Economy (1985)

Hierodeacon Theodosius of Holy Trinity Monastery, Jordanville, NY

 

1985 Orthodox Conference, July 22-26, 1985, Seattle, Washington

St. Nectarios American Orthodox Church

10300 Ashworth Avenue North

Seattle, Washington 98133

 

INTRODUCTION

In the Acafist [Akathist] to the Mother of God we read: “All angel-kind was amazed at the great act of Thine incarnation; for they saw the inaccessible God as a man accessible to all, abiding with us...” [1] In the act of incarnation, the inaccessible God became a man, accessible to all. This was the divine economy. The great Byzantine theologian of the fourteenth century, Nicholas Cabasilas, explains:

“Though men were triply separated from God — by nature, by sin, and by death — yet the Saviour made them to attain to Him perfectly and to be immediately united to Him by successively removing all obstacles. The first barrier He removed by partaking of manhood, the second by being put to death on the cross. As for the final barrier, the tyranny of death, He eliminated it completely from our nature by rising again.” [2]

This was an act of God’s love, “a mode of economic condescension”; [3] God became man in order to give man the chance to become deified and to find eternal life and happiness with Him.

“God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son” (John 3:16).

The “divine economy”, therefore, in this sense, is God’s descent into the world, motivated by love, where He built Himself a house — that is, the womb of the Mother of God, and thus made possible man’s salvation.

But this “self-emptying and abasement” [4] of the Son of God in the act of incarnation is not the subject of this talk. The economy that I want to talk about is that arrangement of man’s affairs in relation to the Church — that “mode of economic condescension” — exercised by the Church also out of love, and also so as to facilitate man’s salvation.

It will be easier to look at this idea of economy from three distinct points of view so as to see how it is put into practice and for what reasons, and with what aims and results. Then we will be able to draw some conclusions as to what exactly economy is.

1. RELATIONS WITH NON-ORTHODOX

My first area for observing the operation of economy is in the relations of the Orthodox with the non-Orthodox. But I must quickly point out that economy is not something new. In the Acts of the Apostles, we read of the centurion Cornelius, a just man and one that feared God, who, together with other Gentiles, received the gifts of the Holy Spirit before he was baptised (Acts 10:44). In his commentary on this event, St. John Chrysostom says: “Observe God’s providential management”. [5] This was an exception to the established order.

Further, again in Acts, we read that the apostle Paul circumcised his disciple Timothy “because of the Jews which were in those quarters” (Acts 16:3). Timothy’s father was a Gentile and Timothy, therefore, was uncircumcised. But to satisfy the Jewish law and to be more acceptable to the Jews in his ministry among them, St. Paul decided that Timothy should undergo circumcision, rather than allow it to cause an obstacle. This, Timothy’s circumcision, was an exception to the established order.

In both these scriptural examples of economy, exceptions were made in particular cases, in particular circumstances.

In the 37th canon of the Sixth Ecumenical Council (held in 680), we actually have the legislation of a general rule of economy, that is, the fathers of this council laid down that, in a particular situation, when a bishop is unable to go to his see because of its occupation by “barbarians”, or, we might say, “atheists”, then that bishop does not have to observe the letter of the law by making his way to his diocese, through hell and high water, as it were, but has the right, as a condescension and in mitigation of the strict rule, to administer his diocese from outside. This canon prescribes a solution based on economy, until such time as the normal, strict, canonical position can be observed.

(A) Recognition of Heterodox Holy Orders

In the last century, the question arose of the recognition of the validity of the orders of the Anglican Church.

With regard to the attitude of the Orthodox Church to the sacraments of the heterodox, the position is clear and unambiguous: “According to the teaching of the Church, every heretic is outside the Church and outside the Church there can be neither true Christian baptism nor true Christian sacrifice, and, in general, no true holy mysteries.” [6]

This view is based on the teaching of St. Cyprian of Carthage, which is restated in the canons: “those who have been baptised or ordained by [heretics] cannot be either of the faithful or of the clergy” (68th Apostolic canon); and, “no one can be baptised outside the catholic Church, there being but one Baptism and this being existent only in the catholic Church” (1st canon of the Council of Carthage). [7]

From the strict canonical point of view, therefore, any ordination performed outside the Orthodox Church is invalid and of no effect. The question arises, however, about the nature of this “ordination” when a person seeks to join the Orthodox Church. Can this “ordination” be accepted? Does the person need to be re-ordained, or more accurately, ordained (since ordination can be performed only once and he has no real ordination)?

