stipulation that his bishops had to wait for the (canonical) bishop to pass away and if the people still wanted the Meletians, let them then be diocesan bishops (Canon 8 and Epistle 1 of the Ecumenical Council). The Bishops of the Council of Sardica and Philoppopolis in 343, defrocked 10 leading bishops one after the other, but this decision was very quickly passed over and the mutual decisions were ignored. St. Photius writes (Letters, London 1864, pg. 562) that St. Proterius of Alexandria (452-547) defrocked priest Peter Mongos, and Timothy of Alexandria, who was later elected as bishop (without being ordained again to the priesthood) and later Peter became Patriarch of Alexandria. Also, he cites the example that Acacius of Constantinople (481-489) who was defrocked by the Council of Rome and even anathematized, and when he passed away, those that were consecrated by him were received and served with the Romans. Patriarchs Philotei of Alexandria, Dorotheus of Antioch and Joachim of Jerusalem, at the Jerusalem Council in 1443, condemned and banned from priestly services and church rites all bishops who signed the “final decree of union” at the Florentine Council in 1449 and expelled them “until their Orthodoxy was investigated;” “and if they are disobedient in this decision regarding the ban of their priestly service, that they be expelled and ousted (defrocked). Later, when the Council of Constantinople was held in 1450, they were all forgiven and the issue was not even raised regarding the consecrations which they performed during the 7 years for which they were under ban (P. Trembelas, Dogmatics, Book 3, pp. 51-52).

Many suitable examples that can be applied to our American case are provided by canons from the Council of Carthage, who broadly applied economia on the Donatists (schismatics in Africa and Italy that were greater in number and tenure). Canon 75 (Milas: 66) states: “Since we considered and understood everything that occurred was to the benefit of the Church, with incentive and inspiration from the Holy Spirit, we chose to mildly, meekly and peacefully deal with the aforementioned individuals (the Donatists)...Perhaps, as the Apostle says, when we with meekness gather those who think differently, God will grant them repentance for realizing the truth, and to free the devil’s snare those who were entrapped by his will.” Canon 77 (68) discusses how the council from across the sea, in Italy (Rome), refused to recognize the consecration of the Donatists, but the Fathers in Africa decided to recognize and accept them: “It was decided...for the sake of peace and benefit of the Church, and for the Donatist clergy, if they correct their understanding and wish to enter into conciliar unity, according to the will and freedom of every individual conciliar bishop who in the respective region administers the Church, and should this contribute to peace among Christians, that they be accepted in the same rank. It is known that even in the past, such action was applied to schisms as was witnessed in nearly all the Churches in Africa, where the fallacy appeared.

This, however, the decision to accept the Donatist clergy in their ordained rank was not intended to harm the council held across the sea in Italy...but to assist those who wanted to join the Conciliar Church, such that no obstacles were placed before their hastened reunification with the Church. For those who worked and helped in their own manner, in the places where they lived, towards a conciliar unity, for the obvious benefit of the souls of the brethren, the decision regarding their ranks was not to be an obstacle in Italy, where their ranks were renounced, for salvation is not to be kept from anyone. That is: that the ordained on the Donatist side, if they made corrections themselves and wanted to enter into the conciliar faith, they should not act according to the decisions of the council across the sea that did not receive them in their rank, but on the contrary, receive them because they contribute to the caring for conciliar unity of the Church).” (A canon was brought forward at the Council of Carthage in 401 and while no comment is necessary, it applies to our American schism completely).

