Ecumenism triumphs because powerful economic actors, with enormous influence in politics, offer unwavering support and abundant funding.
by Elder Paisios of Kareia and Monk
Epiphanios of Kapsala
The
Orthodox World is shaken by the Ukrainian issue: an essentially fratricidal
civil war, which took its final form after the triumph of Neo-Nazi ideology in
Ukraine [a biased reference to the influence of the Social-National Party of
Ukraine – tr. note]—something that became possible due to the deep
involvement of the West therein.
It
is, however, a crisis that—among other things—is also deeply ecclesiastical. A
crisis that brings to the surface pathologies which can no longer be hidden, as
was previously the case. Pathologies related to the East–West polarity—a
polarity that, in our view, does not merely describe broader geographical or
even geopolitical definitions, but entirely distinct worldviews. In this sense,
the “West” appears within parts of the (geographically defined) East, while the
“East” is now discernible in parts of the (geographically defined) West… When
referring to the geographically defined “East,” we of course mean the Orthodox
World and not the Far East (i.e., Asia).
The
research that must therefore be undertaken is obliged to examine how the – at
least modern – face of the “West” was constructed (understood as a cohesive
worldview), and by what means its acceptance is imposed upon the radically
Other, that of the “East.” It is necessary, therefore, to define the Western
worldview, its origins, and how these origins were combined with major
political and economic pursuits on a planetary scale, as a unified projection
of power. The understanding of these issues constitutes an absolutely
critical task, for it can reveal the reason for the broader intra-Orthodox
crisis…
Already
from the early 2000s, in the field of international relations and diplomacy,
the West began to project the instrumentalization of religion as a pillar of
power, as it was deemed to compensate for the disappearance of political
ideology, which had occurred after the end of the Cold War. It was then that
the term “soft power” was born, intended to denote a real pillar of the
exercise of power, yet not in the realm of brute force (violence), composed
of military forces and all sorts of political measures of imposing that power,
but rather in the realm of persuasion, and thus more directly connected
with the “softer” promotion of positions, as well as with propaganda, with
the primary objective being the reshaping of social consciousness toward the
desired direction.
To
the question of what (new) role the Church and theology are called to play
within the framework of their instrumentalization, the answer is simple: as a
(politically exploitable) pillar of soft power, the Church is used for the
purpose of transforming “Eastern” society in a Western-oriented manner,
through the imposition upon it of the dominant Western model, which mandates
the adoption of “Western” values—such as diversity, the relativization of
traditions through so-called cultural dialogue, and the complete expulsion of
Orthodoxy (insofar as we are speaking specifically about countries where
Orthodoxy predominates) from the “public sphere,” stripping Orthodoxy of any
voice on matters not deemed strictly “theological.”
If
what has been stated thus far appears unclear or vague, let us pose some
questions that will shed light on what we wish to express and why we approach
ecclesiastical problems in this particular way:
Why,
for example, is there a unified new theology across the major Christian denominations,
shaping a theological minimalism, a fundamental agreement among them?
How
and where was this new theology constructed? Does it constitute a genuine
intra-Christian attempt to resolve the problem of the division of the Christian
World, or does it represent yet another means of imposing political decisions
that homogenize Peoples and traditions?
Do
the common elements of the new theology relate, perhaps, to the original
content of the Christian revelation, as it was expressed in Scripture and
authentically interpreted by the Ecumenical Councils of the Church and the
Fathers of the Church?
Finally,
how is the concept of Ecclesiastical Tradition (re)defined within the framework
of Ecumenical theology, which is essentially the new theology?
We
must above all work theologically—not, however, by producing a “theology in a
vacuum,” as if theological writing were detached from historical events and the
factors that generate them—but rather, we must relate theological problems to
the broader context within which they arise, and which in essence directs them…
Therefore,
research into ecclesiastical or theological problems must go further—must
examine the fundamental origins that constitute the broader frame of reference
within which the particular ecclesiastical issues that concern us emerge (e.g.,
the issue of ecclesiastical Primacy, the Ukrainian question, the issue of
Ecumenism, the issue of ecclesiastical unity, etc.). We do not mean to conduct
philosophical investigations, but rather we speak primarily of understanding
the broader context within which the problems that concern us are born and
develop. In other words, we speak of the larger picture, within which the
particulars appear.