I shall talk about the actual reception of these people into the Orthodox Church later, but as far as the acceptance of their ordination is concerned, on being received, the Church takes the view that, if received by a bishop, such a person’s empty sacrament of ordination (received in his heretical church) “receives the complement of grace only through that sacrament which unites [him] with Holy Church (chrismation or penance)” [8] (Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky)

Other writers, when discussing this topic of the acceptance of Anglican orders, always speak of such acceptance being an economy. For example, in an article in The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, on the validity of Anglican orders, it is stated:

“The orders of clergymen joining the Orthodox Church from the Anglican Communion may be recognised ‘by economy’ so long as the competent functionaries of each particular Orthodox Church accepting him, think that there are reasons for the application of such ‘economy’.” [9]

The point of Metropolitan Anthony’s article is that, after reception into Orthodoxy, the question as to any supposed exercise of economy with respect to the person’s ordination is irrelevant, provided there exists “the outward form of the sacraments of baptism, chrismation and orders” [10] because the person’s ordination has been filled up with grace overflowing from the grace received in the sacrament of reception.

In this, Metropolitan Anthony is echoing the view of the great nineteenth century Russian lay theologian, Alexei Khomiakov, who said:

“Reconciliation [by baptism or penance] renovates the Sacraments or completes them, giving a full and Orthodox meaning to the rite that before was insufficient or heterodox, and the repetition of the preceding Sacraments is virtually contained in the rite or fact of reconciliation.” [11]

In another place, he expressed the very same idea that the person coming to Orthodoxy has not received the grace of baptism. He receives this grace “either by the repetition of the Rite [of baptism] or by the prayers of reconciliation [i.e. penance] giving power to a rite otherwise powerless.” [12]

In all this discussion of accepting heterodox ordination by economy, one also finds the statement that economy will not be applied in the cases of (1) “heresiarchs and originators of schism, and (2) those who have mutilated the outward act of the Sacraments where that act has been laid down canonically by tradition.” [13]

There can be no room whatsoever for any consideration of the possibility of the exercise of economy in these two cases, because the exercise of economy is a preliminary matter connected unavoidably with the question of the person’s mode of reception into the Orthodox Church, and to this I shall now turn.

(B) Reception of Converts

As I have already stated, the Church’s position with regard to the sacraments of other churches is clear: she acknowledges no sacraments as valid except those of the Orthodox Church. On that premise, therefore, the Church received converts either by baptism, or by chrismation (and sometimes by confession and communion) and I will not go into the long history of the divergent practices, not only as concerns the rite of reception but also the divergent practices of the Greek and Russian Churches.

To receive by baptism was an application of the strict rule: the canons, in as many words, demand that heretics coming to the Orthodox Church from other faiths be baptised. Anything less than baptism was an application of economy because economy was resorted to when the effect of what was done by the Church was to lessen the strictness as demanded by the canon. What is interesting, however, in this particular area, is to read the comments of textbook writers when they describe the effect of such a practice of economy on the previous heretical rites.

A typical example, although the author is not a scholar and his work is not a textbook of canon law, is the statement of Chrysostomos Stratman in “Orthodox Baptism and Economy”: “The Baptism administered by heretics secures no remission of sin, regeneration, or illumination, even if the correct form is used... The form is of divine institution, and if it has been correctly performed, even though it is of itself nothing but a wetting of the body, the authority of the Church can validate it.... the one missing element is the Grace of the Holy Spirit.” [14] The mistake here is to say, as do many others, that if a person is not received by baptism but by economy, then it follows that the exercise of economy makes the previous (heretical) baptism “valid”.

This conclusion is stated in the same terms by the well-known author and bishop of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, Callistos Ware. In his book Eustratios Argenti, Callistos Ware states as follows:

“[The Church] is therefore in a full sense the steward (οἰκονόμος) and sovereign administrator of the sacraments; and it falls within the scope of her stewardship and economy to make valid — if she so thinks fit — sacraments administered by non-Orthodox, although such sacraments are no sacraments if considered in themselves and apart from the Orthodox Church. Because a person’s baptism is accepted as valid — or rather made valid by economy — when he becomes Orthodox, it does not therefore follow that his Baptism was valid before he became Orthodox. The use of economy implies no recognition of the validity of non-Orthodox sacraments per se; it is something that concerns only the sacraments of those entering the Orthodox Church.” [15]

No less a person than the great canonist and commentator, Bishop Nikodim Milash, was deceived by the same false logic. In his commentary on the seventh canon of the Second Ecumenical Council, he writes with regard to the practice of economy:

“The Orthodox Church recognises as valid and salvific the baptism of any Christian group which is outside her confines, whether heretical or schismatic, but whose baptism is performed correctly in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” [16]