A few of the Canons of Carthage discuss quite adequately the conversations and negotiations with the Donatists that led to the settlement and reunification. Canon 69 (78): “It was decided that representatives be sent by the Donatists—to propose peace and unity, without which it was not possible to establish salvation for them—whether it be to their Bishops or lay people, so that by way of those representatives all would know that they had nothing reasonable to say against the Conciliar Church.” Then, Canon 91 (99) suggested to all local Churches that they negotiate amongst themselves within their territory: “All the bishops with assurances proposed: that every one of them, in their own city endeavor to have relations (encounter) with leaders of the Donatists, or to take a neighbor with them, and hold meetings in each city and place.” Also, Canons 92 and 93 (in Greek it is a single canon, Canon 100) provide an excellent template for negotiations with the Donatists: “The Epistle that will be sent from the Bishops through the Donatists’ representatives: ‘Send with the full authority of our catholic council, we form an agreement with you and wish to rejoice in your address. For we know the love of the Lord, Who said, “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God” (Matt. 5:9), and He told us through the prophet, that those who do not want to be called our brothers, to say to them: “You are our brothers” (Is. 66:5). Therefore, do not underestimate our warning which comes out of our love and desire for peace with you, and if you believe we are being truthful, you need not avoid saying so. That is: summon your council and elect among yourselves those you will trust to prove your righteousness, and we shall do the same, that is, we will elect from our council those who will peacefully understand every contentious issue that separates us from communion (fellowship) with your elected ones in the selected place and time, that in such manner the old fallacy, with the help of the Lord God, end once and for all for the weak souls and unlearned people, that were seduced away, and not collapse in a split contrary to God. For if you accept this in a brotherly manner, the truth will easily shine through. If, however, choose not to do this, your lack of faith will be recognized.’ All of the bishops accepted this proposal as being appropriate.”

Finally, in Canon 129 (118) of the Council of Carthage instruction was given on how Bishops, Orthodox and Donatist, after reunification, more specifically: in the very process of reunification, share the Church’s regions (for these two Church organizations spread into one another’s areas, like our two in the Diaspora): “If there are bishops from the Donatists who paid attention to the unity of the council, they are to evenly divide among themselves the area in which there are people from one side and the other (that is, the Orthodox and Donatists). That is: one area will be under the authority of one, and the other will be under another, so that the older Bishops (in the episcopacy) share, and the younger choose. If there is only one place (set apart from others), let it belong to the closest, and if it is the same distance from both, let it belong to the one whom the people chose (that is, who the people want). If it happens that those who were always catholic (meaning Orthodox, conciliar) wish to have their own bishop (that is, to keep the previous one), and they also converted from the Donatists, then let the voice of the majority (of the people) prevail over the minority; if the sides are equal, let the older bishop remain.”

Following these patristic citations of the salvific, peacemaking and church-building economia, as well as the cited examples, especially from the Holy Canons of the Council of Carthage, it only remains to draw conclusions, that is, specific proposals that could be applied to our schism in the Diaspora.

Specific Proposals

It is appropriate for the Apostolic Father Bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church to look to St. Basil the Great, the Bishop canonist and Pastor-economist, and follow his words: “At this time there is a great need to care and concern oneself with doing good things for the Church. To do something good for the Church—today—means uniting that which is presently separated. And unification can only occur if we are lenient to the weak in that which does not harm the soul... This is why I think it is necessary, that the real and true servants of the Lord show great concern for a return to the unity of the Church of those who in various ways have between themselves separated. For nothing is that characteristic of Christianity as making peace” (Letters 113 and 114).

After everything that has been presented, recall a certain truth: great wounds require a great remedy. I recommend a very short and clear, without great explanation, church-economia and ecclesiological-canonical solution for overcoming the American schism as follows:

1. The Serbian Orthodox Church, as the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of God, has the grace-filled and canonical capacity to overcome the current inertia and lack of perspective in the American case of the Church schism among brothers of one faith and one blood. Thus, the liturgical unity and fellowship must be reestablished as soon as possible with our separated brothers in the Diaspora, applying the fully conscious and conscientious philanthropy of Church economia.