And
the larger picture, unfortunately, is NOT theological! Or to put it
differently, its starting point is not theological… This, after
all, is the most fundamental problem of the secularization of theology—and of
the Church more broadly: that contemporary theological and ecclesiastical
pursuits (such as the issue of Christian unity, divisions, etc.) express deeper
political and economic designs which are being implemented with the help of
people and through the Church itself—people who are deeply connected to, even
dependent upon, those interests.
To
the question of why the investigation of political and economic correlations in
ecclesiastical matters should concern us, the answer is simple: it concerns us
because these are the critical factors that guide new trends, reinforce
them, and essentially destroy the theology of the Church, its
asceticism—that is, the path of salvation. The ecclesiastical faith is being
destroyed, the faith that constitutes the continuity of Tradition, which is our
identity—who we ultimately are!
“The Big Picture”
Let
us now proceed to the examination of the “big picture”…
The
West perceives Orthodoxy primarily as a cultural—and not merely as a
religious/ecclesiastical—entity, and it handles it conceptually solely in
strictly political terms. The bitter experience of the Yugoslav war revealed to
the Orthodox peoples what they were to face after the—victorious for the
West—end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Soviet Union—analogous to that
of Yugoslavia, but on a far greater scale—confirmed those fears: the West wages
war faithfully according to the doctrine of the much-promoted Samuel
Huntington, best known for his work The Clash of Civilizations, the
central thesis of which is that:
During
the Cold War, the conflict was between the capitalist West and the communist
Eastern Bloc. Today, however, it is more likely to occur between the major
global cultures: the seven existing ones—(i) Western, (ii) Latin American,
(iii) Islamic, (iv) Chinese, (v) Indian, (vi) Orthodox, (vii) Japanese—and a
possible eighth, (viii) African.
On
this basis, Huntington articulated how the West perceives the magnitude of
Orthodoxy: in purely geopolitical terms—“If Russia becomes Western, the
Orthodox Civilization will cease to exist,” he observes.
The
method he proposes in response to the West’s rapid political liberalization of
non-Western civilizations is that of gradual liberalization—namely, the gradual
integration of states, societies, and religions into the dominant Western
perceptions: liberalism and a market without limits or constraints, with
cosmopolitan internationalism as the frame of reference—a worldview that
strongly opposes the notion of national sovereignty and independence.
The
target, therefore, becomes the “soul” of a society, while the means employed is
the gradual integration into Western values through cultural osmosis with them.
The result is well known: it is the secularization of the fundamental pillars
of society—among which, perhaps the most important, is its religious
identity—meaning the severing from its native Tradition, the adoption of the
fundamental liberal idea of individualism, which in turn is essential for the
formation of consumerist culture, the point of reference of the American model
that is to be imitated.
Huntington
also refers to the significance of religious identity when, in speaking about
Europe, he distinguishes Western from Eastern Christianity, blending together
Papism and Protestantism on the one hand, and leaving Orthodoxy on the other.
When Huntington speaks of “Western Christianity,” he has in mind its liberal
shaping, which in Europe was imposed by the USA after the Second World War
(WWII).
Indeed,
Huntington warns that the failure to liberalize religion (in the case that
concerns us, Orthodoxy) can only undermine the process of modernizing the
target country or society, with the risk of overturning the overall strategic
plan.
A
recent effort at gradual political-economic-cultural integration promoted by
the West is the case of Ukraine, where the issue of Orthodoxy was
instrumentalized, culminating in the creation of the new Autocephalous Church
there. As a well-known theologian expressing the line of the Phanar (Ioannis
Lotsios) characteristically notes: “Autocephaly constitutes a significant
event and at the same time a historical reference point in European
development. The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s effort to bring forth this autocephalous
church grants a people the right to move forward united and strong, while contributing
to the development of a European Orthodox community within the framework of the
European Union. This new autocephalous and European Church will have much
to offer…”
What
is sought, therefore, is the absorption of the distinct Orthodox identity into
a supranational entity imbued with Western liberal values (the European Union).