The false logic in this conclusion lies in the mistaken understanding of the effect of economy in these cases. Economy does not make valid what was never valid. “It cannot pronounce that to be a sacrament which dogma denies to be a sacrament.” [17] The truth lies in the statement of Khomiakov which I have already quoted: the grace of baptism is received in the rite of reconciliation, which I might add, involves the performance of a mystery, and which gives “power to a rite otherwise powerless.” Chrysostomos Strandman corrects himself a little further in his text when he says: “When the Church accepts the convert and adopts, as it were, this correct but empty form as her own, she supplies at the same time, the sin-remitting, regenerating power of the Spirit.” [18] In other words, the Church supplies the deficiency of the heretical baptism by filling it with the grace of the rite (mystery) of reception. It is simply wrong to speak of any supposed “validity” of the heretical baptism. As Bishop Gregory succinctly puts it, “when any heretic or schismatic is accepted into the Church without re-baptism, that does not signify recognition of the validity of the heretical rite or sacrament. It simply means that he receives the grace of baptism by another rite.” [19]

Some of you may be aware of the spiritual recriminations that a lot of people have suffered (and suffer) because they were not received into the Orthodox Church by baptism. There was the well-known case in England in the late 60s. The facts briefly were that some people had been received into the Moscow Patriarchate by economy. They were subsequently received into the Synod Abroad by economy, namely, by confession and communion, two distinct mysteries of the Church. After some time, they became troubled that they had never received Orthodox baptism, and so, after petition to the bishop, they were baptised by a second economy, in order to quieten their spiritually troubled souls.

Objectively, on the facts of this case and without any regard to the persons involved, it is necessary to say that there was absolutely no need for the subsequent baptism after having been received by economy. Although there was no external performance of the rite of baptism and there was no triple immersion, nevertheless these people had in fact received the grace of baptism when they had been received into the Synod by economy. The grace which they received at that time in the mysteries of confession and communion (the rites of reception) overflowed, as it were, and filled up what was lacking. These people have already been united to the Church. Their subsequent baptism is superfluous — they have already received the grace of baptism, the only thing lacking was the 3-fold immersion. However, if presentation of these facts fails to persuade them and quiet their troubled thoughts, then, of course, a second economy is permitted.

Let us pass now to the second area where economy is said to be exercised.

2. DIVORCE

At the present time, the Church will dissolve a legally contracted marriage on any of the following grounds:

1. apostasy from Orthodoxy;

2. adultery and unnatural vices;

3. incapacity for marital cohabitation;

4. affliction by leprosy or syphilis;

5. unknown absence;

6. jail sentence, with deprivation of rights;

7. infringement upon the life and health of the other spouse and children;

8. incest or prostitution of spouse;

9. entering into new marriage;

10. serious, incurable mental sickness;

11. intentional desertion.

These grounds for divorce were established by the Council of the Russian Church held in 1917–18 — the same council that restored the Patriarchate.

It is interesting that in the preamble to this decision, the Council states that “marriage should be indissoluble. ‘Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder’ (Matt. 19:6).” But immediately after that, it is added: “Dissolution of marriage is permitted only as a concession to human weakness and out of concern for the parties’ salvation” — a clear statement of economy.

The Council, it can be seen, lays down the strict principle — marriage is indissoluble — but, out of consideration for human weakness, will permit divorce on certain grounds. It is instructive to investigate the basis for these grounds and attempt to reconcile this apparent infringement of the evangelical law.

The New Testament teaching is quite straightforward: “Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” These words of our Lord assert the absolute indissolubility of the first lawful marriage, so that the very concept of a second marriage is alien to the Christian ideal. “By its nature, there is one marriage, just as there is one birth and one death” — St. Gregory of Nyssa to his sister St. Macrina, who had refused to remarry on the death of her husband. The fathers of the Church write that second marriages do not accord with the Christian ideal of marriage, not only because they violate the monogamy divinely established in paradise, but because, according to Christian teaching, death is not a complete annihilation and therefore does not destroy the marriage. [20] Consequently, even on the death of one of the spouses, the second marriage by the survivor is a violation of the first marriage by its being a secret adultery.

“A second [marriage] is but a specious adultery.... Anyone who deprives himself of his first wife, even if she be dead, is a hidden adulterer. In breaking the bond of flesh with flesh, which union was formed for the intercourse of the race, he is resisting the hand of God, inasmuch as, in the beginning, God made one man and one woman”. So said Athenagoras of Athens (+180). [21]

Tertullian writes: “A woman, after the death of her husband, is bound no less firmly but even more so, not to marry another husband ... indeed, she prays for his soul and asks that he may, while waiting, find rest.” [22] Further, he says that a second marriage would be an insult to the deceased’s memory and he calls it “a form of adultery.” [23] So also Justin the Martyr: “According to our Teacher, ... they are sinners who contract a second marriage, even though it be in accord with human law...” [24]

Against this, however, must be measured the apostolic injunction of St. Paul, twice repeated in his first Epistle to the Corinthians: “I say therefore to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them if they abide even as I. But if they cannot contain, let them marry” (1 Cor. 7:8–9); and “the wife is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth; but if her husband be dead, she is at liberty to be married to whom she will; only in the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:39).