Not only from the perspective of the Alexandrian Patriarchate from 1975, but taking it as a serious canonical precedent it should and can be accepted and recognized as valid the consecration of Irinej Kovacevic as Bishop. He was consecrated by two Ukrainian Orthodox Bishops, Genadius and Gregory, with the participation of the only suspended and not yet defrocked Bishop Dionisije (referring to a recently published booklet with documentation, which was verified and the same stands as is written in the booklet). Those Ukrainian Bishops were consecrated in 1942 in the Polish Orthodox Church, under war conditions, when the Ukraine was under German occupation and was attached to the Polish Church, but all of those consecrations were later recognized by many Orthodox Churches, even though there exists a somewhat different relationship with the Ukrainian fractions in their hierarchy in the Diaspora between the Church in Russia and the Church in Constantinople. The Church of Constantinople recognizes them (of which Metropolitan Maximos of Sardeon writes extensively in the Thessalonikian magazine “Kleronomia,” January 1973, pp. 199-246), and it had already recognized them in 1949 and the Alexandrian Patriarchate (of which Archimandrite, later Metropolitan, Methodios Fujas—the one who brokered the 1975 recognition of Bishop Irinej Kovacevic by Patriarch Nikolaj VI of Alexandria—in the Alexandrian magazine “PANTENOS” during the entire year of 1955, pp. 211-353 with interruptions, and recently it was republished in two volumes of his “Teologike ke Istorike Melete,” Athens, 1983, pp. 169-231, with documentation attached). These two Ukrainian Bishops were not self-conscious (which was a different case with Jovan Teodorović, who was consecrated again in 1949 by Archbishop Mstislav, the current hierarch of the Ukrainian Church in the US and Canada). One of the Bishops, Gregory, was once under a ban by Ukrainian Church authorities, beginning in 1947 because he had declared himself “independent,” but at the Ukrainian Assembly in Paris on August 7, 1955, he was absolved of his penance and accepted into the “prayerful and Eucharistic unity,” as were his people and clergy. The Patriarchate of Alexandria knew of this all too well, and for that reason recognized the episcopal consecration of Irinej Kovačević (from 1975-78). There is no doubt that a complex problem exists as to the Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdiction in the Diaspora, but for this recognition and acceptance by economia of Irinej’s episcopacy, without being consecrated again, it is not relevant. Posing the question of the necessity of a new consecration of Bishop Irinej, I’m afraid, would only bring “bad blood” and stall our reconciliation.

It can be recommended through discussions with Bishop Irinej that he resign, since his rank is recognized and with it he can serve Liturgies, but with that he need not establish conditions precedent for reconciliation and establishing ecclesiastical fellowship. Inasmuch as he was willing to withdraw himself, perhaps the proposal could be: that Bishop Firmilian withdraws himself, being ill, so that in place of both of them a Bishop could be appointed for the Midwestern American Diocese (perhaps later it could be elevated to the level of a Metropolitanate with a vicar bishop in Gračanica?), which would be acceptable to both sides. In that case the remaining parts (parishes) of the former American-Canadian Diocese in the East, West and in Canada would attach themselves to the Dioceses of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate.

Inasmuch as this agreement could not be reached, or that it would once again prolong reconciliation, then Bishop Irinej (ignoring his self-proclaimed title of “metropolitan”) needs to be directly recognized and received with the entire current American-Canadian Diocese, which would temporarily remain a parallel (that is, overlapping) with the four Dioceses of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate. But, there should be a commitment and condition acknowledged by a signed mutual agreement, that this state of parallel overlapping dioceses remain only as a temporary solution stemming from economia, which needs to be overcome as soon as possible, perhaps even at the next meeting of the Assembly of Bishops (in which Bishop Irinej would take part), and at the latest following the death of Bishop Irinej. (It is guaranteed that the Bishops in the Diaspora will be nominated from there, those that are acceptable to them, and elected and consecrated by the Assembly of Bishops). This allowing of the parallel existence of the American-Canadian Diocese with the remaining four Dioceses fits in the general missionary-economia state of the Orthodox Diaspora, where there is already an overlap, in the same geographical regions, of many Orthodox jurisdictions, dioceses, and parishes. However, the Serbian Orthodox Church should at least help to address this irregular state of the co-existence and overlapping of their Churches, to overcome as soon as possible so that full reunification can be realized. Maybe the full unification could be achieved more readily if it came, and it needs to, with a new reorganization of our Diaspora, of which I noted in the introduction, that is, a new reorganization of the Dioceses and parishes, and creating one autonomous Metropolitanate with more Dioceses (such as, the Church in Crete), since our Church’s Diaspora in the US and Canada already has a special status and Constitution (which should then be thoroughly, brought to conformance with the canons, but without undoing the “self-governance” and so on).