In fact, as early as the “distant” 2015 (one year after the Maidan coup and the
outbreak of war in Eastern Ukraine), a Ukrainian Uniate theologian (Mykhailo
Cheremkov)—whose text was even republished(!) by the aforementioned Greek
theologian—described the conflict with Russia using terms taken exclusively
from Huntington’s political theory, emphasizing: “In a certain sense, it is no
longer Russia as a country, but Russian Orthodoxy as a supranational movement,
which constitutes a geopolitical factor (that must be combated).” The position
in favor of Ukrainian autocephaly is not at all hypocritical regarding its
aims; indeed, the most significant article by the Greek theologian in question,
published before the granting of autocephaly, bore the title: “The
Geopolitical Strategy of the Unifying Council.”
The
political-economic-cultural integration promoted by the West is, therefore, the
objective, and we must seek to understand how—that is, the manner in which—the
achievement of this goal is pursued, particularly with regard to the role of
religion within it.
Here,
almost self-evidently, arises the issue of cross-denominational Ecumenism, as
well as its origins, so that through them we may understand its significance in
the reshaping of European identity (after the end of WWII)—that is, a reshaping
which set forth as its aim the adoption of a new model, one imposed by the USA,
as the only country to emerge from the war unscathed, economically dominant,
and the only one capable of economically aiding the devastated countries of
Western Europe.
The USA and the Processes of
Shaping the Liberal Ecumenical Spirit
First
and foremost, a clarification is needed concerning the bibliography on the
Ecumenical Movement: in this literature, what is presented is merely a
list-like description of ecumenical organizations, persons, and dates—without
the slightest correlation to extra-ecclesiastical centers, individuals, or
possible objectives. These are portrayed as a supposed genuine inspiration of
the Holy Spirit, which calls the divided Christians to unity. But what kind of
unity, and how?
Here,
we must examine the developments within the United States itself, prior to
World War II, since the future of Ecumenism—as it is known today—was shaped
there. Specifically, during the period 1900–1930.
Indeed,
the liberal spirit that permeates Ecumenism at that time acquires in the
USA a powerful patron, as well as individuals in key positions, who together
were able to shape the appropriate power relations in order to prevail within
the ecclesiastical landscape and to push aside the traditional forces. The
individuals behind the liberal Ecumenical spirit held in their hands a powerful
apparatus: specifically, we refer to the organization YMCA (Young Men’s
Christian Association) and its equally powerful leader, John Mott (1865–1955).
A
few words about Mott. Mott, who is more widely known as the “father of the
Ecumenical Movement,” was a Methodist, and already from 1915 to 1928 he served
as the powerful General Secretary of the International Committee of the YMCA,
while from 1926 to 1937 he was President of the World Committee of the YMCA. He
was the founder and first president of the World Student Christian Federation
(WSCF, 1895), which was essentially the university branch of the YMCA. He
subsequently presided over the 1910 Edinburgh Conference (which constitutes the
official beginning of the Ecumenical Movement), which led to the founding of
the International Missionary Council (IMC, 1921), of which he was again
president. He also served in the leadership of the 1937 Oxford Conference “Life
and Work” (which in 1948 was incorporated as the corresponding commission into
the World Council of Churches), and he eventually became vice-president of the
provisional committee of the WCC.
Specifically,
the YMCA under Mott’s control embodied the most liberal spirit within American
Protestantism and became the international vehicle for promoting the two
central pillars of liberal Protestantism: the “Social Gospel” and Ecumenism. In
its Foundational Principles (Paris 1855), its doctrinal conviction was recorded
that the Christian churches are united and that the YMCA constitutes a means
of expressing this unity! By “Social Gospel” is meant the Protestant view
of applying evangelical principles to labor. In the United States in
particular—essentially up until the 1930s—the needs addressed by the Social
Gospel were enormous: widespread use of child labor, absence of state welfare,
absence of labor legislation. The extreme poverty in working-class slums, due
to meager wages, and all that this entailed (corruption, violence, growth of
revolutionary tendencies, etc.), was shaping an increasingly explosive social
situation, exacerbated by the frequent economic crises brought about by the
formation of massive monopoly conglomerates—what is now often referred to as
“the Wild West of American Capitalism.”