St. John Chrysostom in his commentaries on this Epistle, passes over these words as self-explanatory, except that he adds, “He (that is, St. Paul) allows even a second marriage, saying ‘only in the Lord’. Now what means ‘in the Lord’? With chastity, with honor.” [25]

Elsewhere, in his homilies, he says:

“Let women listen to this (for it is on their account especially that I refer to the departed) who enter into a second marriage, and defile the bed of their deceased husband, though they have loved him. Not that I forbid a second marriage or pronounce it a proof of wantonness, for Paul does not allow me, stopping my mouth by saying to women, ‘If she marry she hath not sinned’ (1 Cor. 7:28 & 40).” [26]

On second marriage in general, St. John Chrysostom says: “But what will they say, who are knit together in second marriages? I speak not at all in condemnation of them, God forbid; for the Apostle himself permits them, though indeed by way of condescension.” [27]

The code of Orthodox canon law at first did not recognise second marriages and in fact did not approve of them. The seventh canon of the Council of Neocaesarea (315) states: “No presbyter is permitted to dine at the wedding of persons marrying a second time. For, if the plight of a digamist is one demanding repentance, what will be that of a presbyter who is lending his consent to the wedding by attending it?” Ultimately, however, the Church had to come to terms with second marriages since they were permitted by the civil law. But the Church’s participation for a long time was expressed as a usual reaction to a breach of church law — namely, the imposition of an epitimia. When second marriages were finally accepted, this did not imply a change in the Church’s teaching, but only was a consequence of the civil order; in other words, the Church was constrained by the state to admit them and this she did by economy. According to St. Theodore Studite, this occurred in the reign of Constantine the Iconoclast (741–775) because, before him, there were no such second marriages. St. Theodore Studite is the first to classify them as an economy: “In the Christian Church, second marriage is not a law, but a condescension.” [28] Apart from Constantinople, other local churches did not allow this until the thirteenth century.

At the present time, therefore, second marriage, permitted as an economy, is performed in an abbreviated, penitential ceremony noticeably different from the usual marriage rite. There are prayers asking for “forgiveness of transgressions”, for “purification” and “pardon”. These marriages are considered an appropriate limit to man’s weakness, formally recognised by the Church.

The law of the Gospel is that marriage, once legally contracted, is indissoluble. It is stated in both St. Mark and St. Luke as follows: “Whoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her” (Mark 10:11, Luke 16:18). St. Matthew has it slightly differently: “Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery” (Matt. 19:9). All these evangelists assert the strict rule: husband and wife are one flesh and cannot be divided. The bond is as close as between Christ and the Church. A second marriage, they all assert, is adultery. However, as I have already said, the civil law recognised second marriages and the Church was faced with the manifestation of man’s weakness. In this context, it is interesting that St. Matthew quotes our Lord as allowing an exception to divorce if there had been “fornication”. Further, St. Paul himself allows separation (divorce, if you prefer, but not re-marriage) for unbelief: “If the unbelieving [spouse] depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases” (1 Cor. 7:15). Now we have another exception. Next, if we look at the canons of St. Basil the Great (330–379), we see that he allows another exception, in the case of a wife’s desertion, the innocent husband may remarry (canon 35). We already have three grounds for divorce. The extremely authoritative basis for these exceptions or reasons for divorce cannot but have laid the ground for the later acceptance of others.

It is interesting, by the way, that in his commentary on our Lord’s words that “Whoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery” (Luke 16:18), Tertullian states: “Since therefore, His prohibition of divorce was a conditional one [that is, a divorce is prohibited if it is for a reason ‘wherefore a woman ought not to be dismissed’], He did not prohibit absolutely; and what He did not absolutely forbid, that He permitted on some occasions, when there is an absence of the cause why He gave His prohibition”. [29] In other words, it seems, Tertullian would allow divorce if it is not for an “unlawful” reason.

In his commentary on St. Paul’s text, St. John Chrysostom says: “Since there are cases of separation for continence, or for other reasons, or for ‘infirmities of temper’ (in Russian “неудовольствие”), and then he goes on to exhort the wife to stay with her husband. The point is that this commentary shows the matter-of-fact attitude that existed then (fourth century) to marital separation. [30] Further, St. John Chrysostom adds, “if the unbelieving husband directs you to bring sacrifices and participate in his ungodliness, by force of the marriage, or else depart, it is better to give up the marriage.” [31] (In Eerdmans Series translation, “it were better the marriage were annulled”.) Further, he writes “if the unbelieving one daily insults you and causes arguments, it is best to separate.”

