Ioannis N. Paparrigas | September 26, 2026
Every clergyman certainly has the
right to formulate personal theological or canonical views and to express
reservations or disagreements. There is, however, an institutional reality that
personal assessments cannot set aside: decisions already taken by the competent
ecclesiastical bodies remain binding elements of ecclesiastical order until
revoked, corrected, or replaced by a new ecclesiastical decision. However much
a clergyman may believe that expressing his personal disagreement constitutes
“confessing the Faith,” he should remember the distinction between inward
conviction and actual ecclesiastical action. Confession is not exhausted by
stating a theological position one personally considers correct. It also
entails the responsibility to struggle within the Church to restore what one
believes has deviated, accepting, when necessary, the cost of one’s stance.
The Fathers of the Church did not
treat major ecclesiastical problems as personal disagreements that could simply
be placed on record and then set aside. When they perceived that the faith or
the canonical order of the Church was at stake, they were not content merely to
state their opposition privately, nor did they consider that their personal
disagreement, by itself, marked the end of their responsibility. They
struggled, appealed to the competent ecclesiastical authorities, requested that
the matter be examined, presented their testimony, and insisted upon the need
to correct the problem. For this reason, the severing of ecclesiastical
communion was not, for them, the first or easy solution. It came as a last
resort, when it had become clear that there was no longer any possibility of
healing the situation through the ordinary ecclesiastical means, or when
persistence in a particular error had assumed such proportions that the
continuation of communion itself created a serious ecclesiological problem.
There is an essential difference
between saying, “I disagree,” which expresses a personal position, and saying, “I
am striving to have the matter with which I disagree corrected,” which denotes
ecclesiastical responsibility, personal cost, and concrete action. Greater
still is the difference between declaring that one is “confessing the Faith”
and actually assuming all the consequences of that confession when it comes
into conflict with an already established ecclesiastical situation. True
confession, therefore, cannot be confined to words that soothe the personal
conscience while, in practice, everything remains exactly as it was before. If
someone believes that an ecclesiastical decision or practice is mistaken, the
matter does not end simply with his stating that he personally disagrees with
it. The real question is what he does in order to seek the restoration of
order, what ecclesiastical means he employs, and, above all, how far he is
prepared to go when he sees that efforts at correction are bearing no fruit. The
history of the Church presents to us as a model neither unconditional
submission nor facile withdrawal. It presents the difficult path of struggle:
first, the effort to heal the problem within the Church and, when this becomes
impossible and the requisite ecclesiological conditions are present, the
acceptance of the necessary consequences of confession as well. Confession
without a struggle for the restoration of truth risks remaining merely a
personal disagreement, while confession that is never accompanied by action and
sacrifice may ultimately become a convenient form of inward dissent without any
real ecclesiastical consequence.
Greek source: https://entoytwnika1.blogspot.com/2026/09/blog-post_26.html
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