The
YMCA thus labored tirelessly—among other church-related organizations (e.g.,
the Salvation Army)—providing relief to the working masses and, most
importantly, achieving the much-desired social peace demanded by capital,
which financed the YMCA’s activities, in order to prevent any disruption,
during that critical period (1880–1920), to the process of transforming large
companies into monopolistic conglomerates.
It
is precisely at this point that the entanglement between the Oligarchs of
wealth, the ecclesiastical organizations, and the individuals who led them
becomes evident. For the period under discussion (1900–1930), the most
well-known connection was that of Mott with the Rockefeller family, owners of
the world’s largest oil company, Standard Oil.
Mott,
from his position as leader of the YMCA, guided—in close cooperation with the
Rockefellers (father and son)—the isolation of radical elements within the
Social Gospel Movement (who were demanding greater labor rights that employers
were unwilling to grant), and he also worked toward shaping the conditions for
transforming Protestantism in the United States in a liberal direction. This
entailed its secularization, thereby making it a competitor to the socialist
ideas that, in the early 20th century, were widespread among poor European
immigrants—and which instilled fear in employers.
Secularization
thus became the most significant process that would transform the Protestant
churches from “outdated” dogmatic denominations into modern, bourgeois social
forces capable of guaranteeing social peace—rather than endless and fruitless
dogmatic disputes. Therefore, an additional goal was the elimination of
dogmatic confrontations through the eradication of doctrinal oppositions
between the churches. It was at this very central point that the Social Gospel
and Ecumenism intersected: in the transformation of the churches into a
new—modernized—type of structure that would facilitate their integration into
the new American Model envisioned by the Rockefellers, who were the primary
representatives of major industrial and banking capital.
Within
this perspective emerges the largely unknown theological conflict between
Traditionalists and Liberal Modernist Protestants—initially within the
Methodist Church, and subsequently across all the major Protestant churches in
the United States during the 1920s and 1930s. This theological conflict
represented the culmination of the struggle between the two camps that had
begun in the period 1890–1910, which sought the rejection of the dogmatic
points distinguishing Methodists from other Protestant denominations, and
essentially pursued a theological minimalism, emphasizing the adaptation of
faith to the new scientific discoveries and moral pressures of the time. In
other words, they sought the “modernization” of the church.
The
goal of the Modernists was the reinterpretation of the Gospel in light of
modern science and philosophy, as well as the freedom to accept or reject
central points of doctrine (e.g., the doctrine of Christ’s virgin birth). Their
criticism of the Traditionalists was that Fundamentalism (as the Traditionalist
camp was labeled) was backward-looking and intolerant, unwilling to allow for
dogmatic diversity and difference.
As
a result, by the end of the 1930s, the proponents of theological liberalism had
effectively won the battle, with the Modernists controlling all the major
university theological faculties, the leading publishing houses, as well as the
hierarchies of the largest Protestant churches in the United States. The
Traditionalists (that is, the Fundamentalists) withdrew, founding smaller
publishing houses, universities, and theological schools.
The
role of Rockefeller’s son in the conflict was immense. Primarily through his
consistent funding of the YMCA, which served as a driving force for the
Modernists in the dispute; through the influence he exerted over the
universities; and through the formation—for the first time in the U.S.—of a
supra-denominational Protestant organization that rallied the Modernist forces:
the Interchurch World Movement (IWM). It is no surprise that the president of
the Movement was once again… Mott!
The
importance that Rockefeller attributed to the Movement was immense.
Communicating with his wealthy friends, he requested their financial support
not for the various Protestant churches individually, but for the strengthening
of the IWM, because, as he characteristically wrote to a wealthy friend:
I
do not know of any better insurance policy for a businessman—for the security
of his investments, the prosperity of the country, and the future stability of
our government—than this Movement.