This commentary is a clear recognition of the fact that some marriages may not work out. The answer is to separate. But nowhere do the Scriptures or fathers advocate the contracting of a second marriage. The operative word is “separate” — although the spouses remained married, the only solution was to separate. Then, however, deprived of the restraints of marital cohabitation, man’s weakness prevailed and in most cases he wished to re-marry.

In view of all this, therefore, it is easy to understand the mentality of the Church in allowing divorce and remarriage in practice, whilst still teaching the ideal of marital fidelity and eternal union. The Scriptures and fathers recognise that some marriages will fail and they even advocate separation. Since the civil law permitted divorce and remarriage, it was a short step for the Church, out of love for her children, to regularize that second union as a condescension (economy).

It is instructive to read the comments of those who participated in the Pre-Council (Russian Church Council of 1917–18) Commission when they discussed the establishing of the grounds for divorce, and to see what, to their minds, the important factors were in allowing this or that ground.

They acknowledged that since “marriage is the full unity of the spouses”, the grounds for divorce could only be those that, as a result of their existence, made it impossible for the spouses to realize the aim of the marriage, to the same extent as when adultery had occurred. It is clear, they admitted, that adultery destroyed the sacramental sanctity of the marital union, but marriage is not just a religious rite but a relationship giving rise to moral, juridical, social, governmental, natural and economic factors. The mutual rights and duties of the spouses, therefore, had to be considered when establishing a reason for divorce.

These factors were particularly significant when they looked at incurable insanity. This was specifically discounted as a reason for divorce by canon 15 of Timothy of Alexandria. Yet the participants in the Pre-Council Commission were moved, out of compassionate considerations, to allow it and it remains to this day as a ground for divorce. The members of the Commission said: “Insanity signifies mental and therefore civil death if it is incurable. It causes more tragedy than natural death. Insanity so changes a person’s personality that everything human in him dies. In a moral sense, an insane spouse, usually being unaware of his condition or surroundings, undergoes no loss if the other spouse remarries. Mental illness is tantamount to spiritual death, removing not only the physical but also the moral basis of the marriage.” [32]

(I should add, incidentally, that before being made a separate ground, it was often cited in actions brought on the basis of incapacity for marital cohabitation.)

Syphilis, leprosy and other infectious diseases were considered grounds for divorce “if they deprive spouses of all possibility of conjugal cohabitation or if they create a danger of infection of the offspring.” [33]

It is even more interesting to look at how the canon law textbook writers justify divorce.

In his book, Orthodox Church Law, (St. Petersburg, 1897, in Russian), Bishop Nikodim Milash (whom I have already mentioned with regard to his mistaken view of the effect of economy on the validity of heterodox sacraments), makes the following two points:

1. “It is only possible to dissolve legally the marital bond by death, or for such reason as overcomes the Church’s concept of indissolubility and which destroys its moral or religious basis and in itself represents the same death, but in another form. Thus, only death, physical, moral or religious, may dissolve the marital union.” [34]

2. “The dissolution of marriage is not an act recognised by the Church’s law-making authority, but it is in itself the consequence of the destruction of the marital union; for, as between the spouses, the very basis of the marriage and the aim of the marital union cannot be achieved — there is no marriage.

Therefore, the Church authority does not dissolve the marriage but only juridically testifies to the sad fact that a legal marriage has been deprived of its basis and consequently is dissolved by God Himself.” [35]

This second point is akin to the Roman Church’s concept of annulment where, usually by some canonical fiction, the marriage is said never to have existed and is therefore declared annulled. On this reasoning, because of some legalistic and basic fault, God Himself recognises that no marriage exists and the Church officially testifies to this fact (that is, grants a divorce).

The same point, however, is taken up by others and expressed in less scholastic and legalistic terms. Thus, Protopriest V. Pevtsov in his book, Lectures on Church Law (St. Petersburg, 1914) states: “Only as an exception to the general rule, the words of Christ allow divorce for such a reason as infringes the sanctity of the marital union and destroys its very basis” (page 192).

These writers (as well as the author of Notes on Church Law, Kiev, 1871) all emphasize that the Church’s recognition of various grounds for divorce was a reaction to the Roman custom, enshrined in the civil law, of allowing divorce at will and by common consent.

The strict teaching of the Church is that marriage, once lawfully contracted, is indissoluble. However, as even the Church fathers recognise, some marriages will fail for one reason or another and man, being weak and hardhearted, will want to embark upon another relationship. At this point the doctrine of economy is invoked in practice in order to allow the possibility of that second relationship AND to facilitate man’s salvation, for without economy in this case, man would be liable to condemnation as an adulterer. The Church provides for such an arrangement (but nevertheless subjects the parties to penance) out of love, and to mitigate the harshness and terrible consequences of the strict rule. Though it is a condescension to man’s weakness, still the Church, as a loving mother, does not close her eyes to her children’s weaknesses and provides an alternative, while teaching the ideal of perfection, just as did our Lord.

