From an MP Commentator: Why has the Moscow Patriarchate never repented?

Alexey Rodionov | July 29, 2025

 

Today marks 98 years since the writing of the infamous “Declaration” of Metropolitan Sergius. At least, in the text itself, it is dated July 16/29, 1927. Although it is clear that the Soviet authorities had been demanding such a declaration from the Church long before that, and attempts to compose it had been made at least since 1924, if not earlier. But I will not speak about that; rather, I will speak about why the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate has still not apologized for this document and has not declared its full denunciation, although there have indeed been attempts to “distance” themselves from it.

Thus, the Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church on October 25–27, 1990, stated:

“We declare that, while paying deep respect to the memory of Patriarch Sergius and gratefully recalling his struggle for the survival of our Church during the difficult years of persecution, we nonetheless do not at all consider ourselves bound by his 1927 Declaration, which for us remains a monument to that tragic era in the history of our Fatherland.”

(https://www.patriarchia.ru/db/document/525407/)

In an interview with the newspaper Izvestia on June 10, 1991 (published in full in Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991, No. 10, pp. 5–8), in response to a question about his attitude toward Metropolitan Sergius’s Declaration, Patriarch Alexy II replied:

“Metropolitan Sergius’s statement, of course, cannot be called voluntary, for he, being under terrible pressure, had to declare things far from the truth for the sake of saving people. Today we can say that falsehood is mixed into his Declaration. <...> It must be acknowledged that the Declaration does not place the Church in a ‘proper’ relationship with the state, but on the contrary, destroys that distance which, even in a democratic society, must exist between the state and the Church, so that the state does not breathe upon the Church and infect it with its breath, the spirit of coercion and silence <...> We were in no hurry to renounce it in words until we could in fact, in real life, take a truly independent position. Over the past year, I believe, we have indeed been able to emerge from under the state’s intrusive tutelage, and therefore now, having in fact distanced ourselves from it, we have the moral right to say that Metropolitan Sergius’s Declaration as a whole belongs to the past and that we are not guided by it.”

As noted by Protopriest Vladislav Tsypin in Volume 14 of the Orthodox Encyclopedia (edited by the same Patriarch Alexy II), published in 2007 (article “Declaration” of 1927): “The very form of the ‘Declaration’—a document lacking a regulatory character, being not a definition or resolution, but precisely a declaration—renders the question of its repeal or disavowal unnecessary.” Finally, the “Act of Canonical Communion,” signed on May 17, 2007, states that “previously issued acts that impeded the fullness of canonical communion are recognized as invalid or having lost their force.” Not a single one of these acts is listed explicitly, but it is clear that the 1927 Declaration is meant first and foremost.

But it is clear that these are rather timid attempts, lacking direct and unambiguous criticism and outright rejection of the “Declaration.” What is the reason for this? This question was posed both within the ROCOR, especially in its “Russian parishes,” and by entirely secular journalists and public figures. And they themselves gave the answer: because the Patriarchate had long since become firmly fused with the Soviet regime and is fully in solidarity with it, including in matters of eradicating the faith in the USSR. Some even went so far as to claim that the Moscow Patriarchate is the only surviving subdivision of the KGB after 1991. I will not even bother to refute this nonsense [sic]. The reason, of course, lies elsewhere. Namely, that after 1988 the ideology of “church revival” took hold in the Moscow Patriarchate. I have already mentioned that by “revival” I do not mean construction and repair work, but rather a mindset—an ideology in people’s heads—which, having undergone some modifications, has quite survived to this day. What does this ideology consist of? I believe that here one can identify, so to speak, three pillars (in order of significance):

1. It is postulated that church life (as opposed to non-church life), in its established forms, is ideal and sacred. This applies not only to the present but also to the Church’s past. However, such a view has been refuted many times by reality itself. One can often observe that non-church people live not only more successfully than church people, but even more sanely and internally sound, whereas among church people there is total chaos in their minds, including outright nonsense and conspiracy theories. I cannot fail to note that two-thirds to three-quarters of children raised in church families leave the Church as soon as they reach adulthood! They leave because they see the catastrophic discrepancy between the idyllic image of a “church revival” and the rather grim reality. To this must be added the lack of clear pedagogy. Also relevant here is the general distrust toward any church reforms: why would they be necessary if, in words, everything is already perfect?