The
Movement proved to be the crucial factor that supported, expanded, and directed
the spread of the conflict between the Traditionalists and the Liberal
Modernists beyond its initial boundaries—that is, beyond the Presbyterian
Church—to the entirety of the largest Protestant churches in the United States.
The characteristics of the Movement—essentially a forerunner of the World
Council of Churches (WCC)—do not merely classify it as a precursor, as such
initiatives are usually described, but rather as a stage of organization
toward a final goal.
The
goal of the Movement was, from the outset, the preparation of the ground for
the next step. Essentially, it was a transitional mechanism that explored and directed
the existing possibilities for union among the Protestant churches, while
coordinating actions and initiatives, having gathered into a unified body those
willing participants from the individual churches—namely, those inspired by the
Ecumenical spirit and the new teaching of Ecumenism and the “Social Gospel,” so
useful to Rockefeller and the great financial interests.
As
for the particular ecclesiastical characteristics of the Movement, Rockefeller
himself explained its role as follows:
“The
Movement does not aim at the establishment of a super-church; it is nothing
other than the churches themselves cooperating through this simple mechanism,
which they themselves have created and control.”
The
designation of the Movement as a “mechanism” is revealing. Strikingly, the
definition given is exactly the same as the one still officially promoted today
by the World Council of Churches (WCC) and its supporters—that the WCC is not a
super-church…
The
supra-denominational nature of the organizations funded by Rockefeller was not
merely a matter of preference; it was his deep conviction that Christianity
needed to change and transcend confessional, dogmatic distinctions. For
example, in a speech he gave to the student members of the YMCA at Brown
University, as early as 1894, he made it clear:
“A
Christian is a Christian regardless of the church to which he belongs.”
The
Movement, then, was staffed by individuals who embodied the new missionary
vision brought forth by Ecumenism together with the Social Gospel. It had Mott
at its head, and most importantly, it enjoyed enormous direct funding from the
Rockefellers. These were the same individuals—at least with regard to the
United States—who also staffed the IMC, which Mott had founded in 1921,
implementing the decisions of Edinburgh 1910, through an organization that
internationalized the new missionary spirit of liberal Protestantism and
exported the new American ethos beyond the U.S. After all, the financiers of
this new endeavor were once again the same…
This,
then, is why Ecumenism triumphs: because powerful economic actors, with immense
influence even in politics, offer unwavering support and generous funding to
the organizations that promote it and to the individuals who propagate it.
Founding of the WCC
Already
during the pre-war years, the United States had a decisive presence within the
three main ecumenical organizations: the International Missionary Council
(IMC), the “Faith and Order” movement, and the “Life and Work” movement, having
first and foremost secured the “internal front”: the liberal form of
Protestantism within the U.S. itself. From 1937 onward, preparations for the
coming developments were underway: the WCC’s office in New York had already
undertaken the principal financial burden of the organization in formation.
Rockefeller once again provided direct and generous financial support.
Making—unavoidably
due to lack of time—a leap into the post-WWII situation, we
find—unsurprisingly—the same figures working toward the founding of the World
Council of Churches, which was finally achieved in 1948, with its first General
Secretary being Dr. Visser t’Hooft, who simultaneously served as secretary of
the World Committee of the YMCA (with Mott as president), as well as general
secretary of the WSCF (again with Mott as president)… Mott once again played a
decisive role in the creation of the WCC, which, in recognition of his
invaluable services to the Ecumenical Movement and to the WCC itself, honored
him with the title of lifetime president.
The
United States had now indisputably become the leading power of the West,
entering into a trajectory of confrontation with its former ally, the Soviet
Union. The doctrine that defined the framework of this conflict was the
well-known “Truman Doctrine” (March 1947, by U.S. President Harry Truman), and
the lever for its reinforcement in the European countries was the “Marshall
Plan,” that is, the economic aid provided by the U.S. to Europe. The Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan functioned complementarily; the former
constituted the geopolitical framework within which the latter operated. The
openly proclaimed aim of the Marshall Plan (launched in 1948) was the reduction
of interstate barriers and the economic unification of Western Europe,
thereby shaping the conditions for the subsequent political unification of
Europe.