Bishop Irinej would either retain his so-called parishes in Australia and Europe, again temporarily, or he would allow them to join of their own volition to the Dioceses of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in those regions. Regarding Bishop Vasilije Vejnović, who is essentially the Bishop of Western Europe only by title, it would be best for him and them to recognize his episcopal title and then have him retire, for he isn’t even popular among his own people (and there is no discussion that he would be accepted, for instance, as Irinej’s successor!).

Full autonomy with respect to property should be guaranteed regarding the assets of American-Canadian Diocese and its parishes, since as far as I know this is one of the main fears among many that the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate will confiscate it from them. I think, however, that when that which is most crucial is realized: reconciliation and establishing full liturgical communion, for this is the source of Christian life, love and salvation, that then full brotherly trust will be realized, and likely the consolidation of parishes will occur quicker and more spontaneously. No “recruitment” of any kind, insincere and behind the back of anyone, should be permitted: anything that would create suspicion, doubt and undermine the achievement of Eucharistic unity and fellowship.

2. With the recognition of the episcopacy of Irinej and Vasilije, and according to the same application of economia, all the clergy and clergy rites should be recognized in the American-Canadian Diocese. If true reconciliation is to be achieved, there should not be any question of defrocking, conviction, etc. of priests brought up now, nor who was ordained, before or after, and by whom. Because this would, from the start, cause more problems than there are now and effectively derail the reconciliation. Nor should the question of priests ordained by Bishop Dionisije after he was defrocked be raised, since the schism was already formed, and they are now being accepted in communion as a whole. The Orthodox Church has always functioned as such when there was an issue of overcoming a schism. Those priests, who were either in the country or the Diaspora, judged and sentenced and deprived of their priestly rank, for real misdeeds, every bishop should make it their duty to address those matters within their respective dioceses, so that any scandal among the faithful might be resolved. However, many of those cases of priests who were defrocked by declarations of bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, or because of their “disobedience” or “abandoning their service,” or “going into schism”—should all be ignored or set aside with one general decision, pardoning them and leaving them as priests, recognizing all of their priestly rites without any dispute.

Parishes can remain as they were, or they can be reorganized if the people so desire. The people and clergy should be allowed to attend services and take communion in every parish and to concelebrate and commune without any special conditions apart from the regular order that exists generally in Orthodoxy. Clergy should be permitted to transfer from one diocese to another, in accordance with the usual agreement of bishops, but without “recruitment” or anything else that would undermine trust, love and communion. Both sides can also bind themselves so that not only will they not do such things, but neither tolerate them among themselves. The position of “victor” or “defeated” should not be used, only reconciliation and unity of brothers.

All of these, and other questions, should be discussed and debated beforehand by a commission of greater number and representation (as the cited Canons of the Council of Carthage suggest). The Holy Synod should form the Commission, that is, its leadership ranks, and then the Commission (or the Synod directly) should reach agreement with Bishop Irinej and our bishops in the Diaspora and to coopt in accordance with Articles 2-3 from all corners of the region. The Commission would need to beforehand, prior to forming the final recommendations, travel to all the parishes or at least the larger Church centers from both sides, and immediately hear from the people and clergy. For the people of God truly need to be heard and asked questions of at the parishes, and to also ask them for peace, mutual forgiveness, love and unity. The people need to be sincerely helped, so the Church itself can be helped, and everything to the glory of Christ, who loves man and is Savior of all.