2. The identification of church life with temple life. During the Soviet period, all legal church life was concentrated in the few functioning churches. Beginning in 1987–1988, the number of churches began to increase sharply, but the principle remained the same. We are still being told that the key to salvation is weekly attendance at church, the recitation of prayers (specifically recitation, not living prayer), and, of course, unconditional loyalty to the church hierarchy. It is no surprise that, starting from 1988, the church leadership directed all its efforts toward repairing ruined churches and building new ones, effectively leaving everything else—and the common people—in the hands of sectarians, who quickly flooded the country. By the way, regarding the new churches: they are generally designed according to the principle of “slap it together and it’s done,” and thus stand in sharp contrast to pre-revolutionary ones. One would think the ROC should know everything about churches—yet it doesn’t! Even the specialized journal for church architects, Khramozdatel (“Church Builder”), appeared only in 2010, quickly withered, and was revived only in 2023. Overall, all this has led to the fact that life outside the church building has still not truly become ecclesial.

3. Rigid clericalism and rigid hierarchy. Although the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate constantly declares that it cares day and night for the rights of the faithful, reality speaks to the contrary. The laity are completely excluded from participation in church governance. Yes, some laypeople occupy responsible positions, but all of them received their posts “from above”—from the hands of bishops, not through election or delegation “from below.” Brotherhoods were disbanded, parish assemblies and parish councils are virtually non-functioning. In the parish, all power belongs to the priest; in the diocese—to the bishop; in the Synod—to the Patriarch. Everything is structured strictly top-down, and the laity have ended up essentially superfluous. That is, the Patriarchate does not have real trust in its own parishioners. I don’t know about you, but I am convinced: there can be no strong Church without strong parishes. And today’s parishes are, in essence, a random gathering of people around a church building, whose only required attribute is the rector.

What does all this lead to in practice? Imagine a young man who decides to serve the Church. First, he becomes a reader, then assists in the altar—this is already the first step in his distancing from the other parishioners and their concerns. Then he enters seminary, which means he is removed not only from the parish but, in essence, from the life of society altogether. Next, he becomes a deacon (most often not for long), but even during this period he is firmly separated from the parishioners—by the solea and the altar. When he becomes a priest, no one is allowed to contradict him during a sermon. Moreover, a group of parishioners inevitably forms that hangs on his every word, watching their beloved priest’s mouth. When he becomes a bishop, the former priest loses touch with reality even more—now even with the parishioners. At this point, priests are obligated by duty to hang on his every word, whether they like it or not. He is inevitably surrounded by subdeacons and other attendants, whom he selects according to principles not unlike favoritism. The bishop inevitably becomes a despot in his diocese. And it’s fortunate if he at least understands what the cost of his mistake might be! But such understanding is not always present. Everyone has plenty of examples of this before their very eyes.

And so the years pass, and this bishop—or rather, now a venerable metropolitan—enters the inner circle of church leadership. That is, not only the state of affairs in his diocese depends on him, but also in the entire Church... Do you think that after everything described above he will be morally prepared, without external pressure, to dig into church history in search of the things for which the church leadership is truly guilty? Especially after decades during which people kissed his hand, trembled before him, and hung on his every word? It’s clear that anything is possible—but, alas, the church environment with its supposed sanctity (church subculture) does not foster this at all. In such conditions, it becomes difficult to maintain not only clarity of thought, but often even basic humanity. It is much easier to simply become an appendage to the mitre, the staff, and the vestments, sometimes with dictatorial inclinations. That is the reality. And the “fragments” [i.e., the ROCOR elements who opposed the 2007 union] are by no means an exception here, since it is precisely the Moscow Patriarchate that serves as their main forge of personnel. Still, I am inclined to hope that this will change. Because with each passing year, the number of those dissatisfied with “revivalism” continues to grow. And not only in the Church.

UPD: I have no desire whatsoever to offend or hurt anyone. Because both in the Moscow Patriarchate, and even within the Patriarchate itself, one often encounters very sincere and selfless people. But the environment (“the system”) itself is built incorrectly and therefore constantly pushes even these very good people toward tragic mistakes.

 

Russian source: https://rocor-observer.livejournal.com/285377.html