It seems to me, however, that the doctrine of economy becomes relevant at the point when a person wishes to dissolve his existing union in order to contract another. People do not, usually, seek to obtain a church divorce merely for the sake of it but to be free so as to marry another. Divorce and second marriage, therefore, are closely bound and the economy of divorce is allowed for the sake of a second marriage, which is itself an economy.

Divorce cannot be allowed on whim (as it is in the civil law today and is obviously the cause of the gradual breakdown of society and its moral decay). Since divorce was not absolutely forbidden by our Lord, and second marriage is allowed on the death of one of the spouses, then the Church gave her blessing to such reasons as, by analogy with adultery and physical death, violated the sanctity of the marriage bond, on one hand, or, on the other, destroyed its moral or religious basis and thus effectively prevented the spouses from achieving the aim of the marriage.

3. EPISCOPAL CELIBACY

I wish, finally, to attempt to respond to a remarkable article that appeared recently in The Greek Orthodox Theological Review (Vol. 29, #1, Spring 1984), entitled Married Bishops (Agreement between Sacred Scripture and Holy Canons) by Panagiotes I. Boumis, a lecturer in the School of Theology, University of Athens. It is remarkable because the author has to perform amazing contortions to substantiate his argument.

Ostensibly, the author’s object in his brief article is to reconcile what he sees as the apparent contradiction between holy Scripture — “A bishop must be above reproach, the husband of one wife” (1 Tim. 3:2, Titus 1:5–7) — and the twelfth canon of the Sixth Ecumenical Council which prescribes that bishops should not live with their wives after their consecration; in other words, that bishops should not be married. “We assert this, however, not with any intention of setting aside or overthrowing any legislation laid down apostolically, but having due regard for the salvation and safety of peoples and for their better advancement with a view to avoiding any likelihood of giving anyone cause to blame the priestly polity” (The Rudder, p. 303).

The author’s main point is that the twelfth canon, prescribing episcopal celibacy, is a canon of economy, as opposed to the strict rule, laid down in the Epistles of St. Paul, that bishops should and must be married!

He tries to establish this point by bringing forward arguments against it:

1. how can the twelfth canon prescribing episcopal celibacy be a rule of economy if it is stricter than the so-called strict rule that bishops be married?

2. how can the twelfth canon prescribing episcopal celibacy be a rule of economy if the great canonists — Balsamon, Zonaras — allowed married bishops as an economy?

3. how can the twelfth canon prescribing episcopal celibacy be a rule of economy if a rule of economy is only temporary and the twelfth canon seems to be permanent?

Apart from these contrary arguments which he hardly discusses and if he does, he lamely dismisses, he brings forward two additional truly amazing arguments.

1. the Lord and apostles allowed the marriage of bishops, thus, it is a strict rule that bishops must be married; and

2. the 30th canon of the same Sixth Ecumenical Council says that, as an economy, married priests living in barbarian lands may separate from their wives by agreement, to strive after sobriety and virginity. As this was permitted by economy (contrary to the fifth Apostolic canon), by analogy, the author maintains, the rule in the twelfth canon that bishops separate from their wives is also an economy.

In his first epistle to Timothy, St. Paul says: “A bishop then must be blameless, the husband of one wife...” (1 Tim. 3:2). He repeats this in his Epistle to Titus (Titus 1:6).

St. John Chrysostom explains: “What is said here about the marriage of bishops does not relate to other times, for a bishop is embellished by complete purity and holiness. But among the Jews and Gentiles who were committed to self-indulgence, to have only one wife was considered a great thing. Therefore the Apostle does not make it a law, but shows condescension to people’s understanding at that time.” [36]

In the first centuries of Christianity, as St. John Chrysostom expressly acknowledges, it was not the law that a bishop be married, but it was a practice observed by some. The majority of bishops were not married. [37]

The great Russian canonist, theologian and preacher, Bishop John of Smolensk, in his book The Monasticism of Bishops [38] makes out a complete case supporting the concept of episcopal celibacy. In respect of St. Paul’s words, Bishop John says that in fact, St. Paul was addressing himself to priests, not bishops, because in speaking of the duties of the clergy, he mentions bishops and then passes to deacons, omitting priests. In Apostolic times, Bishop John says, the title “bishop” also applied to priests.