Peaceful, sober and truly Church-oriented people should be appointed to the Commission. Its leadership, according to us, should be entrusted to Bishop Pavle of Ras and Prizren, whose authority is indisputable by all. In addition to him, another 2-3 members from the homeland should be added, and 2-3 from each side from the Diaspora, but not ones who are forceful, irreconcilable or hardliners, and provide the Commission with the right to decide who they will nominate.

I think it necessary to also say this: at least if the Assembly of Bishops in June 1989, had decided to form a Commission of all Bishops from the Diaspora with one member from each Diocese, I nonetheless believe a new Commission should be formed, as I have proposed, and not ignore the local bishops and structures, rather respect and consult with them, deal in the capacity of a special delegation of goodwill, who would prepare the way and learn the true state of affairs, and propose a real solution based on economia overcoming the schism.

Everything else, issues not addressed here, or newly emerging during the discussions, should be resolved in the spirit of the aforementioned Holy Tradition, ecclesiological-canonical brotherly love and reinforcing of the Church.

Everything must be done in order to achieve liturgical unity and fellowship, and it will provide new zeal for missionary action and witnessing of the unity of Holy Orthodoxy and its saving ability in the New world and New age, that is, unity and growth of the Holy Orthodox Church of Christ.

Belgrade 1/14 March 1990
Hieromonk Atanasije (Jevtić)

 

FOOTNOTES

1. Canon 19 (27) of Carthage states: “If a bishop is being accused, the prosecutor needs to present the charges first to the bishops in that area, and the accused is not to be removed from communion, except if he has been called in a written form... and does not reply within a month from the time of receiving the invitation. If then, he proves for reasons of incapacity... he is given one additional month to respond. And if the second month passes without a response, then he is not to partake in communion with others until he finally justifies himself (or he is adjudicated, which is implied). If he does not want to attend a regular annual Council, to at least address (to conclude) his matter there, it is then determined that he pronounced his own sentence against himself. And during all that period while he is outside of communion (he may not be in communion, i.e. he cannot serve and take Holy Communion) he cannot serve in his own Church nor in the region (i.e., in other churches around him)... If the accused goes into hiding (i.e. withdraws himself) a new bishop may be appointed in his place, in communion, and the accused removed from communion.” We have already cited Rule 96 (87) of Carthage: “Removing a diocese from a bishop before a final verdict has been reached, is not considered correct among Christians.”

2. The schism known of late in the Cypriot Church, between Archbishop Makarios and the Synod with Gennadios of Paphos as the head, saw the current Cypriot Archbishop exceed all expectations with the acceptance of Gennadios’ letter of repentance written on his deathbed. The Church was reconciled with only one Bishop and one priest remaining committed to the schism.

3. It was a notable fact that Bishop Dionisije was not adjudicated from the first moment by the Synod as required by Article 35 paragraph 35 of the Constitution of the Serbian Orthodox Church, where instead he was immediately adjudicated by the Assembly of Bishops, through which his right of appeal was limited. Bishop Dionisije’s judgment was directed to Canon 6 of the Second Ecumenical Council and Canons 14 and 15 of the Council of Antioch, and Canon 12 of the Canons of Clerical Discipline by the Council of Carthage. Canon 6 of the Second Ecumenical Council and Canon 15 of the Council of Carthage contradict each other in the matter of appeals, as Canon 15 of Antioch ostensibly dismisses appeals to the broader Assembly (enumerated ones), while Canon 6 of the Second Ecumenical Council clearly states a right of appeal, and priority should have been given to this ecclesiastical understanding of the Canons, particularly if it was known that the canons of Antioch arose under historically conditional acceptance of the situation at that time (against Saint Athanasius), while Canon 6 of the Second Ecumenical Council has authority as a decision of the Ecumenical Assembly.

Source: The Serbian Christian Heritage of America: The Historical, Spiritual and Cultural Presence of the Serbian Diaspora in North America (1815-2019), edited by Bishop Maxim (Vasiljević), Sebastian Press, Los Angeles, 2019, pp. 393-423.