At
the same time, within the WCC, through strong representation and massive
funding, the liberal American Protestant churches had now become the dominant
force. Thus, after 1948, the Ecumenical Movement—now possessing a central
institutional body that had absorbed the “Faith and Order” and “Life and Work”
committees (the IMC would be “coincidentally” absorbed in 1961, immediately
after the entry of the Eastern European Orthodox Churches—let the reader
understand)—would soon be instrumentalized in the long-term strategic plans of
the United States for the future of (Western) Europe. A Europe that was
expected to adapt to the new conditions and be re-educated in the
liberal values of the American version of democracy.
Indeed,
the promotion of the “value” of Western Democracy became one of the principal
aims of the newly established WCC, and it went so far as to identify it—and its
economic system—with human freedom, dignity, and Christianity itself! In fact,
John Dulles (later U.S. Secretary of State in 1953 under the Eisenhower
Administration) was the author of one of the documents (prepared as early as
1946) of the WCC’s Study Department Commission, which was presented at the
founding assembly of the WCC in Amsterdam, under the title: “The Church and
the International Disorder.”
The
text was a political manifesto, faithful to the Truman Doctrine, reproducing
its key points, and did not hesitate to attribute the rejection of Ecumenism by
the Orthodox Churches (at the Moscow Conference) to the “Communist parties,”
which, as Dulles himself emphasized, “governed seven countries representing
approximately one-quarter of the world’s population. These parties alone
made the immediate creation of a global organization for peace impossible.”
He also stressed the need for better organization of the churches against
Communism, effectively supporting the “Christian” anti-communist front proposed
by Truman.
The
text focused on two events, one ecclesiastical and one political. The political
event was the beginning of Cold War rhetoric on the part of the United States
and the “crusade” President Truman was calling for from the Western Europeans
against the Soviet Union.
The
ecclesiastical event was the Moscow Conference of July 1948—just one month
before the founding Assembly of the WCC in Amsterdam! The Moscow Conference
took place on the occasion of the celebrations marking 500 years of
autocephaly.
In
essence, it was a pan-Orthodox Synod, in which all the Orthodox Churches
participated—either with representatives or with hierarchs at their head—except
for the three that were in direct dependence on the Western bloc: the
Patriarchate of Constantinople, guided by the extreme Ecumenist Metropolitan
Germanos of Thyateira, with Patriarch Maximos V effectively held hostage
(he was forced to resign in October 1948 under the pretext of… mental
illness!), until he was replaced by Archbishop Athenagoras of America (who
arrived in Turkey in January 1949 aboard President Truman’s personal plane);
the Church of Greece (with Greece living through the final days of the Civil
War and essentially under American military occupation); and the Church of
Cyprus (with Cyprus still under British rule).
The
decisions of the Moscow Conference dealt a critical blow to the upcoming
U.S.-led founding assembly of the WCC, as they theologically undermined
the significance of the participation of the three Orthodox Churches in it. The
decisions included an unprecedented condemnation of Ecumenism as foreign to the
Orthodox self-consciousness of being the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic
Church. In conjunction with the condemnation of Papism and the refusal to
recognize the validity of Anglican ordinations (which had been recognized by
Constantinople, Romania, and Alexandria)—a stance essentially grounded in the
theology of the Seventh Ecumenical Council concerning the priesthood of
heretics—these decisions constituted the definitive theological tombstone of
the coordinated assault on Orthodoxy and the Orthodox peoples.
The
WCC, stripped of meaningful theological recognition by the Orthodox world, was
destined to sink even lower: at its Second General Assembly in Evanston, USA,
in 1954—at the height of the Cold War—the proceedings of the assembly were
opened by none other than the then President of the United States, Dwight D.