Be that as it may, it was a church tradition, not carried into law until the Sixth Ecumenical Council, but preserved in church life, that bishops be celibate. Clement of Rome (first century) said: “It is good for a bishop to be unmarried; if he is not, at least he should be married only once.” [39]

Until the Sixth Ecumenical Council laid down the rule of celibacy, there was an attitude in the Church directed at that aim. This attitude had its origin in the spirit of the Gospel which tried to turn man away from the world, from the flesh and direct him to the spirit, to God. Therefore, pastors as preachers of the Gospel and the representatives of Christianity, most of all had to embody this spirit.

As the Church is represented in Scripture as the bride of Christ, a holy and chaste virgin in a mystical union with Christ, and this union with Him is presented in the image of the marital bond (Eph. 1.5), so the bishop, as the highest pastor of the Church and the image of Christ, is represented in Church teaching as the guardian of her spiritual virginity, that is, inner purity in faith, life, in all her activity in the world and so he is betrothed to her, as the apostle Paul speaks of himself in relation to the Corinthian church (2 Cor. 11.2). This bond of the bishop must be exclusive and single. Thus, a church (or group of the faithful) that is left without a bishop is called “widowed”. This was so strictly understood in the ancient church that the occupation of two sees was called bigamy and the unlawful occupation by a bishop of another’s see was considered adultery.

Thus a bishop should be unmarried, celibate in the sense of complete moral renunciation of flashy and worldly ties, so that his union with the Church (and his diocese) will be completely pure, spiritual and independent of the flesh and world, as is proper for a bridegroom of the Church. [40]

This attitude of the Church, therefore, was given formal definition in the canon of the Sixth Ecumenical Council, and this rule, without doubt, is a strict rule for all time in the absence of another ecumenical council.

In his commentary on this canon, Bishop Nikodim Milash writes:

“The rise of monasticism [in the third century] which had given the Church many great bishops on one hand, on the other hand gave a lofty understanding of bodily abstinence and a consciousness that, inasmuch as the hierarchical rank is the highest in the Church, then there is the least right to bodily indulgence and all the more must it be directed to total service of God and the Church in body and soul — all this contributed to the fact that, already in the fourth century, unmarried bishops were regarded as naturally basic to church order and that it was essential, sooner or later, that it become the law.” [41]

Further, he says,

“In 390, a council was held at Carthage and the second canon of this council prescribed that a bishop must be unmarried and preserve his virginity, with respect to which, the fathers of this council, in order to have a basis for their decree, refer to the apostolic tradition preserved by the Church from ancient times.

This and other testimonies show how deeply rooted was the practice of appointing only unmarried persons as bishops. They also show us that the majority of bishops came from the monks and that these bishops from the monks were the greatest luminaries of the Church.” [42]

In view of this ancient and weighty authority, it staggers the mind to read in the pages of The Greek Orthodox Theological Review that this rule was a mere economy and therefore, being an economy, exactness (that is, married bishops) may be restored without an ecumenical council. But it is obvious at the very beginning of his article what motives have produced such alien ideas. The author states in his second paragraph: “I was encouraged by revered ecclesiastical personalities to present this paper.” Then, in a footnote to his very next paragraph, he writes:

“The usefulness of the present study can be clearly understood from what was stated at the Pan-Orthodox Conference in Constantinople, 1923. In relation to our topic, Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios Metaxakes proposed the following: ‘I am of the opinion that... promoting married priests to the office of bishop, without compelling them to send their wives to a monastery, is a proper goal and is urgent and rational at this time.’” [43]

CONCLUSION

The three areas that I have examined in relation to the application of economy show the usefulness of this doctrine, but two of them especially also show the dangers inherent in it when misinterpreted and misapplied. Economy is a doctrine of compassion and is available to be used for man’s benefit and ultimately, his salvation. Consequently, it cannot be used frivolously. One often hears it invoked in cases of personal weakness, for example, to justify one’s breaking the fast, but this is an abuse and a misconception. Every dispensation from the rule of the Church is not an economy, especially when used to excuse one’s own weakness.

St. Cyril of Alexandria said that the peace and general good of the Church are the only legitimate grounds for the use of economy. [44] He compares economy to a ship at sea which is in danger when a storm blows up and some things have to be thrown overboard in order to save the people on board. It is, in effect, the sacrifice of something (in this case, strictness) for the greater good, which is man’s salvation.

St. Theodore the Studite is of the same mind as St. Cyril. He says economy is a derogation of the general rule of law which re-establishes its strictness once the situation has returned to normal.⁴⁵ He distinguishes two types of economy, temporary, for example, the reception of converts by confession and communion, and permanent, like the permitting of second marriage. As Nicholas the Mystic, Patriarch of Constantinople expressed it, its aim is to deliver from sin and not to cause its commission. [46] Strictness is the rule of law and economy is the practice of love.

With regard to the last case I looked at, episcopal celibacy, it is manifestly obvious that the proponent of this so-called economy was falsely creating a situation of economy to serve his own purposes. His purpose was to advocate a married episcopate, but the doctrine of economy failed him here, not only on historical grounds. “Economy exists when, by necessity or for the greater benefit of some or of the whole Church, a deviation from strictness is allowed, on certain conditions, temporarily or permanently, as much as to ensure that piety and the purity of dogma remain unaltered.” [47]

It is clear that the whole of Church tradition favoured an unmarried episcopate. Economy, therefore, cannot be invoked to change the Church’s belief or to alter her piety.

What, then, can our conclusion be as to the nature of economy? Essentially, it is the overflowing of God’s love, expressed through the Church, to cover man’s imperfection. It is God’s “providential management” of man’s affairs, when he falls short of the ideal.

The doctrine of economy is flexible but not frivolous. It has social and salvific significance rather than juridical. Strictly, it is not “dispensation” as practised in the Roman Church, for it takes no account of legalities. Its motivating factor is the good of souls, a human element, and this also is its purpose, to ensure the salvation of those souls. To some, it may appear to be “hypocritical dissimulation” [48] but, in fact, it is merely evidence that “the ways of God are inscrutable.” [49] Our limited human reason bears no relation to God’s limitless love.

 

FOOTNOTES

1. Kontakion 9.

2. The Life in Christ by Nicholas Cabasilas, St. Vladimir’s Seminary, 1974, page 106.

3. St. John of Damascus, Contra Jacobitas in The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church by Vladimir Lossky, James Clarke & Co., Ltd., Cambridge and London, 1957, page 138.

4. idem, page 144; St. Cyril of Alexandria.

5. Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Eerdmans Series, Volume XI, page 155.

6. Bishop Nikodim Milash, quoted in Strictness and Economy by Protopresbyter George Grabbe (now Bishop Gregory), Orthodox Life, #2, 1979, page 36.

7. See also the first canon of St. Basil the Great.

8. Why Anglican Clergy could be Received in their Orders by Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovitsky, The Christian East, Volume VII, 1927, pages 60–69, reprinted in Orthodox Life, #4, 1980, page 29.

9. Volume IV, No. 1, page 63.

10. Orthodox Life, #4, 1980, op. cit., page 34.

11. The Unity of the Church and the World Conference of Christian Communities by Archbishop Ilarion, Montreal, 1975, page 69.

12. Russia and the English Church by W. Birkbeck, London, 1895, page 158.

13. The Relations of the Anglican Churches with the Eastern Orthodox by Rev. J. Douglas, London, 1921, page 58.

14. published by The Orthodox Christian Educational Society, Chicago, page 25.

15. Eustratios Argenti, Eastern Orthodox Books, 1974, page 84.

16. Правила Православной Церкви с толкованиями, Никодима, Епископа Далматинско-Истрийского, С.-Петербург, 1911 г., стр. 283.

17. The Orthodox Principle of Economy and its Exercise by J.A. Douglas in The Christian East, Volume XIII, London, 1932, page 103.

18. Op. cit., page 26.

19. Op. cit.

20. Догматический смысл запрещения второбрачия священнослужителям, С. Троицкий, Церковные Ведомости, № 13, 14, стр. 7–8, № 15, 16, стр. 14.

21. Supplication for the Christians in The Faith of the Early Fathers by W. Jurgens, Volume I, The Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1970, page 71.

22. idem, page 158.

23. Ante Nicene Fathers, op. cit. On Monogamy, pages 59–72.

24. Jurgens, op. cit., page 52.

25. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., Volume XII, page 111.

26. idem, Volume XIII, “Homily VII on 2 Tim. 3:1–7”, page 503.

27. idem, Homily XX on Eph. 5:22–24, page 148.

28. Троицкий, op. cit.

29. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., Volume III, Against Marcion, page 405.

30. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., Volume XII, page 106. In Russian, Volume 10, page 180.

31. Russian edition, Volume 10, page 182. Eerdmans Series, op. cit., page 108.

32. Журналы и Протоколы Заседаний Высочайше Учрежденного Предсоборного Присутствия, С.-Петербург, 1907 г., Том 4, стр. 97–134.

33. idem.

34. Православное Церковное Право, С.-Петербург, 1897 г., стр. 635.

35. idem, стр. 635.

36. О монашестве епископов, Иоанна, Епископа Смоленского, Москва, 1981, стр. 6.

37. idem, page 5.

38. op. cit.

39. idem, page 9.

40. idem, page 63.

41. op. cit., page 462.

42. idem, page 464.

43. op. cit., page 82.

44. L’économie dans le droit byzantin par Mgr Pierre Raï, Orient et Occident, Istina 3 (1973), page 266.

45. idem, page 274.

46. idem, page 279.

47. idem, page 359.

48. Russia and the English Church, op. cit., page 149.

49. idem, page 159.

 

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