Eisenhower. In the guiding study document (That We May Be Witnesses and
Servants), the line already established by Dulles in 1948 was continued: to
the basic human needs of “freedom, equality, stability, and productivity” was
contrasted the “politics of totalitarian government” of the communist
countries, while a distinction was made between the “Soviet and non-Soviet
world,” forming the subconscious Cold War slogan of a world of tyranny versus a
world of freedom… The politicization of the WCC had now reached its peak…
At
the same time, in 1950 the WCC established the Ecumenical Commission on
European Cooperation to develop how the European churches ought to
collaborate in the goal of European unification—as envisioned by the
so-called “Father of the European Union,” Jean Monnet, and Robert Schuman (then
French Minister of Foreign Affairs). This vision was implemented through the
famous Schuman Declaration of 1950, which led to the first step in the
process of European integration: the founding of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) in 1951 (known as the Treaty of Paris). The aim of the
commission was to cultivate a climate of “Christian responsibility, which ought
to lead to the reconciliation of the European peoples, as the only secure path
to European cooperation.” Let us not forget that the Schuman Declaration
stated: “The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the
elimination of the age-old opposition between France and Germany.”
The
primary significance of this commission lies not only in the time of its
formation but also in the stature of its members. It brought together politicians
from Western European countries that would not become part of the new
European Community until decades later, such as Britain, the Scandinavian
countries, Greece, and Austria—while some of its members would later hold
the highest political offices in post-war Europe.
Epilogue
Many
important subjects were left outside the scope of this text. For example:
What
was the role of the YMCA in pre-revolutionary Russia, and what was its
influence on the ecumenical stance of the Patriarchate of Moscow?
What
was the decisive role of the YMCA in the founding and funding of the Orthodox
Theological Institute of Saint Sergius during the interwar period—a role that
proved catalytic in the dominance of ecumenical theology within the Orthodox
world, through the Institute, as well as in its alignment with the new liberal
personalist theologians of Papism?
What
is the significance of the coordinated action of the IMC and the YMCA in the
matter of the “rescue” of Russian Orthodox anti-Soviet “refugees” (who had
openly collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War [sic]),
whose final destination was the United States, and their subsequent
instrumentalization in the anti-Soviet front formed by the U.S.?
What
were the understandings between the United States and the Vatican prior to
1948, as well as the transformation of the Vatican itself, in full alignment
with U.S. aims for its liberalization—culminating in the Second Vatican Council
(1963–1965)? And many other such matters.
The
topics not presented would certainly have strengthened the image we sought here
in broad strokes to depict: namely, that Ecumenism is, from the very beginning,
a purely Western project, whose goal is the diffusion of American culture into
the Christian world. Even Western Europe itself succumbed to the process of
Americanization, which transformed it into a dependent region, without its own
will, and the role of religion—especially in the first two decades after the
end of World War II—was critical in this.
In
closing, let us add something regarding the event of critical importance that,
unfortunately, continues to go undiscussed even to this day: the Moscow
Conference and its decisions. The theological argumentation that was
developed—fortunately recorded in the official proceedings for anyone who
wishes to examine it—leads to the conclusion that the refutation of Ecumenism
and Papism that was presented is grounded in the consistent Orthodox polemical
theology, in the primacy of the Orthodox Faith, and not in political
calculations or objectives.
Proof
of this lies in the fact that, aside from the three Greek Churches, which had
already joined the Ecumenist movement due to American and British pressures,
all the others signed in agreement. And, of course, who could possibly claim
that the Patriarchates of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria were...
“Communist”?
What
should also raise concern is the disastrous entry of the Eastern European
Orthodox Churches into the WCC (in 1961), which overturned the theologically
correct positions articulated by the 1948 Conference, placing at the
forefront—let us emphasize once more—the confessional Orthodoxy, in contrast to
a secularized liberal version of it. We are, unfortunately, living through the
consequences today, especially in light of the recent announcement of the
agreement for a common celebration of Pascha between Orthodox and Papists—a
long-standing demand of the Ecumenical Movement from the very beginning… An
agreement that will not be a first step toward union, but the very union
itself!
Greek source:
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.